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Abstract. 
The primary aim of the project is to address the issue of the neglect of the 'natural' 
environment in British sociology. Taking an historical approach which argues that 
sociology's history involves environmental, social, political and economic factors and 
the personalities and personal lives of its practitioners, as well as texts, theories and 
ideas (Chapter 1), it is argued that an environmental sociology was in existence in early 
20th Century Britain in the work of the environmentalist Patrick Geddes (Chapter 2). 
Geddes' exclusion from institutionalised academic sociology in this country is examined 
in detail in Chapter 3. His disappearance can be accounted for by factors largely 
external to sociology itself, including contemporary intellectual and political conditions 
and his own personality, as well as that of his rival Leonard Hobhouse. The slow 
development of institutionalised academic sociology in Britain helped to ensure that 
Hobhousian theory remained dominant up to the 1950s, while a number of other 
factors, including financial difficulties at the Institute of Sociology and the disloyal 
behaviour of his followers effectively ensured that Geddes continued to be excluded 
(Chapter 4). This provides one answer to the question of the neglect of environmental 
issues in sociology up to the post-war period. In addition, on the basis of a comparison 
of aspects of the work of Hobhouse and Britain's central contemporary theorist, 
Anthony Giddens, in the context of Giddens's academic background and career, it is 
argued that in spite of his concern with other, European, theorists, Giddens's 
theoretical orientation remains close to that of Hob house (Chapter 4). Like Hobhouse, 
Giddens is primarily concerned with, and awards causal primacy to, the 'reflexive' 
agent in his social theory. The result is that his approach to environmental issues 
remains inadequate, since he fails either to develop an adequate approach to the 
relations between societies and their natural environments, or to address the structural-
political issue of inequality of access to resources or inequality in the capacity to 
consume and pollute (Chapter 5). 
For Ruth, without whose unstinting support this 




There are a large number of people to thank for their generous help and 
support over the last four years. Not least among these have been my 
fellow postgraduates, in the basement of 12, Woodland Rd.~ in particular, 
Andy Danford, John Carter, Ian Famden, Angus Murdoch, Ian Coates, 
Erol Kavechi, Jae Ryong-Song and Minghua Zhao. Thanks are due, too, to 
all other members of the department - both academic and administrative 
staff - but especially to Jackie Bee, for always being there, always knowing 
where things are, and for being able to make the photocopier work. All the 
library staff here at Bristol, fortunately, always kept their heads while I was 
losing mine, and to them I am grateful for all sorts of help. lowe a great 
deal, too, to my friends as well as my family: to Gill, Pip, Joan, Barry and 
Sarah - thanks for putting up with me, and helping me, sometimes, to 
unwind; to Carol and Charlie - thanks for all the tea and sympathy, and the 
times when you have looked after one or more of the children. My boys, 
Bill, Clem and Jack - without either understanding why, or meaning to do it 
- have both driven me mad and kept me sane, while my partner, Mil, has 
many times shouldered a larger number of household tasks than were 
properly his share. To my mother, I am grateful for both emotional and 
financial support: whatever our differences about particular things, I hope 
that you will be proud of this work. From all our animals - but especially 
from Rose, Scarface, Lonely, Donna, Stoichkov, and Buddy - I have 
learned a lot about nurture as well as nature. Rose's contribution, it should 
be said, has been immeasurable. I should confess here, too, that without the 
help and encouragement of many friends from an earlier life, particularly 
Frank Webster, Tom Woolley, Peter George, John Perkins and Roger 
Griffin I almost certainly would not have come this far, while to my 
advisers Ruth Levitas and Willie Watts Miller, lowe more than I can say. 
Without your help, I could not have completed this work. Needless to say, 
its failings are entirely my own. 
IV 
I declare that this is my own work (except where I have cited other 
authors), and that the views expresse~ herein are my own and not 
those of the University of Bristol. 






Introduction: Notes on the Origin and Evolution of a Research Project 
A Personal Account 
The Origin of a Research Project 




Chapter 1: The History of Sociology and the Issue of the Environment 
Introduction 
The Strategy of Exuberance 
Exuberance Examined 
The Strategy ofRe-Interpretation 
Re-Interpretation Re-Examined 
Durkheim, Darwin and Sociology 
Darwin's Theory of Evolution 
Darwin's Influence in France 
Durkheim: Societies as Part of Nature 
Durkheiril and the Institutionalisation of French Sociology 
Social Morphology and Human Geography 
Towards an Alternative Strategy 
Environmentalism and Politics 
Sociology and Politics 
Sociology, Reflexivity and the Adequacy of Accounts 
SOCiology as Social Life 
Chapter 2: Patrick Geddes as Environmental Sociologist 
Introduction 
Historical Context: Conditions in Late Nineteenth Century Britain 
Environmental Conditions . 
Economic, Social and Political Conditions 
The Emergence of Environmentalism in Environmental Crisis 
Background and Character of an Environmental Sociologist 
Personality 
Geddes' Theoretical Orientation 
Geddes and Darwin 
Geddes' Environmental Sociology 









































The Principles of Economics 81 
Physical Principles 81 
Implications of Physical Economics 85 
Biological Principles 86 
A Theory of Biological and Social Evolution 87 
A Theory of Mental Evolution 88 
Population 91 
Population and the Consumption of Resources 92 
Social Amelioration and Environment 93 
Psychological Principles 94 
~~~ % 
Economics and Ethics 97 
The Theory of Civics 98 
Geddes and Durkheim 99 
Founder of Environmental Sociology? 102 
Geddes and Classical Human Ecology 102 
Geddes and New Human Ecology 104 
The Strange Disappearance of Patrick Geddes 107 
Chapter 3: Environment in Early British Sociology: A Case Study in Exclusion 108 
Introduction 108 
Geddes: from Natural to Social Science 110 
The Sociological Society: Foundations 112 
Sociology at LSE: Foundations 115 
Two Professorial Candidates 115 
Academic Sociology Defined 117 
Sociological Society Early Years 119 
Historical Accounts of the Early Years 120 
The Dispute at the Sociological Society 121 
Branford Appeals to Durkheim 123 
Karl Pearson Fires the First Shot 124 
Civics and the Durkheimian School 127 
Civics and Eugenics 130 
Civics and Ethical Sociology 134 
Hobhouse: Mind in Evolution 135 
The Reception of Civics in 1904 138 
The Sociological Society, 1905 142 
The Sociological Society, 1906 147 
1907 -1911: Divergence and Dispute 151 
The Issue of the Martin White Chair 152 
The Issue of Geddes' Exclusion 156 
A Clash of Personalities 162 
Chapter 4: Continuity and Change in British Sociology after 1929 168 
Introduction 168 
'Orthogenesis': A Summary 169 
Continuity and Decay 171 
The Role of Alexander Farquharson 173 
Intellectual Continuity: Sociology at LSE 178 
Change 
Environment gets a Se~ond Chance 
Lancelot Hogben and LSE 
Intellectual Continuity: Personnel 
Institutional Continuity: Expansion 
Theoretical Departures: Discontinuity? 
International Developments: Parsons 
Anthony Giddens and the British Tradition 
Giddens: Continuity and Change 
Capitalism and Modem Social Theory 
Giddens, Parsons and Environment 
Giddens and Hobhouse Compared 
Giddens and Hobhouse: Agency over Structure 
Giddens and Hobhouse: 'Social Structure' or 'Institutions' 
Giddens and Hobhouse: Unconsciously Motivated Reflexive Agents 
Riding the Juggernaut to Global Utopia 
Hobhouse and Giddens: Sociology and Contemporary Politics 
Chapter 5: Anthony Giddens as Environmental Sociologist 
Introduction 
Giddens as Environmental Sociologist 
The Environment in Giddens's Work Before 1990 
Goldblatt's Critique of Giddens 
Citizenship, Surveillance and Democracy 
The City and the Countryside 
The Urban as 'Created Space' 
The Importance of Politics 
The Environment in Giddens's Work After 1990 
The Risk SOCiety as a Consequence of Modernity: Ulrich Beck 
ReflexiVity 
Anxiety and the Dissolution of Tradition 
Realism versus Constructivism 
The Risk Society as a Consequence of Modernity: Anthony Giddens 
Risk and Structuration Theory 
Political Solutions to Environmental Problems 
Life Politics 
Democracy and Corporate Power 
Individual Power and Consumer Choice 











































List of Figures 
Figure 1: The Classification of Statistics 
Figure 2: Geddes' Sociological Axioms and Classification of Statistics 
Figure 3: The Mapping of Life 
Figure 4: The Official London Syllabus, 1906 
Inside Back Cover 
77 
Inside Back Cover 
118 
Introduction. 
Notes on The Origin and Evolution of a Research 
Project. 
1. 
In the knowledge that it is not a conventional way to introduce a doctoral dissertation, 
I wish to begin with a personal account of how this project began and developed. In 
doing so, the plot is reversed, and the story told backwards. The issue of the 
contemporary environmental crisis and its treatment in the work of Britain's most cited 
sociologist, Anthony Giddens, which formed the starting point of the project and thus 
appears first in my ac~ount of the research process, appears only in the second half of 
the dissertation. The first half examines the foundation of sociology in Britain - the 
people, ideas and events surrounding its establishment as an academic discipline. The 
two halves are linked by a section which considers the extent to which there is 
historical continuity or discontinuity between the early period of British sociology and 
its post-war expansion. 
There are two reasons for writing the introduction as a personal account. The 
first is to emphasise the extent to which the research has been an exciting process of 
discovery (as well as sometimes frustrating or disheartening). The second is to do with 
methodology. The dissertation examines the early history of sociology in this country, 
as well as aspects of its contemporary form. It would be relatively easy to justify this as 
somehow self-evident. At its inception, academic sociology in Britain was dominated 
by debates which resonate with our fin de siecle sense of both social and 
environmental 'crisis', and our consciousness of the need for some kind of 
'regeneration' - whether 'moral', social or economic, environmental or eugenic. Though 
2. 
this resonance seems obvious with hindsight, it seems important to emphasise the 
'accidental' nature of the project. 
Reflexivity is one of our contemporary sociological 'buzzwords'. Recent 
methodological debates in sociology have been concerned with the extent to which the 
reflexivity of the researcher, and the relationship between researcher and researched 
has relevance for the outcome of the research. 1 Yet in much academic writing -
particularly of a historical or theoretical kind - the author, on whose reflexivity the 
character of the finished product largely depends, is absent. If I have not put my 'self at 
the centre of this finished product - the result of more than three years 'reflexive' 
involvement by way of reading, writing and thinking - it has something to do with the 
way in which sociology has come to be defined, historically, as an 'academic discipline' 
with a particular 'scientific' or objective methodological orientation. 
A major reason for the absence of many sociological authors from their own 
work is that it somehow takes on greater credibility if the role in its production of the 
author as an individual and a member of society is denied or unexamined. Thus, in spite 
of C. Wright Mills, the play of the imagination, the following up of a hunch, the 
emotional involvement of the researcher with the research have often remained 
unacknowledged in sociological products, particularly where these are of a historical 
or theoretical type. Instead, we present our work as though its end was plain at its 
beginning, as if it has had some logical and sequential development. We leave out the 
wavering uncertainties inherent in each unexpected finding - our attempts to find some 
order in the chaos of evidence. 
A Personal Account 
This project began from the profound personal dissatisfaction and disillusionment of 
the researcher with the 'discipline' of sociology, a fact which coloured its initial 
formulation, and thus becomes important to explain. The development of the project 
1 For examples of recent methodological debates, see Hammersley, M. (1991), Ramazanoglu, 
C. (1992), Gelsthorpe, L. (1992), and Williams, A.(1993). 
3. 
was influenced by many factors, accidental and coincidental, and personal and political, 
as well as academic. 
The Origin of a Research Project 
The project was initially conceived at the end of a decade in which environmental 
crises and disasters seemed increasingly to dominate the news. As a parent I was 
primed to be disturbed by the events at Bhopal and Chernobyl. Perhaps, also, my 
undergraduate encounter with the work of Jeremy Seabrook had sensitised my 
imagination. His nightmare visions of a captive and depleted humanity, wrecking the 
earth in its search for some lasting but intangible satisfaction, had left an enduring 
impression on my mind (see especially, Seabrook, 1974, 1978, 1985). Increasingly I 
felt despondent about the future which my children would inhabit as adults. 
Sociology offered little comfort. Indeed, so far as I knew then, sociologists 
seemed for the most part to be blissfully unaware of the 'environmental crisis'. Jeremy 
Seabrook, an outsider from the point of view of institutionalised university sociology, 
offered a critique of industrial capitalism which incorporated an awareness that its 
detrimental effects were not confined to individuals but involved a systematic using-up 
of finite natural resources and the despoliation of the natural beauty of the earth. Yet 
his work was in general not regarded as 'proper' sociology. (see for example Beynon, 
H. (1982) and Selbourne, D. (1985». A question began to formulate itself: 
Why was the environment not central in contemporary sociology? 
Quite suddenly, it seemed, between 1989 and 1991, one sociologist's name was 
beginning to be heard more than any other. That name was Anthony Giddens. I 
attended one seminar at which Giddens talked about the cultural significance of 
anorexia nervosa, and another at which the speaker posed the question of why Giddens 
4. 
had not yet been acknowledged as our 'star' sociologist. 2 The recently published 
Consequences o/Modernity was referred to as a 'big little book'. 
Of course, I had read Giddens as an undergraduate. Capitalism and Modem 
Social Theory had been a set text on at least two modules. Also, I had written a 
'critical review' of The Nation State and Violence as coursework for another. In the 
latter book, Giddens writes of the basic importance of the New Social Movements 
(NSMs) in polyarchic systems for redressing the 'imbalances of power involved in 
surveillance' (1985: 314). Giddens includes 'counter-cultural' ecological movements, 
peace movements, labour movements and democratic movements among NSMs. He 
defines 'surveillance' as 'control of information and the superintendance of the 
activities of some groups by others' (ibid: 2). Even as an undergraduate in 1986, I had 
felt unhappy about Giddens's analysis. Given the unequal distribution of authoritative 
and allocative resources (both of which were intimately connected with the extent of 
any group's ability to 'surveille' other groups or to disseminate ideology or 'historicity') 
it seemed that there were few possibilities for any counter-cultural movement to 
influence substantially the activities of either governments or capitalist organisations in 
respect of the global environmental crisis. 
Giddens's analysis was not improved, it seemed to me, by the appearance in 
1991 of Modernity and Self Identity. There Giddens is concerned not with the 
structural properties of nation states but with the inter-connections between the 
personal lives of individuals and large-scale 'globalising influences' (Giddens, 1991b: 
1). The self-identity of individuals becomes an ongoing 'reflexive project' or narrative 
which must be shaped, altered and sustained in the context of rapidly changing social 
systems which are both global and internally-referential. The external, natural or 
physical 'environment' is depicted as a 'nature' from which humanity is increasingly 
separated by the urban environment. Moreover, such external 'nature' is seen to be 
2 My (unfortunately undated) notes from that seminar suggest that the speaker, Professor 
Frank Webster, offered three possible reasons for Giddens's lack of star status: his lack of 
empirical work; British 'reserve' or reticence; and intellectual snobbery. 
s. 
coming to an end; human intervention has so drastically altered nature that it 'loses its 
character as an extrinsic source of reference' (ibid: 166). Against the sequestration of 
experience (where direct experience of nature is only one among other dimensions), 
Giddens posits 'the return of the repressed' at 'fateful moments in the lives of 
individuals, as well as in more general social trends. It is in 'life politics' or the politics 
of 'life style' that individuals begin to re-engage with the basic existential questions that 
have been sequestered by Modernity. The question 'how shall we live?' comes to the 
fore, and is expressed through individual choice and decision making. Giddens seemed 
to be suggesting that the ecological crisis could be resolved through consumer choice! 
If this was the best that sociology could offer (coming as it did from Britain's most 
discussed contemporary theorist) what hope was there for sociology? 
The Evolution of a Research Project 
It was David Pepper's (1984) The Roots of Modern Environmentalism that propelled 
me into thinking about sociology and its lack of an 'environmental' perspective. Pepper 
cited Lowe and Goyder's (1983) study of environmentalist movements. Lowe and 
Goyder noted the uneven historical development of environmentalism, and identified 
four major periods of development. These were the 1890s, 1920s, late 1950s and the 
early 1970s. The earliest of these periods coincided with the emergence of our classical 
sociological perspectives in the work ofDurkheim and Weber. 
There seemed to be nothing particularly odd about this. At one level Classical 
sociology could be seen to be a critical engagement with the impact of industrialism 
and its politics on human societies and relations. Contemporary 'environmentalism', 
broadly defined, was also concerned with industrialism and its politics, but had a 
different focus - the impact of industrial society on the natural environment. In spite of 
the fact that both developed during the 1890s, it seemed that an emergent sociology 
and the nascent environmentalist movement were two parallel strains of thought in 
history which had - in a manner of speaking - moved past each other without touching. 
6. 
People I spoke to suggested that the differences between early sociology and 
environmentalism were not only obvious, but so profound as to have made all contact 
between the two sides impossible, historically. These differences had something to do 
with the response of each to Darwinian biology, the gulf that separated post-
enlightenment rationalism from late nineteenth century romanticism, and the difference 
between an academic discipline and a political protest group or social movement. 
Pepper highlighted the romanticism inherent in the environmentalist movement 
of the 1890s. Men such as Ruskin, Morris and Mill, all of whom founded 
environmental movements, he claimed 
. . . rejected the optimism of economic liberalism and 
became pessimistic about the prospects for social and 
economic advancement through laissez faire capitalism. 
They were equivocal towards industrialism and, like earlier 
romantics, saw it as destroying morality and social order, 
human health and values, and nature (pepper, 1984: 17-18). 
This suggested that a potential link between the sociology of Durkheim and 
environmentalists like Ruskin was the concept of community. This idea, which Robert 
Nisbet (1967) called one of the 'unit-ideas of sociology', seemed to hold out some 
promise for an examination of the relations (or lack of them), between classical 
sociological ideas and those of the environmental movement. Another potential link 
appeared to be that each side had engaged in a critique of classical liberalism and its 
(disintegrative) impact on the social 'order'. In sociology, moreover, this critique was 
not, in spite ofits claims to the contrary, objective or 'scientific'. Nisbet emphasised the 
extent to which classical sociology was grounded in the 'persisting moral conflicts' of 
the nineteenth century (1967: 19). Could the sociological critique be seen to be at all 
'romantic', in its moral values? If so, was this yet another 'link' between classical 
sociology and environmentalism? 
Pepper (1984) followed O'Riordan (1981) in making a broad distinction 
between techno-centric (rational, scientific) and eco-centric (non-rational or 'romantic') 
environmentalism. Within each division he identified further subdivisions, or positions 
7. 
along an ideological continuum between Deep Ecologists, who believe in the intrinsic 
value of 'nature' and hence its protection and conservation, and Cornucopians (after 
Cotgrove, 1982), who believe that humankind will always find a way to solve 
environmental difficulties through the application of science and technology. As well as 
these specifically environmentalist positions, and following Sandbach (1980), Pepper 
recognises divisions among environmentalists along a more traditional political line 
from Left to Right. These positions broadly match those between Marxism and 
Functionalism or 'conflict' and 'consensus' theorists in sociology. Further, Pepper 
suggests an underlying philosophical distinction between environmental determinists 
(for whom environment is a major determinant of human activity), and those 
committed to free-will (for whom humans control their own activities and future). In 
these terms, most sociological thought, historical and contemporary. consensus or 
conflict oriented, seemed to be grounded in a techno-centric perspective involving the 
application of (social) science to the amelioration of the human (social) environment. 
Pepper's distinction between the underlying philosophical positions of 
commitment to determinism or free-will, however, illuminated what appeared to be a 
basic difference between sociology and environmentalism. In the history of sociology, 
this sort of debate has been common - but it has usually, in the recent history of the 
discipline. been concerned with the question of the extent to which a distinctively 
social (rather than natural) environment 'determines' the activities of individuals or 
collectivities. 
Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity; the rejection 
ofParsonian Functionalism, in spite of its claims to be a theory of 'voluntaristic' action; 
and Giddens's attempt, in structuration theory, to reconcile the structure and agency 
division in sociology, have all been contributions to this debate about the influence of 
the social environment on human activity. 
Was this yet another difference between sociology and environmentalism? If so. 
it was a fundamental one, for the concept of 'social' environment seemed to have little 
or no consonance with that of the 'natural', 'organic', or physical environment. 
8. 
At about this time I was able to list, in my (second) research proposal and grant 
application to the ESRC, a series of questions about the nature of the relationship 
between sociology and environmentalism: 
What were the structural locations, and philosophical and 
ideological differences that kept the two discourses apart, 
historically, and is there now, in any sense, a convergence? 
What were the major problems addressed by sociologists 
and environmentalists . . .? Were sociologists interested in 
environmental problems at any level, and if so how were 
these conceptualised . . .? How has the very idea of 
environment been used in sociology, historically? 
Foolishly, I believed now that the answers to these questions would be fairly 
straightforward. My research would be, to a large extent, a matter of simply 'filling in 
the blanks'. 
Since I could not hope to cover the whole of sociology, and since I was 
particularly interested in Giddens's treatment of environmental issues, I had specified 
British sociology in my research proposal. I would compare his work with that of the 
classical sociologists. 
Variation 
The classics meant Durkheim, Weber, Marx. I had learned that these three were at the 
baseline of all sociology. The textbooks I had used, as an undergraduate, included not 
only Capitalism and Modem Social Theory, but also Philip Abrams' (1982) Historical 
sociology and David Lee and Howard Newby's (1983) The Problem of Sociology. 
Each of these texts treated our European Founding Fathers as if their status was self-
evident. Marx, Durkheim and Weber were the 'three names which rank above all 
others' in the foundation of sociology (Giddens 1971: vii). Since Marx died in 1883, 
and the 1890s was the earliest date of the articulation of environmentalist ideas 
according to Lowe and Goyder, the project, in its initial formulation, would examine 
attitudes to 'nature' and environment, the treatment of humanity/nature relations, and 
9. 
any links with environmentalism in the work ofDurkheim and Weber? Moreover, the 
link between the European founders and the central figure in contemporary British 
sociology - Anthony Giddens, were well documented by Giddens himself. That 
Giddens had begun to take on board environmental issues helped add to the coherence 
of the project. His intellectual association (and apparent theoretical compatibility) with 
the German, Ulrich Beck, whose 1986 Risikogese/lschajt appeared to put 
environmental issues at the centre of his theory, was a somewhat unexpected bonus. 
The sociological community's response to the 1992 translation, Risk Society, included 
the establishment in 1993 of a British Sociological Association (BSA) Study Group on 
'Risk and the Environment'. The first meeting of this group (at the London School of 
Economics) drew an unexpectedly large audience. Were environmental issues 
beginning to be central, and if so how were they defined? I added Beck's theory to my 
project. 
I began to read about the history of British sociology. Philip Abrams's (1968) 
essay on its origins gave me three 'major' names: Francis Galton, Leonard Hobhouse 
and Patrick Geddes. Although other names do appear in his account - in particular 
Geddes' patrons Victor Branford and J. Martin White, the English Positivists J.R. 
Bridges and Frederic Harrison, Charles Booth, Seebohm Rowntree, and C. S Loch of 
the Charity Organisation Society - Galton, Hobhouse and Geddes seemed to be of 
pivotal importance for the establishment of sociology in Britain. Abrams characterised 
them as 'wealthy amateurs with careers elsewhere, academic deviants, or very old men' 
(Abrams, 1968: 103). They were the men whose great achievements were the 
foundation of the Sociological Society of London in 1903, and the establishment, at 
the London School of Economics (LSE) in 1907, of a Chair in sociology. Galton, 
Hobhouse and Geddes, not Durkheim or Weber, were the founders of British 
3 Peter Dickens's (1992) Nature and Society: Towards a Green Social Theory does examine 
Marx's treatment of naturelhumanity relations It must have been, then, on the brink of 
publication. Even earlier, Benton's (1989) article Marxism and Natural Limits, involved an 
ecological critique of Marx's economic theory, which is among the works cited by Dickens. 
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sociology as an academic institution. Galton was the 'very old man'. Hobhouse was 
Abrams' 'academic deviant'. That left Geddes in the role of 'wealthy amateur' with an 
alternative career (though it would be a while before I understood the complexities 
inherent in that statement). 
On the shelves of Bristol's library, to my great surprise, I found all three 
volumes of the Sociological Papers, the journal in which the proceedings of the early 
meetings of the Sociological Society were reproduced. The second and third volumes 
had never been read by anyone; the pages were uncut - a strong hint that these 
volumes were seen as unimportant at Bristol - a department founded during the post-
war expansion of sociology. 4 Yet inside these books I found a battle raging. It was a 
battle for the right to define 'what' sociology would be, a battle for academic 
recognition, and a political battle between the old and the new Liberalisms inter-
mingled with a debate about Eugenics and National Efficiency. 
I read Owen (1974) and Collini (1979) on Hobhouse, and Boardman (1944, 
1978), Mairet (1957) and Meller (1990) on Geddes. The Eugenist, Galton, I pushed 
aside initially. Not only was his theory (and his politics) distasteful, but he had not 
fought the battle to the end. Although he had come out of retirement to present his 
first paper, he had initially refused to join the Sociological Society, on the basis that its 
'activities would begin and end with "palaver'" (cited in Saleeby, undated, circa 1906: 
117). Although Eugenics was to be an important factor in the early days of the Society, 
the outcome of the struggle would be of lesser importance to Galton, partly owing to 
his advanced age, and partly to the fact that his independent meanS and reputation as a 
scientist and statistician allowed him to endow first a Eugenics Records Office (1905), 
and later, on his death, a Chair in Eugenics at the University of London (1911), with 
the recommendation that this should go to his disciple, Karl Pearson. 
4 Dahrendorf (1995: 98) records that his own copy of Sociological Papers initially belonged to 
the then Archbishop of York, Cosmo Gordon. Gordon, he says, had never read his either, since 
its pages were also uncut! 
11. 
Hobhouse was a liberal. His status as an 'academic deviant' came from the fact 
that he had abandoned a career in Philosophy at Oxford for the world of journalism at 
the Manchester Guardian. His sociology was grounded in his philosophical outlook, 
which was itself concerned to prove that the biological theory of evolution could not 
be applied in a straightforward way to the evolution of society - as was advocated, in 
particular, by Herbert Spencer. 
According to Abrams, Geddes was an eccentric biologist turned sociologist 
whose work was confused and confusing, his methodology suspect and ill-defined. In 
spite of certain brilliant anticipations of what future sociology would be, his 
achievement, in the last analysis, was almost wholly 'negative' (1968: 114-120). It was 
in Boardman's (1978) book on Geddes that I first began to realise that I had hit upon 
an historical link between environmentalist ideas and sociology which dated from the 
final decades of the nineteenth century. Boardman quoted Geddes' (1884) 'ecological 
warning' that 
when any given environment or function, however 
apparently productive, is really fraught with disastrous 
influence to the organism, its modification must be 
attempted, or, failing that, its abandonment faced (Geddes, 
1884, cited in Boardman, 1978: 4-5). 
Patrick Geddes! His name was nowhere cited in the textbooks I had learned from as an 
undergraduate. Giddens was concerned with European figures, as was Abrams in his 
later book (1982), which had in any case a different focus (it was concerned with 
historical sociology rather than the history of sOciology).5 Lee and Newby's book 
contained references to Galton as a 'social Darwinist' (1983: 90), and a paragraph on 
Hobhouse who had 'almost unwittingly' produced a theory 'which completely reverses 
Spencer's view of civilisation as unregulated individual self-interest' (ibid: 83).6 
5 Abrams's posthumously published Historical Sociology was a contribution to debates going 
on in both history and sociology at that time, concerning whether either should be idiographic 
or nomothetic in orientation. 
6 Hobhouse's 'reversal' of Spencer was not 'unwitting' but deliberate (see Chapters Three and 
Four). 
12. 
The Founding Fathers of sociology, in Lee and Newby's book as for Giddens 
and Abrams, were Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. The founders of academic sociology 
in Britain seemed to have all but disappeared from contemporary textbooks. This left 
me looking at an historical link between sociology and environmentalism that had 
clearly, at one point existed (however tenuous it might yet tum out to be), but was 
now nowhere in evidence. Not only had Geddes vanished from view, but so also had 
Hobhouse and Galton. 
This raised a number of issues. Clearly it was for the quality of their theoretical 
ideas that Marx, Durkheim and Weber were revered in contemporary sociology. I had 
no major quarrel with this, apart from my new-found interest in environmentalism. Yet 
sociology was an academic institution as well as a collection of ideas. Without its 
institutional embodiment it was unlikely that the classical theories would have become 
so well known. And what had happened to Hobhouse, who, as well as being the first 
Professor of Sociology in a British University, had been a theorist in his own right? 
Most importantly, where had the environmentalist Geddes gone? 
For sociologists of an earlier generation, many of whom have 'lived' the 
expansion and development of the discipline in the post-war era, these questions might 
seem unproblematic. But I became, at that point, dramatically aware that what I had 
understood to be the history of sociology was simply a particular construction of that 
history. It was a construction, moreover, that was so firmly established, so self-evident, 
as to be questioned by few contemporary sociologists. 
One of the few who had both been involved in the institutionalisation of 
sociology and questioned the construction of its history, however, was the American, 
Edward Shils. In a long essay in 1971, he had asked 
How has all this come about? Why has the intellectual stock 
of sociology come to be what it is and why has it taken that 
form in particular places? Why have certain ideas which are 
now thought to be constitutive of sociology come to 
dominate the subject? (1971: 761) 
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Shils suggested that though universities, as institutions, did not create sociology, they 
functioned to focus attention on, and reinforce, particular sociological ideas. 
Universities fostered the 'production of works' which then became part of the 
sociological tradition. 
Institutions create a resonant and echoing intellectual 
environment. The sociological ideas which undergo 
institutionalisation are thereby given a greater weight in the 
competition of interpretations of social reality.(1971 : 762) 
This did not really clarify matters all that much. For though it provided at least 
a tentative explanation for the disappearance of Geddes, whose sociological work was 
undertaken outside the remit of institutionalised sociology, it did not explain what had 
happened to Hobhouse, much of whose work was very much the product of sociology 
as an academic institution. Shils explained it by suggesting that sociology was poorly 
established in Britain during Hobhouse's time and that he had little support from other 
academics. Moreover, the only journal, the Sociological Review,' was in the hands of 
'amateurs, enthusiasts and cranks' (1971: 769). Looked at from another angle, 
however, the problem was not so easily explained. Hobhouse was in a unique and 
privileged position to define and develop the subject matter of sociology from 1907 
until his death in 1929. The sole British chair in sociology passed to his friend, 
colleague and disciple, Morris Ginsberg, who continued to be the only professor of 
sociology in Britain until the post-war expansion of the 1960s. The institutional base of 
sociology in Britain may have been small, but it was firmly established. His 
disappearance was, therefore, a question at least as perplexing, if not more so, than 
that of Geddes, the environmentalist. 
, The Sociological Review was the successor to the Sociological Papers, first published in 
1908, during Hobhouses's first year in the Chair. He was its editor until 1911. 
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Natural Selection? 
By this time I seemed to have come a long way from the question with which I had 
originally embarked upon the project. From the question 'why is the environment not 
central in contemporary sociology?', and the subsequent formulation of a series of 
questions which would help to explain this, I had arrived at a whole series of seemingly 
unconnected questions? How did the environmentalist, Geddes, disappear from 
sociology? What happened to Hobhouse and his theory? What was the relation 
between institutionalisation and ideas, or the relation between the early period of 
institutionalisation and the later one? How had Marx, Durkheim, and Weber come to 
be seen as our 'founding fathers'? And where did this leave Giddens, in relation to this 
alternative perspective on the history of British sociology? 
As surely and imperceptibly as an infant, who grows without his parents 
noticing, my project had outgrown its boots. Where I had intended to examine the 
concept of 'environment' in Durkheim and Weber, and Giddens's treatment of the 
current 'crisis', I had now a bigger group of thinkers to contend with. In place of two 
discrete episodes in historical time (the early years of sociology and the present), I had 
mid-century changes to contend with also. 
I dropped Weber, who was little known in Britain until at least the 1930s.8 
Durkheim was recognised in Britain as a professional sociologist from as early as 1903. 
He had played a role in the establishment of the Sociological Society. He retained, 
therefore, at least some importance for the project 
By this time I had become 'emotionally' attached to Patrick Geddes - whose 
personality was large, and whose work was every bit as difficult and eccentric as his 
biographers suggested. I felt that he had been undeservedly neglected in the history of 
sociology, and this reaction was (in general) not uncommon among those who had 
8 The earliest critical work on Weber in English appears to be a 1933 essay by H.M. 
Robertson: A Critique of Weber and His School. Robertson's name does not appear in the 
bibliography to the 1943 essay on Max Weber and German Politics by J.P. Mayer from LSE. 
Mayer says in the foreword that the work was begun in 1934, when 'the political writings of 
Max Weber are almost unknown' (Mayer, 1943: 7). 
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taken any interest in him. Even Abrams had suggested that his sociology was worthy of 
closer study than it had to date received - even from Geddes himself (1968: 152). He 
was also my sole link with environmentalism in early British sociology. 
Among a number of possible reasons for his disappearance was a poorly 
documented 'dispute' with Hobhouse over the allocation of the Martin White Chair at 
LSE. I developed a suspicion that Hobhouse had been ruthlessly devoted to the 
advancement of his own academic wor~ and began to read his books and his 
biography, in the hope that I could find some clues to his relationship (personal as well 
as intellectual) with his rival. 
I had by this time read and written widely about Giddens, structuration theory 
and its critics, though I had, now, no idea how I would use it. It seemed unlikely that 
he could be linked to Geddes, via an 'environmentalist' approach. It looked as though 
my dissertation would consist of discrete historical episodes, with no continuity 
between them. 
In the course of reading Hobhouse, however, I was struck again and again by 
several similarities between his ideas and Giddens's. Each made individuals the 'motor' 
of social change. Each had a very similar concept of the 'agent', motivation, and 
reflexivity. Was there perhaps, some connection between these two men, one of whom 
had dominated the early years of British sociology, just as the other dominated in the 
present? 
With the help of an unpublished PhD thesis on the development of sociology 
first degree courses at English Universities from 1907-1971(Fincham, 1975), I began 
to make some tentative connections. 
Before the second World War, the University of London, whose sociology 
department at LSE was dominated first by Hobhouse and then by the Hobhousian 
Ginsberg, had been the only University in this country to offer a degree in sociology. 
Such degrees as were on offer elsewhere were external degrees of the University of 
London (LSE). Fincham suggested that the formal course structures of the external 
degrees followed closely the structure of that offered by LSE. Four University 
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Colleges offered this degree: Hull, Nottingham, Exeter and Leicester. Giddens had 
been at Hull between 1956 and 1959. Although Hull had received its charter in 1954, 
allowing it to devise its own courses and validate its own degrees, it seemed unlikely 
that the structure of the degree in sociology had been radically revised all at once, 
making it extremely likely that Giddens, as an undergraduate, had learned Hobhousian 
theory as part of a degree course whose very structure reflected an earlier era. 
Another connection appeared to be Hobhouse and Giddens's common interest 
in psychology. Giddens had studied psychology with sociology for his bachelor degree. 
Hobhouse had not only insisted that social psychology should be part of the syllabus 
for the sociology degree, but had undertaken to teach it himself. 
Yet it was abundantly clear that Giddens's interest was in the three 'founding 
fathers', Marx, Durkheim and Weber. He had never cited Hobhouse in an academic 
context. It seemed possible that the apparent affinities between their theoretical 
perspectives were simply an accidental outcome of his undergraduate education - a 
particular mind-set or way of thinking. 
But if this went some way towards suggesting an element of continuity 
between the early and later periods of sociology, it did not explain Giddens's particular 
interest in Marx, Durkheim and Weber. And if it was possible to designate his interest 
in Marx as a 'sign of the times' (i.e. the 1960s), what about Durkheim and Weber? The 
link, in this case, had to be Parsons. In spite of the fact that an early journal article by 
Giddens shows him analysing life in a student hall of residence in a distinctly 
functionalist vein (Giddens, 1960), it was clear that by the time of Capitalism and 
Modem Socia/Theory in 1971, he was moving away from this perspective. A careful 
reading of the preface to that book told me that not only was it intended at least partly 
as are-interpretation of what Parsons had written about Durkheim and Weber, but that 
Giddens was also quite clearly aware of another interpretation of Durkheim. This 
earlier interpretation was one in which Durkheim was presented as the purveyor of an 
'unsound' theory of a 'group mind'. Moreover, it was one which had emanated, in the 
first instance, from Hobhouse's years at LSE. 
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The research had come full circlel From a concern with Giddens's treatment of 
environmental issues, to the early history of British sociology, in an attempt to discover 
how it had come about that environmental issues were either absent or inadequately 
dealt with in sociology, I had come back to Giddens as an intellectual heir to 
Hobhouse. An environmentalist perspective, however inadequate or ill-defined, had 
been in existence during the early days of British sociology in the work of Patrick 
Geddes, but had somehow become 'lost' during institutionalisation. At last I had 
assembled the parts of my jigsaw. All that remained would be to see if and how they 
could be put together to show at least part of a bigger picture in which, somewhat 
ironically, the centre - environmentalism - was not there. The remainder of this 
introduction traces the outline of that picture as it appears in the chapters to follow. 
Orthogenic Evolution? 
Given the nature of the project and the way in which it developed, there are obviously 
a variety of textual structures which might have been imposed upon the material. I 
hope that the structure I have finished up with is comprehensible. Also, as a result of 
the particular focus of the project, which began and ended with Giddens, much 
interesting material that might have been taken further has become somewhat marginal 
to the project itself This is particularly true in three respects. 
First, as I have noted briefly in Chapter One, Geddes was not the only late 
nineteenth century sociologist or 'social theorist' who was directly concerned with the 
inter-relations between humanity and nature, or who insisted on the importance of 
environment in shaping both cultures and personalities. Others included Friedich Ratzel 
in Germany, Rudolph Steinmetz in the Netherlands, and Vidal de La Blache in France. 
I have read little of the work, or about the ultimate fate of these thinkers and their 
theories (with the exception of Vidal de La Blache, whose work was of interest in 
connection with Durkheim). Even so, it is clear that an interesting alternative to the 
project as it appears here might have been a cross-cultural comparative study of 
environmentalism in late nineteenth century European social thought. 
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Second, on bad days, as I have struggled with Geddes' peculiar mixture of 
general incomprehensibility of expression combined with genuine insight, I have 
thought that his sociology, on its own, would have been sufficient-as a topic in its own 
right. In the interpretation of Geddes' work which appears in Chapter Two, I have had 
to confine myself, for reasons of both relevance and space, to a relatively compact 
outline of the central aspects of his theoretical thought, although I feel certain that his 
sociological work - practical as well as theoretical - is worthy of further study. That 
this is so is evidenced by continued academic interest in the various aspects of his work 
(two recent examples include Meller, 1990; Mercer, 1997). 
Third. apart from the environmental sociologists discussed in Chapters One and 
Five, there is little here about the development of environmental sociology as a sub-
discipline in its own right. Environment is currently a major growth area in sociology 
as well as other disciplines (politics and geography are both well ahead of sociology in 
their consideration of environmentalism and environment). One interesting feature of 
its incorporation in sociology is the variety of perspectives from which it is currently 
being studied - both 'new' and 'traditional'. It is too early, perhaps, to tell, if, or when, 
one of these will emerge as the 'dominant' perspective for the study of environmental 
issues (though there are currently signs that it will be environment as risk), but since 
each has different implications for future relations between humanity and nature, a 
study of the political implications of all these different approaches is both desirable and 
necessary. 
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter One begins by exploring 
briefly two strategies used by contemporary environmental sociologists to explain the 
absence of environment in sociology: the strategy of (economic) exuberance, and the 
strategy of re-interpretation (of classical theorists). These strategies are then re-
examined; the first very briefly, with reference to the history of sociology in America, 
where contemporary environmental sociology first emerged, and the second at slightly 
greater length via a re-assessment of Durkheim's treatment of environment. This leads 
into a discussion of an alternative, more 'reflexive' strategy for the explanation of the 
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neglect of environment in the history of British sociology. The chapter argues that 
sociology is more than just a collection of ideas and theories~ and more, too, than an 
academic 'institution'. Sociology exists inside the societies it studies, and is both 
constrained and enabled by factors external to the discipline itself Sociology is also the 
social life - personal and professional - of its practitioners. Its history is, therefore, as 
much bound up with personal and political (social, economic and ideological) factors, 
as with the rise and fall of theories or ideas. This chapter is to some extent a 'cheat', 
since it implants at the beginning a methodological strategy that was actually worked 
out during the practice of the research. However, since the strategy makes explicit 
some working assumptions about the nature of the history of sociology, and its 
construction by sociologists, it was important to put it at the beginning, so that the bias 
of my own account is clear to the reader. 
In keeping with the approach developed in Chapter One, Chapter Two begins 
with an outline of the social, economic, political and environmental context of the 
years around the tum of the century in Britain, when sociology first began to establish 
itself as an academic discipline, which is followed by an account of the character and 
theoretical orientation of Patrick Geddes, the earliest 'environmental' sociologist. This 
establishes a basis from which to embark upon a fairly detailed account, in Chapter 
Three, of the process by which Geddes was excluded from institutionalised academic 
sociology, while Hobhouse, the so-called 'reluctant' sociologist (Collini, 1979), moved 
into a position of pivotal importance for the development of the discipline. 
Chapter Four gives only a brief account of the years from Hobhouse's death in 
1929 to Giddens's graduation from Hull in 1959. It charts the continuing decline and 
disappearance of a 'Geddesian' environmental perspective outside the remit of 
institutionalised academic sociology, and attempts to assess the extent to which there 
was both intellectual or theoretical continuity and change inside sociology as an 
academic institution. This somewhat cursory treatment of a period covering thirty 
years is justified by the project's focus on 'environment' in sociology and its almost 
total neglect during these years. Giddens's location relative to the tradition of sociology 
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established by Hobhouse and his successor Ginsberg is established and a number of 
similarities between the theoretical orientation of Giddens and Hobhouse are explored. 
Chapter Five returns to the issue of the environment via its incorporation in 
Giddens's work, and examines two moments in Giddens's treatment of environmental 
issues. The first moment consists of the period before his contact with Beck's 'risk 
society' thesis and is approached by means of a recent critique by the 'environmental 
sociologist' David Goldblatt (1996). The second moment consists of the period 
following the publication of The Consequences of Modernity (Giddens 1991a [1990]), 
in which Giddens takes up several new themes, without abandoning any of his old 
ones. It is argued that Giddens's insistence on the primacy of the autonomous 'reflexive' 
agent in his social theory, and his refusal to consider (either living or non-living) nature 
as something that exists independently of human societies, fundamentally inhibits the 
theory's capacity to address environmental problems. 
The conclusion acknowledges that the text IS open to a number of 
interpretations, while attempting to draw together the main threads of an answer to the 
question of why environmental issues have been neglected in sociology. It also pleads 
for the recognition of Patrick Geddes as an early founder of environmental sociology, 
whose work remains worthy of further investigation. 
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Chapter 1. 
The History of Sociology and the Issue of the Environment 
Introduction 
Environmental sociologists currently use two strategies to explain the neglect of 
natural environmental factors, and the inter-relationships between societies and their 
environments, in the discipline as a whole over the course of its history. The first 
strategy - 'The Strategy of Exuberance' - also contains a myth of origin. According to 
this myth, sociology developed at a time of unprecedented economic growth, when 
neither resource shortages nor the degradation of the environment that is an inevitable 
(if 'latent') side-effect of industrial production were apparent. As a result, the story 
goes, classical sociologists paid little or no attention to environmental issues. 
Environmental sociology was thus not established until the 1970s, in America, when 
environmental degradation could no longer be ignored and was widely seen to be 
problematic. The jumping-off point for this heightened awareness of environmental 
problems is said to have been the first 'Earth Day' in 1970. In the late 1970s, the 
'founding fathers' of environmental sociology, Catton and Dunlap,l published several 
papers calling for the establishment of a New Environmental Paradigm to replace what 
they categorised as Human Exceptionalism (Catton and Dunlap, 1978, 1980; Dunlap 
and Catton, 1979). Exceptionalist sociology was seen to encompass all hitherto 
existent sociology, the theoretical diversity of which amounted to no more than 
variations on a single theme. The second strategy - 'The Strategy of Re-Interpretation' 
_ follows Catton's (1976) recommendation that contemporary sociologists need to re-
1 Although it is still early in the history of (contemporary) environmental sociology. Catton and 
Dunlap's status as founders has already been established by William Freudenburg and Robert 
Gramling (1989). 
22. 
examine the near misses of their predecessors to find out where they went wrong. 
Since then, several environmental sociologists have looked again at the work of the 
'founding fathers' of sociology - now almost universally agreed to have been M~ 
Durkheim and Weber (Buttel, 1986: 338). As a result, aspects of the work of all three 
have been claimed as early examples of environmental sociology. 
Marx and Weber remain outside the scope of this project. It is only necessary 
to note that Benton (1988, 1989, 1993), Dickens (1992). and Martell (1994) all find 
aspects of Marx's treatment of the relations between human societies and the natural 
environment useful for a contemporary environmental sociology. Buttel (1986) has 
argued that aspects of Weber's work can be seen to contain a basic human ecology, 
though since Martinez-Alier (1987) has also suggested that Weber rejected the 
importance, for sociology, of 'environmental economics', his status as environmental 
sociologist remains open. 
The two strategies of Exuberance and Re-Interpretation are briefly outlined and 
re-examined here. On the basis of a re-examination of the emergence of an 'exuberant' 
sociology in the United States, it is argued that although the paradigm of 'Exuberance' 
does to some extent 'fit' the history of American sociology, neither American 
sociologists nor society in general were wholly unaware of resource constraints or 
environmental issues. This suggests that there was more involved in the foundation of 
'sociology-as-if-nature-did-not-matter' (Murphy, 1995) than mere 'exuberance'. A re-
examination of the re-interpretation of Durkheim as an early environmental sociologist 
reveals that a number of factors were involved in the establishment of Durkheimian 
sociology in France, including both structural (political, economic, and intellectual) 
conditions, and issues to do with 'agency'. In particular, Durkheim's personality, his 
commitment to 'founding' sociology and his ability to ward off competitors were all 
important factors in ensuring that only Durkheimian sociology became established 
there. This leads into a discussion of the development of an alternative strategy for 
explaining the absence of 'environment' in the history of sociology, via the history of 
environmentalist values and movements, Giddens's concept of the role of sociology as 
,', .... 
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'reflexivity' and reflexivity as a research methodology. Sociology, it is argued, is more 
than its intellectual heritage. It is also its 'embodiment' in both academic institutions 
and personnel. This means that any attempt to explain the absence of environment, 
either historically or in contemporary sociology must consider both the institutional 
forms of sociology and sociology as the 'social life' of its practitioners, both of which 
are embedded in the social, economic and political context of the societies of which 
they are a part. 
The Strategy of Exuberance 
Catton and Dunlap (Catton, 1976: Dunlap and Catton, 1978, Dunlap and Catton, 
1994) suggest that sociology emerged at a time of unprecedented economic growth 
and prosperity, when natural resources were abundant. In combination with the 
increasing separation of humanity from nature, which resulted from urbanisation and 
technological progress, resource abundance and economic growth led to a generalised 
belief among sociologists that human beings were increasingly released from the 
constraints imposed by nature through the benefits of industrialisation. 
Christopher Columbus' 1492 discovery ofa New World 'revolutionised western 
civilisation and had much to do with launching and shaping sociology' (Catton, 1976: 
25). This sudden territorial increase also increased the earth's ability to support a 
burgeoning human population, and in the period which followed, Western populations 
- specifically Europeans - expanded exuberantly to fill the newly available space, 
doubling in the two hundred years from 1650-1850, and again in the eighty years after, 
leading Catton (1976: 29) to describe it as 'the Age of Exuberance'. The concept of the 
inevitability of progress was one result of such territorial increases, which in tum 
helped to generate the science of sociology. 
Sociologists in the age of exuberance learned to regard human nature as 
something open to perpetual modification by the cumulative 
development of culture. . . . [which] came to seem so compelling to 
sociologists. . . that they overstated their non-biological conception of 
human nature. The overstatement became a cornerstone of the 
sociological paradigm, the obsolescence of which was felt but not 
understood by the 1970s. (Catton, 1976: 29-30) 
Exuberance Examined 
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Sociology as an academic institution became established earlier in America than 
elsewhere (Barnes and Becker, 1938), due to the absence of an already entrenched and 
resistant university system (Oberschall, 1972; Seidman, 1994: 95). Although the 
American Sociological Society was not founded until 1905, formal courses in 'Social 
Science' were established during the 1860s, 70s and 80s, and the American Journal of 
SOCiology dates from 1895. The first departments of sociology were at Kansas (1889) 
and Chicago (1892). 
Late nineteenth century America was politically stable. Seidman suggests that 
In spite of the existence of a number of movements which challenged political 
hegemony, there remained a 'relatively broadly based liberal ideological consensus'. 
The challenges to liberal consensus came not only from labour disputes and the rise of 
socialism, but from a more broadly based radical political culture which included 
women's movements, black nationalism, and cultural criticism as well as socialism 
(1994: 94-7). Although Seidman's account makes no mention of early American 
environmentalism, rapid deforestation as part of the American attempt to 'civilise' the 
'wilderness', did spawn early environmentalist movements and ideas between 1870 and 
1910 (Simmons, 1993). In fact, a concern with the degradation of natural 
environments was manifest as early as the mid-1800s in, for example, the cultural 
criticism of Henry Thoreau (1817-62), who suggested that 'in wilderness lies the 
preservation of the world' (cited in Worster, 1977). 
In academic life, early American sociology drew heavily on the language and 
data of Darwinian and Spencerian conceptions of biology, as well as on ethnography 
(Barnes & Becker, 1938: 955). This suggests that notions of , environment' (or 'nature') 
cannot have been entirely absent in early theoretical work. As Sumner's (c. 1880) 
Socialism indicates, in spite of his laissez faire political orientation (Barnes & Becker, 
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1938: 960), he was well aware of the limited capacity of any given environment to 
support its human occupants: 
If the stores of nature were unlimited, or if the last unit of the supply 
she offers could be won as easily as the first, there would be no social 
problem. If a square mile of land could support an indefinite number of 
human beings, or if it cost only twice as much labour to get forty 
bushels of wheat from an acre as to get twenty, there would be no 
social problem . . . . The fact is far otherwise . . . . The constant 
tendency of population to outstrip the means of subsistence is the force 
which has distributed population over the world, and produced all 
advance in civilisation. (W.G. Sumner, c1880, in Kennedy and 
Robinson, eds. 1970: 170) 
Sumner's contemporary, Lester Ward, was no less aware of the importance of 
natural resources for social organisation. But where Sumner saw resource shortages, 
. 
rather than human purposive behaviour, as the key to expansion and progress, and as 
an argument in favour of laissez faire economics, Ward used his perception of nature 
as hostile and of the finite nature of resources to argue for the importance of the social 
control of nature, and co-operation between people: 
Art operates to protect the weak against adverse surroundings. It is 
directed against natural forces, chiefly physical. By thus defeating the 
destructive influences of the elements and hostile forms of life, and by 
forcing nature to yield an unnatural supply of man's necessities, many 
who would have succumbed from inability to resist these adverse 
agencies... were able to survive, and population increased and 
expanded. (Lester Ward 1884, in Kennedy and Robinson, eds. 1970: 
192) 
These post-Malthusian ideas, the one anti-socialist, the other pro, seem to support 
Catton and Dunlap's view of sociology's history. American 'progress' during the 
nineteenth century consisted to a great extent in pushing back the 'frontiers' of the 
'wilderness', through conquest, annexation and purchase of additional territory 
(Barraclough, 1985), rapidly deforesting on the way (Simmons, 1993). At the same 
time, however, Sumner's and Ward's acknowledgement of 'nature' and resources as 
important factors in social life, show that it is too simple to suggest that the early 
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American sociologists were blind to humanity's intrinsic connection to 'nature' or the 
finite nature of resources, or were straightforwardly 'exuberant'. They were not. 
Seidman's historical analysis is not concerned with the treatment of 
'environment' in sociology. Nevertheless, his conclusions tally with Catton and 
Dunlap's to the extent that he suggests that American sociology was institutionalised as 
a 'liberal' discipline which reflected the values and interests of white middle class men, 
and did not take on board any of the contemporary challenges to the liberal consensus. 
His analysis also shows, however, that to depict the early years of American sociology 
as occurring wholly in the context of economic abundance is an over-simplification. On 
the contrary, American sociology was institutionalised against the background of both 
distributional and political conflicts. As a result, the exclusion of both socialism and 
social movements, including environmentalism, from the institutionalisation and 
development of sociology, is rendered slightly more problematic. Exuberance as an 
explanation for the neglect of environment in sociology is not wholly adequate, as 
Dunlap and Catton (1979: 245) recognise implicitly when they cite early 'under-rated' 
or 'neglected' examples of 'environmental sociology', including work by Sumner 
(1913), Mukerjee (1930, 1932), Sorokin (1942) and Landis (1949). 
The Strategy of Re-Interpretation 
Catton (1976) cites Gouldner's ground-breaking book on the approaching 'crisis' in 
sociology (Gouldner, 1971), as evidence of a generalised awareness in the sociological 
community of the 'obsolescence' of a sociology which overstated the importance of 
'culture'.2 Gouldner suggested that the working assumptions of the functionalist 
paradigm were stifling the sociological community's ability to understand 
contemporary social change. His suggested remedy involved making sociology both 
'radical' and 'reflexive' through the 
2 Levine (1995: 1) includes Eisenstadt (1976), Tumer and Turner (1990) Wallerstein (1991) 
Halliday, (1992), and Horowitz (1993) among those who have documented the continuing 
'crisis' in sociology. 
deepening of the sociologist's own awareness of who and what he is, in 
a specific society at any given time, and of how both his social role and 
his personal praxis affect his work as a sociologist. (Gouldner, 1971: 
494, cited in Catton, 1976) 
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Catton's response to this was to suggest that instead of self-reflexivity, sociologists 
would do better to apply their critical abilities to the 'near misses' of their antecedents 
to find out where they went wrong. He suggested that Durkheim's work, on which 
Parsonian functionalism was based, had been 'misconstrued' and that sociologists 
in the post-exuberant age who want accurate understandings of the 
momentous changes happening around them will need a better 
understanding of what Durkheim actually achieved. (Catton, 1976: 38) 
Without citing previous work by Schnore (1958), which claimed that Durkheim 
had anticipated the work of the Chicago school of classical human ecologists, Catton 
argued that Durkheim had in fact quite explicitly drawn major ideas from the work of 
the biological evolutionist Charles Darwin (Catton, 1976: 39). Moreover, Durkheim's 
insistence on population volume and density as mechanical causes of the division of 
labour was the sociological equivalent of Darwin's insistence on speciation as the result 
of the struggle for survival (Catton, 1976: 41). 
More recently, Buttel (1986) has also drawn attention to the evolutionary 
framework contained in Durkheim's Division of Labour. He suggests that the classical 
'Human Ecology' of the Chicago school, which cannnot be labelled environmental 
sociology, was developed by those with an interest in Durkheim, to become an 
environmental sociology. Classical human ecology was influenced, according to Buttel, 
by analogies drawn from plant and animal ecology. Moreover, its emphasis was 'almost 
exclusively on urban spatial structures in societies such as the United states that were 
already industrialized' (Buttel, 1986: 342; see also Miley, 1980; Gaziano, 1996). Its 
subsequent development, however, between Hawley's (1950) Human Ecology and 
Schnore's (1958) 'Social Morphology and Human Ecology', led to the establishment of 
an environmental sociology rooted in the social morphology of Durkheim (ibid). By 
that time, however, Parsons had discredited human ecology and supplanted it with 
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functionalism (ibid.). Parsons's 'misleading if not erroneous' reading of Durkheim was 
also the reason that the elements of 'environmental' sociology in Durkheim's work went 
un-noticed. Buttel suggests that it was Giddens, in Capitalism and Modem Social 
Theory (1971), who corrected Parsons's misinterpretation ofDurkheim (ibid: 339). 
Re-Interpretation Re-Examined 
Catton's insistence that Durkheim's theory is the sociological equivalent of Darwin's 
theory of evolution is interesting, for several reasons. First, Darwin is often seen -
rightly or wrongly -to have been primarily responsible for making humanity a part of 
nature again, after its removal during the Enlightenment (Kumar, 1978: 18~ Worster, 
1977: 156). Second, Darwin is also seen to be the 'father' of modem scientific ecology, 
which has become intermingled with environmentalism in modern political ecology 
(pepper, 1984: 103; Williams, 1976). Third, Catton's interpretation is interesting 
because he suggests that Durkheim took on board Darwin's work while simultaneously 
refuting the social Darwinism of Spencer (Catton 1976: 41). Darwin's theory, and 
Durkheim's use of it are re-examined below. 
It is also possible to take issue with several aspects of Buttel's analysis, not 
least the suggestion that it was Giddens who corrected Parsons's misinterpretation of 
Durkheim. This issue is addressed in Chapter Four. A second issue is Buttel's assertion 
that Hawley (1950) and Schnore (1958) developed an 'environmental sociology' on the 
basis of Durkheim's social morphology. Hawley, who cited Durkheim briefly only 
twice,3 insisted that the major concern of human ecology was not environment, but the 
nature and development of community structure. Any broader definition, he said, 
would lead the student to 'spend himself in the mere extension of his reach' (Hawley, 
1950: v). This produces an anomalous situation where Durkheim's work was either not 
really important for Hawley's development of Human Ecology, or, was important, but 
for a Human Ecology that cannot be said to be an environmental sociology of the type 
outlined by Catton and Dunlap because it is concerned only with community structure, 
3 The index shows three, but is mistaken. 
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rather than with the relations between human societies and their natural environments. 
Secondly, although Schnore's conception of human ecology is superior to Hawley'S, 
since he insists on the study of population, technology and environment, as well as 
social relations (Schnore, 629-30) his analysis ofDurkheim seems somewhat tenuous. 
It is based mainly on his reading of the Division of Labour and The Rules of 
Sociological Method and although Schnore notes that references to social morphology 
became less common after about 1905 (Schnore, 1958: 633fn.), he does not question 
why this might have been. Recent evidence, however, indicates that Durkheim's 
interest in social morphology may have been primarily instrumental, aimed at warding 
off intellectual competition from the human geographer Vidal de la Blache. Durkheim's 
sociology, moreover, had a number of other competitors - most particularly an 
environmental sociology practiced by the followers of Le Play - which raises a further 
question about how it was that Durkheimian, rather than Le Playist, sociology came to 
be institutionalised in the French University system. 
Several inter-related issues need to be addressed, therefore, in order to make a 
proper assessment of Durkheim's status as environmental sociologist. First is Darwin's 
theory, and Durkheim's use of it; second, the process of the institutionalisation of 
French sociology via its establishment in the French University system; and third, 
Durkheim's treatment of social morphology in relation to the human geography of the 
Vidaliens. 
Durkheim, Darwin and Sociology 
Durkheim's engagement with the idea of humanity as part of nature, and subject to the 
same evolutionary processes as other animals, was embedded in the intellectual and 
institutional context in which he wrote. This context was one in which Durkheim was 
struggling to define sociology as a subject in its own right, with its own clearly 
delineated focus and methods, and in which he was in competition with others for both 
professional and theoretical status and recognition. Intellectually, Darwin's scientific 





Europe (Hughes 1959). The sociological treatment of Darwin's theory, therefore, must 
playa role in any assessment of the 'environmental' elements in early sociology. 
Darwin's Theory of Evolution 
Debate surrounding Darwin's theory of evolution, its impact, implications, historical 
influences and antecedents continues (for example, Bowler, 1987; Young, 1985; Mayr, 
1991). In sociology, in particular, it is generally assumed that evolutionary perspectives 
(including social Darwinism) emanate as much from Spencer as they do from Darwin 
(for example, Lee and Newby, 1983: 77-80). Yet given Darwin's revolutionary impact 
on both natural and social scientific thinking, sociologists could hardly have been 
ignorant of Darwin's work, though the depth of understanding - both of the theory 
itself and what it implied - varied enormously, as did the sociological uses of and 
responses to it. 
Darwin's theory, as presented in 1859, was a compound theory, composed of 
several sub-theories, each of which fared differently over time according to its impact 
on widely held beliefs and values (Mayr, 1991: 38-9; see also Hawkins, 1997: 32). The 
evolution process, Darwin recognised, involved two separate processes: 
transformation over time, and transformation in geographical and ecological space. All 
species, he believed, could ultimately be traced to a single ancestor (the theory of 
common descent). The enormous diversity of existing species had occurred through 
multiplication by one of two processes; either by splitting into daughter species, or due 
to the geographic isolation of a parent population, which then evolved into a separate 
species. The process was gradual rather than sudden. Moreover, within each 
generation there was great diversity in characteristics; Darwin suggested that only 
those with a particularly well-adapted combination of characteristics would survive to 
produce the next generation (Mayr, 1991:35-7). Only the last of these propositions is 
the theory of natural selection and it was this which many of Darwin's contemporaries 
(including Huxley, Romanes and others) found hard to swallow. Darwin's major 
difficulty was that he did not understand the (genetic) origin of variation, nor, as a 
result, how species originated - whether through geographic isolation of a population 
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or through differentiation within a population occupying the same territory (allopatric 
or sympatric speciation) (Mayr, 1991: 33-34). Consequently, although he wrote in 
1859 of 'natural selection' as the major factor in evolutionary change, he did not 
entirely rule out the earlier, Lamarckian, evolutionary mechanism, which involved the 
gradual transformation of species towards more perfect forms through the efforts of 
the organism to adapt itself to its environment (Mayr, 1991; Jones, 1980). Because he 
had not got the requisite knowledge of genetics, Darwin was not entirely clear about 
whether or not acquired physical characteristics (as opposed to innate qualities) were 
heritable, shifting from an emphasis on the inheritance of innate characteristics in On 
The Origin of Species (1859), towards the transmission of acquired characteristics in 
The Descent of Man (1871) (Jones, 1980: 78). 
In 1883, however, the biologist August Weismann (who, like Darwin and 
Lamarck, had previously believed in the inheritance of acquired characteristics) 
published On Heredity, in which, based on detailed (though poorly conceptualised) 
experimental work, he categorically denied that acquired characteristics could be 
transmitted between generations (Mayr, 1991: 110). Darwin's co-discoverer of 
evolution by natural selection AR Wallace, immediately supported Weismann, later 
publishing his selectionist Darwinism (1889). By 1885, Weismann was arguing that the 
germ plasm (the genetic material which produces the next generation) became 
separated from the soma plasm (from which the organism itself develops) at a very 
early stage in life, so that changes acquired over time could not then be transferred to 
the next generation (Mayr, 1991:122). Although Weismann was essentially correct in 
this, it was not until the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics in 1900, that the mechanism 
which produced the variations which led to natural selection was found (although even 
then, the way in which genes as a mechanism operated through the recombination of 
parental genes rather than as a consequence of blending, was not properly understood). 
In the mean-time, many continued to believe in the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, a theory that did not finally die out until the 1940s and 50s (Mayr, 
1991:120). 
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There are effectively two stages in Darwin's theory of natural selection, internal 
and external, although in practice the two stages cannot be separated (Mayr, 1991: 
87). In the first stage internal variation occurs (now known to be the result of the 
recombination of parental genetic material). In the second, those variations which are 
useful to the individual in any given environment survive, while those that are useless 
or negative in their effect will die out. The environment only 'passively' determines 
which characteristic survives and which dies out~ internal characteristics of the 
organism actively effect its interaction with its environment. The theory is complicated 
by sexual selection, which Darwin (and later Weismann also) realised was not related 
to genetic selection (genotypes), but was made on the basis of outward physical 
appearances (phenotypes). Darwin stressed that evolution by natural selection was an 
accidental process unrelated to any particular directional changes. There was no 
guarantee, first, that the internal differences between two generations would be passed 
on to a third generation~ and, second, survival of particular genes might have less to do 
with their advantages for individual adaptation and survival than with sexual selection 
and reproductive success. 
As Young has suggested, 'Darwinism' became an umbrella term for a much 
more general evolutionary movement which began at the end of the eighteenth century 
with the publication of Erasmus Darwin's Zoonomia (1985: 1-2). Theories that went 
under the name of Darwinism, then, might bear little or no resemblance to Darwin's 
own, depending on the moment at which they were constructed, the theorists' capacity 
for understanding contemporary biology,4 which other evolutionists they had read, and 
even which of the editions of Darwin's species book they had picked up. In addition, 
theorists' receptiveness to different aspects of Darwin's work might be affected by a 
number of other factors, including religious beliefs in a created or unchanging world; a 
belief the uniqueness of humankind emanating either from the Christian religion or the 
4 As Halliday (1979: 122-123) has pointed out, the Victorians regarded the methods and 
subject matter of biology as 'clear and fairly easy', and associated with the removal of 'doubt, 
perplexity and mystery'. 
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post-Enlightenment philosophers; philosophical essentialism (the belief that all natural 
phenomena are manifestations of a limited number of constant 'essences'); a belief in 
final causes (teleology); or a generally accepted belief, for generations after Bacon and 
Descartes in universal laws of nature (Mayr, 1991: 38-9). 
Darwin's Influence in France 
Clarke (1984) has suggested that many French intellectuals had no sophisticated 
understanding of Darwin's work, but 'simply raided Darwinism to bolster preconceived 
opinions' (1984: 176). Darwin was appealed to in support of a wide range of 
ideological positions, including socialism, co-operation, pacifism and democracy, as 
well as individualism, competition and militarism. 
Clarke argues that 'Darwinism' in French social thought took two different 
forms: a 'reform Darwinism' distinguishable from 'social Darwinism'. The latter 
involved the concept of competition or the struggle for existence, while the former 
insisted that Darwin's theories provided more support for the idea of 'co-operation for 
life' (Clarke, 1984: 6-7). Moreover, there was a distinct shift away from social and 
toward reformist Darwinism (with a corresponding decrease in the use of organic 
analogies in social thought) in the closing years of the nineteenth century and the 
opening decade of the twentieth, in the work of social thinkers including Espinas, 
Marion, Worms, and Fouillee (ibid: 118-126). 
In addition, the French situation was complicated both by the popularity of 
Spencer and by a Lamarckian revival in the late nineteenth century. Spencer's 
evolutionism, which itself derived largely from Lamarck rather than Darwin (peel, 
1971: 134-5; Jones, 1980: 85-7; Clarke, 1984: 120), confused the issue further, for 
although he argued against state intervention on behalf of the 'unfit' (an ideological 
position akin to social Darwinism), Spencer also suggested that social evolution (when 
not interfered with) leads away from militarism and egoistic competition and towards 
altruistic, co-operative, industrialism (a teleological position nearer to reform 
Darwinism). The reason that the state should not intervene was simply that this would 
prevent evolution - since it was only through the efforts of individuals themselves that 
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evolution - as increased 'fitness' for the 'social state' could be produced (Spencer, cited 
in Peel, 1971: 148 - 50). 
Durkheim: Societies as part of Nature? 
For Durkheim, humanity was part of nature, but unique among all living things in its 
capacity for communication and sociability. This is best illustrated by beginning with 
the theory of knowledge he developed in his last major work, The Elementary Forms 
of the Religious Life: 
At the root of all our judgements there are a certain number of essential 
ideas which dominate all our intellectual life . . . the categories of the 
understanding: ideas of time, space, class, number, cause, substance, 
personality etc. They correspond to the most universal properties of 
things (1915 [1912]: 9) 
These categories (or 'essences') have a social origin; they do not emanate from 
individual experience, but are shared and exist independently of any particular 
individual. 
If men did not agree upon these essential ideas at every moment, if they 
did not have the same conception of time space, cause number etc., all 
contact between their minds would be impossible, and with that all life 
together. Thus society could not abandon the categories to the free 
choice of the individual without abandoning itself . . . Does a mind 
ostensibly free itself from these forms of thought? It is no longer 
considered a human mind in the full sense of the word, and is treated 
accordingly. (ibid: 17) 
For Durkheim, the common conceptual basis of communication is the foundation of 
social life. Without society people cannot be fully human, so that the social or 'moral' 
order is seen, by Durkheim, to be fundamentally important. It is what makes a 
distinctively human existence possible, and is, therefore, prior to all other aspects of 
social life. The categories of thOUght are social constructs - they originate in society 
and are transmitted socially; they transcend the experience of individuals, and they 
express social conditions - even when the things that are expressed by them are 
'natural' things. But the categories we apply to nature, the basic concepts through 
which we comprehend it, are not mere metaphors, which have a practical use but bear 
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no relation to reality. Society, Durkheim wrote in 1912, echoing a statement of 1903, 
(see Chapter 3, p.128) 
. . . is a part of nature, and indeed its highest representation. The social 
realm is a natural realm which differs from the other only by a greater 
complexity. Now it is impossible that nature should differ radically from 
itself in the one case and the other in regard to that which is most 
essential. The fundamental relations that exist between things - just that 
which it is the function of the categories to express - cannot be 
essentially different in the different realms.(Durkheim, 1915 [1912]: 18) 
Thus, humanity is both a part of nature, according to Durkheim, and endowed with 
special characteristics which enable us to fully comprehend it. Even the most primitive 
religions serve this function of understanding the world. In fact, among their other 
functions (including the most fundamental function of re-affirming the individual's 
emotional attachment to society (ibid: 427», primitive religions are the precursors of 
modem scientific thought (ibid: 429). 
Here, Durkheim was doing two things. First, he wanted to argue that human 
scientific thought was capable of fully comprehending the world of nature. 5 Second, he 
put humanity firmly inside the realm of nature. Yet, against the background of the 
generalised acceptance, by at least the 1890s, of the fact that Darwin's achievement 
was an enormous scientific advance (even where it was not properly understood, or 
where parts of it were still disputed), he could hardly have done otherwise. In raising 
the status of human society to that of nature's 'highest representation', however, 
Durkheim marked us out as unique among all other living beings, through our capacity 
to understand 'nature' - thus rejecting the imputation that humanity is subject to the 
same blind forces as the rest of nature. This was not a late development in Durkheim's 
5 Long before publication of The Elementary Forms, in his course on Moral Education at the 
Sorbonne (1902-3), Durkheim suggests that scientific understanding of nature is 'the wellspring 
of our autonomy' (1961 [1925]: 116) As Watts Miller (1996: 166) says, Durkheim's suggestion 
that scientific understanding might lead to a freely chosen acceptance of the natural order of 
things raises 'crucial issues' in respect of contemporary attitudes to nature. Durkheim, however, 
never developed this line of thought anywhere else. 
" 
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conceptual thinking about societies, but one which had marked his work from the very 
beginning.6 
In The Division of Labour (1893), Durkheim had explained the mechanics of 
social change (the means by which, among other things, a primitive' religious 
cosmology is 'transformed' or 'evolves' into a modem scientific one). His account of 
social change drew heavily on Darwinism (Lukes, 1975: 170; Hawkins, 1997: 12), 
even though there are only five direct references to Darwin and most of Durkheim's 
polemic was aimed specifically at Spencer, to whom there are 105 references 
(Borlandi, 1993: 70). 
Contrary to Lamarckian (and Spencerian) theory, Durkheim suggested, with 
Darwin, that evolution is not the result of the goal directed behaviour of individuals, 
but of causes that are purely 'mechanical'. Increases in the volume and density of 
societies (i.e. in the number of people who live in close contact with one another) 
increase the competition for limited resources so that just like other animals humans 
are forced to specialise to survive (1933 [1893]: 266). The function of the division of 
labour, therefore, appears to be that it mitigates the struggle for existence, and in doing 
so serves a social need (of preserving society, and making it more 'solidary'). 
This was as far as Durkheim wanted to go with Darwinian theory, however. 
Although he could not do otherwise than agree, overtly, with Darwin, there are a 
number of clues in this early work which point to a different perspective. Early on in 
the book he opposed humanity to the nature it is supposedly part of, when he wrote of 
the 'fight against nature' (1933 [1893]: 42), a slip which indicates either an 
Enlightenment view of humanity as separate from nature, or (less likely, perhaps) a 
religious world view. He suggested that the physical environment remains relatively 
constant (ibid: 343), perhaps a further indication that he may have retained, 
unthinkingly, a creationist view of the world. The social environment, on the other 
6 As early as 1892, in his thesis on Montesquieu, Durkheim was inclined to play down 
Montesquieu's appeal to the influence of climate and terrain on social and political structure 
and the character of the population (Durkheirn, 1997 [1892]: 48-9,56). 
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hand, inevitably changes (ibid: 344). It is to the social rather than the physical 
environment, therefore, that we must look for the causes of change (ibid: 251). Thus, 
Durkheim exhibited little awareness of the impact of human societies on the natural 
world, or of the effects of such changes back onto human societies. His discussion of 
the gradual development of morphological differentiation between men and women 
according to function is frankly Lamarckian (ibid: 60), while his insistence on the 
increasingly diminished importance of heredity and instinct in human development, in 
his discussion of the work of Francis Galton, makes it plain that he wished to release 
humanity from any 'inevitable' natural forces (ibid: 305-328; particularly pp.321-3). As 
Hawkins (1997: 12) points out, Durkhiem's refusal of biological reductionism is likely 
to be linked to his awareness - as a Jew and a Dreyfusard - of its 'racialist possibilities'. 
The value of the division of labour is not that it leads to civilisation or to 
greater happiness - Durkheim went to great lengths to insist that often the opposite is 
true. Rather its moral character lies in the fact that it is a necessary constraint 
externally imposed on human activity (ibid: 42 and 53), and has as one result the fact 
that people become simultaneously more and more different from one another, and 
more and more dependent on one another (ibid: 37). And since society is the primary 
condition of a fully human existence, any increase in the degree of social 
interdependence results in an expansion of the distinctively 'human' qualities of 
existence. With each increase in the degree of division of labour in society, therefore, 
human beings become more and more fully human. Thus although Durkheim made the 
division oflabour the inevitable result of biological and physical evolutionary forces, its 
real importance for him, as for Spencer, was its value for social evolution. 
Social evolution, under 'normal' conditions, increases the human capacity for 
understanding both itself and nature, with the result that we become able to control the 
direction of change through science. Civilisation may be no more than the inevitable 
result of the division of labour (ibid: 336-7), but this does not prevent it becoming an 
end in itself (ibid: 339). Durkheim introduced the idea that there is a 'normal' state of 
social 'health'; an ideal intensity of social life in which there is a perfect 'fit' between the 
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needs of the individual and the availability of the means to satisfy them (ibid: 340). To 
ascertain this ideal state of health was to be the province of sociology. What is more, 
since the conditions of the social environment continually change, the social need for 
sociology will be perpetual (ibid: 339-44). 
Durkheim, therefore, drew on the biological theory of Darwin in order to argue 
both that we are capable through science of understanding nature (including society), 
and in order to refute Spencer's assertion that evolution occurs through the 
unrestrained striving of individuals, in which the 'fittest' survive. Having used Darwin's 
theory in this manner, he then went to extraordinary lengths to refute its importance 
for social development. Social development may be the inevitable result of (biological 
and physical environmental) forces outside human control, but it does not follow from 
this, for Durkheim, either that human beings are bound to be competitive and self-
interested (ibid: 204), or that we should not intervene in the process in order to 
ameliorate social conditions. Contrary to Darwinian theory, in which each new 
generation has different characteristics from the one before and consequently has no 
essential traits, and against Spencer's utilitarianism, which suggested that evolution 
occurs through the efforts of individuals to satisfy, self-interestedly, individual needs, 
Durkheim wanted to argue that there is one intrinsically unchanging human 
characteristic. This is that human beings are essentially 'moral' or social, and therefore 
co-operative rather than competitive. 
The reader who comes to the Division of Labour uninitiated can be forgiven 
for wondering why - again and again - Durkheim insists that the division of labour does 
have a moral character, even though its progress is the result of biological and 
environmental, as well as social (dynamic density) forces with all the inevitability of 
necessity, and even though its result, 'civilisation', is in itself devoid of moral value? It 
is because, somewhat ironically, in view of the fact that it was Spencer who in 1852 
coined the 'Darwinian' term 'survival of the fittest' (peel, 1971: 13 7), Durkheim drew 
directly on Darwin in his attempt to refute this aspect of Spencer's theory (Durkheim 
[1933] 1893): 266-270), but in doing so found himselfin a bit of a mess, theoretically. 
39. 
For political reasons, he wanted to argue for both social co-operation and individual 
autonomy, a position very close to that of Spencer himself But Spencer's means to this 
social end - laissez-faire policy - was the very opposite of what Durkheim himself 
believed in. And once Durkheim had appealed to Darwin as a superior scientific 
authority, in order to refute Spencer, he then had to refute Darwin himself This was 
not because, as Durkheim himself recognised, Darwin's position implies the 
inevitability of competition between individuals - in fact, this is not necessarily the case 
(see for example, Darwin, 1866 [1858]: 72-3). Rather it was because Darwin's theory 
implies that evolution occurs through causes that are internal to the individual (i.e. 
variation), thereby reducing the scope for effective political intervention and for a 
science whose area of study is dedicated to the discovery of the ideal conditions of 
social 'health'. This is why so much of his argument was concerned to show that the 
'moral' nature of the division of labour is to be found in the 'social' needs that it fulfils. 
In the last analysis, it seems, Durkheim himself found these arguments 
unconvincing. In the final pages of The Division of Labour he falls back on the 
assertion that the very 'essence' of humanity is morality: 
If there is one rule of conduct which is incontestable, it is that which 
orders us to realise in ourselves the essential traits of the collective 
type. . . . [This] is nothing else than the collective conscience of the 
group of which we are a part.(Durkheim, op cit: 396) 
The collective conscience contains the moral rules, which 'enunciate the fundamental 
condition of social solidarity'. 
Everything which is a source of solidarity is moral, everything which 
forces man to take account of other men is moral, everything which 
forces him to regulate his conduct through something other than the 
striving of his ego is moral, and morality is as solid as these ties are 
numerous and strong. (ibid: 398) 
For Durkheim, then, social morality was the essential characteristic of humanity. This, 
of course, is entirely unobjectionable in itself, but it does not make human beings any 
the less dependent on their natural environments. In the course of weaving together, in 
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the Division of Labour, a number of different aims - the refutation of Spencer, the 
attempt to carve out a bounded subject matter for sociology, and the attempt to claim 
for it the status of a science of 'moral life' - Durkheim utilised an argument (Darwin's) 
that was wholly at odds with the latter two aims. He was then forced, in spite of his 
explicit statement to the contrary, to deny the importance of heredity actively working 
in a physical environment, and focus on the role of the social or cultural environment in 
evolution. One result is that his his theory reads as if the division of labour makes 
humanity exempt from natural constraints by allowing many more to exist than would 
have otherwise survived (Durkheim, 1933 [1893]: 270-271). 
Durkheim and the Institutionalisation of French Sociology 
The Durkheimian conception of sociology was not, of course, the only possibility in 
late nineteenth century France - others attempting to define and establish sociology in 
an academic context included the Le Playists, the statisticians, and Rene Worms. That 
it was Durkheimian sociology, and only Durkheimian sociology, that became 
established in the university system, was due not only to his outstanding intellectual 
and personal qualities, but to a number of other inter-related factors, including changes 
in the structure of the French University system, and the need for political 
consolidation in the Third Republic. 
France was not particularly stable, politically, in the century following the 
Revolution. Although, like Britain, it has been held up as an example of a successful 
parliamentary democracy in which revolutionary ideas had become orthodox (Joll, 
1983), the political situation remained volatile, a fact illustrated by the Dreyfus affair of 
1898 (Wright, 1981~ McMillan, 1985). Perhaps partly as a result, the French economy 
had remained stagnant for the greater part of the century. Although France was still, 
for the greater part of the century, the second largest industrial nation - experiencing a 
sharp upturn in industrial activity around the tum of the century - its position had 
declined to fourth by 1914 (Wright, 1981; Kemp, 1985). Political stability, therefore 
was a major concern for the Third Republic, established after the French defeat in the 
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Franco-Prussian war, the fall of the second empire, the bloody days of the Paris 
Commune and the loss of Alsace Lorraine. Part of the blame for the French defeat 
appeared to lie with the outdated education system, which led to the establishment of 
the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques, as an institution for training government 
officials, diplomats and journalists (Oberschall, 1972: 154). The Primary Education 
Law of 1882 was another response, under which a free, non-religious education was to 
be provided for all aged between 6 and 13. This led to the expansion of the number of 
students and the opening of new schools. 
The liberation of education from Catholicism, however, left a 'moral' or 'civic' 
gap, which had to be addressed by the educational authorities. Whether or not it was a 
mere coincidence, Durkheim - following a conversation with the director of education 
Louis Liard - was appointed as charge de cours at Bordeaux in 1887, to fill that gap. 
There, he rose rapidly to be a recognised authority on 'ethics and public morality', and 
was appointed Professeur de Science Sociale in 1896. In the same year he founded the 
Annee Sociologique (ibid: 155). Its first volume appeared in 1898. 
The Annee, and Durkheim's approach to its day-to-day administration as well 
as to the foundation of sociology as an academic subject, were significant factors in the 
insitutionalisation of Durkheimian sociology. In giving sociology a broad definition as 
a synthesising discipline, which encompassed the relevant aspects of a range of other 
social science disciplines (rather than, as did Worms and Tarde, a narrow definition as 
the philosophy of the social sciences), Durkbeim was able to gather round him a 
significant number of talented and well qualified individuals. By contrast, the Le 
Playists designated the work of their own school Social Science, thus severely limiting 
its number of acknowledged practitioners. For them, the title 'sociology' belonged only 
to work which built on that ofComte (ibid: 158). 
Durkbeim's success was also due to his professional approach. The structure of 
the 'cluster' around the Annee was similar to that of Wilhelm Wundt's research institute 
in Germany (of which Durkheim had had direct experience (Lukes, 1975», but 
organised in a more rigidly hierarchical and authoritarian manner. Its primary goal was 
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the compilation and review of useful sociological publications. The division of labour 
between the collaborators was intended to overcome superficiality, while Durkheim's 
own Rules of Sociological Method and personal involvement set the scientific and 
academic standard. The Annee simultaneously served other, less obvious functions, 
however, in particular the recruitment and training of new talent. Unity and continuity 
were ensured, at least in part, by the fact that Durkheim personally revised and 
corrected all the proofs, returning them to their authors before they were finally sent to 
the printer (ibid: 169). Intellectual integration was further enhanced by the Dreyfus 
affair of 1898, in which Durkheim played a central role, and where many of the Annee 
collaborators were also Dreyfusards. 
Political and intellectual 'fitness', therefore, combined with Durkheim's own 
'authoritarian' personality and his ability to draw others into the cluster around the 
Annee via his conception of sociology as a synthesising science, ensured that 
Durkheimian sociology would survive where other conceptions perished institutionally. 
Moreover, recent evidence indicates that one way in which Durkheim warded off 
threats to the intellectual dominance of his own school was to absorb them. On at least 
one occasion this involved taking up an area he had previously dealt with and 
dismissed: social morphology. His treatment of 'social morphology', on which rests his 
status as a precursor of classical human ecology, appears to have been largely 
instrumental, aimed at the absorption of the human geography of Vidal de la Blache 
and his school, which constituted a threat to the supremacy of the Durkheimians 
(Mucchielli & Robie, 1995: 120). 
Social Morphology and Human Geography 
Durkheim's reputation as a precursor of human ecology rests on his 'morphological' 
analysis of societal types in the Division of Labour. There he suggested that the cause 
of the division of labour, the function of which was to mitigate the struggle for 
existence, was the disappearance of the segmentary type of society, caused in tum by 
increased physical and moral density. Settled agriculture, the growth of towns and 
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cities, economic development, and increases in communications and transport 
technology were all symptoms or symbols of the degree of density of a society (1933 
[1893]: Chapter II) 
In 1895, in The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim argued that social 
facts were of two kinds. The first type of social facts were ways of acting, thinking and 
feeling external to the individual, 'which are invested with a coercive power by virtue 
of which they exercise control over him' (Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 53). The second 
type were 'collective ways of being, namely, social facts of an 'anatomical' or 
morphological nature' (ibid: 57). This sort offact consisted of such things as 
the number and nature of the elementary parts which constitute society, 
the way in which they are articulated, the degree of coalescence they 
have obtained, the distribution of population over the earth's surface, 
the extent and nature of communications, the design of dwellings, etc. . 
. (Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 57) 
These 'ways of being', which correspond to the social facts outlined in The Division of 
Labour as visible symbols of the degree of density, may have a 'physical' or 
'geographical' basis, but since they are 'only ways of acting that have been 
consolidated', they were subject to the same rules concerning generality, exteriority 
and constraint, as other social facts (ibid: 57-59). To admit their existence, therefore, 
was not to claim them as an area for separate study - the difference between a moral 
rule and an architectural form was a difference merely of degree and not of kind. 
Both are forms of life at varying stages of crystallisation. It would 
undoubtedly be advantageous to reserve the term 'morphological' for 
those social facts which relate to the social substratum, but only on 
condition that one is aware the they are of the same nature as the 
others. (Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 59) 
'Social morphology', in the Rules, became a way of classifying human societies as 
social species on an evolutionary scale, from the most basic of human groups, the 
single segment or 'clan' (formed from an association of undifferentiated 'hordes'), to the 
most complex civilisations, in which a 'complete coalescence of the initial segments 
takes place' (ibid: 112-115). Durkheim's rules for the constitution of social types 
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explicitly stated that social species were identifiable by their 'organisational' patterns, 
but did not mention physical - geographical, geological, or climatic - factors. It does 
not seem to have occurred to him that these necessarily have some bearing on cultural 
and organisational patterns at various points in a society's history, as limiting or 
enabling factors in the acquisition of social necessities via the availability, accessibility, 
ease of cultivation or exploitation of such life-sustaining resources as food, water, 
building materials and fuel. 
There need not be any continuity between one social species and another, 
Durkheim said, since they were formed by the mixing of 'clans', rather than, as with the 
biological organism, through reproduction. There was no 'internal force' of heredity 
operating to preserve social characteristics, so that when two or more social species 
combined to form another, the result, as a rule, was another new species with an 
'entirely fresh organisational pattern' (ibid: 116). This contrast between the biological 
and the social illustrates, yet again, both how Durkheim felt obliged to engage with 
Darwinian theory and the extent to which his understanding was limited. Yet he was 
concerned above all to refute its application to social evolution. Neither physical 
environment, nor individual or 'social' heredity were relevant factors in sociological 
analysis, which was limited to the discovery and explanation of social facts by other 
social facts. People were a part of nature, but the relationship between the two was 
always mediated by society (Mucchielli & Robic, 1995: 111).7 
Thus, when the first edition of the Annee Sociologique appeared in 1898, 
'Socio-geographie' was relegated to the category of 'miscellaneous' ('Divers~, in its 
catalogue of sociological specialisms (ibid: 109). Durkheim's critique of Ratzel's 
political geography was the trigger for its marginalisation.8 He was quite clear about 
the nature of his dissatisfaction with Ratzel's geography. 'The primary fact is social 
7 Durkheim put his 'rules' into practice a few years later, in Suicide (1952 [1895]), in which he 
argues against 'cosmic' explanations of suicide (Book 1, Chapter 3). 
8 Ratzel's geography postulated a direct 'mystic' bond between the people and the land 
(Bramwell, 1989: 61; Mucchielli & Robie, op cit: 110-111). 
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organisation and not the way in which people use the earth, the latter depends on the 
former, far more than the reverse.'9 (Mucchielli & Robic, 1995: 1l2~ see also Rhein, 
1982: 245). 
From 1899, however, human geography became a category in its own right, 
under the name 'morphologie sociale'. Its re-instatement followed Vidal de la Blache's 
own 1898 critique of Ratzel, and his accession to the Chair formerly occupied by the 
historian A. Himly at the Sorbonne, thus firmly establishing geography in the 
University (Mucchielli and Robic, 1995: 120). Durkheim introduced this new category 
by explaining that it was made up of different areas. Geography studied territorial 
forms, history the evolution of urban and rural groups, and demography the 
distribution of population. Combined under the rubric 'morphologie sociale' Durkheim 
suggested, these disciplines could be rescued from their isolation and 'unified' 
(Mucchielli and Robic, 1995: 113~ Rhein, 1982: 245). Thus, it was Vidal de la Blache's 
success at establishing geography as an academic subject at university level that 
prompted Durkheim to give 'morphologie sociale' its own place in the A,mee. 
On the basis of Durkheim's social morphology - as developed in The Rules of 
Sociological Method - there are no grounds for the suggestion that Durkheim has a 
basic 'human ecology' in anything other than a purely 'sociologistic' sense - a sense 
which excludes the natural or physical environment as a significant factor in either 
social structure or function (a fact which is acknowledged by Schnore, 1958: 620-
628). By contrast, Vidal de la Blache's (1926) Principles of Human Geography offers 
a 'new conception of the inter-relationships between the earth and man' which resulted 
from 'a more synthetic knowledge of the physical laws governing our earth and of the 
relations between the living beings which inhabit it' (1926: 4). It has chapters on 
population distribution and density, physical environment, food, building materials (in 
9 My translation. The original reads 'La critique de Durkheim est eminemment pertinente, elle 
marque nettement, Ia difference entre morphologie sociale et geographie sociale, elle affirme 
que Ie fait primordial clest la fa~ dont les humaines sont organises en societe et non la 
maniere dont its occupent Ie sol, cette demiere dependent de la premiere bien plus que l'inversel. 
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different climates), and means of transportation as factors affecting both social 
structure and social evolution. 
Although Durkheim continued to discuss 'physical' factors in social structure -
sometimes as though he believed in their relevance, and social morphology was 
elevated (at least for a time), in the Annee, to the status of a section in its own right, 
his motives for doing so seem to have been more concerned with academic rivalry and 
the professional status of his school, than with a genuine recognition of the importance 
of physical factors as enabling or constraining particular social forms or functions. 
Towards an Alternative Strategy 
Neither 'Exuberance' nor 'Re-Interpretation' as strategies for explaining the neglect of 
environmental issues in the history of sociology are quite adequate, therefore. Catton's 
strategy of exuberance can not account for the existence of a number of neglected 
early works of environmental sociologists (see above, p.26). Nor do the attempts by 
Schnore (1958), Catton (1976) or Buttel (1986) to re-interpret Durkheim's sociology 
in environmental terms quite work, once factors external to the theory itself are taken 
into account. 
Re-interpretations of Durkheim and others by contemporary environmental 
sociologists are of interest in their own right, however, since the very attempt to 're-
interpret' the classics is an instance of the recent development of a heightened 
reflexivity among sociologists in general, some of whom are beginning to at least 
discuss the application of the insights of their own discipline (in particular, insights 
from the sociology of knowledge) to that discipline itself (for example Levine, 1995; 
Hopper, 1995; Mouzelis, 1997; Parker, 1997). This constitutes an acknowledgement 
of the fact that the classical sociological tradition has been less intellectually self-
evident (Shils, 1971) than has often been supposed, but rests on particular 
interpretations of the work of the 'founding fathers'. Consequently, other 
interpretations are seen to be possible, and the European 'founders' can be seen to be 
concerned with issues to do with the relations between humanity and its 'natural' 
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environment, even if they were motivated quite differently than their contemporary 
counterparts. 
This sort of reflexivity is not at all new, of course. In the post-war period 
especially, sociologists have engaged, intermittently, in re-examining, re-defining, and 
re-interpreting 'founders' of sociology.lO What is new, however, is the attempt to 
assess their treatment of the 'environment', or the relations between humanity and 
nature as a result of a generalised heightened awareness of environmental issues both 
in and outside academic sociology. It may also be, in part, an effort to claim or retain 
some kind of conceptual 'unity' for an imagined sociological 'community' (Becker, 
1979: 24; Levine, 1995). 
Whatever its origin or rationale, the attempt to ground environmental sociology 
in the work of the European classical thinkers may be insufficiently reflexive in 
accepting a severely attenuated form of sociology's intellectual heritage - considering 
only the sociological ideas which have been formally recognised and legitimated 
through institutionalisation. Since Comte first coined the word, there has been a wide 
range of thinkers who have either claimed the title 'sociology' for their work, or who 
have had that title awarded to it by others, sometimes retrospectively. In France, these 
included the Le Playists, whose sociology was based on the study of 'the working class 
family, the locality it inhabits and the social constitution by which it is governed' (Le 
Play, cited in Nisbet, 1967: 62). Although the study of locality, or 'place', gave Le 
Play's sociology a dimension that was missing from Durkheim's (in spite of its 
inadequacy in other respects), it has remained marginal (and is sometimes even absent) 
in the history of the discipline as a whole. 
10 These are too numerous to list exhaustively. Some examples include Nisbet's (1961) The 
Sociological Tradition; Aron's (1965, 1967) Main Currents in Sociological Theory; 
Bottomore and Nisbet's (1979) A History of Sociological Analysis; Swingewood's (1984) A 
Short History of sociological Thought; and Hughes, Martin and Sharrock (1995) 
Understanding Classical Sociology. 
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Since its earliest attempt at institutionalisation, the scope of what is legitimately 
recognised as sociology has undergone a continual process of expansion and 
contraction. The most obvious and overt example of this can be seen in Parsons's 
(l937) extreme limitation of the field through the narrowing down of Sorokin's (1928) 
account of diverse sociological theories into a mere handful of thinkers, whose work 
he suggested consisted of contributions to a single theory. Beyond this, however, the 
limitation of the field has been carried on covertly, in the day-to-day practice of 
sociology by sociologists. It has been partly a function of the reception, inside 
institutions, of particular sets of ideas, theories and definitions of sociology. As Shils 
(l971) said, institutions create a 'resonant and echoing' intellectual environment. 
Significantly, institutions empower not just ideas, but also particular individuals, whose 
values, judgements and opinions thereby carry greater weight. Thus, although to a 
greater or lesser extent the theories which have survived in sociology have been those 
that are intellectually superior - they are intellectually superior in their own terms, 
which are inevitably bounded, or limited by the values and beliefs of their creators. Any 
particular theory of, for example, the 'functions' of the division of labour in society may 
be adequate in respect of its own terms of reference. It may, for example, address the 
problem of the relation between the individual and society, or the question of how a 
society of individuals can 'cohere'; and in these terms it may be perfectly adequate. It 
only becomes less adequate, or inadequate, if the 'reader' or 'audience' to whom it is 
addressed, is inclined to believe in the central importance of the relations between 
societies and their natural 'environments', or the question of how a society of 
individuals can 'survive' or maintain itself in the face of the finite resources it must 
necessarily consume. In this way, the self-evident intellectual superiority of an 
established theory may be called into question. By the same token, however, an 
established thinker or theory may effectively marginalise another, since the acceptance 
of a particular set of values (expressed either implicitly or explicitly in a theory) may 
appear to exclude the acceptance of alternatives. 
49. 
Environmentalism and Politics 
Lowe and Goyder have suggested that the three major periods of the articulation of 
environmentalist ideas - the 1890s, 1920s and late 1950s, have all been at the end of 
periods of sustained economic growth (1983: 16-17), though they acknowledge that 
there have been 'isolated examples of preservationist sentiment as far back as the 
Middle ages' (Lowe and Goyder, 1983. See also Worster, 1977; Merchant, 1980; 
Oelschlaeger, 1991). Environmentalism (formal and informal) is seen to involve a 
distinctive value system or orientation (Lowe and Goyder, 1983), which involves an 
implicit or explicit attitude to nature, and our relationship to it (pepper, 1984). As 
Raymond Williams suggested, our ideas about what nature is, as a thing in itself, as 
well as whether we see ourselves as part of, or distinct from it, are part of the way in 
which we define ourselves, and what it means to be human. Moreover, 'what is often 
being argued', he suggests, 'in the idea of nature is the idea of man;. . . not only 
generally, or in ultimate ways, but the idea of man in society, indeed, the idea of kinds 
of societies' (1980: 171). 
Human ideas about nature, therefore, form part of a more general normative or 
political belief system. They have an ideological component. This suggests that there 
may be more involved in the articulation and reception of environmentalist ideas than 
merely a response to particular material (economic) conditions, or an awareness of 
resource limitations. In particular, if we accept that there have been recognisably 
'environmentalist' values or social movements as far back in history as the middle ages 
(Lowe and Goyder) or even in 'pre-history' (Oelschlaeger), it suggests that the extent 
to which these values have achieved a public and political voice or impact, may be 
related as much to their acceptability in the context of existent (hegemonic) political 
conditions in particular times and places, as to other social and material conditions. 
This should not, however, be taken as an argument in favour of a 'constructivist' view 
either of 'nature' or environmental degradation. As New (1995), suggests, 'nature' or 
'environment' has a 'real' existence which is independent of either the existence of 
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humanity, or of human representations or constructions of its 'nature' (or of the causes 
of environmental problems). 
So while claims about environmental threat and its societal causes are 
made within a discourse or set of discourses, they address, more or less 
adequately, a material threat whose present nature is independent of our 
present thinking, though it is partly the product of our past thinking . . . 
(New, 1995: 810) 
Sociology and Politics 
Both historically and in contemporary society 'the social sciences offer various more or 
less adequate accounts' of the nature of ' social reality' (ibid: 809). Whether or not these 
accounts are taken up, listened to, or perpetuated through institutionalisation may 
depend at least as much on factors external to sociology, including a dominant political 
ideology or value system as on the extent to which they are adequate. 
To say this is to admit that Catton and Dunlap's assessment of the history of 
sociology is correct - but only up to a point. Their argument suggests that sociologists 
have until recently accepted unequivocally what they call 'the dominant western world 
view' which assumes that human beings are unique among all the inhabitants of the 
planet in respect of their cultural and technological capacities, and therefore released 
from the natural or ecological constraints to which other species are subject. It is 
likely, however, that what came to be understood as 'sociology' was the outcome of a 
process of disagreement and debate about the extent to which different accounts of 
social reality were more or less adequate, and that the sociological accounts of social 
reality which achieved dominance were not those which were 'more adequate' than the 
others in terms of their account of the natural basis of human societies or the 
interrelationships between human societies and their environments, but rather that 
which most accurately reflected the dominant political ideology ofthe time. 
As New remarks, the nature of the current ecological crisis represents (at least 
partly) the outcome of past thinking, and 'its future nature is likely to be affected by 
how we think (and act) now' (ibid: 810). This is to beg a question about the definition, 
role and purpose of contemporary sociology. Nisbet has pointed out that however 
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much the classical sociologists cloaked their ideas in the language of objectivity, their 
work invariably had its roots in moral aspiration (1967: 18). This remains true of 
sociology today, with the significant difference that where the early sociologists often 
worked against a societal background in which sociology either did not exist, officially, 
or had little influence outside Universities due to its small institutional base (as well as 
public and 'official' suspicion of the subject), in the period since the Second World War 
it has expanded institutionally and, in general, become more 'acceptable' to people 
outside the university system. Contemporary sociology's role extends beyond the 
academy into both the political and public realm. 
If, as has been suggested, contemporary sociology is not just about society but 
in some part helps to constitute it, through its contribution to the institutional 
reflexivity of modernity (Giddens, 1991b: 2), two important questions follow. The first 
is the question of the adequacy of various contemporary accounts of the nature of 
social reality. The second is the question of the extent to which it is not the adequacy 
of accounts, but their correspondence with a dominant value system or political 
ideology which is decisive for their general acceptance, popularity and (social and 
political) influence. Even if the current assessment of the nature and scope of the 
'ecological crisis' is only partially accurate, these issues have an urgent relevance for 
contemporary sociology. 
Since the ecological crisis is simultaneously a social crisis and a socially created 
crisis, and sociology claims to be the academic and practical discipline whose concern 
is with the nature, problems and amelioration of social life, then any sociology that it 
worthy of the name must grapple seriously with the issue of the social creation of the 
crisis as well as with potential social solutions. 
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Sociology, Reflexivity, and the Adequacy of Accountsll 
A radical view of the role of sociology is that its role is essentially subversive. 
Sociology, according to this view, aims to get beneath the surface appearance of the 
world to discover 'what is really going on' out there 12 - whether or not what it 
discovers corresponds to or complements either popular (common sense) or more 
formally expressed political (ideological) accounts of social reality. This idea of 
sociology's role requires a more thorough-going 'reflexivity' than that inherent in the 
idea that sociology is part of modernity's inherent reflexivity (ie. the perpetual 
surveillance of social institutions by other social institutions) - which itself derives from 
the use of the concept of , reflexivity' as it has come to be defined by sociologists. To be 
'reflexive' is in one sense merely to be 'self-referential' (Abercrombie, 1988). For the 
ethnomethodologists on whom Giddens draws it is also in some way 'constitutive' of 
social contexts or situations, and may 'reproduce' or 'transform' them (lary and Jary, 
1991). 
While there is nothing wrong with these definitions in themselves, it should be 
pointed out that there is a potential difference between reflexivity as 'self-referentiality' 
and reflexivity as 'self-awareness'. Both definitions are implicit in an ordinary (non-
academic) dictionary definition of reflexive as 'implying action by the subject upon 
itself (Garmondsway, 1979). Certainly, all sociological accounts are self-referential to 
the extent that they are a part of the social world that studies the social world (or its 
parts). Not all sociological accounts, however, are self-aware. Reflexivity as 'self-
11 This discussion of reflexivity attempts to avoid getting bogged-down in some of the more 
extreme and complex contemporary debates about the role of reflexivity in the sociology of 
(scientific) knowledge. These are exemplifed both in and by Ashmore's (1989) The RefleXive 
Thesis. I came across Ashmore's book only after I had written the above, and felt that nothing 
positive would be added to the argument by engaging in a detailed consideration of the problem 
of the 'reflexivity of reflexivity'. and its implications for the (meta-) status of (sociological) 
knowledge. 
12 In his introductory textbook, Martin Joseph (1986: 5) put this clearly by suggesting that the 
role of the sociologist is to 'try to "stand outside ourselves" and our society ... to examine our 
taken for granted world: to examine and criticise what passes for common sense'. 
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awareness' is primarily a methodological tool, which has most recently become 
associated with feminist research processes, but was almost equally well-described by 
C. Wright Mills' term 'the sociological imagination': 
It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote 
transformation to the most intimate features of the human self - and to 
see the relations between the two .... it is by means of the sociological 
imagination that [people] now hope to grasp what is going on in the 
world, and to understand what is happening in themselves as minute 
points of the intersections of biography and history within society 
(1959: 7) 
A radical or subversive reflexivity involves a radical definition of sociology's role (to 
get underneath appearances to discover 'what is really going on')~ and it involves 
methodological reflexivity (the open acknowledgement that sociologists are themselves 
historically situated, both personally and 'institutionally'). At the level of theory, it 
involves recognising that (theories or) accounts of social reality are themselves 
historically situated social 'products'. 
If followed to its (logically extreme) ends, of course, this position is in danger 
of sliding into an endless relativism, where no account can lay claim to superiority, 
because all are equally social products. All that is being argued here, however, is that it 
is necessary to distinguish between the adequacy of an account of social reality, and its 
academic or social status. In institutionalised academic sociology, as in society, there 
exists what Becker (1967) has called a 'hierarchy of credibility'. 
In any system of ranked groups, participants take it as given that 
members of the highest group have the right to define the way things 
really are . . . those at the top have access to a more complete picture of 
what is going on than anyone else. Members of lower groups will have 
incomplete information, and their view of reality will be partial and 
distorted in consequence. Therefore . . . any tale told by those at the top 
intrinsically deserves to be regarded as the most credible account 
obtainable of the organisation's workings. And since . . . matters of rank 
and status are contained in the mores, this belief has a moral quality. 
We are ... morally bound to accept the definition imposed on reality by 
a superordinate group in preference to the definitions espoused by 
subordinates . . . Thus, credibility and the right to be heard are 
differentially distributed through the ranks of the system. (Becker, 
1967:241) 
54. 
While it may not be true of sociology as an institution that its members 
unquestioningly 'take it as given' that those in positions of power have the right to 
pronounce upon the adequacy of different accounts of social reality, a hierarchy 
nevertheless exists. Those at the top do have a greater capacity to define what counts 
as know/edge than those lower down. Moreover, as an institution, sociology is not free 
from external constraints, but is embedded in the wider society, in a largely dependent 
role, since, as Nicolaus (I 972: 50) points out, the salaries of the people called 
sociologists come from outside the discipline itself Of course, 
The sociology of knowledge cautions us to distinguish between the 
truth of a statement and an assessment of the circumstances under 
which the statement is made; though we trace an argument to its source 
in the interests of the person who made it, we have still not proved it 
false. (Becker, 1967: 240) 
A subversive reflexivity that keeps in mind this distinction at the level of theory is 
unlikely to slide into an extreme relativism. 
Overall, a subversively reflexive radical sociology involves, first, a recognition 
that a sociology that is merely 'self-referential' cannot provide an adequate account of 
the relations between social reality and its 'natural' environment. The societies which 
are the subject matter of sociology are not simply 'social orders' but are ultimately 
'natural' orders which are dependent on the existence of life-sustaining resources (both 
matter and energy). The availability of resources in tum becomes at least partially 
dependent on the social order, though this was not so in the first instance. Thus the 
continued existence, maintenance and development of societies and their 'natural' 
environments are profoundly interconnected (Williams, 1980). Second, a subversive 
reflexivity requires the recognition that there may be a difference between accounts of 
social reality that have a 'constitutive' or 'reproductive' role and those which have a 
'transformative' potential (leaving on one side the question of qualitative differences 
inherent in different 'transformative' potentials). This is to say that sociologists must 
recognise the possibility that any theory or account of social reality whose popular 
appeal lies in the fact that it appears to be an accurate reflection of 'what is really going 
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on' may be itself little more than a reflection or symptom of the social reality it 
attempts to describe or explain. In this sense, a sociology that 'in some part helps to 
constitute' social reality may be not much more than ideology, where ideology is 
understood, following Pareto, as 'derivations': rationalisations based on non-logical or 
sentimental beliefs (residues) which serve to justify particular (social or individual) 
activities (Jary and Jary, 1991; Parsons ([1937] 1968a: 199). 
The converse of this is that sociologists need to be aware of the possibility that 
a description or explanation of social reality that is apparently at odds with our 
everyday understanding of the world may still claim to he an adequate account of 
social reality, although such an account may not be 'constitutive' of it, in so far as it is 
an account that conflicts with a dominant ideology or system of beliefs, and is 
therefore not taken into consideration by either individuals or collectivities in the 
course of their day to day activities. The 'transformative' potential of an account of 
social reality which is (more) adequate in terms of its depiction of societal-environment 
relations may remain limited by a number of things, including its complexity, 
unfamiliarity or lack of an immediate appeal, in respect of particular interests that are 
perceived to be general, i.e. they are perceived to be the interests of an entire 
community, nation state, or group of nations. Importantly, the transformative potential 
of a radically subversive sociological account of the nature of social reality may be 
limited for reasons which have nothing to do with its adequacy, but precisely because it 
constitutes a challenge not just to competing sociological accounts, but also to the 
hegemony of existing political ideas. 
For sociologists, a subversive reflexivity must also acknowledge the fact that 
sociology itself has been embedded, historically, in the societies it has theorised and 
observed. This involves more than the recognition that the sociologist can only work 
with already existent lay concepts, so that there is continual slippage between the 
sociological use of a concept and its lay meaning (the 'double hermeneutic'), but insists 
that neither sociologists as individuals nor sociology in its institutional forms either are, 
or have been, immune to prevailing social and political conditions in the societies of 
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which they are part. Thus suggests not only that sociologists can never be value free -
a statement so commonplace as to be unremarkable - but neither are sociology's social 
or institutional forms. And these have been at least as important as the adequacy of its 
theoretical or empirical accounts of social reality for the definition, role and purpose of 
sociology. 
Institutions create a resonant and echoing intellectual environment. The 
sociological ideas which undergo institutionalisation are thereby given a 
greater weight in the competition of interpretations of social reality. 
(Shils, 1971: 762) 
Sociology as Social Life 
As Levine (1995:1) reminds us, the social sciences playa dual role: 'they study human 
behaviour and they exhibit it'. At the level of everyday life and professional practice, 
sociologists recognise (even if only implicitly) that the reception, acceptance or 
rejection of particular ideas or theories can often be effected by considerations that are 
not merely academic or intellectual. Power differentials inside academic institutions, 
personalities and inter-personal skills, professional jealousy, competition for posts, and 
the ability or commitment to 'networking' can all be factors in success or failure. Nor is 
academic life insulated from the social and political conditions outside the institution. 
The response of mass medias, or governments and others responsible for academic 
funding, can be crucially important for the development and public recognition of 
particular work, and therefore the careers and life chances of sociologists as members 
of society. Yet although all this is known by sociologists to apply at the level of their 
day-to-day lives, it is rarely acknowledged in histories of sociology, which tend to be 
histories of ideas which have been formally recognised. In this way, histories of 
sociology can in fact contribute to the process of legitimation and ultimately 
canonisation. 
Dunlap and Cattons (1979) re-examinination of the wider history of sociology 
which found evidence of the existence of (neglected examples of) environmental 
sociology in works other than 'classics' (see above p26) involves both the tacit 
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acceptance of the existence of a 'hierarchy of credibility' (historically) and the attempt 
to redefine what counts as sociological knowledge (now). Simply by drawing attention 
to a number of neglected works of 'environmental sociology', they raise a question 
about the sorts of processes that lead to particular sets of ideas taking precedence over 
others. 
This sprt of re-examination of the history of sociology can, however, also 
function to explain away the problem of how sociology developed with its peculiarly 
one-sided definition of 'environment' as social or cultural environment, which excludes 
the physical or natural environment. Hannigan's (1995) account of the neglect of the 
natural or physical environment, for example, argues that the exclusion of physical 
environment from sociology results from the geographic and biological determinist 
theories of two British thinkers, Thomas Henry Buckle and Herbert Spencer. In doing 
so, his account neglects to mention another early British 'environmental' sociologist, 
Patrick Geddes, whose work was neither geographically, nor biologically determinist, 
although he did give both environment and heredity a role in social evolution. 
Hannigan's account, admittedly, focusses on the influence of these theories in 
America, rather than in Britain. Spencer's, of course, is a household name in sociology. 
Although his work is no longer much studied (and he is mostly excluded from the roll 
call of classical 'founding fathers' of modem sociology), he is remembered as one of the 
first whose work called itself sociology, for the enormous popularity of his work in the 
nineteenth century, and for his unacceptable Utilitarianism. By contrast, Buckle's work 
is almost completely forgotten. Why then, does Buckle appear in Hannigan's account, 
while Geddes, (perhaps almost equally forgotten, but not exclusively 'geographical 
determinist') does not? 
Buckle's work, says Hannigan, was 'widely read and quite influential', used by 
the economist T. N. Carver in his course at Harvard even before that University had a 
formal department of sociology. Also, one American 'founder', Sumner, had developed 
an interest in Buckle, developed during his years at Oxford University (Hannigan, 
1995: 6). Hannigan's account of Buckle as an influence on Sumner draws on 
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Bierstedt's (1981) American Sociological Theory: A Critical History. 13 His account of 
Buckle's work draws on a 1976 revised edition of Timashe£rs 1955 Sociological 
Theory: its Nature and Growth (Timasheff and Theordorson, 1976). Buckle achieved a 
place in the history of American Sociology via Sorokin's (1928) Contemporary 
Sociological Theories, perhaps as a result of his inclusion in Carver's courses (Carver 
and Sorokin almost certainly corresponded at some time around these years (Sorokin, 
1963: 225». Timasheff, another Russian emigre, friend and colleague of Sorokin's 
from his university days before the Revolution (Sorokin, 1963: 88), leaned heavily on 
Sorokin's definition of the field, for his own book (Timasheff, 1967 [1955]: 8; Sorokin, 
1956 [1928]: 760-761).14 Geddes, by contrast with Buckle, appears nowhere in 
Sorokin's book (and hence not in TimashefPs), although there is one reference each to 
his colleagues Victor Branford and lA. Thomson. IS Perhaps, in such a compendious 
work, Sorokin's oversight seems trivial. Yet many of the sociologists who were 
deemed worthy of inclusion in his textbook are now marginal and forgotten figures 
(where Geddes, in spite of his generalised exclusion from sociology, is not (see, for 
example, Meller, 1990; Novak, 1995». Additionally, there is some evidence that 
Geddes did have a small influence on the development of American sociology (see 
below, Chapter 2). But as a consequence of his exclusion from accounts of early 
history of American sociology by Sorokin, then Timasheff, then Bierstedt, Geddes' 
name was not available to Hannigan, when he wrote his account in 1995. This 
illustrates the extent to which the institutionalisation of particular sociologies and 
sociologists has the capacity to effectively marginalise or exclude others, via personal 
allegiances as well as textbooks of sociology, the construction of histories of sociology 
and the establishment of a 'hierarchy of credibility'. 
13 Bierstedt was a student of Sorokin's during his Harvard years (Coser, 1977). 
14 Tirnasheff quietly took Sorokin's part in the rivalry between Sorokin and Parsons 
(Tirnasheff, 1967 [1955]: especially 248; Sorokin 1966: 420-431). 
15 The reference to Branford is to his (1918) obituary and Review of Durkheirn. The reference 
to Thomson (mis-spelled Thompson) is to the 1917 American edition of his (1909) Darwinism 
and Human Life. 
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An alternative strategy for accounting for the neglect of environment in 
sociology, then, needs to be radically reflexive, by maintaining an awareness of the 
inter-relations between sociological ideas and theories, sociology's institutional fonns, 
sociology as the social life of its practitioners, and the social and political conditions 
in which all of these are embedded. In the chapter which follows, therefore, an account 
of Patrick Geddes' sociological work is preceded by a brief account of the social, 
economic, political, and environmental context of the years around the tum of the 
century in Britain. It was against this background that sociology became established as 
an academic discipline in Britain, a process in which Geddes, initially, played a major 
part. The story of the foundation of sociology as an academic discipline, and Geddes' 
exclusion, is told in Chapter Three. 
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Chapter 2. 
Patrick Geddes as Environmental Sociologist 
Introduction 
Patrick Geddes makes only rare appearances in contemporary sociology. When he is 
discussed at all, it is usually only for his role in the establishment of sociology in Britain 
- a role that isgenerally understood to have been, in the end, a negative one. His work, 
to the extent that it is mentioned at all by sociologists, tends to be associated with the 
development of Town Planning, and it is for Cities in Evolution (1915) that he is most 
commonly remembered. 1 Geddes, however, made his earliest forays into the new 
subject of sociology in the early 1880s, attempting to map out the scope and definition 
of the new subject - on the basis of his reading of Comte and Spencer - before even 
Durkheim. His early work is not well-known. Yet it is only on the basis of this work 
that an assessment of Geddes' sociology can properly be made, since it constitutes the 
theoretical and epistemological foundation of all his subsequent work. Consequently, 
two early papers (Geddes, 1881, 1884) form the basis of discussion of Geddes' work, 
though his later work is also mentioned where relevant. The chapter begins with brief 
accounts of the historical context in which he worked and of his early life and 
character, and ends with an attempt to assess his significance for both classical human 
ecology and the 'new' human ecology associated with Catton and Dunlap. No attempt 
is made to assess the extent of Geddes' influence on the American sociologist Lewis 
Mumford (but see Mumford, in Novak, 1995: 353-372). 
1 The Collins Dictionary o/Sociology (lary and Jary, 1991) has no entry under Geddes. The 
term 'conurbation' however, is attributed to Geddes, and Cities in Evolution appears in the 
bibliography. 
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Historical Context: Conditions in Late Nineteenth Century Britain 
The contrast between the British experience of industrialisation and that of America, 
France and Germany cannot be drawn too strongly. Not only had Britain's population 
grown exponentially (unlike that of France) during the course of the nineteenth century 
(without, as in America, a correspondingly large geographical area to expand into), but 
so had its means of industrial production. Yet where Germany's more recent industrial 
growth was largely state-directed, and had the advantage of being able to utilise the 
most up-to-date technology, Britain's was unplanned and haphazard (Peel, 1971: 240-
241). As Kemp (1985) suggests, Britain was the industrial pioneer. Moreover, perhaps 
because it depended on the private initiative of individuals, investment in new and 
possibly cleaner technologies was delayed, so that by the 1890s, not only was Britain's 
position as the industrial capital of the world under threat, the environmental 'side-
effects' (Beck 1992) or impacts of industrialisation and its accompanying urbanisation 
were, in many cities, but particularly in London, highly visible. 
Environmental Conditions 
Atmospheric pollution in urban Britain was at its height in the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century: 'in 1881-5 it lost a sixth of the sun it might have enjoyed in a state 
of nature'. (Clapp, 1994: 14) Most, though not all, of this pollution was caused by 
industry (boilers, blast furnaces, coke ovens, pottery kilns and so on), which was 
careless in its use of coal. Another major cause was the steam driven railway engine 
(ibid: 21), while in any urban area the smoke from domestic fires was also problematic. 
The design of grates and chimneys was often inefficient,2 and it was this which 
prompted the formation of the Coal Smoke Abatement Society in 1898.3 Attempts to 
2 The continental stove, much more efficient than an open fire in tenns of the ratio of useful 
heat to fuel consumption, was ignored by commissioners appointed to report on the heating and 
ventilation of dwellings. Englishmen (apparently) 'preferred fresh air to warmth' and stoves 
'tended to make a room stuffy' (Clapp, 1994: 17). Small wonder that the English invited the 
derision of the efficient Germans! 
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legislate for the control of smoke were largely ineffective throughout the nineteenth 
century, partly due to the difficulties of enforcing the legislation, and partly to a lack of 
enthusiasm for the cause. The Metropolitan Police, charged with the job of enforcing 
smoke control in London, achieved over a thousand convictions between 1877 and 
1881, but the fines were so small that a conviction was unlikely to be a deterrent (ibid. 
32-4). 
Other causes of atmospheric pollution came from alkali manufacture, which 
produced as 'by-products' hydrochloric acid and, less dangerously, calcium sulphide. In 
spite of the fact that a means of reducing the production of hydrochloric acid had been 
patented as early as 1836, very few manufacturers took up the system. and those that 
did often allowed the weakly acidic solution produced to drain away into the nearest 
river, instead of finding a use for it, thus simply transferring the pollution from air to 
water (ibid: 24). 
Organic pollutants (including, perhaps especially, human waste), were widely 
perceived to be problematic in urban areas, by local authorities as well as Poor Law 
reformers and members of the medical profession, as early as the 1830s. The 
traditional way to deal with organic pollutants was the ash-pit, into which went the 
'night-soil', rotting vegetables, bones. and fat. Although galvanised dustbins came into 
use during the 1880s, and the installation of 'water closets' was gradually increased 
after the completion of London's trunk sewers in 1864, some ashpits remained in use 
up to the first world war and beyond. They were not forbidden in new buildings until 
the 1930s (ibid: 27-29). 
Urban water supplies for drinking were largely secured by the late part of the 
nineteenth century, by drawing them from the upper reaches of the Thames, from 
3 The Coal Smoke Abatement Society was itself the result of a smoke abatement committee 
formed in the 1880s on the inspiration of the National Health Society. (founded in 1873), and 
the Kyrle Society (founded in 1877) by Miranda and Octavia Hill 'to bring beauty home to the 
people' (cited in Clapp. 1994: 45)4 It was Spencer, in Man versus the State (1969 [1884]) who 
coined the phrase 'old liberalism'. 
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central Wales and the Peak and Lake Districts as well as from wells, dams and 
reservoirs. But the pollution of rivers further downstream became increasingly severe 
throughout the nineteenth century. Filth poured into them from factories as well as 
from the sewers 
. . . but an unsightly stream devoid of fish is not necessarily a threat to 
health. Events were to show that aesthetic and ecological arguments 
unsupported by public health considerations or a powerful body of 
opinion would not persuade local authorities to refrain from river 
pollution. (Clapp, 1994: 74) 
All of this indicates that late nineteenth century Britain was experiencing what 
would now be described as an environmental 'crisis'. Moreover, it is clear that the 
causes of this crisis were social. In particular they were linked to the haphazard and 
unregulated nature of industrialisation, and a capitalist political and economic system 
that was as reluctant to intervene against the capitalists' despoilation of the 
environment as they were to intervene to ensure either the health of the labouring 
population or a more equitable distribution of the 'wealth' it created. 
Economic. Social and Political Conditions 
The period of the late nineteenth century was, of course, a time of economic, social 
and political as well as environmental 'crisis'. All four were profoundly inter-connected. 
As the first nation to industrialise, Britain had enjoyed a prolonged period of economic 
expansion up to the depression of the 1870s. Economic and imperial expansion went 
hand in hand with urbanisation and Britain's cities, in particular London, grew at an 
alarming rate. Increasingly, social conditions, including pollution, became a matter of 
both charitable and official concern. Chadwick's Report on the Sanitary Conditions of 
the Labouring Population was published in 1842 (Best, 1964), and Mayhew's London 
Labour and the London Poor in 1851 (Quennell, undated). After 1870, when Britain's 
industrial supremacy came increasingly under threat from other industrialising nations, 
most especially Germany, America and Japan, social conditions began to affect 
political stability. Economic and imperial expansion had both been factors in political 
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stability for most of the century, but as decline set in, the efficiency and capability of 
government and administration began to be questioned. 
Nmeteenth century governments adhered largely to the 'old' Liberalism4 
embodied in the idea oflaissez-faire economics, of which Samuel Smiles, author of Self 
Help (1859), Character (1871), Thrift (1875), and Duty (1880), is often held up as an 
exemplar (Bellamy, 1992). As the titles of Smile's works indicate, old Liberalism 
involved an ideal of moral virtue as well as an economic ideal. Smiles summed up the 
prevailing ethos of the greater part of the nineteenth century when he wrote that 
'National progress is the sum of individual industry, energy and uprightness as national 
decay is of individual idleness, selfishness and vice' (1859, [1925]: 3~ cited in Bellamy, 
1992: 11). By the late 1880s, however, social conditions were contributing to the 
breakdown of political consensus. 
One major factor was poverty. Although living standards rose for many during 
the course of the nineteenth century, the distribution of income remained unequal. In 
1867, 0.07% of the population had an annual income of £5,000 or more, while at the 
other end of the scale, 29% had an annual income of between £10.10s. and £36. This 
distribution had not changed significantly by 1900 (Thane, 1982: 4). The causes of 
poverty were primarily low pay, old age, ill health or widowhood, although 
unemployment and underemployment were also important. 
The development of social science was another important factor in the 
breakdown of consensus. After Mayhew and Chadwick, other social investigators, in 
particular Booth and Rowntree, began to publish their findings, bringing the severity 
and extent of poverty to public attention. Booth's surveys in London, and Rowntree's 
in York were startlingly similar in their conclusions. Booth found that 30% of the 
inhabitants of London were poor - meaning that they had no surplus income above the 
barest of essentials for much of the time, with nothing left over in case of a crisis. 
Rowntree found that 10% of the people of York had earnings which were below his 
4 It was Spencer, in Man versus the State (1969 [1884]) who coined the phrase 'old liberalism'. 
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stringently defined poverty line, while another 17.93% remained poor in spite of an 
income above the poverty line, and continued to live in extremely squalid conditions 
(Thane, 1982: 5-7). Although Rowntree believed that poverty was often linked to 
'immoral' behaviour (alcoholism, gambling), he also drew attention to poor 
environmental conditions as partly responsible for this. Drinking and gambling, he felt 
are themselves often the outcome of the adverse conditions under 
which too many of the working classes live. Housed for the most part in 
sordid streets, frequently in overcrowded and unhealthy conditions, 
compelled very often to earn their bread by monotonous and laborious 
work and unable, partly through limited education and partly through 
overtime and other causes of physical exhaustion, to enjoy intellectual 
recreation. (Rowntree, cited in Thane, 1982: 9) 
The Boer War (1900-1902) was another important factor in the breakdown of 
political consensus. First, many potential recruits had to be turned away as a result of 
their malnourished condition, a fact which initially became known to the public in the 
form of rumour, but which becme 'official' when the figures were pulished in 1904 
(Thane, 1982~ Searle, 1971). Second, a number of administrative errors and 
inefficiencies in the conduct of the war caused widespread public despondency about 
the supremacy of the British nation, and raised doubts about the abilities of those in 
positions of power to administer effectively. As Shaw said 'Whatever else the war may 
do or undo, it at least turns its fierce searchlights on official, administrative and military 
perfunctoriness' (cited in Searle, 1971: 39). Thus, by highlighting the inefficiencies and 
failures of the political establisment, the war became a factor in both the rise of the 
new 'social reformist' Liberalism (of which Leonard Hobhouse was a principle 
exponent), and a contributory factor in the rise of the LSE, whose founder, Sidney 
Webb, was both a Fabian socialist and an advocate of efficiency. 5 
5 An illustrated headline, which adorned a 1902 article on LSE, by Sidney Webb, proclaimed: 
'London's New Weapon in the Struggle for Commerical Supremacy. The New School of 
Economics'. (The Sphere, 31st May, 1902, illustration in Dahrendorf, 1995, between pages 
108 and 109). 
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The Boer war, Britain's declining world position, jealousy of Germany's rising 
industrial and social efficiency and the 'degenerate' condition of the masses were all 
contributory factors in the rise of the ideologies of both nationalism per se, and 
National Efficiency. The latter was not a homogenous political ideology, but had wide 
cross-party appeal (Searle, 1971: 54). Germany and Japan became the models to be 
followed, though the Japanese, as Britain's allies from 1902, did not inspire the same 
jealousy and fear as did the Germans. National efficiency could mean administrative, 
industrial, military or social efficiency, a concern with the improvement of the 'national 
physique', or with ensuring that those in positions of power were appropriately 
educated (the 'cult of the expert') (ibid: 60-80~ Freeden, 1978: 177-85). For some it 
meant that government should be based on an awareness of the social implications of 
scientific knowledge, or should be run according to the principles of good commercial 
business (Searle, 1971: 83-92). Most worryingly perhaps, and linked with the 
intellectual atmosphere of the rise of Darwinian science - which was as central in 
Britain as elsewhere - national efficiency sometimes came to mean 'racial progress' 
(ibid: 96). Calls for a variety of social policies could be, and were, justified by an 
appeal to 'efficiency' by conservatives, socialists and liberals alike. Francis Galton's new 
'science' of 'Eugenics' - which appeared to be a realistic proposition for some people, in 
the wake of the re-discovery of Mendelian genetics in 1900, would be an important 
factor in the establishment and development of sociology in Britain. Its political appeal, 
like that of national efficiency, was broad. It attracted, at different times, A.I. Balfour, 
Neville Chamberlain, I.B.S. Haldane, Harold Laski,6 and 1.M. Keynes (Searle, 1976: 
12-14). Even those who never went so far as to become members of the Eugenics 
Education Society, and were otherwise genuinely liberal, like I.A. Hobson, could be 
found insisting that 
6 Dahrendorf(1995: 224) suggests that Laski's interest in eugenics was 'kindled' by his wife, 
Frida. 
Selection of the fittest, or at least, rejection of the unfittest, is essential 
to all progress in life and character ... To abandon the production of 
children to unrestricted private enterprise is the most dangerous 
abnegation of its functions which any government can practice. 
(Hobson (1901), cited in Freeden, 1978: 178) 
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Eugenics, like national efficiency in general, was (except perhaps for a short 
while after its inception in 1901), hardly ever a 'unified' movement. Eugenists divided 
into two main camps - 'positive' and 'negative' eugenists. Positive eugenists wanted 
racial progress via 'good breeding', while negative eugenists aimed to prevent 
unsuitable breeding. At least at first, eugenics attracted many who were keen to see 
social amelioration of one sort or another, believing that 
eugenics covered any measure that might improve the health and 
happiness of babies. Others, who knew better, were easily side-tracked, 
or, in some cases, deliberately posed as eugenists in order to attract 
attention to some other cause they wished to promote, temperance, sex 
education, control of venereal disease, the establishment of milk depots, 
. . . The social reformer, as [Major Leonard] Darwin was aware, 
sometimes sought the eugenist's support 'in connection with some 
minor eugenical advantages resulting from his proposals . . . when once 
the eugenic blessing has been received, all thoughts of hereditary 
influences are likely to disappear from his mind'. (Searle, 1976: 14) 
Thus it was often difficult to separate those who were true eugenists from 
those who were not. Caleb Saleeby, for example, called himself a eugenist, and took a 
prominent role in the Eugenics Education Society (Searle, 1976). He wrote one of the 
earliest textbooks of Sociology to appear in Britain. Here, he proclaimed himself to be 
interested in sociology and the social sciences 'as the necessary preliminaries to any 
scientific study of the principles of morality' (Saleeby, c.l905: 19).' This proto-
Hobhousian or Durkheimian conception of sociology is supplemented by a chapter on 
the city which gives the strong impression that Saleeby was an environmentalist, in a 
7 Saleeby's textbook, SOciology, is undated. Textual evidence indicates that it was published 
around 1905-6. Saleeby mentions only the first volume of the journal of the Sociological 
Society, the Sociological Papers, which contains the papers read to the Society during the 
course ofits first year's meetings in 1904. 
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fairly modem sense. He wrote at length of the causes of degeneration in the city as 
consisting in overcrowding, dirty air, lack of sunlight, and the absence of adequate 
sources of fresh food. 
[T]he citizen is a stranger to pure air. . . because he bums coal and 
bums it uneconomically, dirtily, and dangerously. His air is not merely 
an impure mixture of gases, but is loaded with deleterious solid particles 
as well. The lungs of the eskimo are pearly white; those of the average 
Briton a dirty grey; of the Londoner, coal-black - which is indeed to be 
expected, since they are full of coal. . . . the modem city is an insult to 
the sun, which is the giver of life and the great anti-septic. Sixty percent 
is the proportion of sunlight cut off from the citizens of London by the 
dirt in their atmosphere. (Saleeby, c.190s: 88-89) 
Saleeby's 'eugenic' position provides a good illustration of the ways in which this new 
'science' of racial improvement, of which the purpose, according to its founder, Francis 
Galton, was to improve the inborn qualities of the race, could be 'perverted' by those 
with other motives. Saleeby called himself a eugenist, was active in the Eugenics 
Education Society, claimed to believe that heredity was more important than 
'environment' in evolution (ibid: 105), while simultaneously trumpeting the virtues of 
Garden Cities and model villages like Port Sunlight and Bournville (ibid: 93). 
Overall, the years around the tum of the century were the culmination of a 
rising tide of concern about the problem of 'degeneration', whether physical, moral or 
both, and nationalistic jealousy of (especially) Germany, against an intellectual 
background in which Darwin's theory exemplified the highest achievements of science. 
The central question of the age was how to arrest this national decay. How it was 
answered depended to a large extent on one's political beliefs, socio-economic and 
intellectual background. This confused and confusing political and intellectual situation 
would eventually give rise to the 'new' Liberal welfare reforms between 1906 and 
1914, which have been seen by some as the foundations of the Welfare State (Thane, 
1982), and by others as a 'social service' state (Hay, 1983). 
At the 'official' level of government and administration, awareness of the 
existence of an 'environmental' crisis connected to the social crisis, was evident in the 
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rise of the Public Health movement. By 1889, there were 1,500 Medical Officers of 
Health, a role that involved reporting on health and the enforcement of sanitary 
legislation in a district (porter, 1991:165). By 1907, the public health movement, 
which included such institutions as the Society of Medical Officers of Health, the 
Royal Institute of Health and the Royal Sanitary Institute, began to align itself with the 
Town Planning Movement (ibid: 168), a movement which was undoubtedly 
'environmentalist' (though not necessarily concerned with 'natural' environments or the 
relations between people and nature). Similarly, Town Planners like Barry Parker and 
Raymond Unwin (strongly influenced by the ideas of Patrick Geddes) co-opted the 
language of public health when they advocated housing reform on the basis that over-
crowding exacerbated the spread of disease (ibid: 168). Both groups played to the 
popularity of eugenics. As Porter suggests 
environmentalist ideologies co-opted the language of degenerationism 
into arguments for comprehensive, holistic social planning. . . an 
example of the mixture of eugenic rhetoric and environmental 
reformism, the latter of which was exemplified by Patrick Geddes' 
work. Whatever the precise terms of the discourse, however, the 
emphasis was on regeneration through nurture rather than nature. 
(porter, 1991: 169) 
During these years, however, the public health and town planing movements were only 
one response to environmental and social crisis. The foundation of other recognisably 
'environmentalist' movements was indicative of a more generalised public awareness of 
the extent of the crisis of , industrial' society. 
The Emergence of Environmentalism in Environmental Crisis 
Several recognisably environmentalist movements began in the decades around the tum 
of the century, among which were the Coal Smoke Abatement Society as well as the 
Garden Cities Association, the Selboume Society, the Royal Society for the Protection 
of Birds, the National Trust, the Metropolitan and Garden Cities Association, the 
Camping Club, and the Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire 
(Lowe and Goyder, 1983: 16). If Dunlap and Catton's argument for the visibility of 
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environmental problems, and the emergence of environmentalist movements as factors 
involved in the development of environmental sociology (1994: 7), is correct, the 
existence of an environmental sociology in Britain during these years should not 
surprise us. One reason that it has remained hidden lies in the fact that sociology did 
not 'officially' exist in Britain during these years, but was itself no more than a 'social 
movement' (Halliday, 1968). There were many social thinkers who either called their 
own work sociology during these years, or who quickly adopted the title following 
institutionalisation. One difficulty for contemporary historians of sociology is to decide 
which of these works was really sociology, and which was not. 
Background and Character of an Environmental Sociologist 
Born in rural Scotland, in October 1854, Patrick Geddes was the youngest child of 
elderly parents of fairly modest means. His formal education took place at the local 
school, but it seems to have been his informal education which inspired him and 
determined his adult interests. His father, who had been a professional soldier, was 
retired by the time of his youngest son's birth, and spent many hours teaching the boy 
to garden, and to observe the plant and animal life around him in the Scottish hills. 
Geddes resisted careers in both banking and the church, and continued to study, 
informally, chemistry, biology, geology, mineralogy, botany and physiology. In the 
mid-1870s, at the age of twenty, and under pressure from his family to finally choose a 
career, Geddes opted for botany and left for the University of Edinburgh, where, 
finding the classroom education dull, dry and lifeless, he discovered the work of T .H. 
Huxley, champion of the (then heretical) ideas of Charles Darwin. Abruptly terminating 
his Edinburgh studies, he determined to work with Huxley at the London School of 
Mines. 
Upon arrival in London, however, Geddes found that his years of informal 
study counted for nothing, as Huxley demanded that he spend a further year in more 
formal study before being allowed to join the course. The result was that Geddes spent 
the following year exploring and observing in urban London, a startling contrast with 
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his former habits of rural observation and nature study. At the end of the year he 
passed with ease the exams necessary to enable him to study biology under Huxley. 
Geddes' subsequent intellectual development owed much to the influence of 
Huxley. Through him, Geddes developed an interest in the social theories of Comte 
and Spencer,8 who would remain important influences throughout his life. In London, 
too, he came into contact with the English positivists as well as with Ruskin, with 
whom he corresponded, and who was to become another life-long influence. It was 
Huxley who suggested, in the late 1870s, that his over-worked student spend time in 
France, where Geddes came into contact (via Demolins) with the social theories ofLe 
Play. 
From the early 1880s, Geddes made increasing incursions into the new science 
of sociology, even while he was employed as a teacher and demonstrator of botany at 
Edinburgh. He never produced a work solely devoted to sociology, however, though 
one was planned. He remained on the fringes of academic life all his life, even after he 
became the first Professor of Sociology and Civics at the University of Bombay, for a 
fixed five year term. 
Personality 
In so far as Geddes appears in texts devoted to the history of sociology he is usually 
presented as having been a 'maverick' (Meller, 1990), eccentric (Hawthorn, 1976), 
amateur (philip Abrams, 1968), a 'sociographer' whose theory made no impact on 
sociology (Fletcher, 1971)~ or with having contributed little beyond the development 
of the survey method (which is mainly attributed to Booth and Rowntree (Mark 
Abrams, 1951». More seriously, he has been condemned for having shown subsequent 
generations of town-planners what to avoid (Hebbert, 1980). This characterisation is 
to some extent understandable. Geddes was an exuberant, plain-speaking, forthright 
man, whose capacity to assimilate the ideas and theories of others from both natural 
8 Huxley and Spencer were old friends, though they fought publicly about theories of evolution 
(peel, 1971: 132; 151-3). 
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and social science was enormous. The scope of his own knowledge was vast, and he 
had little patience for those who failed to understand and be enthused by his ideas. 
Although he touched the lives of many of his contemporaries in a profound way 
through personal contact, lectures and letters, he felt himself, in the end, to have failed. 
As he wrote to his friend Branford in 1919, a life-time spent thinking was doomed to 
futility if not accompanied by publication. And then, too, he had simply ignored those 
who disapproved of his theories, when it would have been better to have defended 
himself publicly (Geddes, cited in Boardman, 1978: 298-299). 
Lewis Mumford, who claimed to have been profoundly influenced by Geddes 
intellectually, met him, towards the end of Geddes' life, in 1923. The two men had 
corresponded intermittently from 1917 (Novak, 1995), and Geddes had hoped that 
Mumford would be his colleague and collaborator, helping him to sort out his 
sociological ideas and produce his long-planned sociology book. Geddes was by this 
time an old and broken man, having lost both his wife and eldest son in 1917 (the 
former to dysentery, the latter to the war) a tragedy from which he never recovered 
(compare photographs, Boardman, 1978: 279). He had high hopes of his relationship 
with Mumford, both personally and intellectually. Yet their meeting was not a success, 
and Mumford, clearly filled with guilt at having failed to live up to the older man's 
hopes, while profiting intellectually from their association, subsequently attempted to 
exonerate himself by publishing an account of the failure of their friendship, which 
amounts to no less than an outright assassination of Geddes' character. There can be 
little doubt that Geddes was never, even before his personal tragedy, an easy 
personality. Yet the picture Mumford presents is of a wild and dishevelled maniac, 
lacking in manners and mumbling perpetually and incoherently into his unkempt beard 
(Mumford, 1966). Meller's (1990) sketch of his character is probably much more 
accurate. 
Working outside any conventional framework, either institutional or 
academic, Geddes . . . . had a brilliant facility for demolishing the ideas 
of others, from which he gained much pleasure. He was a restless 
'entrepreneur' in the newly-developing social sciences, who preferred to 
test his own ideas in personal debate which tended to give him the 
advantage. He reached out to as many individuals as he could by 
constant travelling, fleeting exhibitions, and lecturing, and was happy 
when he met people receptive to his ideas. Believing that achieving his 
objective: social and environmental improvement and regional self-
determination, could not be done by book learning alone, he was too 
impatient to spend his time developing his ideas in a major 
treatise. {Meller, 1990: 2) 
Geddes' Theoretical Orientation 
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Geddes was a holistic thinker, although the term itself was not coined until 1926, near 
the end of his life.9 All things biological and social, natural and cultural, scientific and 
artistic, theoretical and practical, were, for Geddes, interlinked in basic and essential 
ways, leading him to transpose his own basic biological triad of environment, function 
and organism, on to the Le Playist formula, place, work and folk. 10 By the early 1920s 
Geddes defined sociology in terms of the holistic study of people, affairs and places - a 
synthetic discipline composed of anthropology, his own brand of economics and 
geography - whose object was to catch the flux or moving stream of everyday life, the 
better to discern its evolutionary direction (1920:3-4). But Geddes, in common with 
the other classical sociologists, was concerned not only with an understanding of 
society and social change, but with improving it. His difficulty (or one of them) lay in 
getting people to understand his vision, which - though it differed only in certain 
respects from more conventional world-views - was incomprehensible to many of his 
contemporaries. In 1920, Geddes felt that a return to the pre-war trajectory of social 
and economic development would be inimical to progress. The post-war era, he 
believed, offered opportunities (as well as many dangers) for radical social departures 
and reconstruction, in which the newly developing social sciences had much to offer 
(1920:4). His major ideas for 'the making of the future' were published as part of a 
9 The tenn holism was coined by J.C. Smuts, in Holism and Evolution (1926). Both Boardman 
(1978) and Kitchen (1975) record Geddes' approval of this book. 
10 The influence of Le Playist sociology should not be overstated. Geddes was equally 
influenced by Comte's work, from which the Le Playists wished to dissociate themselves. 
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series of the same name between 1917 and 1919. Their message was that the time had 
come for a transition from a 'machine and money economy towards one of life and 
personality and citizenship' (Boardman, 1978: 304). 
Geddes and Darwin 
Darwin of course, was at least as important a figure in late nineteenth century Britain 
as he was elsewhere. As a botanist who had worked under Darwin's fiercest defender, 
T.H. Huxley, it would be surprising if Geddes had not had a more sophisticated 
understanding of the theory of evolution by natural selection than some of the other 
sociologists of the late nineteenth century. His dual interest in both social and natural 
science is significant, for if Darwin and Spencer were often 'routinely conflated in the 
public mind' (Young, 1985: 184), and even, as Clarke (1984) has argued, in the minds 
of sociologists, this is less likely to be true of Geddes. Moreover, the debate over 
Darwin's theory did not stand still, and Geddes, since he continued to be both a 
botanist and a sociologist, kept abreast of these debates. With his friend and former 
student I. Arthur Thomson, Geddes produced several articles for the Chambers 
Encyclopaedia between 1888 and 1892 on subjects including Biology, Botany, 
Environment and Evolution and (again with Thomson) published small volumes on 
Evolution (1911) and Biology (1924), as well as in 1931 the enormous two volume 
work entitled Life: an Outline of General Biology. These texts leave little doubt that 
Geddes followed the debates critically, knew the history, and understood the various 
theories of evolution well enough to use them creatively for his own, social-theoretical 
ends. To the extent that his work is 'biologically' confused, therefore, it is likely that 
this is consistent with confusions within contemporary biology itself. 
Geddes' Environmental Sociology 
Two early papers give the best indication of the subsequent direction of his thought. 
The first, 'On the Classification of Statistics and its Results', was presented at the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh in instalments between March and May 1881, followed in 1884 
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by 'An Analysis of the Principles of Economics'. The two papers form the basis of his 
subsequent sociology. 
The Classification of Statistics 
The 1881 paper was an ambitious attempt, heavily influenced by his reading of Comte, 
to devise a system of classification for all social statistics. The system was based on a 
set of axiomatic statements about societies in their relationship with nature. Having 
defined statistics as 'a quantitative record of the observed facts or relations in any 
branch of science' (1881: 8), Geddes proposed the following definition of 'a society'. 
First . . . a society obviously exists within certain limits of time and 
space. Secondly it consists of a number of living organisms. Thirdly, 
these modify surrounding nature, primarily by seizing part of its matter 
and energy. Fourthly, they apply this matter and energy to the 
maintenance of their life, i.e. the support oftheir physical functions .... 
A society may be much more than all this . . . but in any case these four 
generalisations are obviously true, neither hypothesis nor metaphysical 
principle being involved. These will therefore henceforth be termed 
sociological axioms. (1881: 12) 
These propositions formed the basis of Geddes subsequent explanation of the 
persistence of social activity through time and space, in terms of the production and 
consumption of life-sustaining goods. 11 Contained in these axiomatic statements is the 
basis of his sociological theory. 
Geddes' holism was apparent even at this early stage. A complete set of 
statistics for any given society would include a variety of data about people 
(organisms), their occupations (function) and their environment. The concept of 
environment was absolutely central in Geddes' sociology. He used it, in different 
contexts, to refer to every aspect of human existence - natural, cultural, and built (and 
even to the 'internal environment' of the body), though he was not always careful to 
specify which sense of the term he was using at any given moment. 
11 Geddes may have taken his axioms largely from the German 'social energeticist' Wilhelm 
Ostwald. Compare Sorokin's (1956 [1928]: 20-22) account of Ostwald's work with Geddes' 
sociological axioms. 
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The purpose of a complete set of statistics would be to provide a 'snapshot' of a 
particular moment in the moving flux of history (1881: 8-9). The tabular presentation 
of his system was complex, and it was by no means immediately clear how all the 
information, once collected, could be collated and made commensurable (leaving aside 
the very big problem of interpretation). An unabridged copy of Geddes' diagram 
(figure 1) has here been included on a separate sheet, to accomodate its size (see inside 
back cover). Boardman's (1978) adaptation of the original (figure 2), in which he has 
added a fifth 'axiom' on the basis that this is what Geddes himself intended, appears on 
the following page. 
In relation to his first axiom, Geddes proposed to classify statistics under the 
heading 'Territory' (physical environment). Here he included information about the 
quality and quantity of land and water, the extent of its use and disuse, the functions 
for which it was used, whether specialised or unspecialised, and its expansion, whether 
due to human agency (e.g. expansion through land reclamation, discovery, purchase or 
'conquest') or natural geological changes, or contraction through either social agency 
or natural forces (for example, floods, earthquakes, avalanches, etc.). 
Under Organisms (people) Geddes put statistical data on population, its growth 
and decrease through migration as well as birth and death rates, and information about 
different physical characteristics based on 'racial' difference. To this he added 
information concerning the mental, physical and social health of populations, as well as 
information about employment, understood as different sorts of 'operations on matter 
and energy'. These 'operations' might involve the physical environment as in mining, 
farming, fishing, manufacture and transport, or act on other organisms (as in service 
occupations). 
Another important aspect of 'function' or occupation, for Geddes, was its 
centrality for the study of social relations. Although he did not explicitly formulate it as 
such in 1881, it is possible to elucidate his intention by following his classificatory 
diagram. Under the heading 'organisms' (people), he included statistics relating to 
'mutual relations'. The difficulty of uncovering the nature of something so nebulous as 
Figure 2: Geddes' Sociological Axioms and Classification of Statistics 
Axiom I A society exists within certain Group A (Territory) includes all facts of political geography: the quantity and 
limits of space and time. quality of space occupied by the nation in question 
Axiom II A society consists of living Group B (Organisms) deals with the quantity. quality and occupations of 
organisms. members of society: what they are and what they do. 
Axiom ill Organisms modify Group C (production) co-ordinates the facts relating to sources of energy in the 
surrounding nature, mainly by territory: to exploitation, manufacture and movement of products~ and to 
seizing part of its matter and premature loss of energy and matter. 
energy. 
Axiom IV Organisms use this matter and Group D (Distribution) would include the manner in which territory, products. 
energy in the maintenance of services, or tokens for any of these are divided among or consumed by the 
their life. society's members. 
Axiom V orgarusms are modified by Group E (Results) would provide a place for all the observations of hygienist, 
their environment, their physician, biologist, and psychologist relative to the effects of environment and 
occupation, and by each other. mode oflife upon the organisms. 
Reproduced from Boardman, 1978: 56. 
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a 'relation', which is impossible to observe empirically, led Durkheim to outline and 
clarify, formally, his Rules of Sociological Method (1895). Geddes', working some ten 
years before Durkheim coined his now famous exhortation to consider 'social facts as 
things', proposed to study 'mutual relations' via the social functions of production as 
employment. If the nature of the division of labour could be categorised, on the one 
hand, according to its 'function' in terms of operations on matter and energy, it could 
also be categorised according to the nature and degree of 'mutual' service. He 
constructed a typology of different occupations, classifying them according to the sort 
of service they provided for other members of society. People who were engaged, for 
example, in the primary sector, or manufacture, transportation or exchange of goods, 
were performing an indirect service for other members of society. Those engaged in 
menial or domestic labour (function: non-cerebral service), the creation of works of art 
(function: aesthetic cerebral service), or teaching (function: cerebral intellectual) were 
providing a direct service for other members of society.12 Those engaged in 
government or administrative occupations were put into a separate category for the 
function (or service) of'co-ordination'. A separate column was included for those who 
provided no social service to others or whose contribution was dysfunctional. Those 
who were unemployed or disabled for different reasons (including the very old and the 
very young, as well as those who 'refused' work) contributed nothing to the 
maintenance of society in energy terms; and occupations that were either in themselves 
destructive (war, crime) or devoted to remedies for these, involved an energy loss or 
wastage and as such should be subtracted from the energy balance sheet of society. 
12 Geddes also included a category of direct service which performed a 'moral' function. 
Although it is not obvious which occupations fall into this category we might assume that he 
meant those who provided 'religious' as well as perhaps law-making or law-enforcing services. 
In all likelihood, in view of his views on women as 'natural' educators, he would probably have 
included them in this category or that of 'intellectual' service, as a result of their roles as 
parents (Geddes, 1914: 214-228). 
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Quite clearly then, for Geddes, people could be said to modify or change each 
other in social interaction, even at a distance, between strangers, through their 
occupations, and it is this which justifies Boardman's addition of a fifth axiom: 'people 
are modified by their environment, their occupation and by each other'. 
What also becomes clear, at this point, is the normative element in Geddes' 
thought. The 'functions' of different occupations are to be described not in terms of 
individual acquisition, social status, market position or according to whether they 
involve ownership of capital or labour (the descriptive categories applied by some 
others), but in terms of the degree and type of social 'service' they provide. In other 
words, both the division of labour and the social needs it fulfilled, were central for 
Geddes as for Durkheim, but for Geddes these needs were conceptualised as concrete 
material and cultural requisites of societal life, rather than as an evolutionary response 
to resource scarcity which is simultaneously an expression of social solidarity and an a 
priori emotive attachment to the social. For Geddes it was 'production' (which always 
involved social relations) rather than communication, which was the fundamental social 
fact. 
Statistics covering both goods and processes of production again began from 
the sources of energy and potential energy to be found in a particular territory -
including basic, uncombined chemical elements, volcanic energy, tides, sunlight, water 
and wind as well as sources of food (from the soil and sun) and fuel (as coal, oil, gas). 
Geddes also considered the energy potential of plants as food and fuel, and animals and 
human beings as food, fuel and machines - though in the text which accompanied his 
massive table he explicitly ruled out cannibalism as a source of energy on the grounds 
that it was morally wrong. Processes of production involved the conversion of matter 
and energy into 'ultimate' products. Necessary statistics included a classification of the 
different sources of energy used to produce different goods and services, including the 
energy used in transportation to the place of consumption. Products were to be divided 
according to function - whether they were socially useful (protective and supporting, 
locomotive, alimentary or aesthetic) or destructive (as in instruments of war) - or 
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whether they had a 'remedial use for putting right the damage done by the destructive 
elements in production. 
Lastly, as with people and territories, Geddes was interested in loss or wastage 
in production, and the column devoted to statistics on the premature dissipation and 
disintegration of energy and matter classifies it according to the stage of production 
(exploitation, manufacture, transport, exchange or 'ultimate product', or (in 
consideration of the wastage of people), in terms of the remedial effort involved in 
putting right the results of war, crime or other 'folly'. 
Other statistics necessary for a whole picture of society at any given moment in 
history included those which portrayed the distribution of resources whether as 
'territory' or different sorts of goods and services (or money as the symbol of title to 
these). Geddes' statistical table includes columns for information about both shared 
resources and those which were distributed between the different classes of people - to 
those engaged in 'indirect services to members of society' through exploitation or 
manufacture, those engaged in 'direct services to members of society' and those 
disabled or unemployed for different reasons. 
A final row of squares on Geddes' classification of statistics - 'Results', 
indicated that the purpose of the collection of such disparate statistics on land, water, 
energy, people, employment, unemployment, war, crime, disaster, production and 
distribution was knowledge about the quality of both community life in general, and as 
this varies between classes - as these were defined in terms of the functions of 
occupations for social service. 
In sum, Geddes' early attempt to construct a system for the classification of 
statistics, is as suggestive as it is impossibly exhaustive. Certainly, it is systematic, in 
that it begins from the most basic or 'axiomatic' assertions about the nature of human 
existence: in order to live, people must produce the material means of survival from the 
surrounding environment. The act of production involves them in activities which 
modify the natural environment. The act of production is also 'social' - the different 
occupations perform different services with respect to other members of society. Not 
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only can some of these 'services' be seen to be 'dysfunctional', in that they involve the 
loss or wastage of energy (including human energy), but some of them are services that 
acknowledge the distinctive characteristics of the human species: the occupations 
which modify other human beings through 'direct' service serving a 'cerebral' function, 
indicating Geddes' belief that 'art' and other cultural activities that did not contribute 
directly to the acquisition of material wealth were equally important social activities. 
The Principles of Economics 
The 1884 paper on economics was essentially a continuation of what Geddes had 
begun in 1881, and amounted to a swingeing attack on contemporary theories of 
political economy as well as an attempt to devise a new economic theory. It is a long 
paper, and was presented to the Royal Society of Edinburgh in three parts. After this, 
whenever Geddes insisted on the importance of economic analysis in sociology, he had 
in mind this particular interpretation of the relations between people and resources 
and the nature of wealth. 
Using a Spencerian classification of sciences, Geddes began from physics and 
chemistry, moving through biology and psychology, to 'sociology' - though he claimed 
to have 'put off the sociological part of his analysis (1884:8). In his view,13 economics 
operated on these three analytically separable levels - the physical, biological and 
psychological, although these were interrelated in practice. 
Physical Principles 
The first principle of economics (beyond pure mathematics) was 'physical'. The 
production, distribution and consumption of 'material wealth' must be explained in 
physical terms using energy as a unit of measurement. Physical economics began from 
producers and consumers, not as 'biological' or thinking beings, but 
13 Geddes' view was similar to that of others engaged in attempting to revise economics, 
including Frederick Soddy, Stanley JevOlls and Withem Ostwald (Martinez Alier, 1987) 
simply as so many forms of mechanisms constructed out of the matter 
of the earth's crust and worked by the energy of the sun - as so many 
species of automata called Homo ... (1884: 11) 
Every living organism in this physical sense, including the human organism is 
constantly wearing out and its energy running down - and this waste 
which its functions involve must be repaired by obtaining from the 
environment periodic supplies of new matter and energy. From the 
destructive forces of the environment it must similarly be protected; . . . 
. From the present standpoint then, it is not merely analogous to, but 
identical with a mechanism; "producers" are those automata devoted to 
the acquisition of matter and energy from the environment; while all are 
"consumers", and in this aspect in wonderfully similar degree (1884:11-
12) 
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Starting from a given 'territory' at a particular moment in history, it was possible to 
enumerate the available sources of both matter and energy. 
This matter and energy are as yet mere raw material or potential 
products, and require development into ultimate products; the requisite 
processes of production generally having three stages - exploitation, 
manufacture, and movement, the last including transport and exchange; 
for exchange from our present point of view is simply part of the 
process of movement of the product from the place of production to 
that of consumption. That proportion of potential products (large in 
complex societies) which has to be converted into apparatus used in the 
stages of development is conveniently termed mediate products: and 
thus we have an exhaustive classification of all products whatever in its 
most generalised form. Finally, much premature dissipation and 
disintegration, termed loss, may occur at all stages of development and 
must be estimated for. (1884:12-13) 
Mirroring his earlier classification of statistics, Geddes argued that economics must 
take into account the producer, consumer, and product, as these were calculable in 
terms of natural materials and energy, rather than in terms of monetary 'value'. Unused, 
or undeveloped matter and energy became 'potential product', the apparatus of 
production (capital), became 'mediate product', and the finished article 'ultimate 
product'. Ultimate products were themselves divisible into 'transient' and 'permanent' 
(the term consumption being not really applicable to the latter, which led Geddes to 
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prefer the term 'use' (1884:21). In developing potential into ultimate product, it was 
also necessary to estimate for any loss or wastage of matter or energy. 
Geddes believed that if the study of production, consumption and distribution 
were undertaken for previous periods in history, as well as for the present, it would be 
possible to compare the relative income of matter and energy from nature over time, 
which would demonstrate not only that capital consisted of both apparatus and energy, 
but also the reality of "the law of diminishing return" (1884:14). 
A particular quantity of matter and energy was employed in any process of 
production of an 'ultimate' or end- product, and a particular proportion of that was 
lost, or wasted at different stages, from extraction, through exploitation to distribution 
and consumption. For every process, theoretically, it should be possible to measure the 
net income in terms of units of energy, as well as by weight or number. Geddes pointed 
out that if human beings were conceptualised only in their capacity as machines or 
automata, as part of the apparatus of production, and their needs calculated in terms 
of matter and energy as fuel, the problem of collation and comparison of data became 
much simpler. 'Producers and machines are, in short, not only interchangeable but 
commensurable' (1884:17). When the loss and wastage in matter and energy at every 
stage of the productive process was subtracted from the gross ultimate product (also 
expressed in terms of energy and matter), the remainder was the net amount of 
ultimate product. Geddes commented that 
'the net amount of ultimate product may seem unwarrantably small in 
proportion to the gross amount of potential product; . . . [which 
suggests] the vast losses of energy and matter, often many times 
exceeding the product, due to the imperfection of our 
processes.(1884: 17) 
Traditionally the loss and wastage in matter and energy from Nature did not enter into 
the calculated cost of production - which involved merely potential and mediate 
products (these latter being the apparatus of production and the human automata 
which operated them), so that a profit was made so long as the cost, in losses and 
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waste, of production at any stage did not exceed the total quantity of ultimate product. 
Geddes argued that profit was actually 'the interest paid by Nature upon the matter and 
energy expended upon her during the processes of production' (1884:18). His refusal 
of monetary calculation at this stage allowed him to see what Marx missed. For Marx, 
the owners of capital derived their profit from the surplus value of the labour expended 
by the worker in production. Yet to the extent that the exchange value of an item is 
produced by the energy expended in human labour, which, according to Geddes, had 
to be considered in the same terms as the rest of nature, but which is not generally 
calculated as part of the cost of production, the surplus appropriated by the capitalist 
can be equated with the increased quantity of resources (and especially food) required 
to keep the worker working beyond what is necessary to reproduce the necessities of 
his own life. Although he had argued in 1881 for the necessity of statistical data 
relating to the social distribution of goods, Geddes did not consider the social 
distribution of profit or products in 1884, suggesting that this was impossible until 
existing conditions had been investigated in detail. This, in general, was a theme on 
which he continued to insist throughout his work: that since theory and practice were 
inextricably related, one ought not to theorise speculatively, but concentrate on 
ascertaining the 'facts' as a basis for theory. He did argue, though, that if the quantity 
of ultimate products per unit time (as man-hour, man-day or man-year) were known, 
the average store of 'wealth' of the community could be calculated. The details of 
appropriate distribution could then be calculated on the basis of the difference 
between the average distribution and deviations from it (ibid.: 18). Production should 
also be estimated for different historical epochs, whether it was measured by the year, 
the decade, the generation, or the century, and in even more general terms, to include 
the total collective production of the entire human race - which he proposed to refer to 
as its 'Synergy'. This calculation would highlight the importance of conservation, by 
showing the vast amounts of matter and energy expended, either as ultimate product, 
or lost, over time. 
85. 
Geddes was as concerned with quality of production, as with quantity. 
Dividing up ultimate products in conventional terms into necessaries, comfort and 
luxuries, Geddes concluded that the consumption of luxuries could be seen to serve a 
useful function. The function of the consumption of luxuries, or 'super-necessaries' was 
to stimulate the sense organs - 'gustatory, visual and tactile' of the consumer. Thus 
Geddes proposed that in 'any at all civilised community' a large part of production 
served an 'aesthetic subfunction'. Thus, dividing up all ultimate products into their 
necessary and aesthetic functions, he was forced to the conclusion that 'production, 
though fundamentally for maintenance, is mainly for art' (1884:21). 
Consumption or use, whether of necessaries or super-necessaries, took place at 
variable rates according to whether the ultimate product was transitory or permanent. 
As the unit of measurement of time was extended from day to year to generation, etc., 
it became obvious that the consumption of transient ultimate products, like food and 
clothing, had increased disproportionately to the use of permanent ultimate products 
(infrastructure as well as 'art'). This yet again highlighted the importance of 
conservation -
for the accumulated wealth - and consequently the historic synergy -
may be said to vary almost inversely as the transitory and directly as the 
permanent elements ofproduction.{l884:21) 
Implications of Physical Economics 
The prac~ical implications of these 'physical-economic' principles of production and 
consumption led Geddes to suggest that of the two alternatives of maximising or 
minimising production per unit time, maximisation of permanent ultimate products was 
the proper direction to take. The (re-)organisation of production, however, should be 
concerned with improvements in exploitation and manufacturing power, with the 
reduction of wastage and loss of materials and energy, including the minimising of 
friction in transport, and the simplification of trade (1884: 23). As far as consumption 
was concerned, Geddes pointed out that if an increase in wealth was the concern of the 
economist, then the increased manufacture of permanent ultimate products was the 
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ideal to be aimed for, rather than the increase in transient ultimate products. 'Real 
wealth' consisted of the total environmental conditions of living,' in the aesthetic and 
cultural value of the man-made environment, as well as in its utility as nutrition or 
shelter,' and in clean air, good light and pure water. In short, Geddes was interested 
in quality of life. Given the appalling environmental conditions in many urban areas 
during this period, what is surprising is perhaps not that Geddes should calculate 
wealth in this way, but the refusal of so many others to do so. Geddes clearly found the 
apparent indifference of both the wealthy and poor to their environment thoroughly 
inexplicable. He reiterated the point in an 1888 pamphlet: 
The reduction of wealth from its mere notation in money to its concrete 
terms of materially enriched environment has never indeed been 
adequately attempted by economists, while the public remain as much 
mercantilist as ever; for so long as the businessman continues to define 
"success in life" in terms of money making, instead of money making in 
"success in living", or so long as the workman who strikes readily for a 
rise or against a fall in wages submits patiently to the increasing 
unwholesomeness of his surroundings, or resents all outlay on their 
amelioration, it cannot be said that the realities of wealth have as yet 
been really discerned behind their symbols by either the capitalist or 
labourer.(1888: 295-296) 
Biological Principles 
Geddes noted that much contemporary economic literature used the language of 
biology, but believed it was spurious to apply such analogies as "competition", "laws of 
population" or the "social organism" to human society. Any application of biology to 
economics must avoid comparisons between people and nature, and all concepts of 
'human nature' and begin from the study of people in nature (1884:24). Bio-
economically speaking, people become not automata but a species ofliving organisms 
. . . to be generalised with the rest of organic nature, terminating the 
greatest line of genealogical ascent, and supremely successful in the 
struggle for existence and domination, in virtue of peculiarly high 
evolution of the nervous system. (1 884:24) 
The use of such phrases as 'greatest line of genealogical ascent' and 'supremely 
successful in the struggle for existence' are entirely compatible with Durkheim's view 
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of humanity as nature's 'highest representation', clearly indicating Geddes' belief that 
although humanity was a part of nature, it had certain special or distinctive qualities, 
which, as he had indicated in his earlier article on the classification of statistics, were 
associated with moral and intellectual capacities. 
Biological economics was based on statistical data on the quantity of a 
population, as well as its 'quality' in terms of 'health', 'efficiency' and education as well 
as its 'structure' (racial characteristics), functions and 'mutual relations'. From a 
functional angle, people were identical with all other animals because they had to find 
life-maintaining resources in their environment 'by the performance of muscular 
contractions co-ordinated by the nervous system'. (1884: 25). This was, Geddes 
believed, the widest possible definition of productive labour. 
A Theory of Biological and Social Evolution 
Complex functional differentiation in contemporary societies was the result of 
evolution. Individual organisms, whether ants, bees or human beings were 'modified' by 
occupation, heredity, and environment. Although, Geddes suggested, the social 
advantages of the division of labour as co-operation were obvious, there might be 
disadvantages in biological terms. The physical demands of an occupation could 
modify the characteristics of the individual. Where, as in Caste societies, these 
modifications became hereditary, the degenerative impact of particular occupations 
could be passed on . 
.. , without the slightest postulation of morals, it is a biological fact that 
as "function makes the organ", it also shapes the organism, and 
modifies it either for evolution or for degeneration; ... determines its 
quantity of health and limits its length of life. Ploughrnen and weavers, 
joiners or soldiers, then, are incipient castes, as surely as Brahmin and 
Pariah, queen, worker and drone, are formed ones; and the 
disadvantages of the division of labour, so slowly forced into 
prominence. . . through the sufferings of the many and the moral 
enthusiasm of an unscientific few, demand study and classification 
among the "Variations of Animals and Plants under 
Domestication. "(1884:27) 
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Geddes may be forgiven for this apparent confusion concerning the 'mechanism' of 
hereditary modification of the organism, since this was 1884, only shortly after the 
appearance of Weismann's On Heredity, which suggested that only internal variations 
could be inherited. In fact, it is not at all clear whether it was confusion, since it is 
possible to read this passage as suggesting merely that occupational 'environment' 
could have an effect on general health and longevity, and that this might indirectly 
affect offspring - which was what Geddes would subsequently argue (Thomson & 
Geddes, 1911: 118 and 201). This is an important point. Unlike some among his 
sociological contemporaries (including Durkheim as well as Hobhouse, who would 
later become his rival at the Sociological Society), the biologist Geddes refused to 
refute the importance of organic heredity in evolution. But his was not a single factor 
theory. Even in 1884 Geddes distinguished between 'functional environment, or 
occupation, and 'ancestral environment, meaning heredity, as well as between 'socia! 
or cultural environment and 'natura! environment. In the natural environment, he 
thought, the most important factors were food, air quality and light (1884: 27). An 
organism might degenerate either as a result of the deprivation of food, light, clean 
water and air, or from excessive consumption (of food), in combination with too little 
physical exertion. Geddes moralised that degeneration through over-consumption and 
too little exercise was the most debilitating, bringing about 'that far more insidious and 
thorough degeneration seen in the life history of myriads of parasites' (1884: 28). 
A Theory of Mental Evolution 
For 'progress' or 'evolution' rather than 'degeneration' (or mere maintenance) to occur, 
not only were adequate supplies of food, clean air, and water necessary, but also 'more 
and more complex conditions of the environment'. Though Geddes did not explicitly 
define which of his various senses of environment he had in mind here, he was 
speaking of 'social' or cultural, rather than natural environment. Again, Geddes here 
exhibited his normative bias. Real wealth consisted in the totality of environmental 
conditions. He insisted on the 'evolutionary' importance of a complex environment as 
an organic 'need' (1884:28-9). The importance of the 'aesthetic' element in production, 
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on which Geddes had placed much importance in his discussion of physical principles, 
was that the human senses need stimulus in order to 'evolve'. 
It is instructive to compare this assertion with Durkheim's (1893) discussion of 
the needs created by the division of labour. In The Division of Labour, new needs 
were created by the division of labour because people had to work harder when 
resources were scarce, since they were in conflict with others doing the same thing. In 
the process, more energy was expended (there is a 'great depletion of forces') so that 
more energy was then required to replace it ('reparation must be proportionate to 
expenditure'). However, it was the nervous system that was most overworked during 
this process, and it was as a result of this 'exercise' that the capacity of the brain 
increased (1893[1933]: 272) 
All these changes are . . . . mechanically produced by necessary causes. 
If our intelligence and sensibility develop and become keener, it is 
because we exercise them more, it is because we are forced to by the 
greater violence of the struggle we have to live through. That is how, 
without having desired it, humanity is found apt to receive a more 
intense and more varied culture. (Durkheim, 1893 [1933]: 273) 
These accounts of 'mental' evolution are very similar. But there is one crucially 
important difference. Where Durkheim makes much of the 'conflict' over resources as 
the factor which 'mechanically' engenders mental evolution, Geddes emphasises the 
creative production of a more and more complex environment to stimulate the human 
intellect. Where production at a physical level involved the transformation of matter 
and energy, he now insists that it can be defined, in biological terms as 'the adaptation 
of the world to the wants of the species' or 'the substitution of human for natural 
selection' (1884:29). 
Durkheim's insistence on the 'mechanical' nature of social change, brought 
about as a result of conflict over increasingly scarce resources as population grows and 
becomes more densely settled, created difficulties for his anti-utilitarian arguments 
concerning the essentially social and co-operative nature of human beings. But 
Durkheim, as a social scientist, with an academic background in philosophy, had to 
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rely on secondary sources for his biological knowledge. Geddes, on the other hand, 
with his natural scientific background, more thorough knowledge of biological theories 
of evolution, and (perhaps especially) his first hand observations of the natural world, 
was more confident. He did not feel obliged, in the first place, to claim Darwin directly 
in support of his argument, though the reference to 'natural selection' is revealing. 
Secondly, his superior knowledge of the scientific literature on evolution allows him 
simply to assume that human beings are essentially social by referring to the 'social' 
insects. Of course, since he was not engaging with Spencerian theory in the same 
manner as Durkheim, there was little need to argue his case. Yet to establish co-
operation rather than competition as a basic feature of social life, he uses exactly the 
same tactic as Durkheim - that functional specialisation leads to structural 
specialisation or 'polymorphism' (within a single species) and hence to the decline of 
competition between individuals. Lastly, Geddes inverted the theory of natural 
selection - in which accidental internal structural changes in the organism survive only 
if they prove useful in a given environment - to argue that production involves 
changing or adapting the external environment, and that this has an effect on the 
inheritance of particular characteristics, though not automatically leading to 'progress'. 
In this way, Geddes has set up a powerful argument for sociology as the holistic study 
of the total social and natural environment. The least convincing part of the argument 
made by Geddes is the suggestion that there is some kind of , innate' need for increasing 
stimulation of the nervous system which leads to the 'evolution' of mental capacity. 
This, though, was his way of explaining why or how it had occurred. Its advantage, 
compared with Durkheim's, is that because it does not postulate competition, or the 
struggle for resources between individuals of the same species in order to account for 
either the division of labour or social evolution, it does not leave Geddes with the 
problem of afterwards having to do away with competition as an innate characteristic 
of humanity by postulating a moral character for the division oflabour. 
The purpose of production was the modification of environment in order to 
fulfil human needs. In turn, people were modified by the environments they created; 
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and by both the occupations they engaged in to obtain life-sustaining resources from 
the environment and those through which they provided 'direct' services for one 
another. Each direct or indirect productive action had a corresponding impact on the 
'development' or 'degeneration' of the species. Economists were therefore mistaken in 
treating production as the 'the production of wealth'. What was really being produced 
were particular environmental conditions, which were suitable for particular sorts of 
social life. Contemporary social conditions, which Geddes referred to as 'industrial 
anarchy', were the result of the misconceived notion that the purpose of production 
was "'wealth" in its very variable proportions of maintenance, power over others, [and] 
personal immunity from function' (1884:29). 14 
Population 
Surprisingly, in this early discussion of 'biological' economics Geddes said very little 
about the reproduction of population, and what he did say was far from clear. He 
referred back to his remarks about the physical principles, where he had argued that 
'organisms' are in that context 'automata', to be considered as part of the apparatus of 
production (or capital, or mediate products). He now suggested that so long as 
production processes and the "standard of comfort" remained constant (where 
standard of comfort was equal to the consumption of ultimate products per unit time), 
any increase in production would necessarily involve an increase in 'automata' 
(population) (1884: 22). Extrapolating from his biological principles, he suggested 
further that it was the supply of transient products such as food and clothing which 
resulted in a higher or lower 'standard of comfort', and that this would actually 
determine the extent to which the population of a given class of producers increased 
(1884: 30). The difficulty with this argument, of course, was that the human organisms 
he was considering were, in this context, not 'automata' but sentient - thinking, feeling 
14 It is worth noting that Geddes' assertion that one of the functions of the accumulation of 
wealth is 'personal immunity from function' actually predates Veblen's similar argument by 
more than ten years (Veblen, 1899), 
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beings~ and the contemporary evidence indicated that exactly the opposite was true. 
The very poorest sectors of society continued to reproduce even in the absence of a 
high standard of comfort. His earlier argument, however~ had favoured the 
maximisation of production of permanent rather than transient products. in the interest 
of conservation or 'synergy'. and an increase of this sort of production did not require a 
corresponding increase in population. This made it appear as though he was suggesting 
that it was possible to determine an approximately fixed 'reproductive ratio' per unit 
time, for any given class of producers (1884:30). 
Martinez-Alier, while praising Geddes for his use of 'energetics' in his critique 
of economics, remarks that at times his biology, in these early articles; involved some 
'sloppy reasoning' (1987: 96). This was, however. Geddes' earliest attempt at a 
problem he never managed to solve. This was the problem of the consumption of finite 
resources by an ever growing population. 
Population and the Consumption of Resources 
In 1890. he presented 'A Theory of the Consumption of Wealth' at a meeting of the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science (Geddes, 1890). As with much of 
his work, this theory failed to distinguish between is and ought to be. It was really a 
theory of ideal consumption, in line with his commitment to the conservation of 
resources and the need for a complex social environment. A theory of consumption 
was necessary because demand for commodities was a fundamental determinant of 
both productive occupations and environment, as well as quality of life. Studies were 
needed of both social ideals of, and actual consumption. for any given time and place, 
which would reveal both positive and negative effects. Too much, too little, or the 
wrong sort of consumption, was both individually and socially destructive. A balance 
had to be obtained between consumption of life-maintaining necessaries such as food 
and clothing, and aesthetic and intellectually stimulating goods (transient and 
permanent ultimate products), as well as between goods for individual maintenance, 
and those for social maintenance, at the level of family, immediate community, city, 
nation and species. For 'evolution' to occur, the appropriate balance must be found 
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between individual and social consumption of physical necessities and intellectually 
stimulating 'culture'. Geddes suggested that studies of consumption (bearing in mind 
biological, psychological, ethical aspects of the problem) in different societies, 
historical and contemporary, would show how to achieve the right balance of 
consumption to improve the quality of life, 
Social Amelioration and Environment 
In 1884, Geddes argued that since several factors influenced the quality of the 
organisms that composed any given community; including the influence of organism on 
organism by such factors as heredity; education or competition, the influence of 
function (occupation) on organism~ and the influence of environment on organism, 
social amelioration could not be achieved piecemeal, but must be based in a detailed 
and synthetic study of the various different aspects of environment. He was adamant 
that any environmental or occupational factors found to adversely effect the quality of 
an individual (and by extension an entire community) must be dealt with quite 
categorically; 
Thus. . . when any given environment or function, however apparently 
"productivet n is really fraught with disastrous influence to the organisffit 
its modification must be attempted, or, failing that, its abandonment 
faced.(1884: 31) 
Geddes had already insisted upon the importance of good food, in sufficient but not 
excessive quantities, and on the importance of light and clean air. Any environment 
(natural, built or cultural) that was lacking in these. or any productive occupation that 
resulted in the deterioration of these essentials had to be changed or abandoned 
altogether. Although this sort of analysis would be extremely complex, he thought; 
once it was done it would be possible to 
... attempt the treatment of such practical questions as the state of the 
poor; or the advancement of social progress in general - since practical 
action, at present dispersed into special efforts, each dealing with some 
aspect of organism, function, or environment alone, (or of some 
mixture of these) must on pain offailure attempt the synthetic treatment 
ofall.(1884: 31) 
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Geddes' theory of evolution was multi-causal, and therefore complex. He was quite 
clearly aware of the difficulties of undertaking the enormous project he proposed, as 
well as the problem of drawing conclusions from it as a basis for social action. Yet - to 
him - its necessity was obvious in the face of the unintended and accidental 
consequences of the lack of co-ordination, planning and foresight inherent in 
contemporary attempts at social amelioration. 
Psychological Principles 
Though his concern with social evolution was in part derived from his reading of 
Spencer, Geddes could not bring himself to define 'utility', as Spencer did, in terms of 
the principles of pleasure-seeking or pain-avoidance. Pain, he pointed out, could be 
advantageous to the individual in the process of becoming modified (learning a new 
skill), while many pleasures were straightforwardly disadvantageous, dangerous or 
degenerative (for example, an overabundance of food or alcohol). He also wanted to 
distance himself from conventional economic definitions of 'value', and the notions of 
'want' and 'desire'. (1884:33-4) Instead, he suggested that psychology deals with 'the 
subjective side of the functional aspects of the nervous system'. All productive action, 
defined as 'muscular contractions', is the result of cerebral stimuli - 'and these, 
subjectively considered, are wants and desires' (ibid.: 34). These, however, were not 
mainly individual egoistic 'wants' but were essentially social and as such involved both 
sympathy and altruism. 
All existing societies had developed some degree of complexity of division of 
labour or specialisation of function. Geddes insisted that this involved both co-
operation and an awareness of the social advantages of co-operation. And in co-
operation, just as in reproduction, there is sympathy, or altruism: 
Higher and higher differentiation of social structure and function 
involves corresponding subjective adaptation; as the economic duties of 
an individual develop in complexity and remoteness to the immediate 
result, so must their subjective aspect ... deepen and widen; and thus 
the material evolution demands a moral evolution running parallel to it. 
That the material evolution has for the time outrun the moral adaptation 
is, ... the essential explanation of much existing economic anarchy. . . . 
progress towards the physical and biological ideal of productive synergy 
involves parallel progress to an ideal of maximum altruism.(1884: 36) 
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Again there are shades of Durkheim's Division of Labour here, in the insistence that 
under normal conditions 'moral' evolution accompanies material. Durkheim's 'abnormal 
forms' of the division of labour included the anomic, the forced and one other (un-
named) (1933 [1893]: 353-395). The existence of anyone of these signified a 
'pathological' social condition. Geddes' insistence that 'material' had outrun 'moral' 
evolution anticipated Durkheim's discussion of the 'anomie' division of labour, in which 
the extreme rapidity of economic specialisation outpaced regulative or 'moral' change. 
Durkheim suggested that this left individuals bereft of any notion of how their own 
specialised function contributed to the maintenance of the whole, and was thus 
disintegrative. As examples Durkheim discussed (among other things) the disjunction 
between production and consumption as markets become larger and more impersonal, 
and the disunity of the relatively youthful social sciences. Durkheim's solutions to a 
'pathological' condition of the division of labour involved equality of opportunity in a 
market place undistorted by such external inequalities as inherited wealth. 
It is necessary and sufficient for [the division of labour] to be itself, for 
nothing to come from outside to deform its nature. For normally the 
operation of each special function demands that the individual should 
not be too closely shut up in it, but should keep in constant contact with 
neighbouring functions . . . . The division of labour supposes that the 
worker, far from remaining bent over his task, does not lose sight of 
those co-operating with him, but acts upon them and is acted upon by 
them. (Durkheim, 1933 [1893]: 372) 
Geddes' ideal of moral evolution towards 'maximum altruism' - related to his idea that 
'social service' was inherent in every economic function, seems to go a step beyond 
Durkheim's insistence on equalising 'the external conditions of the struggle' for 
existence. The health of a society, Geddes suggested, could not be measured by levels 
of individual acquisition (the 'struggles of individuals for existence'), but only in 
relation to the whole 'as a responsible and active organ charged with certain special 
functions to a larger brotherhood' in which practical social improvement involved 
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organisms, function and environment all at once (Geddes, 1888: 300). Evolutionary 
theory showed, he suggested, that species-maintaining functions would always triumph 
over those which maintained only individuals 
. . . it is not hunger and struggle for existence, but love and association 
in existence, that mainly move and mould the living world, and this 
gives us a new basis (scientific) for economics. (Geddes, 1888: 293) 
The practical solution to the problem of moral evolution, for Geddes, was the 
modification of the social or cultural environment. 
The problem of practical economics now demands that we produce not 
that mere maximum of food and eaters, which is the first aspect of the 
physical ideal; not even that perfection of quality and quantity of 
physical life which is the first aspect of the biological; but the maximum 
evolution of mental and moral nature which underlies the two former. 
The problem, in fact, inverts itself, becoming not merely how to fill 
bellies, but how to place brains in the condition most favourable to their 
development and activity, and so the problem of practical psychological 
economics passes into that of education. The supremacy of the aesthetic 
factor in production, ... is thus explained:- The modification of the 
environment which is the object of production, while primarily 
addressing the nutritive system and attending to protective needs, must 
culminate in the complex organisation of the environment which, 
deliberately addressing itself to the stimulus and evolution of the 
sensory activities is of such importance for the process of cerebral 
evolution ... (1884: 37-38) 
Education 
Education, therefore, was of central importance for social progress. Too much store 
was set by cramming children's minds with the received wisdoms handed down through 
time. Not all of this knowledge was necessarily good, Geddes believed, just because it 
was old. In fact, it was often no more than suitably diluted 'upper class culture', and as 
such had been 'moderately successful in orienting the minds of "the Populace" to the 
existing social order' (Geddes and Branford, 1919: xviii). Children should be 
encouraged to think for themselves, to learn through observation and experience, and 
through activities and practical projects as well as simply learning 'facts'. Geddes 
abhorred the contemporary attempts to separate and define the subject matter of the 
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academic disciplines. These rigid boundaries were stultifying to the mind, he believed, 
and led to the construction of ' Thought Cages' (1915: 68); whereas what was required 
for social progress was the discovery of new relations between different aspects of 
things, or between things that had previously been assumed to have no relationship, 
leading to a new synthesis. Universities, as the 'trustees of the social inheritance' should 
become more open to the mass of the people, and practical local knowledge should be 
recognised as of equal in value to abstract academic or technical knowledge (Geddes 
and Branford, 1919: xxv; Geddes and Thomson, 1931: 1387). 
Economics and Ethics 
Geddes suggested that his (1884) economic analysis was not complete, but needed the 
addition of a 'sociological' perspective, or the study of ' mutual relations' specified in the 
1881 paper on statistics. He acknowledged that the scope of his system of economics, 
like that of his system for classifying social statistics, was likely to be thought too 
broad in scope (1881: 25; 1884: 39). As in the earlier paper, too, he confessed that it 
looked as though his own 'ethical' or ideological position had crept in right at the 
beginning of the argument, in insisting on maximum production (of permanent 
products) and maximum (cerebral or mental) evolution, his desire to cut out wastage, 
whether in human, material, or energy terms, and in his rejection of the iron law of 
competition in favour of sympathy and altruism (1884: 39). He insisted however, that 
this was only what his scientific studies had shown to be true (i.e. he insisted on his 
own objectivity). Moreover, ethics was not an isolated science but involved a 
generalisation of the findings of the other sciences (1884: 40). Since it was impossible 
to have a perfect and exhaustive knowledge of everything, Geddes pointed out that 
there would always be cases in which what was shown to be the appropriate course of 
action by natural scientific knowledge would clash with existing moral and ethical 
ideas. Scientific knowledge, for example, showed the desirability of utilising all the 
sources o~energy in nature, but as these included humanity itself - unless there were 
clearly defined societal aims and objectives, we might find ourselves logically drawn 
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into such ethically dubious activities as cannibalism or slavery (I 881: 27). Only 
'science' could show what social objectives ('postulates for action') ought to be 
established, and even then, if they were to have validity, they must be based on 'our 
whole knowledge of society' (1881: 28) rather than mere aspects of what is in any case 
only partial knowledge. 
Given that only imperfect knowledge existed (or was likely to exist for the 
foreseeable future), but that various moral and ethical systems nevertheless operate, 
economic analysis ought necessarily to be accompanied by the detailed study of ethical 
systems. Most actions have both an economic and a moral or ethical aspect. Only 
where what was ethically right or good coincided with logically derived scientific 
postulates ought that course of action to be adopted. Geddes believed that ultimately, 
natural scientific knowledge and a scientific ethics would be found to be in harmony 
('unity and continuity') with one another (1881:30). 
The Theory of Civics: 
Geddes' conception of sociology as 'Civics' - the application of social survey to social 
service (Geddes: 1905), was firmly grounded in this earlier work. It was here that he 
developed the idea of the 'region', which, although (perhaps deliberately) spatially 
vague, was consistentt with his insistence on treating environment function and 
organism together. Natural and cultural environments differed from place to place, so 
that it was futile to propose a single national or global solution to social and 
environmental problems. Each solution must be tailored to the needs of a particular 
place - its topography, geology, climate, and the culture of its people. Geddes' 
environmentalism sometimes appeared to be wholly deterministic, particularly when he 
presented it in schematic form via his 'Valley section' which showed how the nature of 
work was 'determined' by naturally occurring feature of a particular environment. 
In his theory of 'civics', Geddes' main development of his environment, 
function, organism (EFO) triad was the addition of the idea that individual and social 
consciousness - as ideas and ideals, values, beliefs and desires - was a product of the 
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total environment (natural, built and cultural). Thoughts and dreams, as products of 
different everyday 'experiences' at the level of place, work and folk (or EFO) translated 
into the creative human 'action' that continually re-modelled and modified the 
surrounding physical and cultural environment. History was a process of continuous 
human activity in environment, leading to the discovery or development of knowledge, 
(feelings, sense and experience), to thoughts (emotion, ideation, imagery), and via 
human institutions (specifically, the 'cloister' or university) to further actions. He made 
several attempts at different times (1905; 1922; Geddes and Thomson, 1931) to 
express this relation both graphically and in written form. His graphic presentations of 
his theoretical work were not popular with his contemporaries, since they were not, as 
he seemed to assume, self-explanatory. One problem was that his readers, or 
audiences, had to be able to understand what he was attempting to say through them, 
in order for them to make sense. Another was that they embodied not just the theory, 
but also a normative correction of reality in the direction of greater co-ordination or 
synthesis. Geddes failed to make an adequate distinction between fact and value, and 
his diagrams show institutions devoted to the development and synthesis of thought 
acting as intermediaries between the knowledge and values that arose out of action in 
environments, and the political institutions that (in theory), enacted the policies that 
directed the modification of environment towards the amelioration of life (see figure 3, 
inside back cover). The reality, as Geddes indicated with his reference to 'industrial 
anarchy' was very different from the ideal embodied in the theory. 
Geddes and Durkheim 
Many social theorists of Geddes' generation found Darwinian evolutionary theory 
particularly difficult to come to terms with, since it seemed to make all attempts at 
social planning or amelioration redundant. The idea of evolution through natural 
selection implied that 'civilisation' (as Durkheim put it) had no 'moral value', but was 
the accidental by-product of the struggle for survival, over which humanity had no 
control. The causes of evolution, according to biological evolutionary theory, were 
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'mechanical', and not susceptible to human purposive behaviour. Geddes' response to 
this difficulty was to argue that social evolution was only partly determined 
mechanically. Human activity could be purposeful and creative, but the 'consciousness' 
which was the source of creative interaction with environment arose from the 
conditions - natural and social - of life. Social improvement involved a change in 
human consciousness, which in tum was dependent on a modification of the 
environment. Geddes saw his own work as offering a synthetic account of the entire 
complex of social causation - the action and interaction of human societies with 
environment, as a necessary prerequisite for social planning. 
In beginning from natural scientific theory, Geddes was no different from 
Durkheim or others of the same generation. Via his sociological axioms, he showed 
that people are indisputably subject to at least some of the same conditions as the rest 
of nature. Like Durkheim, he wanted to argue that human beings have special or 
distinctive characteristics, but his theory allowed him to do this without later rejecting 
his earlier assertions. Instead of beginning from the capacity to communicate as the 
primary distinctive human trait, he began from the identical nature of human 
productive activity with that of all other organisms - the fact that societies, to maintain 
themselves, must utilise the matter and energy found in nature. Production was primary 
for Geddes - but production conceived of in a particular way. He could just as easily 
have followed the utilitarians and many of the biological theorists of evolution, 
including Darwin himself, and taken the individual rather than the societal totality as 
the unit of analysis. In his insistence on taking the whole rather than its parts as his 
starting point he was identical with Durkheim - both refused to theorise from the 
individual as the basic unit of analysis, because both believed that sociability, 
community. or group living was somehow intrinsic to human life. Like Durkheim, too, 
Geddes wanted to argue for the importance of mental or 'psychic' evolution - the 
development of specifically human mental powers. His argument was very similar - it is 
the degree of intensity of social life which stimulates the nervous system, and thus 
produces the superior mental capacities of human beings. Unlike Durkheim, however, 
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Geddes did not draw back, at this or any later point, from the ethical implications of his 
'scientific' approach. This is the purpose of what would otherwise appear to be a rather 
meaningless and high-flown discussion of the relation between science and ethics at the 
end of his 1884 paper. Science might show that something is logically correct - but it 
ought not to be done unless it could also be shown to be ethically good. 
Moreover, where Durkheim restricted the scope of sociology to the study of 
'moral life', or social relations as they were revealed in human institutions, for Geddes 
its scope was encyclopaedic, embracing natural as well as cultural environmental 
influences on human social life. As a biologist, Geddes was not prepared to negate the 
importance of heredity, although he cleverly inverted the theory of natural selection 
making the human production of environments a central feature of both social and 
individual evolution. Durkheim, by contrast, argued that heredity became less and less 
important as society 'evolved', because the characteristics inherited were more and 
more 'general' or vague in their impact. Perhaps the most significant difference, 
however, was Geddes' environmentalism: his insistence on the very basic and life-
sustaining importance of the inter-relationships between people and the natural world: 
. . . to remain healthy and become civilised. . . [man] must take especial 
heed of his environment; not only at his peril keeping the natural factors 
of air, water and light at their purest, but caring only for the 
"production of wealth" at all, in so far as it shapes the artificial factors, 
the materials surroundings of domestic and civil life, into forms more 
completely serviceable for the Ascent of Man. (Geddes, 1884a: 35) 
It is important to remember, when criticising Geddes for his vagueness on the 
subject of 'sociology' that there was really no such thing as sociology in 1884. 
Certainly, Geddes was acquainted with the work of other nineteenth century theorists, 
in particular Comte, Spencer and Le Play. As a natural scientist, he believed that 
sociology needed concrete data on which to base its theories. Social amelioration, 
which was the purpose of sociology, had to be based on concrete knowledge rather 
than on speculation. The problem was to find a way to acquire and collate the different 
sorts of data required. Geddes created a definition of society and outlined the scope of 
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a synthetic sociology, as he saw it, in 1881, and created a theory by which to interpret 
it in 1884. Methods already existed for the collection of physical and biological data. 
For the collection of data on social or 'mutual relations', he later argued for sociology 
as a synthesis of anthropology, geography and economics (Geddes, 1920). 
Founder of Environmental Sociology? 
Geddes' early ecological analysis of economics was fundamental to all his subsequent 
thinking. 'Environment' consisted of all the conditions which might affect the human 
organism in some way: heredity and natural environmental factors such as air, water 
and food, as well as 'cultural' or social conditions and practices. 
In spite of his many failures, 15 perhaps most especially his ultimate failure to 
produce his projected volume on sociology (Boardman, 1978; Meller, 1990), which 
might at the very least have made his ideas more easily accessible than they have 
become, if not also given them more systematic form, Patrick Geddes deserves to be 
re-instated as an early founder of environmental sociology (Martinez- Alier, 1987:98; 
Meller, 1990: 312-14). As Robson (1981: 198) suggests, Geddes anticipated what has 
recently become recognised as essential in any approach to 'environmental 
management' - the need for a multi-disciplinary approach. 
Now that many of his early ideas have been independently rediscovered 
and incorporated in the more united social sciences and in social 
welfare, we are perhaps in a stronger position to appreciate the 
unrealized potential of the 'wandering scholar' whose self-imposed brief 
was not merely to plan the city but to plan the world. (Robson, 1981: 
204) 
Geddes and Classical Human Ecology 
Fletcher (1971: 834) has suggested that Geddes contributed to the development of the 
classical human ecology of the Chicago school, through his contact with Charles 
Zueblin, who took Geddes' work home to Chicago, and published a glowing report on 
15 Geddes' failures have been well documented elsewhere, and need no special elucidation here 
(see for example, Abrams, 1968~ Meller, 1990~ Mumford in Novak, 1995). 
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the activities of Geddes' Edinburgh Summer Schools in the American Journal of 
Sociology (Zueblin, 1899). In fact, Geddes probably took his own ideas to Chicago, 
since he gave a course oflectures there in 1898 (Meller, 1990: 303). The link between 
Geddesian sociology and the Chicago school is therefore genuine. Yet, as recent work 
has shown, the classical human ecologists tended to use biological and ecological 
concepts and terminology as metaphors (Gaziano, 1996: 875). Moreover, as Miley 
(1980) has argued, there were clear continuities between classical human ecology and 
social Darwinism. 
Park and Burgess agreed with Spencer that competition contributes to 
the social good . . . . But they argue that with the growth of cities and 
large scale economic organisations the resulting mutual interdependence 
mitigates against the "old freedoms and liberties" ... that laissez-faire 
guaranteed. (Miley, 1980: 166) 
It should by now be clear that Geddes was not a social Darwinist (though his position 
is close to that which Clarke (1984, and above, Chapter One) calls 'reform Darwinism). 
Nor did he use ecological concepts as metaphors or 'tropes'. He was not only an 
'environmental' sociologist, but an 'environmentalist (in a fairly modem sense). 
Members of the Chicago school, however, did cite Geddes or his colleagues 
occasionally, though Geddes himself, while welcoming, The City (park, Burgess and 
McKenzie, 1925), felt it had barely begun to touch the problem of urban communities 
(Geddes, 1925; Meller, 1990: 303). Even as late as 1950, Hawley's Human Ecology 
contains a few references to Geddes, his colleagues J.A. Thomson and Victor 
Branford, as well as to the anthropologist A.C. Haddon, and Lewis Mumford, both of 
whom were influenced by Geddes. But in an author index which runs to several 
hundred names this is hardly significant. The natural ecologist Frederick Clements, 
from Chicago, as well as T.R. Huxley and Charles Darwin himself, are all referred to 
by Hawley much more than Geddes or his colleagues (Hawley, 1950: 433-437). It is 
much more likely that the theoretical orientation of the Chicago human ecologists 
derived more from interests already existing there than they did from the 'wandering 
scholar', and that they simply cited Geddes selectively to support their own particular 
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perspective. Zueblin, for example, was on the staff of the University of Chicago 
between 1894 and 1907, and was interested primarily in urban reform. Similarly, the 
natural science orientation of Albion Small, first Professor of Social Science there, and 
W.I. Thomas's early interest in natural history were other factors in the general 
orientation of the school (Bulmer, 1984: 34-37). Certainly no direct link exists between 
Geddes and Robert Park, the 'founder' of classical human ecology, who did not join the 
Chicago department until 1913 or 1914 (part-time), well after both Geddes' lecture and 
Zueblin's departure. 16 
Geddes and New Human Ecology 
But if Geddes' link with classical human ecology is tenuous, he is more easily 
connected with the recently emerged 'new' human ecology, which sets itself against the 
'Dominant Western Worldview', and does not limit sociology to the study of 'social 
structure', but insists on the importance of an understanding of the inter-relationships 
between people and nature. 
During his years in India, Geddes was a major influence on Radhakamal 
MukeIjee, who was appointed as Professor of Sociology and Economics at Lucknow 
University in 1921 (Meller, 1990: 220,225). Geddes wrote an introduction for one of 
MukeIjee's early books, Foundations of Indian Economics (1916), and MukeIjee, 
clearly influenced by Geddes, produced a volume on Regional Sociology (1926). Two 
articles by MukeIjee in the American Journal of SOCiology have been hailed by Catton 
and Dunlap as early examples of environmental sociology. In both articles Geddes' 
influence is manifest - in the use of particular words and phrases: region, 'the standard 
of consumption', the 'law of diminishing returns', 'valley section', 'co-ordination of 
biological and social surveys'.17 The earlier article (MukeIjee, 1930) was entitled 'The 
16 According to Gaziano (1996: 880), Park accepted a part-time position at Chicago in 1914. 
Bulmer (1984: 31) suggests the year was 1913. 
17 Mumford cOmplained to Geddes that Mukerjee, in spite of having absorbed so much of the 
master's thought, failed to acknowledge his sources (Novak, 1995: 245, 306). 
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Regional Balance of Man'. In it Muketjee suggested that ecology involves the 'idea of 
the region as an intricate network of interrelations'. 
Man is part and parcel of the process by which the balance of the region 
is maintained or shifted, and the process is ever continued in see-saw 
fashion, now in favour of man, now definitely against him. In this 
process the entire life of inorganic nature is involved, though it may be 
initiated by some slight human action that sets in motion a series of 
processes which may conserve or upset the order of nature . . . . often 
such disturbance is casually and carelessly brought about, or increases 
cumulatively through man's interference continued for generations until 
it saps the root of the region's life and engulfs man in the common 
doom of the region. (Muketjee, 1930: 456) 
Muketjee's (1932) article 'The Ecological Outlook in Sociology' opens with the 
language of the struggle for existence, and the processes of 'competition, invasion and 
succession', but his thesis was the more Geddesian insistence that 'co-operation' in and 
with both nature and each other was a necessary feature of social advance. Geddes' 
'holism' appeared, beautifully expressed, in the assertion that 
The cultural order is woven within the skeleton of the ecological order, 
and it is the intermeshing of the two orders, organic and spiritual, which 
sets before us the complex web of the whole life-community in its 
completeness. As evolution progresses, the organisation of life and 
mind in the region shows greater correlation and solidarity, on the one 
hand and extension and continuity on the other. (Muketjee, 1932: 350) 
Muketjee identified Ogburn's (1922) concept of 'cultural lag' with Geddes concept of 
'survivals', when he spoke of the 'fixity' of location, social and economic status, 'plane 
of living' and 'social norm' (ibid: 350). Social pathology - the maladaptation of 
humankind to its environment, was evident in a generalised increase in mortality, in 
increasing disease, as well as in differential mortality rates for those working at 
different occupations, and in the decay of social institutions. A 'scientific and broad-
minded' co-operation with 'ecologic forces', should be the keynote for the future. 
Instead of continuing to commit 'crime against sun and water, plants and animals', 
disfiguring the ground, and too often letting loose 'destructive forces which have 
impoverished and ultimately engulfed . . . civilisation' in the attainment of quick 
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economic results, it was necessary to advance more slowly, based on research and 
awareness of the interlacing, and linkages between all forms of life. 
Mukerjee's subject was not 'human' but 'social ecology': 
The conservation of soil, water and food, the economy of man's food 
and energy circulation, the protection of the earth's mantle of trees and 
grasses, the selection and crossing of crops, trees and animals, the 
biological control or eradication of diseases, pests and parasites, the 
utilization of all kinds of organic wastage, permanent agriculture, the 
conservation of water supply and the training and management of rivers 
and water-courses, a nicely adjusted occupational balance which may 
best utilize the resources and possibilities of different sections of the 
region and the skill and the aptitudes of the people - all this is social 
ecology.(Mukerjee, 1932: 352) 
Man's understanding of the ecological web which is as yet scanty and 
partial must expand in order that he may be safe for the region and the 
region safe for him .... But mere scientific understanding of the web of 
life does not help matters. Man should cultivate a new humility and a 
new foresight in the interest of the unborn societies of the future, which 
will be religious in its significance, before he can make himself the 
central link in the vital chain of food and energy circulation on the earth 
of which his pattern of civilisation is but a phase, and so far a passing 
one. (ibid: 353) 
Admittedly, this is not much more than a normative statement of aims -
concerned with what should be, rather than with how it is to be achieved. The theory 
was that 'Nature, sun and earth, plants and animals, mingle silently with mind, society 
and culture, and become part of their structure'. Structure and function (as the 'specific 
normal pattern of life and its maintenance') were both of fundamental importance, 
where the presence or absence of a single component or structural factor could affect 
the specific normal pattern of life, and even its ability to function at all (ibid: 354). As a 
counter-theory to the human ecologists insistence on studying only the human social 
structures, for fear of confusing or baffling the student, it was a much needed reminder 
of the inter-dependence of human life with its physical and organic surroundings. It 
was also a voice in the wilderness. 
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The Strange Disappearance of Patrick Geddes 
In view of his role (however small, however selective) in the establishment of classical 
human ecology at Chicago, and his influence on MukeIjee, who is now claimed as a 
neglected example of early environmental sociology, Geddes' disappearance clearly 
needs some explanation. Why for example, does Bulmer's (1984) history of the 
Chicago School not mention Geddes at all, in spite of the fact that he lectured at 
Chicago in 1898, and in spite of his influence on Zueblin? Why have contemporary 
environmental sociologists in Britain begun to discuss the implications and relevance of 
Marx's ideas (Benton 1989, 1993~ Dickens, 1992~ Mellor, 1992~ Martell, 1994), 
Durkheim's, Weber's (Redclift and Woodgate, 1994~ Goldblatt 1996) and even those of 
T.H. Marshall (Newby, 1996), but not Geddes? The answer is that Geddes and his 
ideas were excluded, more or less deliberately, during the early years of the 
establishment of sociology in Britain, from academic institutionalised sociology. 
Moreover, the non-academic organisations and associations which did retain 
Geddesian ideas, kept only some of them - in particular his emphasis on the importance 
of the Regional Survey - often without understanding the importance of the wider 
context of his thought. As a result Geddes, where he is not forgotten entirely, has 
acquired a reputation with which most contemporary sociologists would not wish to be 
associated. The early years of Sociology in Britain, and Geddes' exclusion, are 
examined in the following chapter. 
Chapter 3. 




This chapter tells the story of the establishment and early years of the 
Sociological Society of London and the institutionalisation of academic 
sociology at the London School of Economics (LSE). The story is essentially a 
simple one. Victor Branford and James Martin White invested large quantities 
of time and money in founding the Sociological Society and funding Sociology 
at LSE. in an attempt to help Patrick Geddes gain the academic recognition 
they felt was his due. Previous attempts had been made during the nineteenth 
century to found sociology, institutionally, as the subject concerned above all 
with questions of social reform. In the period of political and economic stability 
and growth up to 1870, these attempts had successively foundered. By the tum 
of the century, however, in a climate of political uncertainty and growing 
nationalism, amidst the movement for university extension and reform. and 
above all in the face of the increasingly severe problem of 'degeneration' of the 
working classes, the idea of a social science of sociology had begun to look 
much more appealing. Unfortunately, the early enthusiasts for sociology could 
not agree about exactly what it was to be, how to go about its study, or where 
to draw the boundaries between it and the other new disciplines - in particular 
geography, anthropology and psychology - at that time all jostling for a place in 
the University curriculum. 
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All the contending schools began from biology, and in particular from 
Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, but each had a different 
political bias and set of objectives. The Eugenists, headed by Darwin's cousin, 
Francis Galton, were in the strongest position. They wanted to found sociology 
as Eugenics - the science of good breeding - a theme which had wide cross-
party appeal. Eugenics was of interest to those with philanthropic tendencies as 
much as to people whose interest was social reform, national efficiency, 
industrial supremacy or imperialist expansion. Most importantly, Eugenics 
appealed to those in the middle and upper echelons of society, for some of 
whom the burgeoning urban masses represented a threat, where others saw an 
object of philanthropic duty. These people could support sociology not only 
intellectually, but also, more importantly, financially. Geddes' sociology, based 
on his earlier papers, in which he had inverted the theory of natural selection, 
involved the survey of cities and regions to discern all that was best and worst 
in the natural, built and cultural environment as a prerequisite to environmental, 
and consequently social improvement. Its supporters were other proponents of 
the social survey like Booth, certain geographers, and social reformers such as 
Ebenezer Howard. Hobhouse's background was academic and philosophical. 
He was an Oxford graduate and had constructed his theory, like Durkheim, in 
direct opposition to that of Spencer. Like Durkheim, too, he both accepted the 
theory of natural selection and argued against its applicability in modem 
societies. 
In spite of an initial spirit of goodwill, and some degree of agreement to 
work together, these three competing factions vied for the right to define what 
sociology would become. Galton's political position was distasteful to both 
Geddes and Hobhouse. Geddes the biologist, however, did not deny the 
importance of heredity, though he believed that cultural inheritance and 
physical environment were at least equally, if not more, important factors in 
social development. Hobhouse, in an attempt to repudiate Spencerian theory 
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and politics, had already effectively rejected heredity as an important factor in 
social evolution - and in a manner very similar to Durkheim. Yet Galton and 
the Eugenists had little need of the nascent Sociological Society. Galton himself 
was able to endow a Eugenics Records Office at the University of London in 
1905, and a Chair in Eugenics upon his death in 1911, with the 
recommendation that the first occupant should be his disciple and collaborator 
Karl Pearson. This left Hobhouse and Geddes. Both applied for the Chair 
created at LSE with Martin White's money. Why the chair was given to 
Hobhouse and not Geddes, when it was an open secret that it had been created 
for the latter, is one question that deserves some attention, if only because 
Hobhouse's appointment to the Chair at the end of 1907 left him in a uniquely 
privileged position with respect to sociology in Britain. Another question 
surrounds Hobhouse's attitude to Geddes and his Civics Sociology. He and 
Geddes could have collaborated; their respective visions, politics and methods 
were undoubtedly different, but they were not as different as all that. However, 
they did not collaborate, and in the final instance, this was disastrous for 
Geddes, who became, as far as British academic sociology was concerned, 
increasingly marginalised. By the time of his death in 1932, though he had 
never quite abandoned the hope of becoming accepted, and acceptable, in 
British sociology, and in spite of a lifetime in which he inspired at least as many 
people as were alienated by his somewhat forceful personality, Geddes was all 
but forgotten. 
Geddes: from Natural to Social Science 
Geddes' interest in sociology developed early, but he was still, during the 
1880s, aiming to earn a living in the natural sciences. In spite of his public 
excursions into sociology - which included, as well as the articles so far cited, 
his practical social experiments and a contribution to a lecture series on the 
problems of distribution - Geddes was still primarily a botanist. In 1882, he 
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applied for, but failed to get, a Chair in Natural History at the University of 
Edinburgh. In 1888, he applied first for a Chair in Botany and later for the post 
of Examiner. His lengthy application for the Chair was accompanied by 
endorsements from Darwin, Wallace and Weismann, as well as his early mentor 
Huxley, though Huxley's comment that he had a high a opinion of Geddes' 
abilities and was 'well aware that his knowledge is unusually varied and 
extensive' (cited in Boardman, 1978: 103) was perhaps a veiled and slightly 
barbed reference to their earlier sociological disagreements over Spencerian 
theory (Boardman, 1978: 113). Why Geddes failed to be appointed to the Chair 
in Botany is not known, but although Boardman hints that it may have been at 
least in part due to nepotism (Isaac Balfour, who got the job, was the son of a 
previous incumbent of the post), it must have been at least as much due to 
Geddes' lack of formal educational qualifications (Boardman, 1978: 108; 
Meller, 1990: 26).1 
Geddes' wealthy friend, James Martin White, subsequently endowed a 
Chair in Botany at University College, Dundee, especially for him. The special 
terms of his contract there required him to be in residence for only three 
months of the year, from mid-April to mid-June (Boardman: 1978: 108). For 
the other nine months of the years from 1889 until his appointment as Professor 
of Sociology at the University of Bombay in 1920, Geddes continued working 
on other projects, including, in the short term, the extension of Edinburgh's 
University Hall, the University Extension Movement, and the establishment of 
his Summer Schools, which became 'The Edinburgh School of Sociology'. The 
Summer Schools at the Outlook Tower in Edinburgh, which began in 1897 
were, in fact, the earliest (if unconventional) attempt to establish sociology in 
1 Boardman (1944) also suggests that Geddes' failure to get the Chair was due to his 
forays into economics and sociology, which was considered 'conduct unbecoming to a 
botanist'. 
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Britain as a subject in its own right, and would allow Geddes, at the first 
meeting of the Sociological Society of London in 1904, to describe himself 
(somewhat disingenuously) as 'Professor Geddes, President, Edinburgh School 
of Sociology (Sociological Papers, 1905: 283). 
The Sociological Society: Foundations 
The initial idea for the Society came from another of Geddes' friends, Victor 
Branford. Its purpose would be to provide a London platform for the 
dissemination of the ideas of his friend and mentor, as well as providing a 
forum for the discussion of developments in Social Studies, taking place in 
Britain and elsewhere (Meller, 1990:139; Boardman, 1944:239; 1978: 199; 
Halliday, 1968: 382).2 
Branford (1864-1930) was an industrialist and financier who had been a 
student at Edinburgh University, where he had first come into contact with 
Geddes. In spite of his successful business career he had a yearning for the 
academic life, attended the Edinburgh Summer Schools and kept in touch with 
Geddes, with whom he became close friends (Meller, 1990: 14fn.). During the 
spring and summer of 1903, Branford, with the financial support of Martin 
White, but without any help from Geddes (who was at that time engaged in a 
survey of Dunfermline for the Carnegie Dunfermline Trust), had begun the 
initial tasks involved in setting up the Sociological Society. A circular was sent 
out to 'teachers of Philosophy, History and Economics', as well as to 'a few 
selected representatives of relevant scientific groups and practical interests, and 
a few foreign sociologists' (Collini, 1979: 198). Over fifty people responded to 
the circular, and the society was officially constituted at a meeting held in 
November, 1903: 
2 Perhaps understandably. accounts by Owen (1974), Collini (1979), and Hobson and 
Ginsberg (1931) all of which focus on Hobhouse as the fotmder of British Sociology, 
omit any reference to Branford's and Martin White's aspirations for Geddes. 
The Right Hon. James Bryce was elected first President, l 
Martin White Treasurer, Victor Branford Hon. Secretary, and 
among its thirty councillors were names such as Sir John 
Cockburn, former Premier of South Australia, Mr. H.G. Wells, 
and as thinly disguised instigator ex-officio, 'Professor Geddes: 
President, Edinburgh School of Sociology'.(Boardman, 1978: 
199) 
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Geddes was not unique in this self-puffery. Perhaps, in his case, it was 
necessary, since not only was he a rank outsider - as an unknown Scot - but he 
had also no academic degree at all. Other members of the Council included 'Mr. 
L.T. Hobhouse', his friend and eventual biographer, lA Hobson, as well as 
several other acquaintances - in particular, Graham Wallace and G.P. Gooch. 
These three, and the majority of the other members of the Council, were 
described by their degrees, occupations or publications. Hobhouse, in spite of 
the 'Mr.' was listed as 'late Fellow and Assistant Tutor, Corpus Christi College, 
Oxford', suggesting that he, as much as Geddes, felt a need to lay claim to 
superior status (Sociological Papers, 1905:283, emphasis added). Other 
members of the Council included the positivist, lH. Bridges, a fellow of the 
Royal College of Physicians; AC. Haddon, supporter of Geddes and lecturer in 
Ethnology at Cambridge; the biologist C.W. Saleeby; C.S. Loch, Professor of 
Political Economy at the University of London as well as the secretary of the 
Charity Organisation Society; and the Reverend AL. Lilley, who was rector of 
St. Mary's at Paddington. 
From the responses to Branford's circular it became clear that the 
definition and scope of sociology was still an open question. There was 
agreement on only a few points, which were, first, that a new Society should 
avoid the concentration on 'Drink, Drainage and Divorce' or the 'construction 
of drains and chimney pots', which had been characteristic of the earlier, and 
now defunct, National Association for the Promotion of Social Science. 
Secondly, there appeared to be general agreement that sociology should be a 
science, and discover 1aws' which would yield some guidance as to matters of 
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social reform. In particular, it was agreed that sociology should be an 
evolutionary science. There was also a certain amount of agreement that 
sociology should be a synthesising or co-ordinating science, which would 
gather together the 'facts' known about society and social life which had by 
now been gathered by a variety of social sciences (Collini, 1979: 199~ see also 
Abrams, 1968). 
Geddes, Branford, and Hobhouse, as well as H.G. Wells, Benjamin 
Kidd, lA. Hobson and G.P. Gooch, formed the first editorial committee for the 
Society's journal Sociological Papers. It was these men who drew up an 
Addendum to the first issue, in which (presumably on the basis of the first 
year's discussions) the scope and aims of the society were outlined in detail. 
These were to be 'scientific, educational and practical', and to promote 
investigation in the social sciences. Its scope was to be 'the whole phenomena 
of society', which were to be investigated from every possible angle, 'with 
increasing precision and completeness'. In all this the Society would function as 
a common meeting ground for all the various social sciences. It would be the 
forum at which each of the differing social perspectives advanced their 
contribution to 'a fuller Social Philosophy, including the natural and civil 
history of man, his achievements and his ideals'. 
This conception of social evolution involves a clearer valuation 
of the conditions and forces which respectively hinder or help 
development, which make towards degeneration or towards 
progress. The physician and the alienist, the criminologist and 
the jurist, have here again their common meeting ground with 
hygienist and educationist, with philanthropist, social reformer 
and politician, with journalist and cleric. (SOCiological Papers, 
1905: 284) 
Though Geddes' unmistakable written style is absent from this 
statement of aims and definition, his mark is indelibly imprinted on it, in the 
references to the practical and educational aims of the Society, and the 
insistence on man's 'natural history', as well as in the insistence on its 
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synthesising role. The Appendix notes further that 1. Martin White has 
endowed the University of London with a fund to be used for the purpose of 
establishing sociology there. 
Sociology at LSE: Foundations 
Meanwhile, in June 1903, Martin White had written to Sir Arthur Rucker, the 
Principal of the University of London, with a formal offer of £1000 to be spent 
over several years for the provision of 'a preliminary course or courses of 
lectures in sociology.' He defined sociology as 
the study of social organisation, development and ideals, past 
and present, over the world, from the lowest to the highest 
forms~ with the object not only of constructing a scientific 
theory of society, but also of associating such theory with the 
highest philosophical thought, and of indicating the bearing of 
such knowledge on practical life. (Letter from 1.M. White to Sir 
A.W. Rucker, June 29th, 1903, cited in Fincham, 1975: 32) 
The Committee set up at the University to consider this gift proposed that since 
there were already several courses in London more or less concerned with 
sociology - in particular those run by the School of Sociology set up only two 
years before, in 1902, by the Charity Organisation Society, the courses set up 
with the money should cover areas not already covered by these. The lecturers 
appointed by the committee would be eligible to be on the Board of Studies in 
Economics at the University of London, and should teach at places where the 
students were already studying related or relevant subjects. This effectively 
ensured that LSE would become the centre for sociology, which became, in 
1904-5, an optional honours subject for the BSc in Economics and the BA in 
philosophy (Fincham, 1975:25-33). 
Two Professorial Candidates 
During these early years of the century, Hobhouse - the man who would 
eventually become Britain's first Professor of sociology - was, like Geddes, 
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actively in search of a job. The contrast between their backgrounds is striking, 
and it is likely that as a result of his family'S socio-economic status his 
prospects were better than Geddes'. The Hobhouses had been prosperous 
Bristol merchants during the eighteenth century (Hobson and Ginsberg, 1931: 
16). Geddes' father, on the other hand, orphaned at a young age through the 
death of his peasant parents in a cholera epidemic in Glasgow, had been a 
Sergeant-Major of a Highland Regiment, the Black Watch (Meller, 1990:5). 
Although, like Geddes' father in his later years, Hobhouse's father was a 
member of the clergy, this was orthodox Church of England, rather than non-
conformist 'Free Kirk'. And unlike Geddes, who was largely self educated, 
Hobhouse, while at Marlborough College, won a Classics Scholarship to 
Oxford, where he remained, as student, Tutor and Fellow, between 1883 and 
1897. At that point, he abandoned the academic life - supposedly forever - in 
favour of a job on the Manchester Guardian, and a life of 'political activism' 
(Hobson and Ginsberg, 1931: 15-37). 
Hobhouse did not abandon his academic work, however, and within a 
few years found the strain of combining journalism with philosophy too much. 
Consequently, he moved his family from Manchester to London in the Autumn 
of 1902, where, although he had hoped to devote himself full-time to his 
philosophy, he found himself in financial difficulties after an unexpected 'heavy 
loss of ... financial resources' and was forced to look for a job. He accepted, 
first, the post of Secretary of the Free Trade Union, and then the job of 
Political Editor of the new daily paper, The Tribune. Both jobs were 
uncongenial to him, and he resigned from the latter at the beginning of 1907. It 
was perhaps fortunate, as Hobson remarked, that Hobhouse had found himself 
in London, just as the movement to found the Sociological Society was getting 
underway (Hobson and Ginsberg, 1931: 41-42), since his involvement served 
as a useful preparation for his move back to the academic life in 1907. More 
particularly, perhaps, it was fortunate that his early involvement with British 
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sociology, gave him, at an early stage, a formative role in its introduction to the 
LSE. 
Academic Sociology Defined 
Under the terms of the 1903 Martin White Benefaction, Hobhouse offered his 
services to the University and gave one course of lectures 'without 
remuneration' on 'Comparative Ethics', during the academic year 1904-5 
(Hobson and Ginsberg, 1931: 43). These lectures (which were attended by 23 
students in 1904 (Fincham, 1975: 33», did provide him with one definite 
advantage, even if they brought him no money. He was eligible, since he was 
lecturing in connection with the Martin White Benefaction, to sit on the Board 
of Studies, which drew up a general scheme of studies in Sociology during the 
academic year 1904-5. This was divided into two parts: Social Evolution, to be 
studied both descriptively and theoretically; and Social Philosophy. There was 
also a suggestion that the more advanced students should gain some knowledge 
of recent psychological treatments of ethics and morality. The more detailed 
Official Syllabus, published in the University of London Calendar for 1906-7, 
was developed on the basis of this (Fincham, 1975: 40). It is reproduced as 
Figure 4, on the following page. 
The syllabus is heavily biased towards psychology, which is likely to 
have been due to Hobhouse's presence on the Board. Hobhouse had published 
Mind in Evolution, which was largely a work on animal and human 
psychology, in 1901, making him eminently qualifed to teach the subject. It is 
also worth noting the emphasis on morality, and moral evolution, bearing in 
mind that Hobhouse published Morals in Evolution, the sequel to Mind, in 
1906. Yet he was not made Professor of Sociology at LSE until 1907. It is 
possible, therefore, that his contribution to defining the sociology syllabus was 
a factor in his eventual ascendancy to the Chair, since the scope of the subject, 
as defined by the syllabus, so closely matched his own academic interests. 
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Figure 4: The Official London Syllabus. 1906 (Source, Fincham, 1975) 
A. Comparative Study of Social Institutions 
1. Sociology in its relations to Biology and Psychology. The principle of evolution 
applied to Social Phenomena. 
2. Forms of Social Organisation 
• A] The family - Maternal and Paternal Descent. Power of the Head of the Family. 
Joints and Individual Property. Regulation of Marriage. Position of women. 
• B] Society - The Clan and the Tribe. Monarchy. Feudalism, the City State. The 
Modem State. Federal Government. 
3. The Maintenance of Social Order. 
• The Blood Feud. Retaliation. Compensation. Primitive Courts and Processes. The 
Oaths and the Ordeal. Growth of Public Justice and Rational Procedure. 
Responsibility, Punishment and the Prevention of Crime. 
4. The Social Structure. 
• Slavery, Serfdom, Free Labour, and Industrial Co-operation. Caste and Class 
Distinctions. Civil and Political Equality. 
5. Religions and other beliefs in their bearings on Social Relations. 
• Influence of Magic, Animism, Ancestor Worship, Polytheism, The World Religions, on 
Social Morality. Antithesis of Temporal and Spiritual Powers 
B. Psychology 
1. The Psychological Standpoint. 
2. Comparative Study of Mental Structure 
• A] in Animals and Man 
• B] in Child and Adult. 
• C] in Primitive and Advanced Peoples 
3. The Psychological Bases of Social Institutions 
• A] Ideas of morals and Political Obligations. 
• B] Nature and Development of Moral Faculty, Psychology of Sympathy, Self-love, 
Moral Sense, Conscience. The idea of Personality. 
• C] Psychology of Responsibility - Analysis of Will, Desire, Impulse, Motive, Intention. 
4. Psychological element in 
• A] Aesthetic Development 
• B] Scientific Development 
• C] Religious Development 
C. Ethnology 
• The physical, mental cultural and social characteristics of the main varieties of mankind 
• The present geographic distribution of races and peoples, and their former wanderings. 
• The antiquity of man, the physical characteristics of prehistoric peoples and the 
evolution of their culture. 
• A detailed acquaintance with a selected continent, or area, comprising a knowledge of 
the main social groups in the region selected, their environment (physical and 
biological), occupation, property, culture, social structure, religion, expansion and 
their influence on one another. 
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Sociological Society: Early Yean 
The development of the Sociological Society went on largely independently of 
sociology's academic foundations, though Branford, Martin White and Hobhouse (and, 
to a lesser extent Geddes) were involved in both from the start The three volumes of 
Sociological Papers, which were published annually for the years 1904 to 1906, are 
dominated by the debate between the Eugenists and the Civics sociologists, and by the 
question of the definition, role and purpose of sociology and its relationship with other 
disciplines. Hobhouse took relatively little part in the proceedings? He was on the 
editorial committee, and he contributed to certain discussions, but did not present a 
paper at any of the Society's meetings. 
Superficially, these early years provided a good start for the new Society and 
the new subject. But in 1907 the Sociological Papers were abandoned, the Eugenists 
and the Civics sociologists each formed separate committees within the Society and 
Hobhouse, at the end of the year, accepted the Martin White Chair at LSE. By 1908 
there was a new journal - the quarterly Sociological Review - edited by Hobhouse and 
with a fundamentally different character. In 1910, Hobhouse resigned from his editorial 
role 'partly from pressure of other work, but partly also from a divergence of view as 
to the conduct and contents of such a review that had arisen between him and other 
active supporters of the society'. (Hobson and Ginsberg, 193:46; Sociological Review, 
1910: 226). In April 1911, Branford's resignation from his role of Honorary Secretary 
to the Sociological Society was announced in the pages of the Review. (1911:175). 
Hobhouse, though he continued to be a member, increasingly distanced himself, and 
3 Dahrendorf, (1995: 101) writes that Hobhouse chaired many meetings of the society and 
contributed to most of them. This is incorrect. Hobhouse's contribution to the active 
proceedings of the society is very much smaller than that of Geddes, who presented several 
papers to Hobhouse's none. By 1906, it seems, Hobhouse had given up attending the meetings 
at all, for there is no comment of his on any of the papers. 
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consequently academic sociology (of which he was certainly the primary, ifnot the sole 
representative), from both the Sociological Society and its Review. 
The signs, then, point to some kind of dispute at the Sociological Society 
during its early years. Yet sociology's historians have been somewhat coy about its 
nature and causes. This coyness is likely to be rooted partly in the subject - eugenics -
around which the dispute ostensibly revolved. Eugenics, although it had many 
supporters in the first quarter of the century, has acquired, as a result of its association 
with the worst excesses of Fascism in the second World War, extremely unpleasant 
associations, so that it would be understandable for post-war sociologists to wish to 
distance both themselves, and their discipline, from it. Cursory and superficial 
treatment of any dispute may also reflect, however, a reluctance to concede that 
personal loyalties, alliances or enmity play any significant role in the reception and 
diffusion of academic work, and a desire to believe that the theories and methods that 
came to be associated with sociology were the only possible choice - that whatever 
went on in those early days, the outcome was all for the best in the best of all possible 
worlds. Certainly, so long as Geddes continues to be regarded as a marginal figure -
eccentric, amateur and hopelessly confused, the dispute itself is of little interest. For 
those with an interest in the fate of the earliest example of environmental sociology in 
Britain, however, the dispute and its outcome was highly consequential. It is therefore 
important, and may be instructive for contemporary sociology, to attempt to unravel its 
manifold threads. 
Historical Accounts of the Early Years 
John Owen, in his 1974 study of Hobhouse avoids the subject of Eugenics altogether. 
Collini, also primarily interested in Hobhouse, insists on his unequivocal rejection of 
eugenics (1979: 198-208). He notes the 'conflict' at the Society (ibid: 219-220), but 
does not connect this to eugenics. Halliday's (1968) account is the most explicit. He 
notes Branford's complaint, which was that Ethics was being advanced at the expense 
of Civics and Eugenics - and suggests that this was probably an over-simplified 
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description of the nature of the dispute, which became more serious when Hobhouse 
became Martin White Professor. He adds that Hobhouse was obliged to reject Civics 
because of its geographical determinism (1968: 386-389). Mitchell believes that the 
dispute over the Chair was at the root of the matter, and spilled over into the Society. 
He notes, also, that the personalities of the two major protagonists, Hobhouse and 
Geddes, were incompatible (1968: 221). Hawthorn argues that Hobhouse, once 
enthroned in the Martin White Chair, was embarrassed by the 'romantic effusions' of 
Branford and Geddes, and consequently ignored them (1976: 167). Bulmer (1985: 10) 
believes that 'coolness' between Hobhouse and Geddes on intellectual matters, as well 
as competition for the Martin White Chair, led to Hobhouse's withdrawal from the 
Society. Abrams (1985: 195-6) represents the dispute somewhat obliquely, as one 
between Geddes' conviction that social science is 'lived not written' and Hobhouse as 
an 'idol' of academic 'purity' untainted by empirical studies. Meller suggests that a 
presentation made by Geddes before the Sociological Society, in which he appears to 
support Galton's new science of Eugenics, may have been at the root ofthe rejection of 
Civics by the Ethical school. It was, she suggests, an attempt to inspire his audience 
and thus to gain needed financial resources for his vision of sociology (I 990: 142). 
These accounts are none of them without substance, but they are all partial accounts, 
which hint at, rather than make explicit, the exact nature of the dispute and its 
consequences. 
The Dispute at the Sociological Society 
Textual evidence, however, indicates that not only did a dispute occur, but that its 
nature was complex, and its effects lasting. Certainly, the social, economic and 
intellectual climate of the time had something to do with it. Nationalism, while it may 
have had causes primarily to do with imperialism and economics, spilled over into 
intellectual life. Sociology was doing better in foreign universities than at home, 
leading to an atmosphere of academic jealousy. Likewise, domestic socio-economic 
conditions, while being for some a matter of philanthropic duty, were for others a 
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matter of political concern, and yet others a matter of increasing national insecurity. 
Finally, Darwin's theory was an important factor, in both a negative and a positive 
sense. It was important in a negative sense, theoretically, because of what it suggested 
about the unavoidable causes and conditions of human evolution, and it was important 
in a positive sense methodologically. Darwin's observational skill and attention to detail 
became the model for science in general. Darwin's achievement inspired the early 
sociologists to create sociology as a science like biology, capable of synthesising all 
social knowledge. 
The Geddesian school, led rather by Branford than by Geddes himself, 
attempted to align sociology with the Durkheimian school in France. Branford's aim 
appeared to be to establish sociology as the post-Comtean 'Queen of the Social 
Sciences'; as a subject with a synthesising role, which could bring all social knowledge 
together under a single theoretical umbrella. Moreover, it is likely that he envisaged 
that sociology in Britain could be organised institutionally as it had been in France, by 
dividing up the academic labour into various departments - perhaps according to the 
broad classificatory scheme already outlined by Geddes. Galton's advocate, Pearson, 
did not agree. For him, if anyone was to be Sociology's great man of science, it was, 
naturally, Galton himself, who had come out of retirement especially to deliver his first 
paper at the Sociological Society. The early discussions there show how few potential 
sociologists were in accord with either Galton's method or his politics. Hobhouse kept 
his distance from this disagreement initially. Yet his editorial experience as a journalist 
and his academic background must have given him a certain leverage on the Society's 
Council and Editorial Committee in those early days - a leverage that became much 
greater after his appointment as Martin White Professor at LSE. He began to call the 
shots - to insist on the publication of particular articles over others, effectively 
excluding both eugenics and civics. Eugenics was distasteful to him, not so much for 
what it claimed to show - that mental characteristics were as much inherited as 
physical, as for the illiberal policies that flowed from it. It is a more complex matter to 
understand why he excluded Civics. Branford complained that Hobhouse did not really 
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understand Civics. This may be true but seems unlikely. Again, it may be at least 
partially true that he was put offby Geddes' apparent alignment of Civics and Eugenics 
in 1904, or by Geddes' refusal, in general, to distance himself from the biological 
sciences. As well as this, however, it seems to have been a matter of politics, academic 
jealousy and personalities - of Hobhouse using his superior status to marginalise any 
political or academic position which did not wholly accord with, or support, his own, 
and Geddes responding by attacking all the more virulently the separation, 
specialisation and most importantly isolation of academic sociology behind the wall of 
the academy. 
Branford Appeals to Durkheim 
One advantage of the particular format of the Sociological Papers, in which the papers 
read to the society and discussions which followed them are reproduced verbatim, is 
that the complex contours of debate and disagreement, of alliance and enmity, as well 
as something of the personalities of various protagonists and the atmosphere in which 
the meetings took place, begin to emerge. Who spoke when, and about what; who 
attended this particular meeting rather than that one; who aligned himself or herself 
with whom - all these things suggest the charged atmosphere of the meetings, and the 
excitement which attended the birth pains of the new discipline - though there must 
have been many private conversations and sotto voce remarks that would reveal more, 
if they had been recorded. 
The very first article in the first volume was written by Branford, entitled 'On 
the Origins and Use of the Word Sociology' (Branford, 1905a). This had been enclosed 
with his circular, and summarised the history of sociology, from its introduction by 
Comte to its adoption by 1.S. Mill, to the influence of Spencer in bringing it into 
international usage. Branford noted the establishment of sociology in firs~ France, then 
Italy, Belgium, America, and Germany, and compared the situation there to its 
undeveloped condition in Britain. 
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In France, Branford noted the work of Tarde, Durkheim, and De Roberty, and 
the foundation of the International Institute of Sociology in 1893, the publication of 
the Revue Internationale de Sociologie, the addition of a sociology section to the 
Revue Philosophique and the foundation of the Anm?e Sociologique in 1898. Italy had 
at least five journals, he said, 'devoted mainly or exclusively to sociological work' and 
even a 'sociological review of reviews!'. He mentioned the foundation of the Universite 
Nouvelle in Brussels - a specifically sociological institution under De Greet; the work 
of Simmel and T6nnies in Germany; the elaborately equipped sociological department 
of Chicago University and the publication of the American Journal oj Sociology. 
This reference to foreign sociology, in an appeal for support, illustrates a high 
degree of awareness of the international context. It also amounts to an appeal to 
nationalist sentiment. Britain stood alone, claimed Branford, in its neglect of sociology, 
while other nations forged ahead. Yet it is clear, at the same time, that the model for 
the development of British sociology, for Branford, was the French Durkheimian 
school, since in order to illustrate the scope and direction that sociology should take in 
Britain, he reproduced an analysis of sociological literature, from the Annee 
Sociologique for 1902. This attempted alliance seems rather odd at first sight. An 
overtly environmental sociology seems to have little in common with a sociology 
which confined it self to the study of moral life and 'social facts' We should remember, 
however, that during these years, Durkheim was making a determined attempt to 
absorb Vidalien human geography, with the consequence that 'morphologie sociale' 
had, temporarily at least, acquired a higher status in the contents of the Annee than 
Durkheim would finally allow (see above, Chapter 1). 
Karl Pearson Fires the First Shot 
Francis Galton's paper, read on 16th May, was entitled 'Eugenics: its definition, scope 
and aim'. He defined Eugenics as 'the science that deals with all influences that improve 
the inborn qualities of a race', adding that it was also concerned with all influences that 
develop inborn qualities to the utmost advantage (Galton, 1905: 45). He went on to 
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claim that the aim of Eugenics was 'to bring as many influences as can reasonably be 
employed, to cause the useful classes in the community to contribute more than their 
proportion to the next generation' (ibid: 47), and laid out some of the means by which 
a 'learned and active Society such as the Sociological' might go about this, as a matter 
of 'national importance'. Galton, in spite of his claim to be interested in nurture, was 
clearly convinced of the over-riding utility of the manipulation of nature. Instead of 
'natural selection', he proposed human selection via a programme of (supposedly 
ameliorative) breeding: 'What Nature does blindly, slowly and ruthlessly, man may do 
providently quickly and kindly' (ibid: 50). 
Galton's collaborator and disciple, Karl Pearson, (at that time Professor of 
Applied Mathematics at University College, London), was chairing the meeting. He 
rose to open the discussion, scathingly declaring that he did not believe that the 
Sociological Society - which seemed to him to be a 'herd without its leader' - of which 
he was not a member, and where he would not ordinarily wish to be seen, could found 
a new branch of science. This must be achieved by one 'great thinker, a Descartes, a 
Newton ... a Darwin or a Pasteur' (Sociological Papers 1905: 52). Pearson went on to 
make it perfectly plain that he had only come to the meeting to support Galton's 
application for that post! (ibid: 53). 
Pearson's declaration obviously (and quite understandably) angered Branford,4 
who, in setting up the society, had wished to promote Geddes' work, and was also 
quite clearly convinced that the model of sociology provided by the Durkheimian 
school was the right way for the Society to proceed. He does not appear to have been 
at the meeting, but was stung to respond in writing to Pearson in a strongly worded 
article appended to his paper on the origin and use of the word sociology (Branford, 
1905b). There, he pointed out that Darwin's achievement had been made possible only 
4 In Branford's personality, according to Mumford, (1948: 683) was combined a 'worldly 
shrewdness, an ability to appraise all the mischief and madness of his fellows, and a wild 
devotion to losing causes and wild ideals', (though since the last trait might have been seen 
differently had Geddes' fate been different, it should perhaps be discounted). 
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as a result of the legions of people who had done biological research before him. He 
followed this in sarcastic tone, claiming that - 'To sit down and await the avatar of such 
an impossibilist hero is no ideal either of religion or science, but a reversion to 
fetishistic obsession'! (Branford, 1905b: 41-2) 
Moreover, the discussants who rose after Pearson made it perfectly plain that 
they did not believe that Eugenics could deliver what Galton was claiming for it. Some 
begged caution due to the complexity of the laws of heredity - 'we must not be hasty 
in coming to conclusions and laying down any rules for the breeding of human beings 
and the development of a Eugenic conscience' (Sociological Papers 1905: 54-5). 
Another pointed to the dangers of incestuous breeding among the wealthy (ibid: 56); 
and yet others to the importance offood and environment in childhood (ibid: 58). H.G. 
Wells expressed the opinion that criminals, who according to Galton should be 
prevented from breeding, 'were the brightest and boldest members of families living 
under impossible conditions' (ibid: 59). Lady Victoria Welby, one of the few women 
who were present, commented that Galton chose to measure heredity only through the 
male line, and followed this with a plea for better treatment of women generally (ibid: 
60). Only one speaker, apart from the Chairman, Pearson, appeared to support Galton 
without considerable reserve (ibid: 56-8). This was Professor Weldon, who had 
collaborated with Pearson in 1901, to found the journal Biometrika (Meller, 1990: 
141). 
The last to speak was Hobhouse, who spoke in measured tones, by comparison 
with some other critics. People (like himself) who were 'only students of sociology' he 
said, who could not 'lay any claim whatever to be biologists, ought to keep silent'. 
Nevertheless, he went on to express his opinion that any regulation of breeding, which 
involved 'one of the most powerful of human passions', would require 'highly perfected 
knowledgel : 
As to the two factors, stock and environment, no one can doubt that 
both are of fundamental importance in relation to the welfare of society; 
. . . if the kind of precise knowledge which I desiderate could be laid 
before us by the biologist, it would have considerable influence on our 
views not only of what is ethically right, but of what could be 
legislatively enforced. Of these two factors. . . which can we modify 
with the greater ease and certainty of not doing harm? It is fairly 
obvious that we can affect the environment of mankind in certain 
definite ways .... When we come to bring stock into consideration, we 
are dealing with that which is still very largely unknown. At the same 
time we owe a great deal of thanks to Mr. Galton for raising this 
subject. The bare conception of a conscious selection as a way in 
which educated society would deal with stock is infinitely higher than 
that of natural selection with which biologists have confronted every 
proposal of sociology . ... But until we have far more knowledge and 
agreement as to criteria of conscious selection, I fear we cannot, as 
sociologists, expect to do much for society along these lines 
(Sociological Papers, 1905: 63, emphasis added) 
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This apparent readiness to take eugenics seriously was somewhat disingenuous of 
Hobhouse, since he had already, by this time, published Mind in Evolution (1901), in 
which he expressed his view that the importance of biological (Darwinian) evolution 
declined as 'mind' advanced. Yet that Eugenics, as preached by Galton, claimed to be 
able to produce more highly evolved - physically and mentally superior - individuals, by 
conscious and deliberate selection, appealed to Hobhouse, who abhorred the idea of 
evolution as a blindly determinist biological process, which denied humanity - if not 
actually of free-will - then at least of the possibility of actively improving the world 
through rational action (Freeden, 1978: 185-6). He was, however, as dubious about 
Galton's political posture as the other critics were of his scientific theory. Even so he is 
prepared to indicate that Eugenics might be worthy of serious consideration, if 
properly developed into a system of 'highly perfected knowledge'. 
Civics and the Durkheimian School 
At the next meeting of the Society, on June 20th, abstracts of two papers by Durkheim 
and Branford 'On the Relation of Sociology to Philosophy and to the Social Sciences' 
were read to the Society (Durkheim, 1905; Branford, 1905c). 
There is no indication as to which of the founding members of the Sociological 
Society was responsible for suggesting or inviting a contribution from Durkheim, but it 
is likely that the juxtaposition of Branford's contribution with Durkheim's is 
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significant. 5 Branford had referred to the contents of the Annee Sociologique in his 
earlier paper, sent out with the circular, and had probably already read (at least) the 
article by Durkheim and Fauconnet on 'Sociology and the Social Sciences' which is 
reprinted in the Sociological Papers for 1904 (published 1905). This had, however, 
been published previously in the Revue Philosophique for 1903, to which Branford had 
also referred. Perhaps the substantial agreement of the two papers is also significant. 
Branford, as in his earlier appeal to the Annee Sociologique, was attempting to 
associate Geddes' sociology with that of Durkheim, whose reputation as an eminent 
sociologist (perhaps even the eminent sociologist) was not, at that time, in dispute. 
Durkheim's paper began with the categorical statement that the 'prime postulate 
of a science of society is the inclusion of human phenomena within the unity of nature' 
(Durkheim, 1905: 197). It was only by beginning from this assumption, he said, that 
'natural laws' would emerge from the detailed study of all aspects of social life. Comte 
and Spencer both recognised the necessity of extending the idea of natural law to 
human societies (specifically the law of evolution), but both studied such matters in a 
speculative or philosophical manner, rather than empirically, or scientifically. Durkheim 
insisted that each of the many inter-related aspects of social life must now be studied in 
detail by specialist sciences. (ibid: 198) It was inadequate, however, for the social 
sciences to operate in isolation from each other, as they had been doing up to now. 
Sociology, as a 'unified science of society' (ibid: 199) must not only systematise the 
knowledge derived from these detailed researches, but must 'interpenetrate the diverse 
technical studies more fully with the sociological conception of unity'. 
5 Daniel Becquemont, in a recent (1995) article, suggests that it was Hobhouse who invited 
Durkheim. Durkheim was Hobhouse's representative, he says, and Branford, Geddes'. This 
may be true, but seems unlikely, for the reasons given above, and also because Hobhouse, far 
from being a supporter of Durkheim's, would. only a few years later. begin to refer to him as 
the author of the 'unsound group mind'theory. In addition the substantial agreement of the two 
abstracts perhaps indicates an attempt by Branford to 'build' on what Durkheim had said. 
Lastly. we might wonder why. if Hobhouse had invited Durkheim, he chose not to present a 
similar paper at this meeting. 
. . . the unity of the social kingdom cannot hope to find an adequate 
expression in a few general and philosophical formulae detached from 
the facts and the detail of specialist research. An adequate sociology 
can only have for its organ a body of sciences distinct but animated by 
the sentiment of their solidarity. And it may be predicted that these 
sciences, once organised, will return with accumulated interest to 
philosophy what they have borrowed from it. (Durkheim, 1905: 200) 
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Branford, in his paper, agreed that the most pressing problem for sociology 
was that of ' the systematisation of the several sociological specialisms', although he laid 
additional stress on the interrelation between theory and practice, and on the need for 
the classification not only of the sciences in general, but also of social knowledge. He 
also posed in plain language a question only strongly implied by Durkheim: 'How far 
does the history of Biology afford a suggestive instance of a parallel problem?' 
(Branford, 1905c: 20 I) Recent advances in Biology, he suggested, had resulted in the 
'schematisation of a large number of practically independent and dispersive specialisms 
by subordination to a few elemental categories of known relationship' (ibid.). That he 
should have put the matter in this way illustrates the central importance of Darwin for 
the early sociologists. Sociology, in order to gain the respectability necessary to its 
development as an academic subject, needed to be able to claim both that it was like 
biology - a science which could eventually provide an overall theoretical perspective 
for social research, and distinct from it - to the extent that social evolution could not 
be reduced to biological evolution. 
In the lengthy discussion which followed the presentation of Durkheim's and 
Branford's papers it is clear that there was no agreement either on the nature of 
sociology, or on the question of its relationship to the other social sciences. According 
to the disciplinary persuasion of various speakers, sociology was to be subsumed under 
the rubric of history or psychology, or to subsume these under itself~ it should 
systematise all knowledge pertaining to the social world, or should beware of 
systematising too soon~ it was to be the science of society, or could not be scientific 
because there were no such things as historical laws. Rather more of the discussion 
was critical than sympathetic~ one contributor indicated that sociology, as defined by 
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Durkheim and Branford, was doomed to be a futile activity.6 Hobhouse spoke last: he 
wished only to support both speakers in the face of an audience he felt were too 
critical. He concluded his remarks on the subject of the future co-ordination of the 
social sciences and the utility of collating of a 'body of truth' for comparative study, by 
saying that though he did not personally agree with every word spoken by either 
Durkheim or Branford, it seemed to him that they deserved thanks for setting before 
the Society both 'what sociology claims to be at the present time' and 'the next step 
which investigation ought to take' (Sociological Papers, 1905:215-6). Nevertheless, he 
also suggested that the student of sociology, if he followed the methods set out by 
both Branford and Durkheim, would 'find much irrelevant detail' which he would 
discard, the better to concentrate on the really important sociological issues and their 
relation to one another. There is a hint here that his conception of the scope and 
subject matter of the new discipline was less broad than either Branford's or 
Durkheim's appeared to be. 
Civics and Eugenics 
Hobhouse's response to Geddes' paper at the following meeting remains unknown, for 
he was either absent or silent on this occasion. Geddes himself had been absent from 
the earlier meetings. He had come down to London towards the close of 1903, to join 
Branford in setting up the Sociological Society, with one job already in hand - that of 
writing up a report for the Carnegie Dunfermline Trust, which would occupy him for 
much of his time in London during 1904 (Boardman: 1978: 199), and to which he 
referred several times in his presentations.' But his Chair at Dundee required his 
presence during the months of April, May and June, which had prevented him from 
6 This suggestion was made by Dr. Emil Reich, Sociological Papers, 1905: 209-210 
7 Referring to the Dunfennline Report probably did not help Geddes to get his ideas across, 
since many members of his audience would have been ignorant of the distinctive features of the 
Scottish landscape (which was peripheral in relation to London's centrality, though in name 
they were part of a single nation) and the geography of the cities he used to illustrate his talks. 
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attending the earlier meetings. He read his paper, with several lengthy digressions from 
the printed text submitted,8 on July 18th. 
He began by formally introducing Civics - as a department of applied sociology of use 
to 'practical men and civic workers', by saying that useful methods for the systematic 
survey of cities might gradually develop towards an orderly Regional Survey out of 
'the experience of any moderately travelled observer of varied interests' who has gained 
a wide knowledge of many different places, rather than simply emerging from study 
itself(Geddes, 1905: 104). 
Declaring that 'Applied Sociology in general, and Civics, as one of its main 
departments, may be defined as the application of Social Survey to Social Service' 
(ibid: 103-4), Geddes abandoned, temporarily, his pre-prepared paper, and spoke of 
the importance and utility of the integration of science with 'art', by which he appears 
to have meant practical 'civic' art. It was at this point that he made what Meller 
suggests was his fatal mistake, from the point of view of his professional relationship 
with Hobhouse. He attempted to illustrate the integration of science with (civic or 
social) art by referring to the 'connection between a scientific demography and a 
practical eugenics'. And continued 
. . . this study of the community in the aggregate finds its natural 
parallel and complement in the study of the community as an integrate, 
with material and immaterial structures and functions, which we call the 
city .... the improvement of the individuals of the community, which is 
the aim of eugenics, involves a corresponding civic progress. Using (for 
the moment at least) a parallel nomenclature, we see that the sociologist 
is not only concerned with demography, but with "politography," and 
that eugenics is inseparable from "politogenics." For the struggle for 
existence, ... is not only an intra-civic, but an inter-civic process, and . 
. . ameliorative selection, now clearly sought for the individual in detail 
as eugenics, is inseparable from a corresponding civic art - a literal "Eu-
politogenics." (Geddes, 1905:104) 
8 That they were digressions is indicated by the use of the same smaller typeface used for the 
verbal discussions, at intervals throughout the paper. 
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Meller has suggested that Geddes created this association (on the spur of the 
moment?) between Civics and Eugenics as a result of his difficult position as 
Branford's 'great man' of sociology in the face of Galton's much more numerous 
following, and Pearson's advocacy (Meller, 1990:140-142). She has pointed out that 
Galton had many wealthy followers who could offer the financial support that Geddes 
was so much in need of, and that there were certain members of the provisional 
Committee who did not support Geddes, or his vision; she mentions, in particular, C.S. 
Loch and E.J. Urwick of the Charity Organisation Society. Thus, according to Meller, 
Geddes' attempt to align his own position with that of Galton was an attempt to gamer 
support, both intellectual and financial. Certainly, Eugenics was extremely popular 
during the early years of the century and, as Searle has suggested, there were some 
others who 'deliberately posed as eugenists in order to attract attention to some other 
cause they wished to promote' (Searle, 1976: 14). Moreover, since Galton's Eugenic 
programme had only been announced to the public in 1901, when he had treated the 
Anthropological Institute to a lecture entitled 'The Possible Improvement of the 
Human Breed Under the Existing Conditions of Law and Sentiment', there remained a 
degree of confusion in the minds of some of its followers, as to exactly what sort of 
'reforms' the Eugenists were proposing (Searle, 1976: 9-15). 
What is certain, however, is that Geddes was not a eugenist; nor was Civics 
sociology reducible to eugenics generally (Chapter 2; and Halliday, 1968: 385-6). And 
although Geddes, as a biologist, refused to reject the importance of heredity, it is 
extremely unlikely that he would have wished to be associated with statistics as 
practised by Galton, who claimed to have proved that good stock begat good stock by 
his over-simplistic study of the family lineages of the 'gifted' families of some of the 
133. 
fellows of the Royal Society (including his own).9 Galton, to be sure, had claimed in 
his paper on the scope and definition of Eugenics, that the subject was just as much 
about the societal influences that developed inborn qualities, as it was about improving 
those qualities themselves. Yet his presentations to the Sociological Society contain a 
number of policy suggestions that Geddes - who had set up home with his wife on the 
top floor of an Edinburgh tenement as part of a practical sociological experiment in 
amelioration - must have found unpalatable, to say the least. 
What is likely is that Geddes, as well as perhaps hoping to attract financial 
support for his own work, was interested primarily in presenting sociology as a unified 
subject - which was what both Durkheim and Branford had urged upon the Society at 
the previous meeting. Branford, indeed, in his attack upon Pearson after the second 
meeting, had written that 
The general discipline derived from the doctrine of evolution (in the one 
case organic, in the other social evolution) has done something towards 
organising these numerous and dispersive specialisms into a co-
ordinated body of unified truth. But, hitherto, this unifying task has 
been but inadequately performed, alike in biology and in sociology. 
There are in both sciences whole groups of rebellious specialists, who 
not only decry the competence and sufficiency of the synthetic leaders, 
but who even deny the relevance of all synthetic doctrine, and disclaim 
all need for architectonic intervention in the organisation of 
specialisms.(Branford, 1905b: 40-41) 
HaIfa page later, he had followed this with a plea for unity. 
It is good, because necessary, that every large problem should be 
parcelled out amongst moderately large squads of labourers specialised 
for their several tasks. But it is not good that discord should be so 
conspicuous as to impress the observer - even though he be a superficial 
observer - with the competitive rather than with the co-operative aspect 
of the process.(ibid: 41) 
9 The results of this extremely over-simplistic study, which has not 'aged' at all well, are 
appended to Galton's article on Eugenics (190Sb:85-99) It uses as proof of the heritability of 
genius, for example, the Darwin family (to whom Galton was related) which had produced a 
good number of geniuses, who were judged as such on the basis of financial or commercial as 
well as intellectual achievements. 
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In claiming the inseparability of Civics from Eugenics, therefore, Geddes was 
attempting to 'synthesise' Eugenics and Civics in the interests of the 'scientific' or 
theoretical unity that sociology supposedly needed. Synthesis was, in fact, one of 
Geddes' main objectives (Halliday, 1968:385); he was appalled by the separation of 
specialist disciplines that was then underway as the new human oriented studies 
established themselves in the universities - and in his own work attempted to unite 
natural with several of the social sciences. In any case, this was the only reference to 
Eugenics that Geddes made in the whole of his presentation at this meeting. 
Civics and Ethical Sociology 
The battle between the Eugenists and the Civics Sociologists which is evident in the 
Papers, has been frequently noted by historians (Meller, 1990; Collini, 1979; Abrams, 
1968; Halliday, 1968). 'Ethical' sociology is most often presumed to have been the 
other major contender, and is associated above all with Hobhouse (Collini, 1979; 
Abrams, 1968; Halliday, 1968). In fact, Hobhouse appears to have taken a much 
quieter role in the Society than either Geddes or Galton, and though sociology as 
'ethics' does make an appearance, this by no means comes exclusively, or even mainly, 
from Hobhouse in the first instance. He did not present a paper at any of the Society's 
meetings, in spite of the fact that either Mind in Evolution (1901) or Democracy and 
Reaction (1904), would have furnished him with at least one presentation with little 
preparation. And although he was Chairman of the Editorial Committee of the 
Sociological Papers throughout, it appears to have been Branford who did much of 
the physical work associated with this function (Report of the Council for the Year 
1910, 1911: 176). 
The relationship between sociology as Civics and sociology as Ethics would be 
an important one, particularly after 1907, when Hobhouse became the first Martin 
White Professor, as well as the editor of the Sociological Review, which took over 
from the SOCiological Papers, from 1908. This dual role would put Hobhouse in a 
position of unprecedented power with respect to the development of sociology. 
r 
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Although the Review remained the organ of the Sociological Society, which continued 
to operate separately from the newly established Department of Sociology at the 
University of London, Hobhouse's editorial function enabled him to shape both 
organisations. There is little evidence in the early Sociological Papers, however, of 
Hobhouse's opinion of Civics. 
Hobhouse: Mind in Evolution 
During his Oxford years, the main influences on Hobhouse's thinking had been the 
idealist philosophy ofT.H. Green, as well as the somewhat contradictory work of J.S. 
Mill, and the sociology of Comte and Spencer. Green's philosophy held that reality is 
essentially spiritual, and that spiritual development was a fundamental principle of the 
world order (Hobson and Ginsberg, 1931: 101). Green argued that knowledge of 
objects implied some unifying principle - something a priori or permanent among the 
flux of sense impressions - a sort of eternal consciousness of the relations between 
things. But though Hobhouse was impressed with this, he found that he could not 
bring himself to believe that all reality was spiritual. He believed that the knowledge we 
have of the relations between things does not create those relations themselves. The 
relations exist, and we learn the relations (ibid: 103). 
From Comte, Hobhouse took the idea of the interconnectedness of all social 
phenomena and consequently the need for a synthetic science which would draw 
together all knowledge about social life. He considered that Comte was correct to 
believe that the emergence of sociology - as a positive science - marked a definite step 
forward in human development. As with Comte, there was a sort of religious 
humanitarianism in Hobhouse's work, based on the idea of a collective spiritual 
principle of humanity, shaping and directing human action. 
The years he spent at Oxford were also the years during which the intellectual 
storm caused by the publication of Darwin's theory was at its height (Owen, 1974: 9). 
Consequently Hobhouse devoted a great deal of time to the study of the implications 
of the new biological evolutionary theory for social thought. Like Durkheim, 
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Hobhouse was keen to refute Spencer, whose political position was antithetical to his 
own. He followed Spencer only to the extent that he believed that social evolution, in 
its later stages at least, was the result of human effort, thus substituting a more 
Lamarckian evolutionism for Darwinian theory. But the particular form of effort, he 
believed, was mental or intellectual effort. It was the development of mind which was 
of fundamental importance in the evolution of humanity. Once mind became self 
conscious it became an increasingly important factor in evolution - more important 
than competition or selection. Given the intellectual context in which he worked, it 
would have been impossible to attempt to refute Darwin's theory wholesale. Hobhouse 
got around this by agreeing that the survival of the fittest (in Spencer's terminology) 
was a fundamental evolutionary principle, but questioning the concept of 'fitness'. If 
fitness was to be defined in terms of adaptation to the environment, then it was 
necessary to be specific about what sort of environment people inhabited. 
Environment, for Hobhouse, was 'the society of other men', and the 'fittest' was 
the person who was best adapted for social life. Who was this well adapted person?, 
asked Hobhouse, in his earliest work, 
Is he the bold unscrupulous man of force, the exacting, the merciless, 
the ungenerous? . . Or is he the merciful and generous man of justice, 
whose hardest fights are fought for others' lives, and would rather, with 
Plato, suffer wrong than inflict it, and who will lay down his life to 
serve mankind? (Hobhouse, 1893: 91) 
Hobhouse concluded that the second type of man 
... 'is fittest morally to survive in a society of mutually dependent human 
beings. And that the morally fittest should actually survive and prosper 
is the object of good social institutions.' 
By this clever sleight of hand, Hobhouse achieved the same effect as Durkheim, 
making moral criteria the criteria for social evolution, without refuting Darwin's 
theory. What made human beings fit to survive, once 'mind' had become self-conscious, 
was their perfect adaptation to a social and cultural environment (rather than a 'natural' 
or physical one). A 'progressive' social environment involved organisation, which 
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depended on rationality and co-operation, rather than on sheer competition and 
aggression. 
Like Geddes, Hobhouse had worked out the main lines of his sociology before 
1904. In Mind in Evolution, published in 1901, he took as his axiom the statement that 
'the highest thing that man knows is Mind, or Soul, or Spirit'. He then introduced the 
(borrowed) idea of 'Orthogenic Evolution' to refer to evolution that tends towards the 
growth of mind, distinguishing this from Doliogenic Evolution - which was evolution 
in any other direction (1901: 5). 
Hobhouse offered an extended discussion of the literature on animal 
psychology, based on his own experimental work with a variety of animals, including 
his dog, Jack, and his cat, Tim. He was attempting to show how, in certain 
circumstances, some animals can make a practical judgement that can be distinguished 
from merely instinctive behaviour - they can draw on 'personal experience' to perform a 
complex action, which is greater than mere instinct or imitation. On the basis of this he 
claimed that the characteristic feature of the operation of mind was not peculiar to man 
and can be found to some extent in the 'higher' animals. This allowed him to construct 
a unilinear theory of evolution in which learned behaviour gradually takes over from 
instinct as the fundamental organising principle - the highest level of which is humanity, 
in which self-conscious intelligence is responsible ~or a greater part of behaviour. He 
developed his theory through an examination of the development of mind in human 
history. The theory had two central aspects. One was the notion of purpose (which 
developed as mind becomes self-conscious) and the other the notion of morality 
(because as mind became self-conscious, the thing that it became conscious of, above 
all, was the unity, 'oneness', or community of humanity, leading to the development of 
moral rules). Hobhouse was thus able to present the development of the social sciences 
in general, and sociology in particular, as the systematisation of the self consciousness 
of humanity, in the latest stage of 'orthogenic evolution', where humanitarianism (a 
guiding spirit, or spiritual principle which recognised the common humanity of all) had 
become a central guiding principle. In Mind in Evolution, sociology was presented as a 
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science, just like botany, a branch of scientific biology, because just as the botanist 
studies the development or evolution of plant species 
[so] does the sociologist with the human species: he treats it as 
something that has evolved and is evolving, and he seeks to discover 
what further developments it hold in germ. In this way, the study of 
growth, human evolution, is to the humanitarian spirit, what botany is 
to the gardener, who would not only bring the flowers that he has to the 
summit of their perfection, but would seek to derive from them new and 
more beautiful varieties.(1901: 351) 
This is the essence of Hobhouse's early sociology. It involved both an acceptance of 
biological evolution, and a rejection of it. Darwin's theory was applicable to human 
evolution only until mind became self- conscious, after which social evolution became 
increasingly purposive, and the learned characteristics of sociability become 
advantageous for 'survival'. The fact that Hobhouse likened Sociology to Botany - as a 
science concerned with the nurture of humanity seems a propitious one. These were 
Geddes' sentiments exactly. Yet events would eventually conspire to make the two 
men wholeheartedly opposed to one another. 
In the meantime, and in the absence of Hobhouse, Geddes' early presentation 
was generally well-received, though it was not without its critics. 
The Reception of Civics in 1904 
Apart from his single reference to Eugenics, the remainder of Geddes' first presentation 
at the Sociological Society outlined his method for the survey of cities, which involved 
geography and history, and the study of individual 'types', or a 'psychological survey'. 
He referred to his Valley Section and the geography of his native Scotland to plead for 
detailed study of people and places - region by region, from rural to urban social 
forms. Like a true evolutionist, Geddes spoke of how it was possible to find 'survivals' 
of the past in the city of the present. The geography of London, for example, showed 
evidence of its past as an agglomeration of villages (Geddes, 1905: 106). He likened 
the work of the historian of cities to the work of the geologist, who also studies 




development from ancient societies (primitive, matriarchal, patriarchal) through recent 
(Greek and Roman, Mediaeval, Renaissance), to contemporary (Revolution, Empire, 
Finance) - he left question marks under the characteristics to be assigned to incipient 
developments (ibid: 109). 
Although much of the material for the survey of cities was already available in 
'parliamentary and municipal reports and returns, economic journals and the like', more 
works like those of Booth and Rowntree were also necessary. A social survey must 
gather information about the condition of the people, 'their occupations and real 
wages, their family budget and culture', their institutions, ideas and ideals (ibid: 116). A 
survey, moreover, must be local, rather thaq national, to enable realistic future planning 
to take place. 
Geddes spoke too, in his presentation about the different classes or 'social 
formations' within the city - how each was a product of its historic, geographic and 
cultural environment, and how each contributed to the functioning of the whole in the 
present (ibid: 111-114) Again digressing from his prepared talk, Geddes admitted that 
his sociological method might seem alien to some among his audience, in particular to 
administrators (whose jobs were concerned with only one aspect of the total 
environment of cities), to those who thought only in terms of party politics, or to 
academics - whose work was essentially 'abstract'. He insisted, however, that detailed 
observations of the kind which a naturalist might make were the necessary groundwork 
for abstract theorising. Sociologists, trained to observe the evidence of social evolution 
in the city, might yet provide a much needed 'missing link' between the practical work 
of administrators and the abstract theorising of academics. 
If, with hindsight, Geddes made a major mistake when he claimed eugenics as a 
complementary study to Civics, he was perhaps no less obviously at fault in his many 
references to Scotland's geography, and the town plan of Dunfermline. To his London 
audience, many of whom would have been ignorant of these particular landscapes, his 
references must have been singularly un-inspiring. Nor was his enthusiastic advocacy 
of foreign town planning at all fortunate - especially in his references to Germany, at a 
140. 
time when nationalist jealousies were increasing rapidly, above all perhaps with respect 
to that particular country. Lastly, perhaps, to condemn academic sociologists for 
working in the 'abstract' was not likely to endear him to that portion of his audience 
engaged in such activities. 
In spite of these mistakes, however, Geddes was received with more 
enthusiasm than his rival Galton had been only two months earlier. Among the 
discussants was Ebenezer Howard, who spoke enthusiastically about Geddes' paper, 
while simultaneously publicising his own project, the Garden Cities Association. 
Somewhat more astutely than Geddes, Howard managed to use nationalist sentiment 
to his own advantage: 
The programme which I have sketched out is certainly not too bold or 
comprehensive for the British Race. If a hundredth part of the 
organising skill which the Japanese and Russians are showing in the 
great war now in progress were shown by ourselves as citizens in our 
great civil war against disease and dirt, poverty and overcrowding, we 
could not only build many new cities on the best models, but could also 
bring our old towns into line with the new and better order.(121) 
The most damning criticisms of Civics came from the historian and liberal 
M.P., 1M. Robertson. 10 Robertson had contributed in writing to the debate on 
Galton's paper, where he had suggested that the Eugenists' aims could not be achieved 
without addressing the political question of the 'bad physical and moral conditions set 
up by poverty'. Furthermore, he claimed, the rise and fall of nations depended more on 
both natural resources and political direction than on the rate of reproduction of the 
'upper classes' (Sociological Papers, 1905: 73). In essence, Robertson's critique of 
Geddes was similar, in that he insisted that sociology, however defined, needed to 
address political questions. He believed that Geddes placed too much emphasis on the 
collection of detailed historical geographic and social data, and not enough on the 
political question of 'social method'. He was particularly scathing about Geddes' 
10 Robertson, during 1904, published a two volume collection of Essays in SOCiology written 
during the last decade or so of the nineteenth century. 
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references to 'survivals' of the past in the present - declaring that it was reminiscent of 
Von Baer rather than Darwin. 11 For Robertson, the real sociological question was the 
political question of how to defme 'progress', and, having defined it, how to achieve it. 
Let Geddes begin his next paper with a definition of 'progress', he declared, so that 
they might begin to squabble over that, rather than simply accumulating a mass of 
'archaeological' detail. 
The problem of sociology arose on the general knowledge. I fear lest 
the work of sociology should run to an extension of this admirable 
study instead of to the stimulation of action taken on that particular 
knowledge, or on more general knowledge. We all knew there was 
plenty of poverty and how it was caused. We all had ideals as to how it 
was to be got rid in the future; but the question is: is the collection of 
detail or the prescription of social method the kind of activity that the 
Sociological Society is to take up?(Sociologica/ Papers, 1905: 124) 
Similarly, among the written comments on Geddes' paper was one which called for 
Sociology as Social Philosophy instead of as mere observation and collection of data 
(ibid.: 132). 
In a somewhat different, but related, vein, other critics complained that Geddes 
had not elaborated the relationship between Civics and Citizenship - in terms of the 
duties of citizens rather than their rights (ibid: 124;133-134). The 'man in the street', 
according to this view. had to be made into a 'conscious citizen', before the civic idea 
could be properly developed. 
Although these were not the only criticisms of Geddes raised by the discussants 
_ they are the most consistent with a Hobhousian view of Sociology as the science of 
the systematisation of the self-consciousness of humanity, concerned not just with 
society as it is, but with how it should be; a sociology concerned with the moral 
11 Von Baer's theory was that 'ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny', suggesting that the 
development of the embryonic organism passes through successive stages which 'recapitulate' 
its evolutionary history (Mayr, 1990; Jones, 1980; Peel, 1971). Geddes' theory of social 
evolution, though more sophisticated biologically, in fact owed slightly more to Spencer, who 
had himself cited Von Baer and other German evolutionists in support of his own theory. 
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development of the citizen and the political means to this end. Ethics, in fact, did not 
make a major appearance at the Sociological Society until the following year. 
Geddes' paper for 1904 does not highlight his earlier analyses, in which he had 
placed so much emphasis on the relations between organisms and their environment, 
via the transformation of matter and energy through 'function', though this approach is 
hinted at. This was to come, however, in his second presentation in 1905. 
The Sociological Society, 1905 
The Society heard the second part of Geddes' paper six months later in January of 
1905. In it, he addressed his critics, and began to work out some of the themes of his 
earlier work. Without providing the definition of progress called for by Robertson, he 
insisted that both its causes, and the factors that prevent or reverse it, were to be found 
in any particular social formation - in the study of each occupational or 'social type', in 
any particular region, and their historical action and reaction, combination, 
transformation, or subjugation of other 'types'. Region and occupation (environment 
and function) were therefore fundamental to any sociological study of race, 
community, institutions, customs, laws, language or literature (Geddes, 1906: 60). 
Yes, said Geddes, this was geographical determinism, after Le Play - and no, it would 
not appeal to everyone - but he hoped to present his point of view in such a way that 
environmental determinism could be combined with psychological and ethical 
theories which insisted upon human claims to 'free-Will' ( ibid: 65). Geddes' train of 
thought was complex, but must have appeared to be more complex than it really was, 
because he was attempting to outline both theory and method at once. 
His method was comparative, involving the tabular representation of data, 
similar to his earlier tables but at once much simplified and more complex, in that each 
table was to carry more information. These were his notorious 'thinking machines'.12 
12 Geddes' most famous 'thinking machine', the nine squared diagram in which place-work-folk 
was the focus, forms the top left-hand comer of the much bigger 36 squared Mapping of Life 
(Figure 3, inside back cover). 
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They were intended to express simultaneously the whole variety of different 
relationships between people, and between people and places and people and their 
occupations, as well as the way in which different schools of thought and social 
institutions arose from different relationships. Geddes felt that it was important for 
sociologists to be able to grasp all this - in overview, at a glance, because it was all 
part of what went to make up the social world, so that his diagrammatic 
representations were in some sense essential to his theoretical perspective. 
Unfortunately, few people were able to grasp the meaning of the machines themselves. 
His theoretical point was that thought (consciousness) arose and developed in a 
particular existential context. In Geddes own words: 'from the everyday world of 
action there arises a corresponding thought world' (ibid: 68). 
The types of people, their kinds and style of work, their whole 
environment, all become represented in the mind of the community, and 
these react upon the individuals, their activities, their place itself (ibid: 
72). 
Geddes' presentation became more and more tortuous as he tried to explain his view 
that culture - ideas, beliefs, values, religion, and the entire stock of scientific 
knowledge was the outcome of social life in continuous interaction with environment. 
Environment determines organisms and occupations, which in tum modify 
environment, which again acts back on organisms and their occupations, culture and 
relations with each other. What he was attempting to say was that humans were both 
determined, and had free-will. We are both product and producers of our 
surroundings. He reiterated briefly his own view of economics as the study of real 
wealth - 'the results of industry on the concrete environment. . . its deterioration or 
progress', and suggested that once all this was understood, sociologists would 
understand the need to pay attention to the total natural, built and cultural 
environment. 
Civic improvers will find their ideals more realisable as they recognise 
the complex unity of the city as a social development of which all the 







or disease. The view of theoretic civics as concrete sociology may be 
more simply expressed as the co-adjustment of social survey and social 
service, now becoming recognised as rational ... (Geddes, 1906: 80) 
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Geddes went on at some length about the way in which various aspects of 
thought developed, and how they became hardened into 'schools'. Formal education 
systems represented the passing down of history, morals, habit and custom, which 
thereby became fixed and resistant to change. It was this 'continual fixation' of social 
conventions which accounted for the 'general lapse of appreciation of environment' 
(ibid.). What was needed, Geddes suggested, was a new department of knowledge, the 
purpose of which was to study and criticise existent forms of law, morality and 
custom, and develop, on the basis of this, new ideas, theory and ideals for the 
evolution and amelioration of city life. He referred to this new department as 'Cloister', 
though what he had in mind was actually a university. Probably, he wanted to distance 
his ideas about the development of new knowledge from the universities of the day, 
which he saw (not without justification) to be compartmentalised, stuffy and resistant 
to change. 
The paper was a long one, and it may be that as a result the time for discussion 
was short. Perhaps, also, it was too complex, and Geddes' use of diagrammatic 
representations had left his audience behind, as the Chairman, Charles Booth, indicated 
somewhat obliquely (Sociological Papers, 1906: 112-113). At least one of those 
contributing to the discussion, though, had managed to extract the heart of the paper, 
which was the essential truth and utility of Geddes' two 'seemingly contradictory 
doctrines that the individual is the product of the city and also that the city is the 
product of the citizen' (ibid: 114). 
Was this seemingly straightforward proposition too much for his audience? For 
contemporary sociologists - most of whom are familiar with Marx's proposition that 
'men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they make it 
under circumstances existing already' (or with another sociological rendering of the 





problematic. At that time, however, the very need for a 'science' of society was 
understood to rest on only one side of the proposition being true - that 'men' can and 
do make their own history, and the question then became, how, and in what direction, 
should history be made? The Eugenists' answer to this question was about to be 
clarified. 
At Galton's second presentation 13 support for Eugenics, which had been 
received with considerable reserve by the discussants at the previous meeting, 
appeared to have increased substantially. Galton argued that just as polygamous 
marriages in some parts of the world were sanctioned on the basis of 'social well-
being', so might be strict limitations on the freedom of marriage (Galton, 1906a: 5). At 
the same meeting, Galton publicised a 'suitable list of subjects for eugenic enquiry', 
which concluded with the recommendation that an authority might be established at 
some time in the future to issue 'Eugenic certificates' to those in possession of 'a more 
than average share of .. goodness of constitution, of physique, and of mental capacity' 
(Galton, 1906b: 17). Neither Geddes (or Branford, who also spoke for Civics), nor 
Hobhouse appear to have been present at the meeting, nor to have found it desirable or 
necessary to make any comment on these propositions. Yet verbal contributions from 
the anthropologist AC. Haddon, the pathologist F. Mott, AE. Crawley, and Edward 
Westermarck, who was in the chair, were generally approving, as were written 
contributions from the French biologist Yves Delage, and the Italian Professors Posada 
(Constitutional Law), and Sergi (Anthropology), and others, including Bertrand 
Russell and Ferdinand Tonnies. 
Ethical sociology - whose solution to the making of history was different from 
that of the eugenists, made its first major appearance in this second volume of 
Sociological Papers. Hobhouse chaired the session at which the Danish philosopher, 
Professor Harald H6ffding read his paper 'On the Relation between sociology and 
13 Galton's paper was entitled 'Restrictions in Marriage'. Was there some irony in the title of 
this paper, offered on this particular date - Valentine's day? 
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Ethics'. The argument was that sociology and ethics were separate, though intimately 
connected, subjects. Ethics could form part of the subject matter of sociology, to the 
extent that 'ethical ideals and ethical endeavours' were factors in social development. 
On the other hand the science of ethics was dependent on sociology because what was 
ethically right had to be sociologically possible. However, according to Hoffding, the 
'character and direction of ethical life' was very often, at the present moment, 
determined by either 'physiological or social heredity' (Hoff ding, 1906: 178) - in other 
words, by genetic inheritance or environment. Eventually a scientific ethics - based on 
sociological knowledge - will become a social art, by showing which ends should be 
valued as appropriate to the highest development of society. This position was entirely 
consonant with that outlined by Geddes in an early paper (Geddes, 1881: 28-30). 
Moreover, Hobhouse, in the chair, agreed. But Westermarck, in the discussion which 
ensued, put his finger on the main difficulty with this point of view when he said he 
believed sociology to be a science, and 
that ethics, as a science, can only be the study of the moral 
consciousness as a fact. Normative ethics, which lays down rules for 
conduct, is not a science. The aim of every science is to discover some 
truth, and an ethical norm can be neither true nor false.(192) 
Now, Hobhouse had his own system of 'ethical norms' which he wished to promote as 
truth, and Westermarck's comment, coming as it did from one who espoused social 
Darwinist values, may well have annoyed him. He had embarked early on his particular 
project, in which he used sociology to ground, epistemologically, a particular set of 
('New' Liberal) values, in direct refutation of Spencer's social darwinism and old 
Liberal values, (Collini, 1979: 172). Of course, in this attempt to create a scientific 
basis for morality, he was no different from many of his contemporaries, but the fact 
that he was more successful than others was bound up with the institutionalisation of 
New Liberal values politically, as well as in the status of the university system 
generally, and the particular events surrounding sociology's institutionalisation at LSE. 
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The Sociological Society, 1906 
If, during the course of the preceding year, both Hobhouse and Geddes had found it 
expedient to ignore Galton, this must have become more difficult between the 
concluding months of 1905 and the beginning of 1906. The third volume of 
Sociological Papers (published In 1907) contains papers on the 'Biological 
Foundations of Sociology' (read on October 24th, 1905), by Galton's supporter 
Archdall Reid; on 'The Study of Individuals (Individuology) and Their Natural 
Groupings (Sociology)' by Lionel Tayler, read on November 23rd, 1905; and another 
on 'A Practicable Eugenic Suggestion', read by W. McDougall on February 21st, 1906. 
All three papers promote Eugenics, in one way or another. With the discussions and 
written comments on their content they absorb 150 of a total of 377 pages, leaving 
proportionally less space for the other eight papers. 
Archdall Reid's paper argued that an adverse environment was a necessary 
prerequisite for eugenic improvement. An appearance of eugenic improvement could 
be achieved through improving the environment - but this would be merely transient 
and superficial, restricted to acquired characteristics. Unless the genetically unfit were 
weeded out in a harsh environment, the overall quality of the race, in spite of 
appearances to the contrary, would decline (Reid, 1907: 3-27). This argument, to 
which neither Geddes nor Hobhouse responded, denied the utility of what both 
believed to be necessary - the improvement of the environment (though, of course, for 
Geddes this was the natural, and built as well as cultural environment, where for 
Hobhouse it was conceived merely as 'social' or cultural environment). 
McDougall's paper distinguished between positive and negative eugenics -
where the fonner involved getting those of greater than average 'civic worth' to 
produce a greater proportion of the next generation, and the latter in preventing the 
unfit from reproducing at all. He suggested, quite simply, that in order to get people of 
greater than average 'civic worth' to have more children, they should be paid on a 
sliding scale according to the number of children they produced (McDougall, 1907: 
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58). These constant references to civic worth seem to suggest that McDougall was 
attempting to create an alliance between eugenics and the civic sociology of Geddes. 
Tayler wanted to suggest that sociology should be based on the study of 
individuals. He argued that individuals cannot be modified by their environments, but 
have evolved nevertheless, and deduced from this that evolution had occurred as a 
result of humanity's superior mental capacities. 'Man is not, therefore, a modified but a 
modifying element in world surroundings' . 
. . . what force is it that checks social development? Not climate, for 
advanced civilisations are . . . scattered nearly all over the world. Not 
geographical nor geo-political position, for world empires have 
developed and decayed in the most diverse situations .... Not 
buildings, for these can be pulled down and erected afresh. What checks 
one man from developing, and many men, is the opposition of other 
men; and this opposition of massed-man to individual-man, and of 
massed man to nature is a growing force in world life. How men and 
women tend to group themselves into sociological units, and how these 
complex units behave in relation to each other, and influence the nation 
or empire to which they belong, is, therefore, the major problem of the 
sociologist, to which other minor geographical, commercial, and 
political studies will have to be related (Tayler, 1907: 111-112). 
In making individual mental capacity the 'motor' of evolution, Tayler was constructing 
an argument which closely followed Hobhouse's own. Social development would best 
be served, Tayler argued, by creating equality of opportunity in society (ibid: 114), 
because it was the human environment rather than the animal, vegetable or inanimate 
surroundings of the individual, that had caused evolution. The best means to improve 
the quality of the individual members of society would be 
The persistent attempt to raise the whole social condition of the nation 
or state to a more human level; and this necessitates a continuous 
hygienic reform in the surroundings - increased educational 
opportunities for, and increased vigilance against anti-social action on 
the part of the lowermost strata of society. By this means an 
increasingly keen competitive mental struggle will be fostered by the 
desire of the best members of the lower strata to displace the worst of 
the higher . . . . Selective influences will not, as it has been claimed, be 
checked; but their character will be changed, a mental selective test 
rather than a physical barbaric one being imposed. The lower types of 
human beings, rather than the higher, would thus tend to be eliminated -
by diseases resulting from failure in life, by results of their own brute 
excesses, by imprisonment, retention in asylums, inability to marry and 
support a family, and other causes. A natural unconscious 
environmental eugenic selection would thus be established. . . (ibid: 
119-120). 
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Tayler's paper illustrates the capacity of Eugenics to change the colour of its coat. 
There can be little doubt that this was a pro-eugenic argument, and although the 'social 
method' it prescribed was more in tune with that of the ethical (and civics) sociologists, 
it contained a very different idea of what was 'ethically' right. Like Hobhouse, Tayler 
made 'mind' the important evolutionary factor, and like Hobhouse too, the important 
part of the environment was the living, social environment. Simultaneously, Tayler 
argued that 'natural' and 'built' environmental factors had been a weak and 'passive', 
rather than an active factor in evolution, and that sociology ought to begin from the 
study of individuals themselves, rather than from the study of their surroundings. He 
argued, without mentioning Geddes, or any of his supporters by name, that this sort of 
sociology would be of little use. By a theoretical twist just as clever as that made by 
either Hobhouse or Durkheim, therefore, Tayler had managed to hi-jack the theory of 
evolution by natural selection, to argue that a political programme of improvement of 
the social environment by creating equality of opportunity would have the 'eugenic' 
result of improving the stock of the nation and weeding out the 'unfit'. Possibly Tayler's 
argument was intended as a panacea for the Sociological Society's theoretical ills, yet it 
does not take too much imagination to realise that Hobhouse must have found this as 
difficult to accept as he would to refute. Perhaps in consequence, he made no 
comment. 
Shortly afterwards, on 14th March 1906, Geddes' collaborator 1. Arthur 
Thomson gave a paper on 'The Sociological Appeal to Biology', in which he 
categorically denied that eugenics per se, as the science of so-called 'good-breeding' 
was of any use to sociology. He argued that although there were good grounds for 
sociology to be based on biology, societies were more than the sum of their individual 
biological parts, so that a sociology that concentrated merely on breeding, therefore, 
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might result in socially adverse consequences (Thomson, 1907: 158-60). The uses of 
biology for sociology were that 1) biological study could bring into relief what was 
distinctively social, 2) that biology might show that certain features of social life had 
'organismal mainsprings', and 3) biological conclusions and experiences might be 
generally suggestive for sociology (ibid: 161-2). 
Accordingly, Thomson went on to speak about inherited variation and acquired 
modifications, and to suggest that 'social organisation provides a means - an external 
heritage - whereby the results of modifications may be practically transmissible, though 
not organically entailed' (ibid: 163). He also suggested that 'man is a slowly varying 
organism, and he is peculiarly liable to have his inborn nature concealed by a veneer 
due to nurture'. Biology could help sift out what was 'natural' in heredity, to leave a 
clearer idea of what was entailed in 'social' heredity. Thomson discussed eugenics in 
considerable and impartial detail, coming to the general conclusion that although many 
of the issues raised by population questions and eugenics were important, 'our 
sentiments of solidarity and sympathy are too precious and too strong to admit of 
much social surgery or of the more thoroughgoing methods of reproduction 
elimination, which moreover assume the possession of more science than we really 
possess (ibid: 179). This paper, in which Thomson also proposes both that struggle for 
existence may be 'a gentle endeavour after well-being' prompted by 'love', and 
essentially 'other regarding' (ibid: 175), and that militarism may actually be 
counterproductive in an evolutionary sense, since the 'best' physical specimens get 
wiped out (ibid: 180-2), amounts to no less than a refutation of the supposed alliance 
between Civics and any but the most innocuous form of Eugenics. 
Thus, before the end of 1906, the initial, precariously 'unified' position of 1904 
_ which had seen Geddes supposedly aligning his Civics school with Eugenics, while 
Branford aligned it with the Durkheimians, and where Ethical Sociology was a latent, 
rather than a manifest, third alternative - had altered quite drastically. The Eugenists, 
by trumpeting about the necessity of breeding on the basis of 'civic worth', were clearly 
ready to align themselves with the Civics school. The latter, however, had begun to 
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draw back from whatever agreement they had had with the Eugenists initially, while 
Tayler's article illustrates quite dramatically how even New Liberal policy - such as 
equality of opportunity, and reform of the social environment, could be justified by an 
appeal to Eugenics. Tayler recommended 'nurture' on the grounds that it would 
ultimately improve 'nature'. In doing so, he collapsed what amounted to a crucially 
important political distinction between social reform, social engineering and eugenics -
and where both Geddes and Hobhouse were in different senses advocates of the first 
two, neither of them wished to be associated with the latter. 
1907 - 1911: Divergence and Dispute 
Hobhouse does not appear to have attended any of the Society's meetings between late 
May 1905 and the end of 1906. There is no evidence that he contributed either verbally 
or in writing to the discussions, although he was still chairman of the Editorial 
Committee. It is likely that his time was largely taken up with his Tribune work, and 
with the writing of Morals in Evolution, published in 1906. Even so, as Chairman of 
the Editorial Committee, Hobhouse must have been aware of what was going on. It is 
highly unlikely that he approved. Yet his was a difficult position. With many Eugenists 
(perhaps most especially Galton), Hobhouse believed in the importance of intellectual 
development for the future of humanity. He also believed that 'evolution' could be 
politically managed, to produce 'progress'. But he denied that Darwinian natural 
selection was important beyond a certain point in human evolution, and he did not 
believe that the way to produce progress was by selective breeding of the sort 
proposed by the Eugenists. 
The general theme of Morals in Evolution was the study of the evolution of 
'ethics', defined as the regulation of life. Based on an comparative historical study of 
systems of morality and ethics, and encompassing the history of philosophy, Hobhouse 
theorised the gradual release of ethical behaviour from inherited psycho-physical 
structures, as mind became the dominant factor in human evolution. Ultimately, ethical 
regulation would expand from a concern with family, to community and society, to an 
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ethical system which envisaged humanity as a whole, and was concerned with the 
maintenance of the common good. This theory, Hobhouse suggested, based as it was 
in human history, was not dependent on biological theories of evolution, and would 
stand up even if the biological theories fell. On one interpretation, then, Morals in 
Evolution can be read as a sustained, and well-researched 'scientific' onslaught on 
Eugenics (Abrams, 1985:193).14 
Thus, the Sociological Society had lost all traces of theoretical 'unity', well 
before the end of 1906. 15 In 1907 the Sociological Papers were abandoned. The 
Eugenists hived off to form, first, a separate committee within the Society, and 
afterwards their own organisation, The Eugenics Education Society. Hobhouse, during 
August of this year, had been offered, and, in September, accepted the Martin White 
Chair at the LSE - a Chair which both Branford and Martin White had hoped would be 
offered to Geddes. Finally, at the tail end of 1907, the Civics sociologists formed a 
separate Cities Committee within the Society. By 1908 there was a new journal - the 
Sociological Review, with the editorial committee replaced by Hobhouse as sole 
editor. This, in combination with his position as Martin White Professor of Sociology 
at the LSE, put him in an unparalleled position of power with respect to the future 
definition and development of sociology. 
The Issue of the Martin White Chair 
Why was Geddes not given the chair? Branford (1929: 275) recorded that a total of 
four applicants (including Westermarck?) had tried out for the Chair by presenting a 
formal lecture at LSE. Surely if Martin White had really meant Geddes to have it he 
might have strongly recommended, as Galton would later do at the University of 
14 Abrams believed that all of Hobhouse's writings were addressed to 'the business of 
unmasking the Policy-science ambitions of Spencer, Galton and the Eugenicists and Social-
Biologists who followed them' (1985: 193) 
15 As Abrams put it, 'the nature and province of the emergent discipline were the heart of the 
problem' (1985: 4). 
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London for Pearson, that he was to be its first occupant? Yet Geddes failed to be 
appointed. 
There are several possible explanations. One is simply that those in control of 
the LSE would simply not allow it. The school was the brain-child of Sidney Webb, 
who was chairman of governors between 1901 and 1911, and who took a personal and 
controlling interest in every appointment (Dahrendorf, 1995). There is little evidence 
that the Webbs knew Geddes at all well, though Beatrice recorded in her diary for 
October 1890, one 'delightful afternoon' with Geddes (Webb, 1982). He was not, 
however, among the chosen circle of close friends and colleagues whom they 
cultivated at their home in Grosvenor Road, but was an outsider as far as this London 
elite was concerned. As a Scot, in fact, he was almost as much a foreigner, to those for 
whom London was the world in microcosm as the (Swedish) Finn, Westermarck. 
Moreover, Geddes had on at least one occasion lectured on the subject 'What's Wrong 
With H.G. Wells?', which may not have endeared him to Wells's friends, Beatrice and 
Sidney (Webb, 1983; Boardman, 1978: 209). Another of their friends, G.B. Shaw, 
apparently loathed him (Boardman, 1978: 210). Hobhouse on the contrary, had paid 
his dues by getting along famously with Sidney Webb, almost becoming a member of 
the Fabian Society, recruiting for the Fabians, as well as being for a while among the 
much favoured habitues of Grosvenor Road (Collini, 1979; Hobson and Ginsberg, 
1931; Webb, 1983). And although by 1904 he had parted company with the Webbs, 
politically speaking, he remained, when all was said and done, a relative of Beatrice's 
(even if only by marriage) (Webb,1983, 1984). 
Another influential figure at LSE was its principal between 1903 and 1908, 
geographer Halford Mackinder. 16 He and Geddes had each attempted to set up a 
16Dahrendorfs 1995 history of the LSE records that it was Mackinder who persuaded Martin 
White to fund a Chair in Sociology, and is therefore largely responsible, with Martin White, for 
the institutionalisation ofSocioiogy (1995: 94). Fincham (1975: 27-8) suggests that Geddes, 
initially, put Martin White in touch with Dr. Roberts, who was registrar of the Board for the 
extension of University Teaching at the University of London. (note continued overleaf) 
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Geographical Institute, the former at Oxford, the latter in Edinburgh. Mackinder 
succeeded where Geddes failed, even though each had a similar conception of the role 
of the region in geography (Meller, 1990). Geddes, however, was both internationalist 
and pacifist in the face of Mac kinder's Liberal Imperialist stance (which suggested that 
Britain could retain her industrial greatness by consolidating her empire) - and 
Mackinder may have felt threatened by this opposition (Meller, 1990: 129-38). 
Hobhouse, of course, was similarly opposed to war and imperialism, but he defined his 
subject differently from Geddes. Sociology, for Hobhouse, did not include geography. 
And then, of course, both Hobhouse and Mackinder were part of the same political-
social circle that clustered around the Webbs (Dahrendorf, 1995). 
Politics, in fact, is likely to have been a major reason for Hobhouse's 
appointment. Not only was Hobhouse at the centre of the London scene, via his 
political journalism, academic publications, and LSE teaching,17 he was also on the 
'winning' side, politically. As Dahrendorf records in his history of LSE, in a political 
climate in which old ideologies and parties were dissolving, new ones emerging, and in 
which all were competing for dominance, LSE was the place to be (1995: 25-47). It 
was an exciting time to be a 'New' liberal, as Hobhouse was, and although there is no 
sense in which LSE can be said to have been founded as a Liberal institution - at the 
beginning, the Webbs were concerned above all with 'efficiency', and part of the raison 
d'etre of the school was just this, a formal training in efficiency for future 
administrators - the political climate and Hobhouse's open espousal of New Liberal 
theory constitute good reasons for the belief that Hobhouse's appointment to the Chair 
was strongly bound up with the rise of New Liberalism. 
Since Geddes was a fervent supporter of University Extension, this seems likely. Overall, it is 
likely that Geddes, Branford and Martin White, who was 'disappointed' that Geddes did not get 
the Chair (Dahrendorf, 1995), did more to get sociology into the university than Mackinder. 
17 Geddes, meanwhile, was still bound by the conditions of his Chair at Dundee, and the need 
to earn a living, to spend at least part of his year in his native Scotland, and still lived with his 
family in Edinburgh. 
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Other reasons for Geddes' failure to get the Martin White chair include the 
possibility that he did not, in fact, really want it, or try very hard to get it (Meller, 
1990). Part of the evidence for this is that recorded by Geddes' son Arthur, according 
to whom Geddes had rushed down to London on the train, and had little or no time to 
prepare his lecture. Consequently, he gave one of his spontaneous and 'scrambled' talks 
(Boardman, 1978: 231). In addition, unlike Hobhouse, whose Oxford education was 
the very model of high status respectability, Geddes not only had no formal academic 
qualifications, but had an extremely disrespectful and critical attitude toward the 
university system with its over-formalised curriculum and specialised departments. A 
more devious or career-oriented man might have dissembled a little, but Geddes was 
openly and sarcastically critical. It is unlikely that this worked in his favour. But 
Hobhouse had contributed in no small measure to the design of the first sociology 
syllabus, thereby ensuring that his own particular interests were (coincidentally?) well-
represented on the syllabus, and it is likely that his trial lecture was addressed to the 
subject matter it covered. Geddes had also given lectures at LSE, but these seem to 
have been in association with the University Extension Movement, rather than as 
courses for the (BSc) degree in Economics (Fincham, 1975). There is also the 
possibility that the rising tide of nationalism, which in combination with a jealous desire 
for administrative efficiency (of governments) seeped into LSE up to 1911 (Searle, 
1971: 54-63, 124-5), was a factor in Geddes' failure. Certainly, sociology, after its 
international beginnings, became increasingly nationalistic in the period up to the 
second World War (Maus, 1962: vii). Neither Geddes, as a Scot, nor the Finn, 
Westermarck, were ever able to playa major role. 
Whatever the truth of the matter, Geddes' failure to be appointed left 
Hobhouse, at the end of 1907, in a position of pivotal importance for the development 
of sociology in Britain. As the sole full-time Professor at LSE, he was perfectly placed 
to define and shape the scope and direction of the subject. He agreed to become editor 
of the Sociological Review in 1908 only on the condition that he was given the same 
'unconditional editiorial control' that Branford had enjoyed over the Sociological 
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Papers (Branford, 1929: 276). He was able to dictate, therefore, both academic and 
extra-academic sociological activity. 
The Issue of Geddes' Exclusion 
It is unlikely that Hobhouse's appointment to the Chair was at the root of subsequent 
events, although it must have been a contributory factor. The earlier debates at the 
Sociological Society had already set the tone. The jury was still undecided on the issue 
of the definition of sociology. Some - Galton, Pearson, Archdall Reid - wanted to 
claim it as purely eugenic; others that it could be a synthetic discipline, based on 
biology but encompassing psychology, ethics and, above all, environment (Geddes, 
Branford). Harald H6ffding had argued for sociology as a subject in which the study of 
actually existing moral values was combined with a 'scientific ethics', a definition close 
to that of Hobhouse himself Attempts had been made, during the course of 1906, to 
create a series of alliances between the different viewpoints, none of which met with a 
generalised approval. Hobhouse's appointment to the Martin White Chair, combined 
with his editorial control at the Sociological Review, gave him a degree of control over 
the development of the discipline that no single member of the Society had previously 
enjoyed. 
Once enthroned as the official head of the new discipline, Hobhouse began to 
exercise his editorial prerogative in a somewhat heavy-handed manner. The 
Sociological Papers had published every paper presented at the meetings of the 
Sociological Society between 1904 and 1906, complete with the discussions which 
followed, as a matter of course. When it became the Sociological Review under 
Hobhouse's sole editorship, presentation ceased to go hand in hand with publication. 
The very first volume of the Review (1908) gave no indication of which of its articles 
had been given as papers, and 'discussions' had been separated from articles. A book 
review section had been added, which must have been intended to bring the journal 
into line with other (foreign) journals of sociology. In a marked change of policy from 
his earlier non-contributory role, Hobhouse published one of his own papers in this 
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issue (Hobhouse, 1908b). And Eugenics, which had seemingly threatened to absorb the 
Sociological Papers in 1906, had all but vanished from the Review. Moreover, either 
sociologists in general had been quick to jump on the Hobhousian bandwagon, 
following the publication of Morals in Evolution and his appointment to the Chair, or 
Hobhouse himself had exercised a considerable editorial discretion in publishing 
articles that followed his own views quite closely. An article on 'Herd Instinct and its 
Bearing on the Psychology of Civilised Man' (Trotter, 1908) attempted to show how 
the social or gregarious nature of humanity was the result of 'natural selection'. Trotter 
theorised that group membership had significant survival advantages, managing to 
incorporate a somewhat sarcastic dig at the Eugenists en route, by suggesting that their 
membership of that particular herd heightened their susceptibility to false science 
(Trotter, 1908: 247). Another article suggested that the problem of national 
degeneration was not likely to be biologically caused, but rather more likely to be 
political in origin (Sorley, 1908: 321-9). 
Hobhouse's editorial acknowledged the theoretical disarray into which the 
society had so obviously fallen by the end of 1906, when he wrote of the 'deep 
divergences of view as to the nature and province of the enquiries' which sociologists 
'professedly pursue in common' (Hobhouse, 1908a: 1). Indirectly, he attacked Wells, 
for his suggestion, at a meeting of 1906, that sociology could not be scientific (Wells. 
1906), and went on to suggest that, in view of the 'divergence in the handling of 
sociological investigations' his editorial role ought to involve some indication of 
sociology's scope. General Sociology. as he defined it, led directly from the political 
philosophy of Green, Mill, Bentham, Rousseau and Locke to a consideration of ethical 
problems. He implied. rather than stated outright. that sociology and biology were two 
distinct areas of study, by defining the latter as the study of 'Life', and the former as the 
study of 'Society'. Of all the different areas of study that went to make up sociology, 
and the practical investigations involved, Hobhouse suggested that their contribution 
would be touched on in the journal at the point where it overlapped with 'General 
Sociology'. 
It does not lie within our province to cater for the investigation of the 
recognised specialist. We invite him rather to discuss his principles and 
broad results with representatives of other specialisms and in the 
presence of those interested in sociology at large. (Hobhouse, 1908a: 
10) 
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Is this statement aimed directly at Geddes, or at the adherents of Civics sociology in 
general? Were the 'recognised specialists' those who had recently organised a separate 
Cities Committee with the Society? If so, Hobhouse had certainly put them firmly in 
their place! Yet there is no evidence that Geddes had been excluded during 1908. His 
paper on 'Chelsea, Past and Possible' appeared, as did a 'discussion' of Civics and 
Citizenship, which included an announcement of the formation of the Cities Committee 
within the Sociological Society (Geddes, 1908a; 1908b). 
Yet Branford (still Honorary Secretary) and other members of the council of 
the Society must have been unhappy with at least some aspects of the new journal. At 
the tail end of 1908, Branford, in a letter to Martin White, complained that Hobhouse 
admitted that he did not really understand Civics, but 'as an editor he refuses to be 
guided and it is in his nature to continue in that independent line' (Branford, 1908, 
cited in Halliday, 1968: 388). 
There is evidence to suggest that the division grew wider in the ensuing year. 
Until at least the end of 1906, all the Society's meetings had been held at LSE. By the 
end of 1909, it had moved its offices to Buckingham Street. But although this was not 
really all that far from LSE, an announcement appeared in the Review to the effect that 
in future its meetings would take place at a neighbouring lecture hall, perhaps 
indicating a determination to separate the Society from academic Sociology. In his 
Presidential address to the Society at the beginning of 1909, Edward Brabrook had 
stated that the Review would continue to 'comprise a record of the papers read before 
the Society', which might have been taken to mean that they would continue to be 
published in full. It quickly became evident, however, that they would not. The Society 
was reduced to publishing short abstracts of papers as 'proceedings'. (Brabrook, 1909: 
185; Proceedings, 1909: 316). 
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It is possible to justify Hobhouse's behaviour to some extent, of course, by 
reminding ourselves that it was his duty and responsibility, as (almost) the sole 
representative of British Sociology in an academic post, to attempt to raise the level of 
sociological debate and the quality of published work. Against this, however, it might 
be that Hobhouse went beyond his remit, in attempting to exclude as far as possible 
ideas that were opposed to his own, and even, perhaps, ideas that were sufficiently 
close to his own to pose a threat to his status as the lone representative of 'British' 
sociological theory. 
The final blow was dealt early in 1910, when a paper presented by Geddes, on 
'City Surveys and City Reports' failed to be published in the Review, while 
presentations by Sybella Guemey, Laurence Gomme, and Professor Caldecott were all 
published, and one by Ratcliffe gained a promise that it would 'probably be published in 
the April number' (although, in the event, it never was). Geddes got no such promise 
(proceedings of the Sociological Society, 1910, January: 94-5). This was a direct snub, 
and for Geddes' supporters in the Society, particularly Branford (who continued to 
take an active role), it must have been too much to ignore. We are left to imagine the 
unholy row which followed. Hobhouse's resignation as editor of the Review was 
announced soon afterwards in July (Sociological Review, 1910, No.3, July: 226). 
According to Hobhouse's biographers, this was 'partly from pressure of other work, 
but partly also from a divergence of view as to the conduct and contents of such a 
review that had arisen between him and other active supporters of the society' (Hobson 
& Ginsberg, 1931: 46). 
Did Hobhouse really fail to understand Civics? Or did he identify Civics with 
Eugenics, as Meller has suggested? Did he have no other option but to exclude a 
sociology in which the concrete, material environment, built or natural, was seen to 
play a major role in shaping human consciousness and action? Or was there, as 
Branford had suggested, something in his nature which ensured that he could not 
compromise or collaborate with Geddes? 
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To explain Geddes' exclusion by suggesting that he did not understand Civics is 
somewhat insulting to Hobhouse, even if this was the explanation he chose to give 
Branford. It is certainly true that Geddes' position was difficult to understand and was 
not expressed in a manner which aided comprehension. Yet Hobhouse was an 
intellectual of much more than average stature. It is only necessary to examine a work 
of the quality of Morals in Evolution to realise that Hobhouse had not only the ability 
to understand, but also to make use of aspects of Geddes' work in his own. Yet he did 
not. 
To explain Geddes' exclusion by suggesting that Hobhouse believed it too close 
to Eugenics will not quite do either, though this certainly had a great deal to do with 
the general nature of the early part of the dispute. After announcing his resignation, 
Hobhouse continued in his editorial role at the Review until the beginning of 1911, 
when the journalist and lecturer S.K. Ratcliffe - a supporter of Geddes, was appointed 
acting editor (Report, 1911: 176; Boardman, 1978). At the end of the Society's Annual 
General Meeting (AG.M.) in 1911, held on 21st March, Hobhouse 'delivered, before a 
large audience, an address on 'Eugenics and Sociology' (Proceedings, 1911: 180). The 
paper itself was never published, though it is highly likely that its text was close to that 
of another lecture on 'The Value and Limitations of Eugenics' delivered in America in 
April the same year, which also appears both in the Review (Hobhouse, 1911a: 281-
302), and as a chapter in Hobhouse's (I911b) Social Evolution and Politicallheory. 
If the contours of the dispute are understood to revolve around Hobhouse's 
conviction that Geddes was a supporter of Eugenics, this paper reads as an attempt at 
rapprochement on Hohhouse's part. Hobhouse remains cautious about the value of 
Eugenics, though he agrees that the 'feeble-minded' ought not to be allowed to breed 
(Hobhouse, 1911a: 282-3). He goes on, however, to agree with Thomson (and thus, 
by implication with Geddes) that environment can and does have an effect on the life of 
the organism and possibly also on its off-spring, by means of poor nutrition, or the 
entry oftoxic substances into the body, which then affect the 'germ-plasm' (ibid: 295) 
We should certainly be risking a good deal if, in the present stage of our 
biological awareness, we were to proceed on the assumption that no 
degree of unhealthiness in the conditions of life would have any 
permanent tendency to deterioration, and here, from the sociological 
point of view, the affect upon the mother would be just as important as 
the effect upon the germ-plasm. . . . on the practical side the indirect 
influences upon the unborn child are just as important as the influences 
on the germinal cells which go to constitute the child. It must be added 
that all careful students of heredity admit the plenitude of our ignorance 
as to variation and that there are not wanting indications that the 
environment has indirect and subtle effects which have yet to be 
measured. (ibid: 296) 
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Sadly, the Society's Proceedings note only that 'an animated discussion' followed 
Hobhouse's lecture. Shortly after the A.G.M. at which this (or a similar) lecture was 
given, Branford announced his own resignation (Report of the Council for the Year 
1910 (1911): 175). Was this his way of signalling that the dispute should now be 
allowed to drop? 
It was not allowed to drop, however, though it may be that Branford, at least, 
managed to make his peace with Hobhouse. Certainly he found it within his powers to 
continue to work with Hobhouse, who remained on a re-formed Editorial 
Committee. IS Perhaps, in keeping with the shrewdness of character attributed to him 
by Mumford (1948: 682-683), this was indicative ofa continued belief in the possibility 
of collaboration between LSE sociology and the work of the Society - if only they 
could all get along together. In his obituary for Hobhouse, Branford would later note 
the many similarities between the two schools of thought, and plead once more for 
collaboration on the lines of the Durkheimian school (Branford, 1929). Hobhouse, 
however, never referred to Geddes or Geddes' work again, which suggests that there 
18 What were Hobhouse's motives for remaining on the Editorial Committee? In view of both 
the 'pressure of work' and the dispute, it would have been easier to understand ifhe had 
dropped the Review altogether. Perhaps he still hoped for a reconciliation with Geddes - but he 
made little attempt to bring this about. Or did he, perhaps, need to keep a finger in the pie of 
the Review, since it was, at the time, the only British sociological journal, and he the only full-
time professor? Or could he, perhaps, not bring himself to sever all ties, on the basis that at 
least, on the committee, he would know what was going on at the society? 
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was more to the dispute than a disagreement over Eugenics. And although he was 
forced to acknowledge at least some of Geddes' contribution, obliquely, in Social 
Development (1966a [1924]: 104), he did so while attacking openly one of Geddes' 
early influences, the Le Playist Geographer, Eduard Demolins. 
A Clash of Personalities? 
At the same time Geddes clearly never forgave Hobhouse either, though whether this 
was a matter of sour grapes over his failure to get the chair, or the result of 
Hobhouse's continuing to ignore him even after acknowledging that he was at least 
partially right (or maybe even both), is hard to say. He vented his spleen both publicly 
in his writing (see, for example, Geddes, 1922), and privately - writing to his daughter 
Norah in 1931, in characteristically sarcastic tone, on the occasion of his Cities and 
Civics Exhibition moving from France to LSE. A room was being prepared, he told her 
to hang it today at school of economics. London's great College Temple 
of University Faculty of Divinity - next the city - where Mammon is 
God! .... I've seen inside Pilgrim's burden, in 'Progress' - and how 
stupid never to have realised its weight of Sins was weighted essentially 
in Gold! .... And what a quaint coincidence for my own Life Comedy 
- to be going today to the very place and type I have most abominated 
since I began economics with Ruskin nearly sixty years ago. (Geddes, 
1931, cited in Boardman, 1978: 422) 
Is there here some veiled reference to Hobhouse in particular as well as to the LSE as 
a whole? In any case, Geddes was doing his own dissembling when he claimed to have 
abominated both the School and its People since as early as 1884. Even if he had not 
wanted the Martin White chair for himself in 1907, there is no doubt that he wanted 
academic recognition for his work. Only months after Hobhouse's death he wrote to 
Branford urging him to get their colleague Alexander Farquharson 'in' at the LSE 
(Boardman, 1978: 410). 
Was this, then, in the final analysis, a case of academic jealousy, a clash of 
personalities and social class? Of himself, Hobhouse wrote at one time that he was 
'speculative by nature' and was 'always in danger of caring more for truth than for 
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doing good, e.g. for finding out what is the best reform to be carried than for the real 
effect on the happiness of the people that it will have when carried' (Hobhouse, cited in 
Collini, 1979: 58). On the other hand, he also wrote (to his fiancee) that 'I like talking 
to the village people. I understand them and feel en rapport with them. I feel friends 
with them and it always makes me feel happy' (ibid: 59). Perhaps, however, there was 
too keen a sense of the class differences between himself and the 'masses' for 
Hobhouse ever to have managed really to bring himself down to their level (ibid: 59th; 
80fn; 89fn; 93fn). 
By others, Hobhouse has been described as a spoilt youngest child, who could 
be irritable and moody, and had a 'puritan' streak (Collini, 1979: 52-4, 89fn.). Like 
Weber, he was prone to periodic outbreaks of despondency, at which times his 
optimistic theoretical assessment of evolutionary trends would give way to pessimism 
about the state of contemporary politics (ibid: 90; 144; 168-170). Nor was he, it 
seems, a particularly sociable man, though his friend and biographer lA. Hobson 
suggested that what appeared to some people as self-centredness, arrogance or 
aloofness was really the mark of a diffident shyness (Hobson and Ginsberg, 1931: 95). 
The most damning indictment of his personality, and the one that suggests most 
strongly that personality may have been a great part of the dispute, is that colleagues 
sometimes found him 'inconsiderate and not easy to work with' (ibid: 94). Collini 
suggests that this may have been due to the fact that 'there was a hint of paranoia in his 
readiness to perceive slights' (1979:94). 
It is not too difficult to imagine that, when confronted with the outspoken, 
forthright Scot, Geddes, with his open lack of respect for the academy and all that it 
stood for, Hobhouse was too ready to read a personal insult into what was, essentially, 
a central part of Geddes' concern with social progress. 19 As Meller has noted (1990: 2, 
19 It may also have been a defensive reaction to his own lack of formal education. Ought 
Hobhouse, with his particular interest in 'mind', to have been more sensitive to psychological 
'quirks' of this kind - both his own and those of others? 
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and above, Chapter 2), Geddes loved to demolish the arguments of others verbally. 
Yet apart from Hobhouse's committment to abstract, philosophic academic 'armchair' 
sociology, and his refusal to accept a role for the natural or physical environment, there 
were many points on which the two might have agreed. Perhaps, too, there was an 
element of both class superiority, and personal jealousy in Hobhouse's attitude to 
Geddes, who succeeded so well at doing what he himself would have liked to do, but 
couldn't quite manage - going out into the world beyond the confines of the academy 
and mixing with 'real' working people at their own level. Again, neither man was able 
to 'suffer fools gladly', and both could be domineering and dogmatic. Geddes badly 
wanted his ideas to be recognised, although he did himself no favours by his mode of 
exposition. His bitterness at JIobhouse's rejection of his ideas is amply reflected in the 
letter cited above. 
Yet there are indications, too, that Geddes and Hobhouse might have got on 
with one another at a personal level, and been able to collaborate intellectually, had 
either been prepared to meet the other halfway. As early as Democracy and Reaction 
(1904), Hobhouse had written deploring the development of 'suburban villadom' and 
the absence of community and public life in the towns to which 'men resort only to dine 
and sleep, while the women have no visible function in life except to marry and discuss 
marriages' (1904: 68-9). Geddes was to spend a good part of his life in attempting to 
create just the sort of participatory community that Hobhouse supposedly desired. It 
may be that Geddes' methods of active involvement in civic improvement were 
anathema to Hobhouse, for whom politics was enacted through the public institutions 
of government. Geddes himself steered clear of involvement in formal political debate, 
believing it a slow and cumbersome method of getting things done, yet his essential 
political orientation, or ideological outlook, was not so far removed from Hobhouse's 
own, even if it is hard to categorise in conventional terms. 
Martinez-Alier (1987) suggests that Geddes' politics were 'weakly anarchistic', 
which to the extent that he bypassed conventional political routes towards social 
change, they were. Bramwell (1989) has dubbed him a 'libertarian socialist', though 
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Geddes could not be called a socialist in any ordinary sense. He did advocate regional 
collective ownership of forests, believing that the socialists with their 'urban' 
orientation had overlooked this vital aspect of social life (Geddes, 1929). In an early 
paper he was critical of both the Socialist and Co-operative movements, coming down 
in the end on the side of the co-operatives. His major criticisms of the Socialists were 
that they made the same mistake as the political economists in not including 'nature' in 
their calculations of 'value', and that instead of taking ameliorative action in the here 
and now, they sat around waiting for a revolution, their minds 'filled with the contrast 
between the sordid facts of everyday life and the luminous glories of the ideal' 
(Geddes: 1888: 287). Again, Meller has, at different times, classed Geddes with the 
tradition of cultural criticism begun by Matthew Arnold, with Bergsonian vitalism, as 
well as with the 'orthogenic' evolutionary theory of Hobhouse (Meller, 1973: 291-315; 
1980: 199-223; 1981: 46-71). 
Yet in spite of his elusive ideological position, there were similarities between 
Geddes' outlook and that of Hobhouse. Both were essentially humanitarian, with a 
profound concern for social justice. Each of them wished for an improvement in the 
human and social habitat, and at the same time cared deeply for non-human forms of 
life. And in a memoir of Hobhouse, his son recalled how his father had loathed the 
destruction of the countryside by the rich in their motor cars (Hobson and Ginsberg, 
1931: 89-90). This was a sentiment with which Geddes, with his deep love of nature, 
and his concern with energy efficiency, would have been entirely in accord. 
In only one respect were Geddes and Hobhouse truly opposed to one another. 
Geddes argued for a dialectical relationship between human beings and their 
environment. If 'nature' in the first place 'determined' what sort of economic activity. 
social life and ideas would emerge in a region, people, through their (freely or 
creatively undertaken) economic activity. altered both nature and each other. Social 
evolution took place through this cycle of action, interaction and reaction, each new 
change in people. occupation or place spawning new types of people and relationships, 
new occupations and altered environments. Social, occupational and environmental 
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location determined the 'consciousness' of the people, their values, beliefs, outlook, 
desires and way of life, but people, within the constraints imposed by this external 
'culture', actively created the present and the future. In his practical projects, Geddes 
set about altering 'consciousness' by altering physical environments above all. In his 
ravings about the inadequacies of contemporary education and city life, he was seeking 
to abolish outdated, ill-planned or haphazard educational or architectural 'survivals' of 
the past, reorganising, renovating and revitalising only what was good, useful or 
beautiful for the future of both citizens and city. 
Hobhouse, on the other hand, wanted to believe that consciousness could 
'determine' being. With the emergence of the self-conscious mind came the possibility 
that humanity could control and develop its social institutions, and with that 'mind' 
itself. He could not concede a position which appeared to insist that consciousness 
might be 'determined' by something other than itself. Far from failing to understand 
Geddes' sociology, it is likely that Hobhouse understood their differences only too 
well. Perhaps in Geddes, in spite of his manifest failures of exposition, Hobhouse found 
a greater threat to his theoretical 'survival' than in the hereditarian theories of the 
Eugenists. Why else attempt a rapprochement by acknowledging Thomson, while 
ignoring Geddes? And how else could he have brought himself to concede, in his last 
major work, without ac/mawledging Geddes, that at 'every stage the physical 
environment whether by stimulating or inhibiting industrial effort, affects the economic 
structure and through it bears on the whole life of society', while still maintaining that 
It is man with his desires, his knowledge, his powers of organisation, 
habits of industry and the like, to which the physical environment sets a 
problem, and it is in strictness the solution of this problem which inter 
alia conditions development. . . . What the environment does is partly 
to stimulate, but more particularly to determine, success and failure, and 
it is through this indirect method of selection that the type acomodates 
itself to its habitat. . . . The environment never makes arts or 
institutions, these proceed from the energy of human thought and will, 
but the environment does go to determine the lines on which human 
energy can succeed, and so to decide what experiments and tentative 
beginnings will ripen into institutions (Hobhouse, 1966a [1924]: 97) 
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Unfortunately, what Hobhouse failed to acknowledge (in common with many 
others), was that human 'energy', whether physical or psychical, is fundamentally 
dependent for existence on its natural environment. This omission was to be 
consequential for British sociology. Hobhousian sociology remained the dominant 
sociology for a long time beyond his death in 1929, through his successor, Morris 
Ginsberg. In the chapters which follow, it will be argued that in spite of more or less 
deliberate attempts to de-throne the Hobhousian perspective as sociology expanded in 
the post-War period, his influence continues to the present day. 
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Chapter 4. 
Continuity and Change in British Sociology After 1929. 
Introduction 
This chapter begins with a summary of Hobhousian theory. This was the sociological 
outlook adhered to and, in some ways developed, by his successor, Ginsberg and was 
the dominant perspective up to, and beyond, World War II. Second, the differing fates 
of the Sociological Society and academic sociology in the thirty years between 
Hobhouse's death in 1929 and Giddens's graduation from Hull in 1959 are reviewed. 
International developments are considered to the extent that they affected British 
sociology. 
Had this project been intended as a comprehensive history of British Sociology 
such cursory treatment of this 30 year period would be incomprehensible. Since the 
primary aim has been to examine the treatment of environmental issues, however, 
which have been largely absent from sociology from Geddes' time until quite recently,! 
this leap can plausibly be justified. Moreover, the early exclusion of the 'natural' or 
'physical' environment as an important aspect of sociological theorising - examined in 
detail in the previous chapter, was surely a primary factor in its continued neglect. 
There is an interesting twist in the history of the fate of 'environment' in recent 
sociology, however, which can be articulated, briefly, as follows. Hobhouse became 
the central theorist, and Hobhousian theory the central theory, up to, and for some 
1 There are, inevitably, a few exceptions to the general neglect of environmental issue in 
sociology, though these tend to be fairly recent in origin- most notably Cotgrove's (1982) 
Catastrophe or Cornucopia. However, most contributions to a distinctively 'environmental' 
approach to social analysis, before Yearley's (1991) textbook, came from outside sociology 
(for example, the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth (1972), or Gorz, (1980». 
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years after World War II. Moreover, it is Hobhouse who must bear the primary 
responsibility for the exclusion of environmental issues from sociology. With a very 
few exceptions, there has been no recognisably environmental sociology in Britain until 
comparatively recently. 
Now environmental issues are back on the agenda. In a very short space of 
time, beginning from around the late 1980s, the issue of environment seems well on the 
way to becoming - if it is not quite yet - a central concern of contemporary sociology. 
In this respect 1992 is a significant year, since it marked the appearance in English of 
Beck's (1986) Risikgesellschajt (Risk Society). The reception of this book, and the 
remarkable similarity between its themes and certain themes in the work of Britain's 
central contemporary social theorist Anthony Giddens, heralded a new era for the few 
British sociologists already concerned with environmental issues. In spite of the 
similarity between his own and Beck's work, however, Giddens can also be usefully 
compared with his British predecessor Hobhouse. In particular, both conceptualise the 
role of sociology, the 'reflexive' agent, and the relation between the agent and society, 
in similar ways. Given Hobhouse's more or less deliberate exclusion of 'environment' 
from sociology, this theoretical continuity between the beginning of the century and its 
end is particularly interesting. How closely does Giddens's orientation follow 
Hobhouse's, and how did he 'inherit' the Hobhousian oeuvre? Most importantly, what 
are the implications of this theoretical orientation for his treatment of environment? 
The final part of the chapter addresses the first question, prior to a consideration of the 
second in the final chapter. 
The sections to follow, however, review first Hobhousian theory, the fate of 
the Sociological Society, and the continuation of academic sociology at LSE, including 
especially its role in the institutionalisation of sociology at other Universities. 
'Orthogenesis': A Summary 
Aspects of Hobhouse's sociology have already been outlined where relevant above 
(Chapter 3). What follows is a summary of Hob house's work between 1901 and 1924. 
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Hobhouse repudiated the Darwinian theory of natural selection as applied to 
the evolution of human societies at an early stage in his career. He insisted that the 
universally important feature of social development, regardless of differences in form 
between societies, was the emergence and development of 'mind' in humanity. 
Individual 'minds', which emerged gradually and accidentally as a product of natural 
selection, had survival value, even if this was not immediately apparent. From purely 
instinctive behaviour, via the ability of mind to correlate a gradually expanding range 
of things, events and experiences, alone and in communication with others, 'mind' 
acquires the capacity for correlation of means with ends, leading to the development of 
particular skills, customs and social traditions. 
Eventually, human evolution ceases to be governed by the 'blind' forces of 
nature, and becomes open to further development shaped by the purposive behaviour 
of individuals. Hobhouse was quite clear that there was no other motor of social 
development than the multitude of human minds each following its own ends. There 
was no single factor (biological or material) driving change in a particular direction. 
Yet his concept of 'ortho-genic' evolution, (literally 'correct', or 'true' evolution), 
carries a normative dimension - the development towards a universal 'harmony' as the 
ultimate human purpose. Hobhouse justified this in two ways; first by an appeal to 
biology - that which was not harmoniously adapted, both in 'organic unity' and to its 
surroundings, would not, ultimately, survive. Secondly, he appealed to the fact of our 
common humanity, which ensures that (whether or not we understand this), we share 
certain fundamental interests. As 'mind' evolved to the stage at which it became self-
conscious, therefore, the thing that it became conscious of, above all, was its unity with 
the rest of humanity. This would lead, ultimately and inevitably, to the emergence of a 
universal humanitarian ethic. 
Although social evolution took different forms in different places, and did not 
proceed in a single unilinear direction, Hobhouse believed that the comparative study 
of social institutions, both historical and contemporary, simple and complex, revealed 
evidence to support his theory. The degree of social development was related to the 
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degree of development of mind - or rather of many individual minds, working in co-
operation and conflict, with and against each other, towards no single pre-defined end, 
but each towards its own ends. Social development consisted of increases in 1) scope 
(size of population and/or territory); 2) efficiency (which referred simply to the 
performance and co-ordination of necessary social functions and did not necessarily 
involve complex organisation or technological advance); 3) mutuality (peaceful co-
operation both within and between nation-states); and 4) freedom. These did not 
necessarily develop together, and in fact were often at odds with one another. An 
increase in scope was not inevitably associated with an increase in efficiency or 
freedom, and an increase in efficiency might not be conducive to either freedom or 
mutuality, but involve repression and bureaucratic control. A high degree of freedom, 
mutuality and efficiency might exist in territorially limited societies of low population, 
but regress as population and territory expanded. Empirically, societies exhibited 
differences in levels of development, in which one or more elements were more or less 
advanced or inhibited. The true end-point of the evolution of mind would be the 
emergence of a peaceful international order of interdependent nation-states, in a 
humanitarian system which recognised the equal moral worth of all, and encouraged 
the free development of individual personalities in a vast heterogeneous harmony. 
This was the sociological perspective inherited and developed by his successor 
Ginsberg. Its fate was to be very different from that of Geddes, though some of the 
latter's ideas, interpreted in a particular way, did survive for a while beyond his death in 
the work of the Sociological Society. 
Continuity and Decay: 
Geddesian sociology really died with its three major protagonists, in the early 1930s. 
Victor Branford, on whose hard work, perhaps more than on any other single person, 
the foundations and establishment of Sociology in Britain depended, died in 1930, 
Geddes in 1932. The only other man who had ever been able to collaborate fruitfully 
with Geddes, 1. Arthur Thomson, died in 1933. Of the three, only Branford retained a 
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major role in the Sociological Society, while Thomson remained a biologist above all, 
and Geddes' subsequent career took him all over the world, though he kept in touch 
with the Society via his correspondence with Branford and intermittent visits to 
London. 
After the split from academic sociology at LSE, the Society continued 
independently, spawning in 1914 the closely associated 'British Association for 
Regional Survey', renamed the Regional Association after the War in 1918 (Evans, 
1986: 49-50). Almost immediately. Branford began to draw in a number of other 
organisations, with a view to co-operation, including the Civic Education League, the 
Geographical and Historical Associations, and the School Nature Study Union, as well 
as the more 'environmentalist' Selboume Society (Evans, 1986: 50).2 
In 1920, Branford purchased 65 Belgrave Road, Westminster - which became 
Le Play House - as a base from which these formally separate but overlapping 
organisations could operate (D. Farquharson, 1955: 167; Evans, 1986: 56). From 
1921, he was joined at Le Play House by a younger colleague, Alexander Farquharson, 
a man who - while superficially a loyal Geddesian - would play a central role in the 
demise of early environmental sociology. Again the situation was a complex one, and 
there is space here to do no more than sketch its outline (but see Evans. 1986, for a 
fuller exposition, albeit from a non-environmentalist perspective). 
What survived of the Geddesian perspective, via these organisations and 
'movements', was Geddes' insistence on surveys as a pre-requisite for town and city 
planning, and his 'Outlook Tower' system of civic education through direct observation 
and experience. What was lost, or perhaps in some cases had never been fully or 
adequately absorbed by his followers. was his holistic theoretical outlook which 
insisted on the study of people in their relations with their natural, as well as social 
environments. 
2 The Selboume Society grew out of Gilbert White's (1720-93) Natural History of Selboume. 
Its members contributed to the rise of the 'natural history essay' (Worster, 1977: 8-16). 
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The Role of Alexander Farquharson 
Farquharson (1882-1954) began his career as a school teacher, but became a District 
Secretary to the Charity Organisation Society early in 1910, joining the Moral 
Education league - which later became the Civic Education League - and the Fabian 
Society at about the same time (Evans 1986: 52-4). After joining Branford at Le Play 
House, Farquharson soon 'became effectively the organiser and moving force' (ibid: 
60). As well as his earlier involvement in the Sociological Society and the Civic 
Education League, he had also been involved in the Regional Association (ibid: 52, 
63). 
In spite of his overt efforts towards co-operation, Branford remained most 
directly involved with the Sociological Society and particularly the Sociological 
Review, and continued to oppose any merging of identities, even when Farquharson 
began, in 1922, to canvass for amalgamation of the three organisations (ibid: 56, 63), 
though it was not until the autumn of 1927 that a Committee was formed to discuss 
this issue formally (ibid: 75). Branford, however, was absent during 1927 and 1928, 
during which time Farquharson seems to have orchestrated a full-scale a1magamation, 
against the older man's wishes. Older members of the Sociological Society also 
protested, and Farquharson at this point took the somewhat drastic step of taking legal 
advice about the status of the Council of the Society (ibid: 76) - an early indication of 
the lengths to which he was prepared to go to de-throne Branford and take over as the 
leader of the non-academic sociological movement. 
By 1930, Farquharson had succeeded in bringing the three allied organisations 
together to form one 'unified' Institute of Sociology (Boardman, 1944: 472fu; D. 
Farquharson, op cit: 167-8; Evans, 1986, 76). But in 1931, the year following 
Branford's death, a dispute at Le Play House divided the movement yet again. The 
exact nature of this dispute remains unresolved, but it is clear that Farquharson 
behaved extremely badly; he appears to have been something of a womanizer. He and 
Margaret Tatton were the main disputants (Boardman, 1978: 412). These two had 
been (at the very least) close friends, since as early as 1910 (Evans, 1986: 54), and 
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both were involved in the foreign fieldwork trips run from Le Play House. From 1927, 
however, their relationship came under strain, partly as a result of Farquharson's more 
recent friendship with Dorothea Price, who would later (1933) become his second wife 
(the first was not Margaret Tatton). Another, maybe secondary cause, was that Tatton 
and others involved in the affairs of Le Play House were keen to move more towards 
geography, which emphasised the study of natural environments, and in which the 
concepts of 'region' and 'regional survey' were at their height around 1930. 
Farquharson, by contrast, and in keeping with his Charity Organisation Society 
leanings maintained a much deeper interest in (voluntary) social work, and in history, 
culture and lifestyle than in environment (Evans, 1986: 66, 70-73). There is evidence, 
in fact, that he made a deliberate attempt as early as 1926, to oust Geddes from the 
Sociological Society, a date which coincides with his attempts to re-form a closer 
relationship with Marshall and Ginsberg at LSE (ibid: 68-69). 
Matters came to a head all at once. Farquharson's affairs - in which four women 
- Eleanor Spear, the secretary at Le Play House, and Eileen Thomas, one of the foreign 
fieldwork tour guides, as well as Farquharson's 'friends' Margaret Tatton and Dorothea 
Price - were all somehow involved (Evans, 1986: 72-6, 85) became mixed up in the 
amalgamation of the Regional Association with the Civic Education League and the 
Sociological Society. Simultaneously, economic recession and complications over 
Branfords' 'obscurely worded' Will forced financial cutbacks, with the result that 
Eleanor Spear, who had offered to take a 25% cut in salary, eventually resigned, and 
Farquharson became a salaried official of the newly formed Institute of Sociology, 
installing Dorothea as joint secretary after their marriage in 1933. Tatton and others 
who remained loyal to Geddesian 'environmental sociology' split off from the Institute 
completely, forming themselves into the Le Play Society and having nothing more to 
do with the former Sociological Society (Meller, 1990: 308), though there was some 
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disagreement about which organisation would inherit Branford's money (Evans, 1986: 
83-5).3 
Geddes' own role in all this was a small one, though he had presented a paper 
at the Institute in October, 1931, making plain his own disagreements with 
Farquharson's style of civic survey. He also attempted to act as peacemaker between 
Tatton and Farquharson - with Farquharson once again threatening to go to the law 
over the matter (Evans, 1986: 84-85). Yet spite of his optimism that the split would 
lead to a 'doubling of sociological action' (since each side was now free to act 
independently of the other in its promotion of sociology), the dispute had adverse 
consequences for the continuance of Geddes ian sociology (Boardman, 1978: 412, and 
423). Geddes, who would die shortly after this last dispute, had clearly - and naively, 
as it turned out - thought highly of Farquharson, and had at one time marked him for a 
successor. Yet there is little doubt that Farquharson'S activities were disloyal to both 
Branford and Geddes, motivated above all, perhaps, by concern for his own career. 
Dorothea Farquharson (1955: 168) later coupled her husband's work with that of 
Branford and Geddes, but this is a post-hoc justification for what were really disloyal 
actions. 
Geddes, however, died soon afterwards, and from 1933 Farquharson, with 
Ginsberg and Carr-Saunders sat on the Editorial Board of the Sociological Review, 
which continued to be the only 'specialist' journal of sociology in Britain until after the 
War (though the LSE journals Economica, founded in 1921, and from 1934 Politica 
did provide an alternative outlet for publication). According to Dorothea Farquharson, 
this was a time of true collaboration between the LSE and the Institute of Sociology, in 
3 Farquharson again took legal advice on this issue, and Branford's legacy stayed with Le Play 
House rather than the Le Play Society. In the event, however, hardly any money materialised, 
since it was largely tied up in foreign investments hit by the depression. It is hard not to feel a 
certain satisfaction in this, since it is clear both that Farquharson schemed to get rid of Geddes, 
and that he failed to edit and publish Branford's unpublished works (many of which were 
ultimately lost) which was a condition of the Will (Evans, 1986: 86-90). 
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which monthly discussion meetings took place at Le Play House, and T.H. Marshall 
organised conferences on the 'relationship between sociology and the allied sciences' 
(1955: 169). Two volumes of papers presented at conferences in 1935 and 1936, 
however, indicate not so much collaboration as take-over, by people associated, in one 
way or another, with LSE. Ten out of fifteen papers at the 1935 conference were 
presented by LSE people: T.H. Marshall (two papers), Morris Ginsberg, Michael 
Postan, Michael Oakeshott, Harold Laski, 1.R. Hicks, Karl Mannheim, D.W Brogan 
and Alexander Carr-Saunders. Another paper was presented by Hobhouse's friend and 
colleague, IA. Hobson and yet another by the Manchester Professor, IL. Stocks, who 
was linked with LSE via Tawney, as well as the former LSE student and staff member, 
Mary Brinton, to whom he was married (The Social Sciences, 1936; Dahrendorf, 
1995). 
The 1935 conference heard papers on history, political theory, and economics, 
in their relation to the social sciences The 1936 conference carried papers on the 
relation of biology, anthropology and psychology to sociology. The 1935 conference 
seems to have been fairly acrimonious, with a conspicuous lack of agreement between 
the two participating bodies (Barker, 1936: 7; Marshall, 1937: 153), one cause of 
which was human geography. Some members of the Institute of Sociology, however 
inadequate their understanding of Geddesian ideas, did not fail to notice the 
conspicuous absense of this discipline, as a subject of major relevance to their wider 
concerns. Marshall's report on the teaching of the social sciences merely acknowledged 
the rapid rise of human geography as a subject for university study, and insisted on its 
interdependence with other social sciences (Marshall, 1936b: 46-7). The Political 
Philosopher, Ernest Barker, President of the Institute between 1935 and 1938, as well 
as of the British committee of International Student Service,4 summed up both 
conferences (Barker, 1936; Barker, 1937) After the first conference he drew attention 
4 This Committee, rather than LSE, appears to have been formally jointly responsible (with the 
Institute) for the organising of the conferences. 
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to the importance of human geography. After the second, when it was still conspicuous 
by its absense, he complained more strongly: 
There is no gulf between "nature" and "man"; man is immersed in 
nature, and every science concerned with man is also concerned with 
the natural foundation of social man. There are a number of such 
foundations which have to be included in any general reckoning. One is 
the natural foundation of man's material environment: the foundation of 
soil or climate, or, as it is expressed in the title of one of the treatises of 
Hippocrates, of "airs, waters, and places." That is the province of the 
geographer; and the sociologist has to make his account, as Ie Play and 
his followers have done, with the findings of the geographer. (Barker, 
1937: 11) 
In view of the history of Geddes' exclusion, and Farquharson's deliberate 
attempts to drop natural environments from regional or civic surveys, Barker's 
subsequent remark that geography had been omitted 'more by accident than design' 
should not be taken at its face value! 
Farqharson's fate, and the fate of the Institute of Sociology, however, were 
ultimately not so very different from the fate of Geddes himself All of them, in the 
end, were pushed aside in the struggle to establish a respectable and - more 
importantly - acceptable sociology. In some ways, Geddes' fate may have even been 
preferable to that of Farquharson, who continued - with only Dorothea for support - to 
struggle to maintain an ailing sociological organisation, right up to his death in 1954. 
The Institute moved out to Great Malvern during the War years, and publication of the 
Sociological Review was suspended, due to shortages of paper and other supplies. At 
the end of the war, financial difficulties remained acute, since very little of the 
promised legacy of Branford ever materialised (see fn.3 above). Yet the Institute was 
determined to hold on to its Review, and (on the advice of the Farquharsons) in 1948 
rejected an offer from LSE to take it over (Evans, 1986: 104, 125). Ginsberg and Carr-
Saunders subsequently felt unable to continue to support the Institute or its Review and 
withdrew from the Institute's Council in 1952, after the LSE began publishing its own 
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British Journal of Sociology(Evans, 1986: 125).5 Farquharson became ill in 1949, so 
that it was not he, but T .R. Marshall, who represented the Institute at the Oslo 
conference at which the International Sociological Association (ISA) was formed. It 
later emerged - after the Institute did not appear on the list of national sociological 
organisations in existence at that time, that Marshall, far from representing the Institute 
and its interests, had informed the ISA that 'the Institute was closing down, and a new 
organisation would shortly be formed' (Evans, 1986: 127). Marshall, moreover, 
according to a letter from Dorothea Farquharson to Ethel Lindgren in 1950 'definitely 
declined to lift a finger' to help the Institute move from Malvern to Ledbury, and 'said 
he would have nothing to do with' the Farquharsons attempts 'to carry on in London or 
Ledbury' (cited in Evans, 1986: 127). The Institute was dissolved after Alexander's 
death in 1954, leaving a library of 15,000 volumes, and a collection of surveys, slides 
and maps. These were taken on by the University college of North Staffordshire at 
Keele, who also took on a new series of the Review.6 
During this period, then, the Society set up with such great hopes by Branford 
in 1903, died a slow and lingering death. But ifLSE sociology saw offits ailing rival in 
the early 1950s, the last vestiges of overt support for (only imperfectly understood) 
Geddesian ideas had died some twenty years before that, during the early years of 
Farquharson's reign over the Institute of Sociology. 
Intellectual Continuity: Sociology at LSE 
Meanwhile, Ginsberg (who had undertaken to teach social philosophy from as early as 
1914) had taken on Hobhouse's old role at LSE and continued to espouse and extend 
5 Again, we may wonder if the name was significant. This was to be not just another joumal, 
but The British 10urnal- perhaps an indication both of wanting to dissociate itself from the 
Review, and of claiming a degree of academic superiority. 
6 Keele's offer to take over the Review, and the Le Play House Library, and the Institute's 
acceptance of the offer (other contenders were Edinburgh, Leicester's adult education division, 
and Reading) were both the result of the fact that Keele's founder, A.J. Lindsay, had been a 
long-standing member of the Institute's Council (Evans, 1986: 132). 
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his ideas until his own retirement in 1954 (Dahrendorf, 1995; Eldridge, 1980; Macrae, 
1961; Mitchell, 1968). Although sociology at LSE did not expand much during these 
years, its reach grew through the establishment of the subject as an external degree at 
other universities, for which LSE sociology became the model (Fincham, 1975). This 
model was one of 'evolutionary sociology, citizenship sociology . . . and political 
arithmetic' (Colin Crouch, quoted in Dahrendorf, 1995: 378). The first two grew out 
of the Hobhousian tradition. The third grew from the eugenic strand, via the social 
biologist Lancelot Hogben, to the demographer David Glass (Bulmer, 1985:12-19). 
Continuity 
Initially, the take-up of sociology as an optional subject on the BSc in Economics had 
been slow, partly due to the foreign language requirement. Students were expected to 
be acquainted with the principle works of sociology in English, French and German, 
and passages for translation were set as part of the exam (Fincham, 1975: 36).7 
Moreover, the few students who did opt for sociology were found to be getting low 
marks, which was attributed to the huge scope of the subject and to the fact that it was 
only one option on the economics degree, making the workload particularly heavy 
(ibid: 50-52). Additionally, there was a feeling that some students who might otherwise 
have taken sociology were being tempted to join the Department of Social Science and 
Administration, set up in 1912. This offered a 'practical training for social work' and 
awarded, initially, 'certificates' or 'diplomas' rather than degrees (ibid: 55-60).8 
Consequently, from about 1915, plans were begun for a sociology degree. The first 
7 The language requirement at LSE was not dropped until after the War, though it became 
increasingly redundant. In 1927, students were allowed to take dictionaries into the exam. By 
1939, an intennediate level pass in French, German or Italian gave exemption from the 
language paper; and by 1949, ifall other options on the Bsc Econ. were passed except 
language, candidates were allowed to re-sit that at a later date. It was eventually removed from 
the syllabus altogether (Fincham, 1975: 36-7). 
8 Dahrendorf (1995: 382) notes Marshall's comment that the Department, in the 1920s, was 
'popularly regarded as a convenient place for wealthy mothers to send their daughters to when 
disturbed by the dawning of a social conscience'. 
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degree in sociology (B.A.) became available in Britain from 1921-22. Moreover, in 
1927 the structure of the economics degree (B.Sc Econ) was radically altered, 
allowing students to specialise in either the Economics or the Sociology option (ibid: 
68). 
The Department of Social Science and Administration itself grew out of a 
proposal drawn up by Hobhouse and EJ. Urwick (the founder of a School of 
Sociology established in 1902-3, in conjunction with the Charity Organisation Society), 
to endow 'research into the principles and methods of preventing and relieving 
destitution and poverty', which would be 'a branch of what may become a distinct 
Sociological Department of the University' (Dahrendorf, 1995: 124-5). The new 
department, founded on money from the Ratan Tata Foundation, was run by 
Hobhouse, Urwick and R.H. Tawney. Tawney himself had done his earliest research 
under Hobhouse, and 'much of what he had to say had been developed' by his elder 
colleague before him (Halsey, 1996: 86). T.H. Marshall (1893-1982), who went to 
LSE in 1925 to teach Social Work students, remembered only Hobhouse, and later 
Ginsberg, especially. It was Ginsberg who invited him to join the Sociology 
Department (to teach the course on 'Comparative Social Institutions'), where he would 
remain until 1956 (Marshall, 1973: 402).9 It is highly likely, indeed, that Marshall's 
conception of citizenship (which his colleague Richard Titmuss 10 to a large extent 
shared) derives, in the first instance, from Hobhouse (Rees, 1996: 8-11). 
Thus was a great degree of intellectual continuity assured - and there were few 
other practitioners of the discipline to break with this tradition. This limitation of the 
number of sociologists in Britain, and sociology's restricted institutional base during 
the inter-war years, was partly the result ofthe depression of the 1930s, which not only 
restricted employment opportunities for sociologists, but also affected the Universities 
9 From 1944-9 Marshall was head of the Department of Social Science and Administration, 
and from 1954-6 Martin White Professor. 
10 Titmuss was on the staffofLSE from 1950-1973. 
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and University Colleges, financially. This, when added to the somewhat marginal status 
of LSE as a recently founded institution, and Ginsberg's 'shy' personality, must have 
had a detrimental effect on institutional development (Shils, 1971). 
Change 
Neither theoretical continuity nor under-institutionalisation should be over-stated, 
however. LSE sociology and social science did experience some variation in approach 
and political perspective in closely related disciplines over the period from 1929 to the 
1950s, and there was a gradual expansion of the realm of theoretical sociology. Names 
associated with LSE sociology (and the social sciences more generally) over the period 
include the socialist political theorist Harold Laski (staff from 1920-150),11 the 
German sociologist Karl Mannheim (staff from 1933-45), another socialist, G.n.H 
Cole (staff 1930s), the American Edward Shils (up to 1949), and the 'founder' of 
demographic studies, n.v. Glass (student from 1928-1932, staff 1932-1978). 
Environment gets a Second Chance 
William Beveridge - an early member of the Sociological Society - became director of 
LSE in 1919. He had been appointed on the strength of his organising and 
administrative skills, to rebuild and expand a devastated School after World War I, a 
role for which he was suited and performed well (Bulmer, 1985: 16; Harris, 1977: 
271). The numbers of higher degree students increased substantially between 1919 and 
1937, and he succeeded in establishing new Chairs in Anthropology, Economics, Law, 
International History, Banking and Social Biology. His eventual reward was rejection 
by his colleagues at LSE. The cause was Social Biology (Harris, 1977: 263, and 285-
290). 
11 Laski was somehow involved in the 'case of the Student Vanguard' in 1934, when there was 
a minor revolt after Beveridge refused LSE house-room for a course on Marxism, though his 
role in the affair was never clear. In general, he was a controversial figure attracting censure 
for his 'pestilent talk of class war' (Dahrendorf, 1995: 273-282). His reading list included 
Hayek's The Road to Serfdom as well as Hobhouse's Elements o/Social Justice (Fincham, 
1975:91). 
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Beveridge, whose concept of ' social science' was closer to that of Geddes than 
Hobhouse, was keen to link sociology more strongly to its bases in the natural sciences 
(Fincham, 1975: 101; Harris, 1977:285). To complete what had been begun at LSE, he 
advocated 
a third group of social studies. . . dealing with the natural bases of 
economics and politics, with the human material and its physical 
environment, and forming a bridge between the natural and social 
sciences. (Beveridge, cited in Harris, 1977: 286) 
Social Biology was just one among this third group. But Hobhouse - who would not 
live long enough to meet its incumbent, Hogben - complained that Social Biology was 
an 'odd name' and that Beveridge's proposal gave the impression that sociology had 
been inadequately taught up to now (Fincham, 1975: 100-101; Harris, 1977: 287). As 
with Geddes, he seems to have felt threatened by an approach to social life that did not 
insist on the overwhelming capacity of mind to control the conditions of its own 
development. 
Lancelot Hogben and LSE 
Hobhouse, however, appeared to be the only objector, and Lancelot Hogben (1895-
1975) was appointed in 1930. H.G. Wells - a self-confessed 'amateur of adult 
education and a dealer in general ideas' - chairing his Inaugural Lecture on 23 rd 
October, 1930, spoke of his hopes for the new subject: 
In the hands of a biologist, economics become merely one special case 
of the science of ecology, the science of the balance and welfare of 
species. He sees humanity maintaining itself in an environment which 
not only changes, but which humanity itself is continually changing, 
wittingly and unwittingly (Wells, 1930: 3). 
How much of this conception of economics Wells had absorbed from Geddes is 
impossible to say, though Geddes had clearly realised the similarity of their ideas when, 
towards the end of his life he made an open plea for Wells's collaboration (Boardman, 
1978: 418). Nor would Hogben have disappointed Geddes, either in style or substance. 
He began by alienating a good portion of his audience at LSE by declaring that the 
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social sciences could no longer cling on to the framework of a philosophical tradition 
'nurtured from Abelard to Kant in servile intimacy with the requirements of 
apologetics' (Hogben, 1930: 6). Hogben went on to make it plain that he believed both 
heredity and environment (social and natural or physical), were important factors in 
evolution (ibid: 10-12), cautiously advising that the natural selection theory, in the 
hands of Weismann, had become so rigid that 
Environment as an aspect of the problem of development faded out of 
the picture. For a generation biologists were hypnotised by the discredit 
into which which the Lamarckian teaching had fallen, till the progress of 
experimental embryology and the new cell anatomy relegated 
Weismann's hypothesis of germinal selection to the same limbo .... 
Social development is the communication of social tradition from one 
generation to another, biologically determined by the extraordinary 
range of man's conditioned behaviour. Organic evolution is brought 
about by the transmission of new heritable properties throught the 
gametes. The mechanism of one is education. The mechanism of the 
other is sexual selection (Hogben, 1930: 11 ).12 
Dahrendorfs account suggests that Hogben's demise as 'Research Professor' 
after only seven years was almost wholly due to the fact that Hogben's research 
laboratory was a highly visible (loud and smelly) part of the school (1995:256-263). 
Harris (1977: 286-90), suggests that Hogben and Beveridge were forced out, amid 
complaints that Beveridge favoured Hogben's department fmancially. Part of the cause 
was the Great Depression, which forced the Rockefeller Foundation, which had 
donated £200,000 towards Beveridge's new Chairs - to withdraw much of its financial 
support. No-one was appointed to replace Hogben, who resigned at the end of 1936. 
Beveridge, whose appointment he had been, and whose conception of 'social science' 
must have been to a great extent shaped by the early discussions at the Sociological 
12 It is odd that Bulmer (1985: 18), who cites Harris (1977) selectively, should emphasise 
Beveridge's definition of social biology as 'genetics, population, vital statistics, heredity 
eugenics and dysgenics', rather than his insistence on the importance of environment. This may 
be an illustration of sociology's historians writing as if events were 'all for the best'. Hogben 
was certainly not a eugenist (Jones, 1983: 169; Dahrendorf, 1995: 259). Nor was he a 
Geddesian, though he did have an interest in energy economics (Bramwell, 1989: 31). 
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Society, resigned soon afterwards, in 1937, with the complaint that LSE 'would have 
nothing of my Science of Society, as learned from Huxley and other men of science' 
(Dahrendorf, 1995: 264). 
Hogben's only positive legacy, according to Dahrendorf (1995) was that he 
cleared the decks, by 'the dismissal of the simpler assumptions of eugenics' for the 
establishment of the discipline of demography. Both Carr-Saunders and David Glass 
would benefit, in the long-term, from Hogben's short spell at LSE. That it was his 
biological legacy that survived, rather than his potential environmentalism, is probably 
due less to Hogben himself than to the already established ethos at LSE, which rejected 
the importance of all but the social environment. 
Ironically, Hogben's limited impact may have actually contributed further to 
Geddes' exclusion. As Meller (1990: 308-9) suggests, the establishment of social 
statistics was at odds with his holistic approach to society as the interaction of 
environment, function, and organism. David Caradog-Jones, for example of the Social 
Science department at Liverpool, would later write that 
To describe the study of a community demands a close study of the 
people who compose it, and of the environment in which they work and 
spend their free time .... [But] while the environment is to be studied 
in its effect upon the community, the main interest is focused on the 
community. That is where the Social Survey differs from the type of 
Regional Survey associated in this country with the names of Patrick 
Geddes and Victor Branford. Their emphasis is on the locality, their aim 
to make a comprehensive study of all its features as they have 
developed, and the interaction of these features with the life of the 
inhabitants. (Jones, undated, c.1946: 10) 
This exhibits a reasonable understanding of Geddes' idea of what Sociology and 
Regional Survey entailed, but omits both its purpose (the improvement of environment 
for the alteration of consciousness, and therefore social relations) and his 
corresponding emphasis on the importance of conservation. In any case, Jones is quite 
clear. 'A good case can be made for each type of survey' but the Geddesian survey is 
not a social survey, and hence outside the province of social science (ibid.). Thus, by 
the mid-1950s, Ruth Glass could attack Geddes with impunity. He, Branford, and 
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afterwards Mumford, were representative of the amateur approach to Town Planning, 
adhered to up to the 1920s by a 'motley group of enthusiasts in semi-philosophical 
speculation and social reform', eccentric and benevolent, 'often endearing and no doubt 
stimulating', but in the end, more of a handicap than a help to the development of a 
British urban sociology (1955: 12-13).13 The articles she cites as examples of Geddes 
approach, however, are among his later contributions to the Sociological Review. It is 
impossible not to wonder whether, had she read either Geddes 1931 contribution to 
Life, or the earlier work on economics, she might have been more generous in her 
assessment. 
Intellectual Continuity: Personnel 
During the War years, when both staffand students were greatly diminished in number, 
and LSE was evacuated to Cambridge, both Ilya Neustadt and Norbert Elias would 
spend time there. Elias probably began work on The Civilising Process while in 
London, and though it is difficult to speculate about the sources of his ideas, which he 
admitted were quite vague initially (Elias, 1994a: 53), it is at least certain that, as well 
as Sumner's (1906) Folkways, Ogburn's (1922) Social Change, and others, he read 
Ginsberg's (1934) SOCiology (Van Krieken, forthcoming). 
Van Krieken suggests that five interconnected principles underlay Elias's 
sociology. At least three of these are consistent with the Hobhouse-Ginsberg tradition, 
though they may, of course, have had other intellectual foundations as well as, or 
instead of these two. First, human beings engage in intentional action, but the outcome 
of the combination of intentional human actions is unplanned or unintended (compare 
Hobhouse, 1966a [1924]: 325-6) Second, human beings can only be understood as 
part of networks of social relations (compare Ginsberg, 1934: 7; Hobhouse, 1966c 
[1920]: 23). Third, human societies can only be understood as consisting oflong-term 
13 Glass gave Manual Castells a similar treatment in a New Society Review entitled 'Verbal 
Pollution', concluding that she did not know of 'anything else that is a similarly slovenly. fatty, 
pretentious concoction' (Glass, 1977, cited in Eldridge, 1980: 169-170). 
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processes of development and change (compare Hobhouse, 1951 [1906]; 1966b 
[1924]). It is difficult to attempt to draw any strong or direct connection between 
Hobhouse and Elias, not least because Elias himself had a tendency to play down the 
influence of other writers on his work (Van Krieken, forthcoming; Kilminster, 1991: 
viii). There are, however, some obvious similarities between Hobhouse's concept of the 
evolution of , mind' and Elias's conception of the evolutionary process of the 'psyche', in 
both his early work (Elias, 1994b [1939]) and his later (Elias, 1991). And in the 
preface to the former, first published in 1939, Elias (who was awarded a Senior 
Research Fellowship at LSE on the strength of it) did acknowledge his debt to 
Ginsberg (Elias, 1994b: xvii; see also Elias, 1994a:62). 
Neustadt also came to Britain to work on his PhD, after escaping from Belgium 
during the War years. He had been hoping to work with Harold Laski in the 
Department of Political Science - a central part of LSE, but was referred to Ginsberg, 
since Laski was, at that time, 'unavailable' (Marshall, 1982: xi). Neustadt remained at 
LSE until his appointment at Leicester in 1949. 
In the immediate post-war period and up to the post-Robbins expansion of the 
early 1960s, A.H. Halsey, Joe and Olive Banks, Michael Banton, Basil Bernstein, 
Percy Cohen, Norman Dennis, Ralf Dahrendorf, David Lockwood, Cyril Smith, 
J.H.Smith, Asher Tropp, and John Westergaard (Halsey, 1982: 151), all had contact 
with LSE sociology, as did others, either as postgraduate students or staff including 
Ronald Fletcher (postgraduate, early 1950s), Herminio Martins (mid-1950s), the 
historian Asa Briggs (Bsc. Econ. 1941), Mark Abrams (Bsc. 1927), Stephen Cotgrove 
(Bsc Econ. 1947, PhD 1957), Eric Dunning (London External, Bsc. Econ. 1959), John 
Eldridge (BSc. Econ, 1957), John Goldthorpe (BSc. Econ. 1956), and Donald Macrae 
(staff 1945-86).14 Very few, if any, of these sociologists would admit to being 
14 Primary source: British Sociological Association Register (1973). 
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'Hobhousians'.lS Certainly, none of them devoted a life-time, as Ginsberg did, to the 
more or less explicit extension and consolidation ofHobhousian theory, and some, like 
Lockwood, made theoretical contributions apparently at odds with the Hobhousian 
emphasis on the development of social harmony via the evolution of mind. Others quite 
deliberately rejected the hegemony of the Hobhouse-Ginsberg tradition of sociology-
as- synthesis as they struggled for professional recognition. Sociology should be, they 
believed, a specialism in its own right, delivered by rigorously trained specialists. This 
was the rationale behind the foundation of the sociology Teacher's Section in the BSA 
(Banks, 1967; Abrams, 1985: 196). 
Halsey remembers Ginsberg as 'the advocate of a nostalgic, rationalist 
humanitarianism', which 'would not do' as a theory of progress, for his cohort of 
aspirant sociologists (Halsey, 1982: 160). Nevertheless, the very fact that they 
continued to have faith in some 'English, Fabian, Labour-movement idea of progress' is 
unlikely to be as divorced from the circumstances of their University education as they 
might since have come to believe (ibid; see also Macrae, 1961: 38-45). Perhaps 
somewhat paradoxically, in view of his (almost) unshakeable faith in harmony and 
progress, Hobhouseian theory may even have received an indirect boost during the 
War years. As Fincham points out, in spite of sociology's increasing drive for value-
freedom or objectivity, 'normative' theory became much more attractive after the rise 
of Nazism (1975:78). 
Institutional Continuity: Expansion 
By 1945, although there was no other university with a Chair in Sociology (Shils, 
1971: 779) its institutional expansion was already underway. It was taught as an 
15 Fletcher is the exception here. In volume 2 of his (1971) Making of Sociology the exposition 
of Hob house is generally admiring. He also edited a memorial volume for Ginsberg, in which 
he bemoans the fact that the 'professional "labellers" - so busy nowadays in the sociological 
scene - have done their superficial work' on Ginsberg and Hobhouse, caricaturing them as old-
fashioned, out-mooed figures (Fletcher, 1974: 1) 
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external degree of the University of London, ensuring that the course structures and 
subject matter remained very similar between 1946 and 1962 (Fincham, 1975: 131). 
The University Colleges of Nottingham, Hull, Exeter and Leicester each entered 
students for the external degree in sociology from the University of London (LSE), 
where course structure only began to change as they were granted charters (in 1948, 
1954, 1955, 1957 respectively), and became universities in their own right, though 
LSE continued to be regarded as the place to do sociology (Macrae, 1961: 7; Fincham, 
1975: 132-4). 
At Hull, which received its charter in 1954, sociology was first introduced as 
part of the BSc in Economics, and could be taken in three papers out of eight in finals. 
Before 1961, the subjects were social institutions, sociological theory and analysis, and 
either general or social psychology, or industrial relations. It was also possible to take 
sociology, with one other subject, as a BA. (Fincham, 1975: 140). 
Exeter received its charter in 1955. G. Duncan Mitchell, whose own first 
degree was the LSE BSc Econ., was in charge of developing sociology. The course 
structure there included options on the history of sociological thought (taught by 
Mitchell), social psychology, the development of modem Britain, and social 
administration, along with capitalism, marriage and the family, and the institution of 
property (Fincham, 1975: 141). 
At Leicester, which received its charter only in 1957, Neustadt initially had sole 
responsibilty for teaching the external degree. He was joined after three years by 1. A. 
Banks (again initially LSE, and more or less openly anti-Ginsberg), as assistant 
lecturer, and after six years by Elias (Banks, 1967; Marshall, 1982: xii). The Leicester 
course included compulsory courses in General and Social Psychology, and teaching of 
sociology was divided between Theoretical Empirical and Applied sociology, though 
there was an emphasis on the higher status of theory. Elias was primarily responsible 
for both the psychology, and the introductory first year course, which continued 
unchanged for some years after he retired (Brown, 1987: 534-535). 
The first and largest part of this course consisted of 'Comparative 
Studies of Contemporary Societies at Different Stages of Development'. 
It was followed by 'Selected Theories of Social Development': Comte, 
Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Hobhouse and others ... (ibid)16 
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In general then, the overall picture of academic sociology IS of both 
institutional and theoretical continuity, at least up to the mid-1950s, and to some 
extent beyond, at both LSE, and the University Colleges at which it could be taken as 
an external degree. Hobhousian theory continued to be taught, whether directly 
through his own work, or indirectly through the work of Ginsberg and others. Such 
textbooks as were available at this time tended to continue in use over a long period, 
which is surely an indication of a more or less stable conceptual base. Ginsberg's 
(1934) Sociology was still in print as late as 1959. Similarly, a (1938) text by 
Ginsberg's American student, Jay Rumney (with Joseph Maier) The Science of Society, 
again with a broadly Hobhouse-Ginsbergian structure and content, re-appeared in a 
second edition in 1953. The Study of Society (1939), which has a distinctly social-
psychological bent, and which was edited by Ginsberg, in collaboration with E.C. 
Bartlett, EJ. Lindgren and R.H. Thouless, was re-printed in 1946. Sprott's (undated) 
Sociology written in the same vein, ran from at least 1949 to 1967. Other books were 
of course used, and recommended as texts, but these were so few that Sprott was able 
to claim in 1957 that his own book, and Ginsberg's of the same title, were the only 
two textbooks of their kind in Britain (Sprott, 1957: 609). 
This section, though, has focussed on continuity at the expense of a slowly 
building theoretical undercurrent which had its roots as early as 1946 (Fincham, 1975: 
16 Brown adds that his notes from these lecture, which he attended as a newly appointed 
assistant lecturer, indicate that only Comte and Marx got much attention in Elias's lectures. 
This statement has been omitted from the quote, since it is highly possible that this was a result 
of selective perception on his part. Other statements in the same article, which refer to 'stages 
of development' and advocacy of a 'unilinear pre-determined model of social development' 
indicate that even if Hobhouse's name was mentioned less frequently, his theoretical orientation 
was not entirely abandoned. 
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122}, a date which corresponds with Shils's arrival at LSE. This undercurrent is 
reviewed briefly below, before turning to Giddens's academic background, and career 
history, as the basis for an exploration of his theoretical similarities with Hobhouse. 
Theoretical Departures: Discontinuity? 
Hobhousian sociology was not the only sociology available to students prior to the 
post-War expansion of the sixties. Yet sociology was often, during these years, seen as 
a subject which had developed on different lines in different places. Histories of the 
subject produced around the war years, for example, often included a section on 
national developments in sociology (Barnes & Becker, 1938 Volume II; Gurvitch & 
Moore, 1945; Barnes, 1948; Maus, 1956; Becker & Boskoff, 1957). Even after this 
period, distinctions were sometimes made between its intellectual or institutional bases 
in different countries (Mitchell, 1968; Hawthorn, 1976). By the 1950s, however, some 
European and American sociologists, particuarly Durkheim, Weber, Parsons and Shils 
were all beginning to find homes in British sociology (Fletcher, 1971a: 250). Marx had 
a small number of supporters, but his work was often regarded with suspicion by the 
older generation (for example Macrae, 1961: 7), and commonly seen as part of 
sociology's pre-history, rather than as sociology proper (Fletcher, 1971: 163-164; 
Mitchell, 1968: vii). 
Shils, arriving at LSE in 1946, was instrumental in broadening the theoretical 
bases of British sociology (Bulmer, 1985: 5). He remained here until 1949, accepting a 
post as Reader in sociology at LSE (1946) as well as a Fellowship at Cambridge. It 
seems to have been he who encouraged the serious teaching of Weber at LSE 
(Hopper, 1997},17 as well as Parsons's (1937) The Structure of Social Action (Bulmer, 
1985: 22), though Mannheim, too, had an interest in at least some of Weber's ideas, 
17 There is evidence to suggest that Ginsberg taught some aspects ofWeberian theory, but 
may not have done so in a sympathetic manner. Hopper (1997) concludes that 'there is little 
evidence that Ginsberg, Mannheim and Marshall successfully pressed upon their students a 
need to take account of Weber when doing sociology'. 
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and may have helped to spread their popularity (Shils, 1971: 784). For Durkheim, this 
was something of a renaissance after a period of years in the sociological wilderness. 
Although he was highly regarded as an exemplary and professional sociologist by 
Branford and others (see Chapter 3; Abrams, 1968)18, he had soon afterwards become 
known as the purveyor of the 'unsound' theory of a 'group mind', a reputation to which 
Hobhouse certainly contributed, though it may have originated with Robert McIver 
(Studholme, 1995).19 
This is an important point, since it illustrates yet again the tendency for 
Hobhouse to pursue single-mindedly a monolithic vision of sociology. As already 
pointed out, there were sufficient theoretical similarities between Geddes and 
Hobhouse for the two men to have collaborated. Yet Hobhouse (quite deliberately) 
marginalised his Scottish rival. With Durkheim, too, Hobhouse had much in common. 
Celestin BougIe, in a review of Social Development, therefore, complained that in spite 
of a great degree of agreement with Durkheim, Hobhouse disregarded his work 
(BougIe, 1925: 195). In Social Development (1966a [1924]: 179-87), for example, 
Hobhouse drew on McIver to argue for the existence of a 'social mentality', but did not 
mention Durkheim in this or in any other context. 
After Hobhouse's death, however, the idea of Durkheim as the purveyor of an 
unsound theory of a group mind appears to have died a gentle, though not immediate 
18 The idealist philosopher Bernard Bosanquet, who read Durkheim's paper at the Sociological 
Society in 1904, had stated (1899: 35) that his were 'amongst the most original and suggestive 
works of modem sociology'. 
19 Collini (1979: 221, n.50) speculates that McIver, who was external examiner at LSE for a 
while (1911-1914) was the main influence on Hobhouse at around this time. However, it is 
worth bearing in mind that McIver was much the younger of the two, and Hobhouse the senior 
colleague. It is my personal belief that the idea of Durkheim as the purveyor of an unsound 
theory of a group mind comes, in the first place, from Hobhouse - though more research would 
be required to substantiate this. It is notable that Hobhouse pursued the same strategy in his 
published work with regard to Durkheim as to Geddes - he simply ignored him. This does not 
mean, however, that he did not spread his opinion of Durkheim by other means. 
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death. Ginsberg's (1934) Sociology claims Durkheim as a thinker comparable with 
Hobhouse in both stature and orientation (1934: 14). Ginsberg noted Durkheim's belief 
that 'the fundamental categories of thought have a social origin' (ibid: 119), but though 
the ensuing discussion mentioned the 'problem of the group mind' (ibid: 120) it was not 
attributed specifically to Durkheim.20 
The same pattern seems to be true of McIver, who mentioned Durkheim's 
fallacious theory· which is also attributed to others - only briefly in Community (1917: 
76). He appeared to have changed his mind by the time of Society (1937). McIver's 
textbook was very popular, and was reprinted nine times up to 1947, to be followed in 
1949 by a substantially re-written collaborative work, with Charles Page (McIver & 
Page, 1949). By the time this last version appeared, Parsons's (1937) Structure of 
Social Action, in which Durkheim's erroneous 'group mind' theory had been re-
assessed, was beginning to be more widely read. McIver and Page (1949:229), making 
no reference to Durkheim, merely warn against blundering into the group mind fallacy, 
stating that mind 'is a possession of individual human beings, whatever the group ties 
that bind them together'. 
In combination with the continuation of the Hobhousian tradition, therefore, a 
small group of European and American sociologists were gradually coming to be more 
acceptable in Britain. Durkheim and Weber, as interpreted by Parsons and taught by 
Shils, were set on the path to becoming - though they were not yet, the central figures 
in the history ofsociology.21 Marx would have to wait slightly longer for his inclusion 
as a 'founding father'. As McLellan's (1977) comprehensive bibliography shows, the 
20 An interesting twist to the story of Hob house's relationship with Durkheim is that when, by 
1966, the tables had turned, and Durkheim's star was again rising in British sociology, while 
Hobhouse's was on the wane, Ginsberg compared Durkheim unfavourably with Hobhouse, and 
rather snootily claimed that 'despite the great and continuing influence of his writings it does 
not seem to me that he succeed in providing the conceptions needed'to overcome the difficulties 
of creating a synthesis of social studies (Ginsberg, 1966: xiv). 
21 According to Fincham (1975: 130) Parsons's work began to appear on reading lists in the 
early 1950s. 
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fifty years between 1910 and 1960, produced only 34 commentaries on Marx and his 
work, compared with 52 in the decade from 1960 - 1970, and 42 between 1970 and 
1977. His continued exclusion from the ranks of 'proper' sociology may have been, in 
part, due to his exclusion by Parsons. His eventual inclusion, however, was largely due 
to factors external to academic sociology (see below, p.198). 
International Developments: Parsons 
Parsons, of course, is another key figure in the history of sociology, both in Britain and 
internationally, in the post-war period. His major contribution, in The Structure of 
Social Action (1937) was to reconstruct sociology's recent history. Most of this was 
contained, however inadequately, in Sorokin's encyclopaedic textbook Contemporary 
Sociological Theories (1928), which covered an enormous range of sociological 
theories, which had been appearing 'like mushrooms after rain' since the mid-1870s 
(Sorokin, 1956 [1928]: xvi).22 
In deliberate contrast with his former teacher and colleague, Parsons 
concentrated on four theorists: Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, Durkheim and 
Weber. He suggested, moreover, that all four thinkers had contributed to the 
emergence and development of a ~single coherent body of theory' (parsons, 1968a 
[1937]: ix, xxi), rather than that each work was a distinct and distinctive contribution 
in its own right. En route, he sought to rescue Durkheim from his role as the advocate 
of the 'unsound' theory of the existence of a 'group mind', which he later claimed to 
have come across at LSE in 1924-5 (1968a [1937]: ix fu.). 
For British sociologists, trained in the Hobhousian tradition, the appeal of 
Parsons was to be found in three features of his theoretical work which were entirely 
22 There is no reference to Geddes in Sorokin's book. though the Le Playists are seen to be a 
school in their own right. Sorokin also considered other geographic theorists. biological 
theorists. Social Darwinist. racialist. and Bio-social theorists under separate headings. This 
sophisticated classification of theorists is worthy of further study. since it appears to avoid an 
over-simplistic lumping together of qualitatively different theories under a single heading. 
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compatible with this tradition. These were, first, his wholesale rejection of biological 
factors in sociallife;23 his emphasis on value-consensus, or social harmony; and third, 
the importance he placed on the development of a single 'unitary' and 'scientific' theory 
of social life. Each of these features had already played a role in the establishment and 
development of Sociology at LSE.24 And if the acceptance ofParsonian theory meant 
the implicit (at the very least) rejection of Hobhouse, the founder, this was facilitated 
by Ginsberg's retirement and justified by the need to create sociology as a profession, 
and as a science in its own right with its own concepts and terminology. 
Anthony Giddens and the British Tradition 
If, by the late 1950s, Hobhousian theory co-existed with other, national and 
international developments, it is difficult to see how Giddens could be said to be part 
of a specifically British tradition. His 'project' has encompassed a critique and 
evaluation of almost the entire spectrum of classic and contemporary social theories, 
beginning with Capitalism andModem Social Theory (CMST) in 1971. Here he dealt, 
23 Mitchell (1968) suggests that it was with Parsons that sociology first began to theorise on 
its own terms instead of on terms borrowed from biology. This is not really true of British 
sociology which, since the establishment of Hobhousian theory, had rejected biology as any but 
a minor factor in social evolution. What is true, perhaps, is that Parsons succeeded in making 
the issue of biology a marginal issue, where Hobhouse, due his obsessive reiteration of the 
futility or inapplicability of Darwinism for sociology, and to his insistence on being the sole 
theorist of any repute, failed. On this see especially Parsons, 1937: 110-114. 
24 There is, in fact, a direct connection between Parsons and Hobhouse from 1924-5 when 
Parsons was at LSE, though too much should not be made of any theoretical similarities. 
Parsons acknowledged that he had 'got a good deal' from both Hobhouse and Ginsberg, though 
Malinowski's influence was greater (parsons, cited in Weame, 1989: 37). In addition, he would 
later lecture on the theories of Alfred Marshall, Hobhouse, Tonnies, Simmel, Weber and 
Durkheim during the 1930s (ibid: 63). 
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not with either Hobhouse,25 or Parsons, directly, but with Marx, Durkheim and 
Weber. CMSTwas followed by The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (1973), 
in which he dealt with Marx's, Weber's and other more recent concepts of class, and 
introduced the concept of structuration. Structuration theory received its earliest 
exposition in his New Rules of Sociological Method in 1976 (1993 [1976]), where 
Giddens dealt explicitly with Parsons, as well as with phenomenology, 
ethnomethodology, and the 'linguistic tum' in social theory. The theory was developed 
more fully in the Constitution of Society (1984), which incorporated insights initially 
developed in the first volume of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism 
(1981). The Nation State and Violence (1985) entailed a substantive application of the 
'contemporary critique'. Giddens's work appeared to take a new direction in 1990, with 
the publication of The Consequences of Modemity (1991a [1990]), where 
environmental problems first became a major feature of his work. Modemity and Self 
Identity (1991b) involved a continuation and development of some of the themes 
explored in Consequences, while the Transformation of Intimacy (1992) took up 
others. Most recently a third volume of the 'contemporary critique' has appeared, in 
which earlier themes are combined with newer ones to produce Beyond Left and Right 
(1994).26 
In the light of this history of engagement with almost everything except the 
Hobhousian 'national' tradition, Giddens appears to be firmly embedded in the post-war 
period - a period marked by an increasingly international discipline and a diversity of 
25 To my knowledge, Giddens has only once mentioned either Hobhouse or Ginsberg by name 
(Giddens, 1995: 3). Even his essay on 'Britishness and the Social Sciences' Un Giddens, 1996: 
112-120) which mentions Fabian Socialism and the establishment of Sociology at LSE, ignores 
both Hobhouse and Ginsberg. 
26 This, of course does not exhaust the entire catalogue of Giddens's published work, though 
these are the works most often refered to in this and the chapter to follow. Other contributions 
of particular significance include Studies in Social and Political Theory (1977), Central 
Problems in Social Theory (1979), Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory (1982), and Social 
Theory and Modem Sociology(1987). 
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theoretical perspectives, and heralded by Gouldner's (1971) warning of an approaching 
'crisis'. Giddens's academic background, however, shows him to have been very much 
in contact with the earlier tradition, at least at the beginning of his career. That he 
chose to engage in contemporaneous debates and concerns, while ignoring those of the 
recent past, is not surprising. Nor is it necessarily an indication that he had either 
avoided, or else had easily shrugged off, the ideas and outlook of the earlier 
generation. It is ratlier the general tone and outlook of Giddens's developed theory, 
and its not always explicit ideological bias, which betrays his identification with a 
distinctively British tradition. His academic background indicates the extent to which 
his contact with the British tradition was tempered at an early stage by theoretical 
developments and debates in sociology. It is hardly surprising that he has engaged in 
these as much as any of his contemporaries. 
Giddens: Continuity and Change 
Born in 1938, Giddens embarked on his University career in 1956, when he arrived at 
Hull to read philosophy. Philosophy was not running that year, so he registered for 
sociology instead, which was one of the things open to him, as someone with 'not very 
good academic qualifications' (Giddens, cited in Mullan, 1987: 94). The sociology 
department at Hull was at that time undergoing a period of transition, having received 
its charter in 1954, thus releasing its degree course from that taught at LSE. Giddens's 
own recollection of that time is of the influence of the anthropologist and socialist, 
Peter Worsley, and of the existence of a strong Socialist Society, of which he was a 
(somewhat non-committed) member (ibid). 
Graduating with a first from Hull, Giddens spent a year at LSE, writing an 
M.A. on the sociology of sport. Ginsberg had of course retired by this time, and 
though he continued teaching in the department until the mid-1960s must have been, 
by this stage, a fairly marginal figure. Giddens was supervised by Asher Tropp and 
David Lockwood in turn (Bryant and Jary, 1991: 3) both of whom were themselves 
LSE graduates, though Lockwood's earliest theoretical contributions (1956; 1964) as 
noted above, took issue with functionalism and emphasised conflict. They were 
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definitely anti-Parsonian, though not necessarily anti-Hobhousian, since Hobhouse did 
recognise the existence of conflict in society, although he saw this as a sign of the 
imperfect development of the unity towards which human evolution was tending. 
Giddens, by contrast, seems to have at least flirted with functionalism, since his first 
published work, almost certainly written while he was still at Hull, was a distinctly 
functionalist analysis of the social structure of a university hall of residence (Giddens, 
1960). 
After LSE, in 1961, Giddens was appointed to a lectureship at Leicester, where 
the leading figures were Elias and Neustadt, both of whom had also had early (perhaps 
formative) contact with LSE sociology. He was, apparently, impressed by Elias as a 
role model, and it was Neustadt who was a major intellectual influence (Bryant and 
Jary, op cit.). As with the similarities between Elias and Hobhouse, however, it is 
tempting to find continuity between Giddens's insistence that the autonomy of the self 
involves control and the overcoming of compulsion or addiction, and Elias's history of 
manners. 
The department at Leicester awarded a particulary high status to theory (above, 
p.188). He has said that it was interests developed there which prompted him to 
produce CMST (Giddens, cited in Mullan, 1987: 95). These interests were not 
confined to Leicester, and are well illustrated by, for example, Cohen's (1968) Modem 
Social Theory and Rex's (1961), Key Problems of Sociological Theory. Cohen (born 
1928) graduated from LSE in the 1950s, and was a contemporary of Giddens's at 
Leicester. Rex (born 1925), was educated in South Africa, and became lecturer in 
sociology at Leeds. His book was, perhaps, more influential than Cohen's, and was 
reprinted many times up to at least 1970. 
Both Cohen and Rex addressed theoretical problems. Their main arguments 
are, these days, familiar to most sociologists. Cohen was concerned with the uses and 
explanatory value of contemporary sociological theories at a general or schematic 
level, to the extent that they dealt with either action or structure, either coercion and 
conflict or integration and consensus. Most especially, he was concerned with the 
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failings of Parsonian functionalism as an attempt at the integration of structure and 
action. Parsons tended to reify social systems, and scarcely discussed action or 
interaction at all, and consequently could not explain social change (Cohen, 1968: 
237). Yet, Cohen concluded, most contemporary debates were sterile - it was time to 
move beyond the foundations established by the classical theorists (Cohen, 1968: 239), 
bearing in mind the purpose which social theory was enlisted to serve. Rex took issue 
with positivism and empiricism in sociology and advocated a theoretical approach to 
research problems. Like Cohen, he complained that Parsons had no room for conflict 
in his theory, and the 'action frame of reference' he advocated came from Weber rather 
than Parsons. Unlike Cohen, however, he also devoted a significant amount of space to 
Marx. 
The 'Marxist incursion' began between 1956 and 1963 (Abrams, 1981). Its 
growth coincided with both the general expansion of British universities, the 
phenomenal growth of sociology itself, marked by a rise in numbers of both students 
and staff up to 1970 (Abrams, 1981: 62-66). This period also witnessed the end of 
post-war optimism and complacence. Famously, Goldthorpe and Lockwood's aflluent 
worker studies, published in the mid-60s, refuted the embourgeoisement thesis 
(workers had never had it so good, but they were still working class). This was the end 
of the 'end of ideology' (Bell, 1960). 
Ralf Dahrendorf, in his recent history of the LSE, gives a useful account of 
some of the contributing factors that led to the 'troubles' of the 1960s. 
President De Gaulle's antiquated authoritarianism in France and the 
oppositionless Grand Coalition in Germany had created their own extra-
parliamentary protests. In Britain, the great expectations of many which 
greeted the Labour Government of 1964 soon turned into 
disenchantment an a feeling of betrayal which encouraged a 'new left'. 
Everywhere the question was raised: what can we do to change things? 
How can democracy be made more real? Increasingly the answer was: 
by helping ourselves, by direct action. The American Civil Rights 
campaigns but also the 'free speech' student movement at Berkeley set 
the tone. In Germany the Emergency Powers legislation brought 
hundreds of thousands out into the streets. The demand for nuclear 
disarmament had much the same effect in Britain.(1995: 444) 
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The international nature of the discontent (perhaps particularly the Vietnam wars), 
which was transmitted across national boundaries not just by the movements of people 
but the media of mass-communications, is emphasised in Dahrendorfs account. Events 
not just at home, or in America or Europe, but in South-East Asia and South Africa, 
were international issues which turned a 'widespread latent readiness for direct action' 
into action itself 
Capitalism and Modem Social Theory 
In such circumstances, it is not really surprising that by 1971, Giddens should have 
begun the task of a 'radical revision' of contemporary social theory by re-constructing 
the history of sociology, with Marx as a central figure (Giddens, 1971: vii). Giddens 
must have learned Hobhousian theory as an undergraduate, spent his early years as a 
professional academic sociologist coming to terms with the decline of both the 
Hobhousian and Parsonian emphasis on harmony or value-consensus,27 and the rise of 
Marxism or conflict theory. And while he may have missed the worst of the 'trouble' in 
Britain, by being out of the country between 1966 and 1968, he can hardly have been 
unaware of the upheavals going on at Berkeley, since for the second year of his time 
abroad he was in Los Angeles. 
Capitalism and Modem Social Theory has been an enormously important book 
in sociology. It has been translated into Chinese, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, 
.. 
Portugese and Spanish, and sold well over 100,000 copies world-wide. Approximately 
38% of the total sales have been in Britain, making it one of the most successful social 
science publications ever published by Cambridge University Press. Giddens's 
achievement was threefold. First, he completed the process of the reconstruction of 
sociology'S history begun by Parsons, while substantially re-writing that history itself. 
27 Their rejection was never total. Rex (cited in Mullan, 1985: 13) has spoken with approving 
of Hob house and Ginsberg and their concern with social evolution and comparative sociology. 
And at least one LSE graduate of the 1950s, Ronald Fletcher. found nothing incompatible in 
his simultaneous adherence to Hobhouse and (especially) Ginsberg, as well as Parsons 
(Fletcher, 1956; Fletcher, 1971b). 
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Parson's had proposed that Durkheim and Weber (as well as Marshall and Pareto) had 
contributed to the emergence of a single body of theory, in direct opposition to 
Sorokin, whose (1928) textbook, written for a post-graduate course in sociology was a 
compilation of sociological theories. Giddens, by contrast, acknowledged theoretical 
differences between Durkheim and Weber, while making their contributions 'a debate 
with the ghost of Marx'.28 Second, he sought to rescue Durkheim from the 
functionalist interpretation made popular by Parsons. Finally, Giddens's own 
interpretation of Durkheim's work set itself deliberately at odds with his reputation as 
the unsound theorist of the existence of a 'group mind' - a theory which emanated, 
initially, from Hobhouse, MacIver and LSE : 
In his own day, Durkheim's theoretical writings were regarded by most 
critics as embodying an unacceptable metaphysical notion of the 'group 
mind'. More recent sympathetic accounts have largely dispelled this sort 
of misinterpretation, but have supplanted it with one which places 
virtually the whole emphasis upon Durkheim's functionalism. . . . 
Durkheim always emphasised the crucial significance of the historical 
dimension in sociology, and ... an appreciation of this leads to a quite 
different assessment of Durkheim's thought from that which is 
ordinarily given. Durkheim was not primarily concerned with 'the 
problem of order' but with the problem of ' the changing nature of order 
in the context of a definite conception of social development.(Giddens, 
1971: ix) 
Giddens, of course, was not the only sociologist between 1950 and 1970 to 
attempt to install Marx, Durkheim and Weber as sociology's 'founding fathers'. Others, 
both at home and abroad, including Aron (1965, 1967), Nisbet (1967) and Fletcher 
(1971) did the same, but each included a number of other thinkers, among whom were 
Comte, Spencer, Le Play, Tocqueville, Tonnies, Pareto and others. It has been 
suggested, in fact, that the impact of CMST has been negative as well as positive; that 
as well as establishing Giddens's sociological reputation, it has had the effect of 
28 This cliched phrase describes the essence of Giddens's story, which is that Durkheim and 
Weber began their careers against the background of a world already substantially altered by 
the existence of Marx (see Giddens, 1971: xiv) 
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severely circumscribing sociology's intellectual heritage (Cohen, 1989: 3; Poggi, in 
Clark, Modgil and Modgil, 1990: 13; Kilminster in Bryant and lary, 1991: 80). 
Giddens. Parsons and Environment 
Giddens did not, in CMST, take issue with Parsons's exclusion of heredity and 
environment as significant factors in sociological analysis, or explicitly 'correct' his 
supposed misinterpretion of Durkheim - at least as regards Durkheim's social 
morphology or his conception of the relations between humanity and nature. His stated 
intention was to rescue Durkheim as an historical thinker, and from his association 
with the 'unsound' theory ofa 'group mind' (1971: ix). Parsons had argued that if either 
Malthusian or Darwinian arguments were accepted (especially the latter), the logical 
outcome was that 'environment' became all important as the deciding factor in 
evolution. Rational and voluntaristic social action thereby lost all potency as a force 
either for the achievement of individual ends, or for social change: 
Precisely insofar as this biologizing tendency, which in fact took 
primarily the Darwinian form, gained ascendancy there was an 
abandonment of the utilitarian position in favor of radical anti-
intellectual positivism. In so far as the conditions of the environment are 
decisive it does not matter what ends men may think they pursue; in fact 
the course of history is determined by an impersonal process over which 
they have no control . . . . Even though rational action might have, 
empirically, a place as one mode of adaptation to the environment, the 
point is that it falls out of the general framework of the theoretical 
system altogether and becomes a contingent phenomenon, an 
unimportant fact in the strict sense. (parsons, 1968a [1937]: 112-113) 
As both Parsons and Giddens correctly noted, Durkheim was ambivalent - to say the 
least - about his 'biologizing' of the causes of the division of labour (parsons, 1968a 
[1937]: 320-324; Giddens, 1971: 78-79). Moreover, Parsons avoided what might have 
become an issue concerning sociology's 'scientific' status (associated above all with 
Darwin's success in creating a 'unifying' theory based on the discovery of new 
'empirical' facts), as a result of the exclusion of heredity and environment, by 
addressing the epistemological difficulties associated with a 'scientific' theory of 
(subjectively motivated) human action (1968a [1937]: 20-27), and by considering the 
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actor, not as a concrete organism acting in a natural environment, but as an 'ego' or 
'self, inside a concrete 'body' which forms part of the conditions of action, motivated 
toward certain 'ends' (ibid: 43-51). Thus, by the time Giddens wrote, neither issue was 
any longer important (1971: x). As far as environment was concerned, neither Giddens 
nor, probably, any of his contemporaries in Britain at that time, was equipped by 
training to single out and develop this issue. 
Giddens has not, of course, ignored 'environment' completely. He could hardly 
have dealt with such a huge range of theories in his subsequent work, while avoiding 
the issue. Nevertheless, where 'nature' or 'environment' does enter his work, it has 
taken the form of 'humanized nature' (Giddens, 1993 [1976]: 156). Although Giddens 
speaks of humanized nature as 'the interchange between human activity and the natural 
environment' (ibid.), this interchange, for him, has been essentially bound up with the 
ways in which human beings 'render the natural world "intelligible'" (ibid: 85). 
The intelligibility of nature and natural events is accomplished by the 
construction and sustaining of frames of meaning from which the 
interpretative schemes whereby everyday experience is assimilated and 
'handled' are derived. . . . The difference between the social and natural 
worlds is that the latter does not constitute itself as 'meaningful': the 
meanings it has are produced by human beings in the course of their 
practical life, and as a consequence of their endeavours to understand it 
or explain it for themselves. Social life - of which these endeavours are 
a part - on the other hand, is produced by its component actors 
precisely in terms of their active constitution and reconstitution of 
frames of meaning whereby they organise their experience. The 
conceptual schemes of the social sciences thereby expresses a double 
hermeneutic . ... (Giddens, 1993 [1976]: 85-6) 
Thus, for Giddens (at least up to 1976), we can never understand nature, or appreciate 
it as a thing in itself, we can only 'humanise' it, by assigning to it meanings it does not, 
of itself, have. Giddens, like Hobhouse before him, has been primarily concerned with 
the role of human agents in creating their own social life. 
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Giddens and Hobhouse Compared 
Giddens's theoretical creation - structuration theory - attempts to overcome the 
historical problem of the action-structure dualism in social (as well as sociological) 
theory. Using the now famous concept of the 'duality of structure' in which the 
'structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices 
they recursively organise' (1984: 25), and in which 'the moment of the production of 
action is also one of reproduction in the contexts of the day-today enactment of social 
life' (ibid: 26), Giddens's main point is that 'lay' actors (agents), in the course of living 
their day-to-day lives, not only routinely invoke and draw upon the societal structures 
that both constrain and enable them, but that in doing so they actively reconstruct, or 
reproduce, such structures. 
Giddens and Hobhouse: Agency over Structure 
Giddens defines societies, or social systems as 'the patterning of social relations across 
time-space, understood as reproduced practices' (1984: 377). The structural elements 
which surround us are 'virtual', conjured into existence anew each time we presume 
their existence in the enactment of our everyday lives. They constrain us, because they 
consist of systems of rules (only analytically separable from resources), but they also 
enable. We do not blindly intemalise social rules, in the manner of an over-socialised 
Parsonian individual, but engage with them reflexively: we are not 'cultural dupes', at 
the mercy of fixed and impersonal forces. On the contrary, although no single agent or 
group of agents can control society or the direction of change, we each, through our 
life-political choices, as agents, decide 'about how (as individuals and as collective 
humanity) we should live' (1994: 15). As Hobhouse put it: there is, in society 
... no superhuman monster but simply human beings, human minds and 
human bodies, human will and passions, in interaction with one another 
and the physical environment . . . . What seems to be the blind march of 
events is the net result of the operation of millions of minds working . . 
. each on its own lines for its narrow end . . . . Hence though every 
individual of the mass is intelligent, the mass as a whole may be. called 
blind, for no intelligence guides it as a whole.(1966a [1924]: 325-6) 
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Neither Giddens nor Hobhouse denies the existence or importance of structural 
elements or social institutions in the enactment of day to day social life, but for each it 
is agency which is paramount - a point which requires further discussion, for there are 
marked similarities in the way each conceptualise.s the human agent. Giddens's 
reification of the agent is more marked than Hobhouse's, through his insistence that 
structures have no existence independent of agents, and his more explicit consideration 
of the ways in which they enable as well as constrain. It is interesting to note that in 
spite of the prior concern with agency, both distinguish a whole complex of ways in 
which the concept of structure may be used, from rules routinely invoked in everyday 
life, through more explicit or codified sets of rules, to the principles of organisation 
which govern entire social systems. Giddens's discussion of structures, structural 
properties and structural principles in The Constitution of Society is obscure and 
difficult to follow, perhaps indicative of a more complex conceptualisation than 
Hobhouse's relatively lucid account of 'institutions' in Social Development, but it is not 
difficult to find parallels. 
Giddens and Hobhouse: 'Social Structure' or 'Institutions' 
Hobhouse identified three different types of social 'institution': 
... (I) recognised and established usages governing certain relations of 
men, (2) an entire complex of such usages and the principles governing 
it, and (3) the organisation (if such exists) supporting such a complex. 
Qiobhouse,1966a[1924]:49) 
These types do not, of course, perfectly correspond to Giddens's concepts of structure 
as 'rules and resources recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems' 
structural properties as 'structured features of social systems . . . stretching across time 
and space', and structural principles as 'principles of organisation of societal totalities .. 
. involved in the overall institutional alignment of a society of type of society' (1984: 
376- 377). Yet both recognise that the structural or institutional features of social life 
operate on different levels, from the established uses or rules which govern everyday 
life, up to the overall principles of societal organisation. The latter, Hobhouse 
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suggested, may be embodied in the political principles of the state (if there is one), and 
constitutes the authority on which rests the 'common rule' of the 'community', though 
as he points out, the constituency in whom the 'authority' to rule is invested will not -
except in the case of 'very democratic countries' - be identical with, or express the will 
of, the whole community. As an example, he cited (in 1924) the domination of the 
German people by the Kaiser, and argued that it was absurd to make the entire people 
answerable for the War (1966a [1924]: 50-51). Giddens (1984: 28-31) argues that 
institutions of different forms are always an expression of inequalities of power; that 
domination is the very condition of establishment of stroctures of signification, because 
'the normative elements of social systems are contingent claims which have to be 
sustained and made to count'. Furthermore 
Normative sanctions express structural asymmetries of domination and 
the relations of those nominally subject to them may be of various sorts 
other than expressions of the commitments those norms supposedly 
engender. (1984: 30) 
Both Giddens and Hobhouse, then, recognise that social structures or 
institutions operate at both the level of everyday life, and at the highest level of 
abstraction, as embodied in the principles of societal organisation. Each also recognises 
that structures (can) reflect inequalities of power and the capacity of some agents to 
make their claims 'count' over others, and do not necessarily involve moral or other 
commitment on the part of 'subject' agents. Giddens appears to be less sanguine about 
the possibilities for 'true' democracy than Hobhouse was, as a result of his insistence 
that domination is an inevitable feature of the very creation, and maintenance of 
structures. Yet his conceptualisation of agency and his insistence that all agents always 
retain some power (as 'transformative capacity') to make a difference, combined with 
his optimistic assessment of contemporary social trends - even the very concept of 
'structuration' itself - is indicative of his conviction that social life is on the way to 
becoming more, rather than less, 'polyarchic'. 
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Giddens and Hobhouse: Unconsciously Motivated Reflexive Agents 
All human agents, says Giddens, know a great deal about what they do in the course of 
their day to day lives, and routinely monitor not only their own activities and those of 
others, but also the social and physical settings of activity. Reflexivity operates in two 
out of three levels in his stratified model of personality. Much day-to-day activity 
draws on 'practical consciousness', a sort of implicit knowledge that actors have of 
why they do things and of the conditions under which they do them, though if asked 
they may not be able to formulate these explicitly. Practical consciousness is reflexive 
to the extent that 'people pay attention to events going on around them in such a way 
as to relate their activity to those events' (1984: 44). Discursive consciousness, also 
frequently implicated in the activities of day-to-day life, is the term Giddens uses to 
refer to knowledge that can be explicitly formulated by agents. Both practical and 
discursive consciousness are distinct from the unconscious, which relates to 'modes of 
recall to which the agent does not have direct access because there is a negative 'bar' of 
some kind inhibiting its unmediated incorporation within the reflexive monitoring of 
conduct and, more particularly, within discursive consciousness' (1984: 49). 
Following Freud, Giddens argues that the unconscious is the seat of human 
motivation, and operates as an unacknowledged causal condition of action. Motivation 
generates definite interests via the maintenance of ontological security, and via 
routinization is immediately relevant to the reproduction of structure (1993 [1976]: 
134-5). 
Hobhouse's account of agency, like Giddens's, includes both a higher or 
reflexive component, and an underlying psychological 'motivating' mechanism. Where 
Giddens refers to the unconscious or unacknowledged condition of action in relation to 
the maintenance of ontological security, Hobhouse speaks of root-interests. Where 
Giddens speaks of motivation, Hobhouse uses the term Will'. 
Hobhouse suggests that all human action, including ethical or moral behaviour 
has a 'psycho-physical' basis in certain fundamental root interests or needs (1913: 170). 
These are not simply primitive impulses towards survival of self and offspring. They 
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contain a whole complex of interests related to the maintenance of both self and 
society, and cannot be simplisticly separated into egoistic and altruistic sentiments. 
Root interests endure throughout life, governing the individual's many different 
reactions to the changing situations of everyday existence, even though they may be 
unconscious or simply unacknowledged. The need to satisfy the root-interests leads to 
the formation of stable community life via the formation of moral rules and social 
tradition (1913: 169-203; 1966a [1924]: 145-175). Moreover, root interests are the 
source of what Hobhouse refers to as 'Will', which is 'founded on an enduring interest, 
directing action to that end or system of ends in which that interest is satisfied' (1966a 
[1924]: 142). 
For both Hobhouse and Giddens, the existence of this underlying psychological 
mechanism which leads to the routinization of everyday life poses a problem in respect 
of social change, for if there is a deep psychological interest - of which we may not 
even be aware, in the maintenance of custom, tradition, habit or routine, how can 
change occur at all? 
Both attempt to solve this problem in several ways. Giddens uses the reflexivity 
of agents, in conjunction with conceptual devices such as fateful moments, de-
traditionalisation, the over-coming of compUlsive behaviours through the reflexive 
project of self, and the return and resolution of existential moral dilemmas previously 
'repressed' by modernity (1991b). Hobhouse counts among the root-interests those of 
constructiveness or creativeness, and cognition - thereby creating a deep psychological 
motivation towards self- and social- knowledge and development. At another, fully 
conscious and reflexive level, lies the continuing evolution of mind and personality. 
. . . [T]he emergence, clarification and harmonisation of root interests is 
the development of mind. The permanent cause of true development is 
the inherent energy of mind itself operating from every living individual 
as a distinct centre, and always in relation to a physical environment. 
The conditions physical and social thus laid down are not the causes of 
development, but rather constitute the problem which mind has to 
solve. The particular form which social life assumes is to be understood 
as the adjustment which mind developed to a certain point is able to 
effect with the conditions ofits life (1966a [1924]: 174-5). 
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Since mind is continually evolving, the conditions (the physical and social 
environment) of social life perpetually change. Root-interests will conflict with one 
another under all conditions except an 'ideal' perfect development of personality. Moral 
rules and social customs become inappropriate as circumstances change. 
Two concrete examples of the way Hobhouse dealt with change help to 
illustrate the point. In the first, he was concerned with the origins of custom, and the 
inequalities of power expressed in custom or tradition as 'structure' ('institutions'). In 
the formation of custom, 'the stronger party will get the best accommodation, and 
when circumstances change old customs may be a serious obstacle to adjustment'. 
Change occurs through the actions of individuals seeking their own ends within the 
constraints imposed by custom. People do not blindly obey the social rule. Rather, they 
'squeeze it a little, this way or that. They 'try it on'.' In this way individuals engage 
reflexively with social rules, which are given a 'critical examination' leading to 
resolution through change (l966a [1924]: 46-7). 
This example shows us that Hobhouse was perfectly aware of two problems 
with his concept of agency with which Giddens has also grappled. One is simply that 
'rules' express asymmetries of power between agents (Giddens 1993 [1976], 1981, 
1984). The second is that agents' 'rationalization' of their conduct may not necessarily 
correspond to the real reasons for action - an appeal to moral rules may cover amoral 
self-interested actions (1984: 3-6). Agents' 'motivational' commitment to a particular 
social order does not necessarily imply moral commitment (1993 [1976]: 135). 
In the second example, Hobhouse dealt with the situation of disjunction 
between morality and changing individual and social needs. This situation could occur 
because moral rules took on the character of tradition and were not only passed down 
through the generations but could also 'crystallise into precepts arrogating to 
themselves a supernatural sanction'. Though he did not use the phrase 'religious 
fundamentalism', it is apparent that Hobhouse was referring to something similar, when 
he wrote that such tradition is 'retrogressive' when it 'obstinately maintains' its own 
'absolute validity and fixity' even against the possibility of wider and more complete 
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forms of life (1901: 350) Again we can find the parallels in Giddens (1991b, 1994), 
where the concept of fundamentalism, as a refusal of critical engagement with 
tradition, is one of the obstacles to the emergence of 'dialogic democracy' in a global 
order. 
Riding the Juggernaut Towards Global Utopia 
For Hobhouse, as for Giddens, society - the milieu in which minds communicate - both 
shapes and is shaped by the actions of individual minds, themselves continuously 
modified both by self-reflexivity, social 'structure', and interaction with others 
(Hobhouse 1966a [1924]): 178; Giddens 1984: 25). 
According to Hobhouse, there is a contradiction in the fact that the more mind 
develops (as the motor of social development), the more a common will (the 
expression of the common-interest of humankind) is expressed in the conditions of 
social organisation. The more the community grows in both size and complexity, the 
greater is the pace of change, which in tum confounds the expression of the common 
interest in the form of the realisation of a common will. Hobhouse writes that 
development 'does not defeat itself but it does continually engender new difficulties 
requiring a still higher development [of mind] to grapple with them'( 1966a [1924]: 
191). 
Human history is created by intentional activities but is not an intended 
project; it persistently eludes efforts to bring it under conscious 
direction. However such attempts are continually made by human 
beings, who operate under the threat and the promise of the 
circumstances that they are the only creatures who make their 'history' 
in cognisance of that fact.(Giddens 1984: 27) 
Thus no single individual can understand the totality, and unintended 
consequences follow intentional action. But Hobhouse suggested that two directional 
forces or interests were discernible among the apparently drifting mass of individuals: 
general ideas about 'national well-being'; and 'large interests appealing definitely to 
certain classes or sections'. These two influences 'originate and maintain political 
parties', to the extent that the direction of change, in so far as it is discernible at all, 
210. 
may seem to be quite opposite to the emergence of international harmony (1966a 
[1924]: 191-8). In view of these entrenched interests of more powerful agents, against 
the disorganised mass of less knowledgeable, less powerful minds, it is surprising 
perhaps that he continued to believe in the emergence of a universal humanitarian 
spirit. Giddens too, has made much of the negative (as well as the positive) 
implications of nationalism (1985: see particularly, p.218), and has extensively 
analysed the conjunction of capitalism with the nation-state system (1981, 1985). Yet 
he continues to assert his belief that even the weak 'always have some capabilities of 
turning resources back against the strong' (1981: 62). 
In the 'Late Modem Age', Giddens says, the fragmented, powerless, uncertain 
and commodifed agent begins to reflexively re-connect with some of the basic 
existential questions sequestered by abstract systems. The mechanism is a 
psychological one - agents made anxious by life in an internally referential world in 
which there are enormous manufactured risks and no certainties, searching for 
solutions via psycho-analytic (and other) therapy, self-help manuals, and even works of 
sociology. The realisation that the personal is political, the emergence of life politics 
and the New Social Movements, all point in a positive direction in the context of 
globalisation. We should not underestimate, Giddens says, the difficulty of resolving 
moral dilemmas in a post-traditional global order, yet the tone of his analysis remains 
both individualistic and optimistic. Though he formally rejects both evolution and 
teleology in social theory, his terminology is revealing when he speaks of 'powerful 
influences' or immanent institutional trends towards polyarchy and the growth of 
citizenship both within and between nation-states (for example,1994: 248~ 1991a: 163, 
167). 
Ian Craib has commented on Giddens's 'increasing tendency towards assertion 
rather than argument' (1992: 183). His concept of the double hermeneutic, which 
posits the notion that there is continual 'slippage' between the lay meaning of concepts 
and their sociological sense, and his insistence on sociology's role as social reflexivity, 
both point to Giddens's underlying conviction that sociological knowledge (his own in 
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particular) can help us on the right path to Utopia (1984: 374; 1994: 250). Similar 
tendencies are apparent in Hobhouse (1966a [1924]: 325-6). 
Hobhouse's account includes much talk of the (potential) emergence of a 
common will, while Giddens often seems more concerned with the proliferation of 
obstacles to consensus. Yet these differences should not blind us to their fundamental 
identity. Though the disciplines of psychology and the psycho-analytic movement were 
barely established in Hobhouse's time, his solution is fundamentally identical: 
.... the last enemy that man shall overcome is himself The internal 
conditions of life, the physiological basis of mental activity, the 
sociological laws that operate for the most part unconsciously, are parts 
of the 'environment' which the self-conscious intelligence has to master 
(1901: 403). 
Hobhouse and Giddens: Sociology and Contemporary Politics 
Human beings are intrinsically social. The assertion that an unconscious, unrealised or 
unacknowledged psychological mechanism operates to sustain social life is, therefore, 
surely correct. And just as both Hobhouse and Giddens recognise this identity of 
interest in maintaining the social, each also recognises our differences, our 
individuality, our cleverness. We are not cultural dupes, but satisfy our most basic 
needs in very individual ways. 
Hobhouse believed that though it was not possible or desirable to force people 
to be good, it was both possible and desirable to create social institutions which, while 
enabling autonomous choice, would also encourage them to choose what was socially 
just and morally good (1901: 351-7; 1966a [1924]: 300). Similarly Giddens (1994), 
advocates generative politics which will enable agents to make the autonomous choices 
which will prevent things from going wrong, in opposition to the traditional welfare 
system which picks ups the pieces when disaster (unemployment, ill-health) has already 
occurred. 
If good government, among other objectives, is about the pursuit of 
happiness, it certainly has to be connected with the psychic states of its 
citizenry.... Policies which sustain or create networks of social 
interaction can provide conditions for the mobilising of psychic 
development; the support of self-help groups of a diversity of kinds can 
play an important role ... (1994: 187) 
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In this manner, Giddens and Hobhouse solve the old chicken and egg question 
concerning the casual primacy of either agency or structure. Both insist upon the 
primacy of the agent, while simultaneously advocating structural changes which 
encourage the agent to choose, in the conviction that, in the end, agents will choose 
what is socially just. 
Thus, the bulk of Giddens's sociology since 1971 has been consistent with the 
sociological tradition which began, in Britain, with Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse. 
Hobhouse, of course, was not just a sociologist, but was highly regarded as a political 
theorist by his contemporaries (for example, Ruggiero, 1927). Even today, when his 
sociology is generally disregarded, Hobhouse has retained his reputation as principal 
exponent of 'New Liberal' politics (Meadowcroft, 1994). Moreover, as CoIIini (1979: 
172) has shown, he constructed his sociology as a more or less deliberate attempt to 
provide 'scientific' or epistemological foundations for his 'new' liberal theory. 
In Giddens's work, Hobhouse's conception of the developing self-conscious 
'mind', has become the 'reflexive' self These conceptions are very similar, and though 
they are not identical~they are sufficiently like one another to enable a realistic 
comparison. For both Giddens and Hobhouse, the knowledgable, reflexive, moral and 
social agent is at the centre of both social and political theory, a concern that is 
consistent with the liberal belief in the importance of 'character' (Freeden, 1978: 170-
178; Bellamy, 1992). 
In his more recent work, Giddens has begun to address environmental issues. 
In doing so, he has incorporated some new concepts, without abandoning any of the 
earlier ones. In view of the close resemblance of structuration theory to Hobhousian 
theory, and since Hobhouse deliberately excluded environment as a significant factor in 
social life, it is entirely reasonable to question the load-bearing capacity of Giddens's 
theory in respect of environmental issues. Giddens's treatment of environmental issues 
is examined in the next, and final chapter. 
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Chapter 5. 
Anthony Giddens as Environmental Sociologist 
Introduction 
Giddens's incorporation of environmental issues is a significant British contribution to a 
much wider international development, in which the 'natural' environment, excluded 
from sociology for most of this century, is becoming a focus of both research and 
theory, not just among those who subscribe to Catton and Dunlap's New Ecological 
Paradigm, but across the whole spectrum of more 'traditional' approaches to sociology. 
Recent debates among environmental sociologists, however, indicate that this 
incorporation of environment by 'traditional' approaches, has not been entirely 
straightforward. These debates focus on two inter-related problems. The first is the 
extent to which, in the course of its development, environmental sociology has become 
subject to the same problems that beset the discipline as whole (Buttel, 1987). The 
second is to do with the adequacy of different sociological approaches to the 
environment (Dunlap and Catton, 1994) 
Buttel, for example, reviewing the progress of environmental sociology, in the 
decade since its establishment in the late 1970s, suggests that while it has failed to fulfil 
its 'founders' early hopes for the foundation of a 'new' sociology (e.g. a New Ecological 
Paradigm), it has succeeded in becoming a recognised speciality area, or sub-discipline 
within the discipline as a whole (1987: 466). In doing so, however, it has become 
subject to the same problems of fragmentation that beset the rest of sociology. 
Following Giddens (1979), Buttel characterises these problems as hingeing on various 
dualisms: structure versus agency, nominalism versus realism, materialism versus 
idealism, and methodological precision versus substantive importance (Buttel, 1987: 
484). From this point of view, he argues, a major failing of the theoretical core of 
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environmental sociology - the 'New' Human Ecology - is its neglect of issues to do 
with subjectivity and agency (ibid.). 
Catton and Dunlap, the two sociologists whose work lies at the 'core' of the 
theoretical core of environmental sociology, echo Buttel's assessment of the 
development of environmental sociology. Moreover, they see the incorporation of 
environmental issues by 'traditional' perspectives as a promising development, citing 
the valuable contributions of several British (as well as American) sociologists. 'The 
eventual merging of these theoretical and empirical efforts', they suggest, 'promises to 
yield important advances in understanding the nature of societal environment relations' 
(Dunlap and Catton, 1994: 15). Significantly, Catton & Dunlap mention Benton 
(1989), Dickens (1992), Jones (1987) and Newby (1991), while omitting to mention 
Giddens, though it is hardly likely that they have failed to come across his work. 
In spite of their optimistic assessment, however, Catton and Dunlap remain 
sceptical about the capacity of some 'traditional' perspectives to enhance the 
sociological understanding of environmental issues. In particular, they point to the 
limitations of a social constructivist approach for dealing with 'big' issues such as 
Global Environmental Change (GEC). Because the 'factual' or 'scientific' status ofGEC 
remains a matter for dispute, Catton and Dunlap argue, a social constructivist 
approach (which might, for example, aim to uncover or examine the social processes 
by which an environmental problem comes to be defined as problematic) may lead to 
the neglect of their societal causes, consequences and amelioration. Worse, a social 
constructivist approach runs the risk of falling into an extreme relativism, with the 
result that environmental issues come to be seen as social constructions with no 'real' 
basis (1994:21-23). 
This raises again the question of the adequacy of sociological accounts of social 
reality, discussed above in Chapter 1. There it was argued that the success or failure of 
different accounts of social reality may be as much the result of non-intellectual 
factors, as their adequacy. Sociology is more than just a collection of concepts, 
theories or ideas. It is also its embodiment in academic institutions, and, as such, is no 
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more immune from external social, economic or political conditions than other 
institutions. Nor are its practitioners any more immune from the same exigencies and 
contingencies than 'ordinary' people, either personally or professionally. Social 
location, personal ambition, personality traits, likes and dislikes, and political 
allegiances are just as much a part of everyday life for sociologists as for 'lay' agents. 
The establishment and development of sociology as an institution has been bound up 
with all of this, as well as with the development of sets of ideas or of ways of 
interpreting the world. Thus, the particular accounts of social reality which are now 
seen to be constitutive of the discipline are not necessarily those that are more 
adequate in terms of their conceptualisations of the inter-relationships between human 
societies and their 'natural' environments. l On the contrary, while the ideas and 
theories which have become 'institutionalised' during the course of sociology's history, 
by becoming part of academic institutions may be intellectually self-eVident, they are 
intellectually self evident only within the confines and constraints of a dominant 
(hegemonic) political ideology or value system. 
These days, when sociology has become an accepted and (more) acceptable 
subject, it is, of course, possible for more than one theoretical account of social reality, 
and for a wide range of research interests, to co-exist. They do not all, however, 
command equal interest, equal attention, equal institutional and financial support, or an 
equal number of citations and printed pages. Thus, theoretical hegemony within the 
discipline can both co-exist with and mirror to a significant extent political hegemony 
outside it. In a worst case scenario, professional sociologists have been compared to 
the 'enterprise commonly known as the oldest profession', selling their authoritative 
accounts of social reality to those who command political, civil, military and economic 
power (Nicolaus, 1972). This is a caricature, of course, but it is not wholly without 
truth. Some sociologists and some sociological perspectives do become central, both 
within the academy and, perhaps more importantly, outside it. 
1 In Geddesian terms, some of these accounts might be categorised as 'survivals'. 
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The central importance of Giddens's work has been signalled by the publication 
of no less than five volumes of appreciation and critique in the four years around 1990 
(Cohen, 1989; Held & Thompson, 1989; Clark, Modgil & Modgil, 1990; Bryant and 
Jary, 1991; Craib, 1992), as well as by a huge number of journal articles which, over a 
period of years, have discussed more or less appreciatively or critically almost every 
aspect of his work. There are too many of these to list here, but their authors include: 
Bryan Turner, 1992; Roland Robertson, 1992; Ulrich Beck, 1992b; Jary and Jary, 
1995; Alan Warde, 1994; Scott Lash, 1993; Nicos Mouzelis, 1989; Gregor McLennan, 
1988; Derek Layder, 1985; Nigel Thrift, 1985; and Paul Bagguley, 1984. 
For a sociologist, Giddens's rise to fame and pre-eminence has been 
spectacular. After leaving Leicester in 1969, Giddens took up a lectureship at 
Cambridge, acquired his doctorate on the basis of his already published work in 1974, 
and in 1985 was appointed Professor of Sociology there, becoming head of the new 
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (Bryant, 1993: 7). In the same year he was a 
co-founder, with John Thompson and David Held, of Polity Press, which rapidly 
became one of the 'leading publishing houses in the social sciences' (ibid.). He was 
awarded an honorary doctorate by Salford in 1993, at which time his published work 
numbered 26 books and over a hundred articles (ibid.). Soon afterwards, Giddens 
nailed his political colours to the wall, by joining Tony Blair's 'New' Labour party 
(Observer, 8.12.96). In the wake of the publication of Beyond Left and Right (1994) 
Giddens was one among a group of intellectuals to whom Blair turned in his search for 
the 'big idea' (Baxter, 1995). He has recently been appointed Director of LSE 
(Thompson, 1996). Blair has become Prime Minister. 
The move to LSE will tie Giddens even more closely to the centres of power, 
both nationally and internationally. Even before his move to LSE, and his committment 
to Blair, he was among those who submitted written evidence to the Labour Party's 
Commision on Social Justice, set up by John Smith during his short leadership (Report 
of the Commision, 1994: 404). The 1995 Report of the Commission on Global 
Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood, acknowledged more LSE-connected 
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individuals than individuals from any other single academic institution, internationally. 
These included the (then) Director, John Ashworth, as well as Fred Halliday, John 
Harriss, John Hobcraft, loan Lewis, and Paul Taylor. Meghnad Desai and Paul 
Redfern, of The Centre for Global Governance (located at LSE), were also 
acknowledged. 2 
In the light of Giddens's central importance, both politically and academically, 
the question of the adequacy of Giddens's account of social reality, especially as it 
relates to environmental issues, becomes extremely important. Has he, in spite of his 
similarities with the 'founder' of the British tradition, Hobhouse, succeeded in creating 
an account of social reality that is adequate in respect of environmental issues? 
Giddens as Environmental Sociologist 
Giddens incorporated environmental issues, initially, via his critique of Marx's concept 
of exploitation in the first volume of A Contemporary Critique of Historical 
Materialism (1981), though the discussion is brief and undeveloped. Giddens's next 
discussion of environmental issues, in volume two of the 'contemporary critique', The 
Nation State and Violence (1985), focuses on the role of environmentalist movements 
for the mitigation of the exploitation of nature, though this a somewhat minor theme of 
that book. Environmental issues move to the centre of Giddens's work in The 
Consequences Of Modernity. There, they are seen both as a major consequence of 
human activities with respect to the transformation of nature, and in causal terms, as a 
major determinant of human action to the extent that they contribute to the underlying 
psychological constitution of agents. Humanly created risks, in the context of a 
generalised awareness of their existence and intractability, threaten the ontological 
security of agents, creating a situation where the capacity to act is perpetually 
2 Compare this figure with the 5 Harvard academics acknowledged by name, 2 from the 
University of Cambridge (Asha Patel, Marc Weller), and 1 each from Oxford (Raymond 
Plant), Manchester (peter Dicken), Reading (John Dunning), Sussex (paul Streeten). Overall, 
individual academics from U.S. Universities received the most acknowledgements, with 
academics from British Universities in second place. 
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threatened by anxiety and radical doubt, which must therefore be 'bracketed' by the 
agent. Thus, Giddens, in common with some other contemporary sociologists - most 
significantly Ulrich Beck - approaches environmental issues via the concept of risk. 
There are, then, two separate 'moments' in Giddens's treatment of 
environmental issues. His work can be divided into an early phase up to 1990, and a 
later phase, from 1990 to the present. These are dealt with in turn, below. 
The Environment in Giddens's Work Before 1990 
Giddens's treatment of environmental issues up to 1985 is examined here via 
Goldblatt's recent critique (Goldblatt 1996). This serves several purposes. First, the 
very existence of a substantial critique highlights the extent to which Giddens's work 
has been taken seriously as environmental sociology. Second, it establishes the context 
in which Giddens later utilises Beck's work, by highlighting reflexivity and democracy 
as central themes of Giddens's earlier sociology. Third, it illustrates how a critique of 
Giddens formulated from an 'eco-system' perspective fails to hit the mark, by making 
assumptions about Giddens's own theoretical orientation which may not in fact be 
warranted. Fourth, it brings into relief the issue of the fragmentation of environmental 
sociology following its co-option within the mainstream. 
Goldblatt is keen to ascertain, with some precision, the direct and indirect or 
structural causes of environmental degradation. His major criticism of Giddens is that 
he does not develop potentially useful themes in his work to this end. Giddens's 
incorporation of environmental issues remains, in the final analysis, concerned above all 
with the impact of high consequence manufactured risk on the consciousness of agents, 
and the consequences of this for contemporary social systems. As such, it remains 
firmly embedded within a perspective concerned with only one side of the society-
nature interaction. And as Catton and Dunlap point out 
Understanding the human dimensions of global environmental change 
necessitates study of societal-environmental interactions, including a 
balanced examination of the impacts of humans on the environment as 
well as the effects of ecological constraints on human societies.(1994: 
7) 
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Goldblatt's Critique of Giddens 
In his first volume of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (1981) 
Giddens suggests that Marx's social theory is inadequate in contemporary terms 
because he adopted an instrumental attitude to nature, which was to be mastered and 
subordinated to human purposes. This means that his theory cannot cope with the idea 
that the natural resources from which humanity produces the material means necessary 
to survival are finite. Though it is through the relations of production under capitalism 
that resources are exploited as if they were in never-ending, there is little indication 
that socialism (at that time still actually existing in the Soviet Union) fares any better in 
this respect. Nor can it cope with the idea of nature as a potential part of a meaningful 
human existence (1981: 245-6)3. Giddens suggests that some of his own ideas are 
superior in this respect, in particular 'those bearing on the commodification of time and 
space, the dissolution of the differentiation between the city and the countryside, and 
the prevalence of "created space'" (ibid., 246). 
In his critique of Giddens's approach to environmental issues, Goldblatt (1996) 
suggests that although these ideas are useful ones, Giddens does not follow them up. 
He also suggests that Giddens's work undergoes a shift in emphasis between 1985 and 
1990 - from seeing environmental problems as associated with the conjunction 
between industrialism and capitalism, to laying the blame firmly at the door of 
industrialism alone. Yet although Goldblatt's discussion of the ways in which Giddens's 
work is adequate or inadequate in respect of environmental issues is extremely useful, 
as well as being sensitive to the lack of clarity in Giddens's arguments, a different 
interpretation is possible. According to this, it is likely that Giddens's failure to develop 
3. This latter point. of course, is arguable. Howard L. Parsons (1977). argued that resource 
constraints were very important for Marx and Engels in their attempt to discredit the classical 
political economy of Malthus and Ricardo. Dickens (1992) has shown that Marx was very 
much aware of the importance of the relationship between humanity and nature, which is 
alienated under capitalism. Giddens himself, in CMST (1971: 13) discusses Marx's concept of 
alienation, including the idea that capitalism alienates humanity from nature or species being. 
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these concepts is due first of all to the fact that until 1990, environmental issues were 
not of any special significance in his work. 
Secondly, if Goldblatt is correct to point up Giddens's shift towards seeing 
industrialism rather than capitalism as a basic causal factor in the transformation of 
nature, it seems likely that this is associated not only with the nuclear accident at 
Chemobyl, which highlighted a fact of which he was already aware - that industrial 
state-socialist societies were equally destructive in terms of the environment, but also 
with the collapse of Soviet Communism, which led to the propagation, by some on the 
Left as well as the Right, of the idea of the 'death of socialism'. That Giddens, who has 
been intermittently engaged in a critical debate with the ghost of Marx since 1971, has 
been influenced by this suggestion is evidenced by his discussion of Socialism in 
Beyond Left and Right (1994). 
Giddens did, as Goldblatt suggests, initially posit a generic association between 
capitalism and industrialism (Goldblatt 1996: 19~ Giddens, 1985: 143-5), but the 
function of this was to allow him to pursue his arguments with respect to the 
discontinuous nature of modernity and was entirely unrelated to his conceptualisation 
of the causes of environmental problems. When he spoke of 'capitalist societies' he 
meant this to be read as 'industrial-capitalism' (1985: 145). Capitalism emerged on the 
basis of certain other developments, which had nothing to do with industrialism - 'the 
formation of frameworks of law, fiscal guarantees and an increasingly pacified social 
environment allowing non-coercive economic exchange to flourish' (1985: 288-9). This 
was the basis of his insistence that the expansion of surveillance is of fundamental 
importance in the development of 'modernity'. It is the expansion of surveillance, in 
conjunction with the dynamism of capitalism which drives industrialism and in doing so 
increases the capacity for both surveillance and institutional reflexivity, which gives 
modernity its distinctive character. 
Citizenship. Surveillance. and Democracy 
When Giddens initially discussed the emergence and importance of environmentalist 
movements in capitalist-industrial nation states, his major theme, therefore, was to 
221. 
highlight the importance of the extension of surveillance in the development and 
maintenance of nation states. An examination of his approach to environmentalist 
movements shows him doing exactly what Goldblatt says that he has not done -
developing his concepts of the commodification of time and space, the dissolution of 
the relations between the city and the countryside and the concept of 'created space'. 
The reason that his analysis is unsatisfactory for Goldblatt is that his sociological 
agenda is different from Giddens's. As an adherent of an eco-system perspective (a 
'New Ecological Paradigm'), he is concerned with theoretical and empirical issues to do 
with actual and potential environmental degradation, whereas Giddens, at that point, 
was primarily concerned to show that the expansion of surveillance is not a wholly 
sinister or totalitarian phenomenon but is, on the contrary, intricately tied to an 
expansion of citizenship rights and democracy in the context of the modern nation-
state. Environmentalist movements are just one among other Social Movements used 
by Giddens as an illustration of his main point. Thus, although it is hardly surprising 
that Goldblatt cannot find what he wants to find in Giddens's theory, this does not 
means that the concepts are left undeveloped. Rather, they are developed in a 
particular direction. 
Giddens suggests that there are inherent connections between the nation-state 
and democracy, since increased surveillance necessarily involves a much closer relation 
between the governed and the governors (1985: 201-2). Moreover, this relation is one 
of reciprocity rather than merely of repressive control, because any services provided 
by the state of necessity involve the accumulation of information about the population 
they serve. In turn, subject populations must recognise sovereignty as legitimate 
authority, which is achieved partly via the dissemination of nationalist sentiments (as a 
constructed history or 'historicity') using the same technologies through which 
surveillance is increased. 
Nationalism is the cultural sensibility of sovereignty, the concomitant of 
the co-ordination of administrative power within the bounded nation 
state. With the coming of the nation-state, states have an administrative 
and territorial unity which they did not possess before. This unity 
cannot remain purely administrative however, because the very co-
ordination of activities presumes elements of cultural homogeneity. The 
extension of communication cannot occur without the 'conceptual' 
involvement of the whole community as a knowledgeable 
citizenry.(1985: 219) 
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The greater the degree of reciprocity involved in the relations between sovereign 
states and the 'subject population', the greater the possibilities the 'dialectic of control' 
offers subordinate groups to influence rulers (1985:202). Thus the growth of 
citizenship goes hand in hand with development of nation-states. 4 
This is the context in which Giddens introduces not only environmentalist 
movements, but also the labour movement and the peace movement, and various civil 
rights movements (1985: 310-325). If sovereignty within nation-states is inherently 
bound up with both the expansion of surveillance and the expansion of citizenship via 
reciprocity and the dissemination of nationalism as historicity, it is simultaneously 
bound up with 
... the emergence oj tendencies and pressures towards democratic 
participation. In each of its aspects surveillance promotes the 
possibility of the consolidation of power in the hands of dominant 
classes or elites. At the very same time, however, this process is 
accompanied by counter-influences brought to bear in the dialectic of 
contro1.(1985: 314 emphasis in original) 
The City and the Countryside 
Giddens expands upon his notion of the pre-modem city as a 'power container', in 
order to demonstrate the discontinuities between pre-modem and modem social forms. 
Whereas in the pre-modem city the administrative reach of the state was low, largely 
confined to the 'subject populations' of cities, leaving those outside the city with a 
relatively greater degree of autonomy of action (since they are not dependent on those 
inside the city for their livelihood), the expansion of surveillance means that the 
nation-state takes over the role of the city as a 'power container'. Unlike the city, 
however, it has administrative capabilities which extend over the entire population 
4 Giddens'S discussion of citizenship, of course, draws on his reading of Marshall's (1950) 
Citizenship and Social Class (see in particular, Giddens, 1985: 202-209). 
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within its boundaries, something which is made possible by a number of other related 
developments which emanate from his three other 'institutional clusters'. These 
developments include 
. . . the mechanisation of transportation~ the severance of 
communication from transportation by the invention of electronic 
media~ and the expansion of the 'documentary' activities of the State, 
involving an upsurge in the collection and collation of information 
devoted to administrative purposes. . . . the second and third of these 
have increasingly merged in the twentieth century as electronic modes 
of the storage of information have become more and more 
sophisticated. Moreover, electricity becomes increasingly involved in 
the means of mechanical propulsion. . . . Each represents a mode of 
biting into time and space, providing the means of radically increasing 
the scope of time-space distanciation beyond that available in class-
divided societies. (1985: 173) 
Giddens discusses the extent to which capitalism, industrialism, surveillance and the 
control of the means of violence, singly or in combination, produce the technologies of 
surveillance, thus contributing to the time-space convergence which permits 
'immediacy of time contact across indefinite spatial distances' (1981: 40). This 
culminates in the emergence of a global system of nation-states which maintain 
peaceful relations both inside their borders and between them (1985: 172-97 and 287-
93 ). 
The Urban as 'Created Space' 
Other consequences, however, include the spread of 'urbanism' beyond the contines of 
the city, as a 'created environment' and the sequestration of experience (1985: 192-4). 
Thus in spite of regional differences both between different locales within nation-states 
and between nation-states themselves, in terms of the division of labour, and variable 
concentrations of population, which may be (but are not necessarily) culturally, 
ethnically or linguistically distinct, 
.,. the transformation of nature is expressed as commodified time-space~ 
as such it is the milieu of all social action, no longer a distinct physical 
entity and social sector within a broader societal totality.{1985: 193) 
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In one sense, Goldblatt is quite correct to point up the difficulties and 
confusions inherent in this position, especially since, as he suggests, Giddens has made 
a case for the central significance of urban sociology for the discipline as a whole 
which he then fails to follow up (Goldblatt, 1996: 52-5). However, this issue is only 
important if one is particularly interested in the relationship between 'urbanism' and the 
causes of environmental degradation, which Giddens, here, is not. Urbanism seems to 
be conceptualised as the homogenisation of the relations between humanity and nature, 
in which the cultural boundaries between social activities in city and countryside are 
dissolved, and has an entirely different purpose. On the one hand, it forms part of his 
arguments for the expansion of the administrative reach of the state, and the 
discontinuous nature of modernity. On the other hand it is connected with his model of 
the psychological constitution of the agent, which is for the most part methodologically 
bracketed in The Nation State, a text which is mostly concerned with an institutional or 
structural analysis rather than with agency. The connection with agency is to do with 
the sequestration of experience (which Giddens suggests is one form of 
regionalisation), as a factor in the dissolution of tradition and the fragile nature of 
ontological security of the agent under conditions of modernity. 
In the contexts of the modem state, the routinised character of most 
day to day life is not grounded in the moral schemes of tradition. In 
such circumstances ontological security is tenuously founded 
psychologically, depending on the enactment of 'morally meaningless 
routines' protected by the sequestration of events and experiences 
which might otherwise threaten it. Where moral meaning has retreated 
to the margins of the private and the public, the communality supplied 
by national symbols... provides one means of support for ontological 
security, particularly where there is a perceived threat from outside the 
state (Giddens, 1985: 218). 
Environmentalist movements, as Giddens employs them in The Nation State, 
exist as a counter-balancing force for the limitation or mitigation of the wholesale 
'transformations of nature' brought about by industrialism (within the bounds of 
capitalist-industrial nation state). He depicts them as essentially backward-looking 
movements often grounded in a romantic view of nature, oriented towards the 
225. 
'recovery of attitudes to the natural world associated with pre-modem forms of society' 
(1985: 315). As such, although Giddens does not elaborate the point until later, in 
Modernity and Self Identity (1991), environmentalists are concerned with the re-
moralisation of the humanity/nature relationship. Environmentalism in Giddens's work 
develops from this portrayal of the environmentalist movement, into one of the ways in 
which individuals can more firmly re-establish their 'ontological security'. At no point 
does Giddens indicate a personal or political affinity with these ideals. By 1994, we 
find him launching into a swingeing attack on what he sees as inconsistencies in green 
ideologies which reinforces this definition of environmentalism as backwards looking 
and romantic (1994: 199-228) 
Although Goldblatt's critique is well-founded in one sense, therefore, there is 
another sense in which it entirely misses the point, since Giddens is not primarily 
concerned in The Nation State with the causes and consequences of environmental 
degradation except in so far as the 'transformations of nature' (of which degradation is 
only one aspect) impacts firstly upon social systems, and secondly upon agents. He 
later takes up and develops his concern with the implications of the 'socialisation of 
nature' for agents, in The Consequences of Modernity and Modernity and Self Identity, 
but this is after his contact with Beck's work. And although Goldblatt is disappointed 
by Giddens's neglect of urban sociology in the face of his claim that it is central to the 
sociological enterprise as a whole, it is not implausible to suggest that Giddens, having 
dissolved the distinction between urban and rural life, can justifiably claim to be doing 
urban sociology without further reference to a distinctive urban sphere. 
All that is implied by Giddens's insistence on urban sociology is the 
homogenisation of cultural experience: it no longer makes a difference whether the 
spatial location of the agent is urban or rural. Moreover, this point is, for the most-
part, well-founded. Giddens insists on the interdependence of capital and labour in 
modem nation-states. Rural dwellers, in pre-modem times, he suggests, were not 
dependent on those inside the city for their means of subsistence. Relationships were 
confined to a fairly limited exchange of goods or services. This is no longer the case. 
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All lives are dominated by commodifed clock-time, irrespective of whether one gets up 
at six to milk cows or to drive to an academic department. A farming community may 
exist up to its knees in mud, but even this direct contact does not bring it any closer to 
traditional attitudes to 'nature'. Farming tends to be dominated by the 'urban' sphere -
by the requirements of, for example, the big supermarkets and banks. If supermarkets 
demand particular types of produce, that is what the farmer must, of necessity, 
produce. It is no longer, for most farmers, a case of producing for subsistence and 
selling the surplus, but of producing according to the demands of the market. Farmers 
may consume the milk produced by their dairy herd, but the primary purpose of milk 
production is not consumption, but sale, and the dairy farmer's existence is entirely 
dependent on compliance with both the requirements of the 'market' and the 'rules' 
(relating to hygiene, health, quotas and so on) formulated by faceless expert systems. 
Moreover, cattle often do not mate 'naturally' but are artificially inseminated (a form of 
genetic engineering, or domestic rather than natural selection) by the representative of 
an expert system of eugenics. Farmers have shopped around, and decided whether to 
breed for meat or for milk, so that the process involves a financial calculation as well 
as the application of both scientific knowledge and industrial technology. The 
Supersires Dairy Bull Directory for 1996, for example, is a splendid advertisement for 
the inter-connections between capital and labour, rural and urban life, and scientific 
knowledge, industrial technology and 'nature'. As an organisation linking all the above, 
'Supersires' are 
... permanently engaged in an unrelenting quest to source superior bulls 
- bulls with the ability to produce cattle which combine production 
potential with the type required by discerning dairy farmers .... every year 
we set out to offer a range of sires of overall higher genetic merit than 
that ofthe previous year ... 
The traits for which farmers may to choose to breed through the purchase of 
appropriate sperm are numerous, and include variable chest widths, body depths, rump 
widths, rump angles, foot angles, udder depth and support, teat position and length, 
temperament, milk production, milking speed and ease of calving. Interestingly, in 
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view of the current popularity of 'natural' products in supermarkets, the word 'natural' 
appears nowhere in this directory. The photographs depict cattle as sleek and shiny 
'supermodels', labelled in terms of their 'uses' for the farmer, and marketed on the basis 
of superlatives - 'stylish', 'sharp', 'excellent udder conformation', and 'comes with the 
reputation of being able to tum a bad cow into a good one!'. This example provides a 
picture of rural life far removed from any traditional image of old-fashioned folk eking 
out a simple but satisfying existence in harmony with nature. Recent developments in 
genetic cloning are likely to further remove from such 'natural' activities as farming any 
remnants of such a traditional or harmonious relationship. 
From the vantage point of an 'advanced' industrial-capitalist society, then, it 
seems difficult to argue with Giddens's interpretation of the dissolution of the rural-
urban divide: the routinised experience of day-to-day life may involve a different set of 
social roles and activities depending on the exigencies of geographical locale and 
occupation, but the institutions of capitalism and industrialism, including institutional 
reflexivity, expert systems and the rules and resources upon which agents draw, are all-
pervasive in the advanced economies of the Western nation-states. Moreover, as 
Geddes suggested (Geddes and Thomson, 1931: 1387-1392), it is the mechanical, 
scientific urban thought-patterns and ways of living that have absorbed the 'vital' and 
'rustic' rural rather than the reverse. 
The Importance of Politics 
Giddens's and Goldblatt's different approaches to environmental issues arise from their 
different political as well as theoretical perspectives. In many respects these may be 
incommensurable. Giddens is primarily interested in the expansion of political, social 
and cultural autonomy for individuals via democracy or 'polyarchy', while Goldblatt is 
interested in the constraints that result from the fact of our ecological dependence and 
interdependence. Moreover, Goldblatt's concern extends to the unequal distribution of 
the degradation of global environments (1996: 64-5), where Giddens's (1985) analysis 
of nation-states was concerned primarily with inter-societal relations as time-space 
relations involving surveillance and reflexivity, but not with the impacts of the 
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advanced societies' economic activities on the environments of other nation states. 
That this is so is evidenced by the fact that in spite of his earlier acknowledgement of 
the global scope of modern capitalism (1981: 168), he later asserts that 
There is no prima facie reason to suppose that the forms of 
interdependence which have been most prominent at particular phases 
in the development of the world system have been those that have most 
favoured the position of the economically advanced societies.(198S: 
171) 
This statement is only explicable from a standpoint that is peculiarly ethno-
centric and unconcerned about environmental degradation. For while there may be no 
prima facie reason to suppose that the economically advanced nations benefited from 
their contact with the less developed, there are plenty of empirical examples which 
show that they did, and do benefit - and which illustrate the extent to which the 
development of a world system has been disadvantageous for many. It is hard to 
interpret as beneficial the impact of international interdependence on the indigenous 
inhabitants and environment of Africa, or on the Native Americans whose populations 
were decimated by the diseases of the white settlers who appropriated their lands, 
even where they did not directly slaughter them. In the recent past too, the inhabitants 
and environments of both Bhopal and Seveso have suffered from the economic 
activities of more wealthy countries. The 1976 accident at Seveso occurred at a 
phannaceutical plant belonging to a subsidiary of the Swiss firm Hoffman La Roche, 
which produced one of the ingredients of a potent chemical weed killer. At the time, 
there was a world shortage of the chemical, due to the closure ofa production plant in 
Britain, itself the result of an accident. No official action was taken for some time after 
the accident at the Seveso plant, which released a cloud of poisonous gas, with the 
result that an estimated 70,000 animals either died or had to be slaughtered. Although 
approximately 30,000 people were affected directly or indirectly by the disaster, the 
long term impact is unlikely to be discovered, since the Italian government had no 
money to carry through its plan to monitor the health of some 100,000 individuals 
(Elsworth, 1990: 411-417). 
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The 1984 accident at Bhopal occurred at a factory owned by Union Carbide 
Limited, a subsidiary of a American owned transnational corporation. Estimates of the 
number of people killed by the accident varied between 1,755 and 2,500. Adverse 
reactions ranged from temporary blindness and burning lungs to permanent disability 
and affected 200,000 more, some of whom were still receiving treatment as much as a 
year afterwards (Elsworth, 1990: 60-64). In both accidents the activities of 
'economically advanced' societies had severe impacts on less economically advanced 
societies, while remaining unaffected themselves. 
The approaches of Goldblatt and Giddens are fundamentally different. Where 
Goldblatt is particularly concerned to develop an eco-system perspective which 
acknowledges the importance of political, economic and cultural factors, to be applied 
to a critique of industrial societies with state-socialist governments, as well as to 
liberal-capitalist societies, in their destructive consequences for specific environments, 
it is fair to say that Giddens - at least up to 1990 - was not. His project, while it has the 
merit of being grounded in both historical research and contemporary concerns, is 
specifically grounded in a theoretical critique of Parsonian functionalism and Marxist 
theory. This does not mean that it has no practical relevance for environmental 
sociology, merely that it is addressed primarily to questions of the relations between 
human agency and social structure, rather than to question of the inter-relations 
between human agency, social structures and the 'natural' environment. 
The Environment in Giddens's Work After 1990 
A shift occurred in Giddens's thinking about environmental issues between the 
publication of The Nation State and the appearance of The Consequences of Modernity 
in 1990. Two factors are likely to have been significant. The first of these is the impact 
of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in the USSR in April 1986, and the second is his 
reading of the work of Ulrich Beck. 
Comparison of Giddens's use of risk with Beck's Risk Society thesis indicates 
that Giddens has taken up only certain of Beck's ideas to add to what Craib (1992) has 
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called his 'theoretical omelette'. Of these, the only one that is wholly new in Giddens's 
work is 'risk', to which he gives a causal role in the psychological constitution of 
agents. The other themes, including reflexivity and the importance of the extension of 
democracy for the resolution of environmental problems, are features of Giddens's 
earlier work, which are developed in new ways following his contact with Beck. 
Environmental issues as 'risk' become central for Giddens only after his contact 
with Beck's work, which is sufficiently similar in other respects for Giddens to be able 
to import the concept into his own work without much in the way of substantial 
change. This interpretation of the incorporation of , risk' into Giddens's work should not 
be understood in a cynical sense as suggesting a leap on to a lucrative publishing 
bandwagon in the wake of the success of Beck's book, or as an accusation of 
plagiarism (although Giddens does draw more extensively on Beck's work than he 
formally acknowledges).s Rather, the necessity of engaging theoretically with 
environmental issues is likely to have been associated, for Giddens, as for many of us, 
with a growing awareness of both the potential for ecological disaster and its reality, 
via the occurrence of a series of large-scale technological disasters between 1976 and 
1986. Giddens's post-Chernobyl contact with Beck's work, combined with the fact of 
some basic and essential similarities between his theoretical position and Beck's, is 
likely to have been at the root of his enthusiasm for 'risk'. 
The Consequences of Modernity began life as a series of lectures given by 
Giddens at Stanford University in California in 1988 (Giddens, 1991: v). Although a 
small number of British social scientists had an interest in 'risk' at that time (see, for 
example, work cited by Adams, 1995, among which Irwin's (1985), Risk and the 
5 In their introduction to Risk SOciety, Brian Wynne and Scot Lash refer to the parallels 
between Giddens's work and Beck's, and stress the extent to which this development has 
occurred independently. Yet while it is certainly true that there were many concepts in 
Giddens's work which pre-figured the approach he has taken since The Consequences, it must 
remain a matter for speculation as to whether, in the absence of his contact with Beck, Giddens 
would have developed these concepts in the particular manner he has. 
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Control of Technology is a specifically sociological contribution),6 interest in risk was 
more highly developed in the United States. Buttel's (1987) review of the current state 
of development of environmental sociology, attributes the development of interest in 
technological risk and risk assessment, as a branch of environmental sociology, to 
accidents at Three Mile Island, Love Canal 'and related instances of technological 
hazards and the politicisation of risk assessment' (Buttel, 1987: 480). He cites a 
significant quantity of work on risk, either published or presented at conferences 
during the early 1980s by authors including Allan Schnaiberg, A. Mazur, D. Nelkin and 
M. Pollack, Mary Douglas and Aron Wildavsky, V.T. Covello, IF. Short Jr., Thomas 
Dietz and R.W. Rycroft, C. Perrow. None of this work, or indeed Butters own review, 
is referred to by Giddens. 
The accident at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania occurred in March 1979 (a 
date which, as Buttel suggests, is significant; the foundation of the American social 
science journal Risk Analysis in 1980 illustrates the point). Large scale environmental 
disaster was only narrowly averted after several features of a newly commissioned 
nuclear reactor malfunctioned simultaneously, releasing a quarter of a million gallons 
of radioactive water into the surrounding environment. It was later estimated that the 
plant had been a mere sixty minutes from core meltdown. Three Mile Island was closed 
after the accident, but in spite of mass public protest was re-opened in October 1985, 
when it suffered two further leaks of radioactivity during its first month of operation. 
(Elsworth, 1990: 438-442). 
Chernobyl, which occurred a mere six months later during the course of an 
'experiment', provided the American population with a dramatic example not just of 
what might have been - but also of what might be at Three Mile Island. The Chernobyl 
plant continued to release radioactive gas for ten days after the accident, and many 
thousands of people were evacuated from surrounding areas. It has been suggested 
that fatalities might eventually total 24,000 people over fifty years (Elsworth: 1990: 
6 The sociology of risk, according to Watts Miller (1996: 110-111), actually dates from 1897. 
Durkheim's Suicide according to this interpretation, offers 'an intemalist sociology of risk'. 
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77-91). An American Scientist who visited the USSR in the aftermath of Chernobyl 
made a public announcement in June 1987 to the effect that the probability of a core 
meltdown in the United States in the next twenty years was 'about fifty percent' 
(Robert Gale, cited in Elsworth, 1990: 81). 
It is, therefore, extremely likely that Giddens's American lectures, in which 'risk' 
is elevated to the position of a central causal element in the psychological constitution 
of the agent, were delivered to an audience in which the psychological condition he 
believes it engenders - 'angst' or 'dread' - was highly developed, at least for that 
particular moment (although its precise nature may have been different from Giddens's 
description of it (see Craib's critique: below p.240». This appears to reinforce yet 
again the importance of the relationship between the immediacy of 'external' events and 
the reception and popularity of sociological theories.7 
The concept of risk, as developed in The Consequences of Modernity, draws 
heavily on aspects of Beck's Risk Society thesis. Risk Society did not appear in English 
translation until 1992, although it was published in German in 1986 as 
Risikogesellschaft. Although Giddens is fluent in German, as indicated by his (1990) 
references to the German edition of Risk Society, and the many references to the 
German editions of the works of Marx and Weber in his early work (1971), it seems 
that his earliest contact with Beck's work was via his 1987 article 'Anthropological 
Shock: Chernobyl and the Contours of the Risk Society', which appeared in English in 
the Berkeley Journal of Sociology. Again, we should note in passing that Chemobyl, 
which differed significantly from other 'disasters' (including Three Mile Island, Seveso 
and Bhopal) in its global implications, is certain to have been a root cause of the early 
7 Of course, one could argue that TMI, Chernobyl, Bhopal and other 'disasters' were all media 
events and that many of the 'agents made anxious by them would simply not have known of 
them in the absense of their construction by T.V. crews and news reporters. One might also 
argue that, in the absense of 'scientific' knowledge of the possible consequences, anxiety might 
not have been so acute. In this case the psycho-sociological theory of risk anxiety might never 
have been constructed. The 'construction' of an event is a difference of scale, rather than 
substance. An 'event' that is socially constructed is nevertheless real. 
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translation oj this artie/e. None of Beck's earlier work achieved the international 
success of Risk Society. 
The Risk Society as a Consequence of Modernity: Ulrich Beck 
In the late twentieth century, Beck suggests, not only is the character of modernity 
altered, but so also is the political agenda. The big political, and therefore sociological, 
question - which used to be concerned with the just distribution of socially produced 
wealth - is today a question concerned with the prevention, minimisation, 
dramatisation and channelling of socially produced risks (1992: 19). Even this most 
basic introductory assertion begins to mark out Beck's difference from Giddens, who 
continues, in The Consequences, to address the 'problem of order' (Giddens, 1991a: 
14). Risk Society, which constitutes an attempt to map out the contours of this 
changed agenda, while keeping the question of the ecological crisis at its core, is 
correspondingly broad in scope and does not just address questions associated with the 
qualitatively altered risks produced by industrial society, but connects them to whole 
range of questions more traditionally associated with sociology - class, work, the 
family, gender relations and the self. 
Beck's core proposition is that in industrial society the production of wealth is 
accompanied by the production of risk. The reduction of human need has involved a 
corresponding production of hazards which are qualitatively different from all 
previously experienced hazards (1992: 19). These risks are ecological risks which are 
socially manufactured, global and invisible. Invisibility has especial significance for 
Beck, who uses radioactivity as a paradigm example of manufactured risk. Because we 
cannot seen what threatens us, scientific knowledge takes on a new significance. 
Global ecological risks are peculiarly open to both scientific and social definition and 
construction. This is the concept of risk - manufactured, global, high consequence, 
invisible - adopted by Giddens (1991a: 124-5). 
Modernisation risks, says Beck, are at first unequally distributed~ those most 
afllicted will be those at the bottom of the class structure. Eventually, however, risks 
come to have a levelling or democratising effect. Because they are 'piggy back' 
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products consumed in the air we breath or the food we eat, sooner or later even those 
at the top of the class structure become unable to avoid them. (Beck, 1992:35-42) 
The circularity of this social endangering can be generalised~ under the 
roof of modernisation risks, perpetrator and victim sooner or later 
become identical (1992: 38). 
Beck suggests that this endows ecological hazards with a novel political power. 
The boundaries dividing classes and nations dissolve, as does the artificial separation 
between nature and culture. Yet because ecological threats such as the poisoning of 
the food chain and the pollution of our water supply are at least initially invisible, they 
first have to be acknowledged or perceived. Several contributory factors operate in the 
perception of risk, most of which have to do with the operation of ' science'. 
Reflexivity 
Scientific knowledge and technologies are not only the root causes of ecological 
problems, but are also a source of solutions, as well as the medium through which risks 
become visible and hence open to definition. Beck identifies two phases in the 
development of the Risk Society: primary and reflexive 'scientization'. In the first phase 
scientific knowledge is applied to nature, people and society. In the second, confronted 
with its own products and mistakes (often the result of over-specialisation), scientific 
scepticism is applied to science itself Science and counter-science - the use of 
scientific methods to challenge or demystify scientific pronouncements of the degree of 
hazard presented by a particular production process or technology, are both vital 
elements in the perception of risk. Yet it is the very success of science that leads to this 
challenge to its authority, as the application of scepticism undermines its claims to 
certainty or truth. 
Risks which are scientifically reflexive are also politically reflexive. A risk 
which comes into the public sphere via a newspaper headline, Beck suggests, is 
politically reflexive, to the extent that it has the capacity to change the political agenda 
of the centre. Politics in industrial society has concerned itself with democracy and the 
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rights of citizens, while science and technology has to a great extent been immune from 
political intervention. 
Ecological risks, though, are only one side of the risk society. Changes in other 
spheres which are occurring simultaneously, overlap with and impact on individual risk 
positions. If one consequence of the transition to the risk society for individuals, is the 
creation of a generalised anxiety, traditional ways of dealing with that anxiety have 
become inadequate. The 'traditional' institutional forms of industrial society - the 
nuclear family, social class and gender roles, are dissolving under the impact of 
reflexive modernisation. The development of social security systems has produced 
social relations which have a high degree of stability at the same time as they remain 
unequal in terms of distribution, which has in turn enabled a surge of social 
individualisation, so that class commitments come to seem irrelevant. In addition, the 
geographical mobility demanded by industrial society has turned out to be incompatible 
with stable attachments to community or place and family and kin. 
The tendency is toward the emergence of individualised forms and 
conditions of existence, which compel people - for the sake of their 
own material survival, to make themselves the centre of their own 
planning and conduct oflife. (1992: 88) 
Under conditions of reflexive modernisation, everyone has to choose their own life 
course - creating a reflexive biography, which has the effect of shifting the problems 
created by 'the system' onto individuals so that failure is always personal failure. 
The centrality of reflexivity in Beck's Risk Society thesis reflects a 
corresponding feature of Giddens's earlier work. Reflexivity as a property of agents is a 
central tenet of structuration theory (1976, especially 120-24~ 42-3). Surveillance 
appears in 1981, and develops in subsequent work. In 1984, Giddens, writes of 
'reflexive self-regulation', causing a 'feedback effect in system reproduction', 
distinguishable from 'homeostatic loops' on the basis that it is a deliberate attempt to 
control system reproduction, rather than the outcome of unintended consequences 
(1984: 375; 376). In 1985 reflexivity becomes 'reflexively-monitored system 
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reproduction' involving surveillance, and the emphasis is on control (Giddens, 1985: 
178). By 1990 'institutional reflexivity is the constant examination and alteration of 
social practices in the light of new knowledge, and Giddens's emphasis is upon 
constant change (Giddens, [1990] 1991a: 38). For Beck, reflexivity means that 
modernity is 'becoming its own theme' (1992: 19). Giddens later introduces the idea 
that modernity is 'internally referential' (1991b: 150). 
Anxiety and the Dissolution of Tradition 
Beck's insistence on the dissolution of traditional forms of life under reflexive 
modernity, and the effects of this, to a great extent mirror Giddens's. The dissolution of 
tradition generates anxiety, according to Giddens, which can to some extent be 
countered by identification with symbols which promote community via national 
identity (1985, see above, p.224). He implies that environmentalist movements, as well 
as being an expression of the dialectic of control, have a similar function. Although the 
source of the anxiety, for Beck, is ecological risk primarily, rather than the dissolution 
of tradition (though it becomes coupled to this), the effects are identical: anxiety and a 
new search for new sources of security and identity. He suggests that 'risks 
experienced presume a normative horizon oflost security and broken trust' (1992: 28), 
and acknowledges the possibility that risk-anxiety can be 'easily' repressed by agents 
(ibid: 48-9), so that it is by no means clear whether, and what sort of, action might 
result from anxiety. 
... [It] is still completely unclear how the binding force of anxiety 
operates, even whether it works. To what extent can anxiety 
communities withstand stress? What motives and forces for action do 
they set in motion? Wlli the social power of anxiety actually break 
individual judgements of utility? How capable of compromise are 
anxiety-producing communities of danger? In what forms of action will 
they organise? Will anxiety drive people to irrationalism, extremism or 
fanaticism? So far, anxiety has not been a foundation for rational action. 
Is this assumption no loner valid either? Is anxiety - unlike material 
need - perhaps a very shaky foundation for political movements? Can 
the community of anxiety perhaps even be blown apart by the weak 
draft of counter information? (1992: 48-9). 
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Thus, the anxiety that results from the existence of high consequence risks, in Beck's 
view, might be either repressed or successfully countered by the assertions of those 
who retain an interest in keeping things as they are, leading to more of the same -
more industrial society, more reflexive modernisation, more risk-creation and more 
industrial-capitalist opportunities for risk-avoidance products (1992:224-8). 
Alternatively, the insecurity caused by risk-anxieties might result in the attempt at 
'democratising' risks. This would entail bringing techno-scientific development under 
control of the political centre, through the establishment of an 'ecolOgical variant of 
the welfare state', with the attendant danger that it might turn out to be hierarchical, 
authoritarian, bureaucratic - in short a step in the direction of totalitarian rule by the 
political centre - a development both unlikely and undesirable (ibid.: 228-231). A 
better solution, for Beck, would lie in the recognition of the 'unbinding of politics' (the 
loss of function of the political centre). He would prefer to see politics differentiated 
into various institutionalised sub-political groups, established for the purpose of 
formalised social critique, which could then discuss the impact of, and alternative to 
proposed techno-scientific developments before such developments were even 
researched (ibid: 231-5) 
Beck links the anxiety caused by the development of risk to the anxiety 
resulting from changes in the social structure. The New Social Movements, in his view, 
represent a response to both forms of anxiety . 
... on the one hand the new social movements (ecology, peace, 
feminism) are expressions of the new risk situation in the risk society. 
On the other they result from the search for social and personal 
identities and commitments in detraditionalized culture.(1992: 90) 
There is much more in Risk Society than this. In particular, Beck lays great emphasis 
on the decline in lay trust in expert systems, the separation of the political from the 
economic (which has co-opted institutionalised science), the increasingly redundant 
role of the political centre, and the role of sub-politics, including the environmental 
movement, in redefining the political agenda to address the problem of ecological risk. 
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Yet he remains cautious about the possibilities for positive change, suggesting that the 
most likely future is more of the same - more global, manufactured, high consequence 
modernisation risks, which spawn more risk industries in a spurious attempt to 
minimise, deny or deal with them. 
Realism VerSUS Constructivism 
In spite of Hannigan's assertion that Beck 'contradicts himself', through his 
simultaneous insistence on the socially constructed nature of risk and on the real 
dangers they refer to (Hannigan 1995: 184), his somewhat apocalyptic tone leaves us 
with no doubt that he believes that 'modernisation risks' have an objective existence 
that is independent of our knowledge of them. He appears to be under no illusions with 
respect to the extent of the entrenched interests which continue to be dominant in 
contemporary society. Yet at the same time, his concluding question has a tone of 
cautious optimism: 
Behind the fa~des of the good old industrial society that are still being 
propped up, could it be that, alongside the many risks and dangers, 
forms of this new division of labour and power between politics and 
sub-politics are already beginning to stand out and be practised today? 
(Beck, 1992: 235) 
Hannigan suggests that Beck's contradictory assertions are illustrative of a 'long 
standing tension' between the Human Exemptionalists and the New Ecologists, 
concerning 'the role of sociological analyst versus the role of environmental activist' 
(op cit.). Whatever the truth of this suggestion, the urgency of Beck's tone provides a 
welcome antidote to Giddens's ultimate conclusion, which asserts that there is no way 
out - we must simply accept, and learn to live with, the riskiness of risk (1994:249). 
The Risk Socidy as a Consequence of l\fodemity: Anthony Giddens 
In his book length critique of Giddens, published in 1992, Ian Craib suggests that The 
Consequences is 'significant not least because in this text, he takes up issues that are 
excluded by his theoretical system' (Craib, 1992: 106). Craib does not link Giddens's 
use of the concept of risk with his reading of Beck, which is not really surprising in 
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view of the fact that Risk Society did not appear in English until that year, by which 
time Craib's own book was complete, as well as the fact that Giddens's 
acknowledgement of Beck in The Consequences is minimal (three references in total -
one short quote from the Berkeley Journal article, two references to concepts used in 
Risk Society: 'the end of the other' and 'socialised nature'). 
Much of The Consequences, in fact, goes over old ground. Giddens retraces 
briefly the 'shortcomings in established sociological positions' he has elaborated in 
earlier works (1976, 1981). He identifies the discontinuous character of modernity in 
the pace and scope of change and in the nature of modem institutions (1985), and 
proposes, in The Consequences, to discuss two aspects of modem institutions 
primarily: security versus danger, and trust versus risk. 
In Giddens's earlier writing, security and trust were related to one another via 
the concept of motivation. In 1984 he approaches it via a discussion of the work of 
Erikson, and the development of basic trust in early infancy (1984: 51-60). 
... the initial formation of trust occurs... against the background of 
diffuse anxiety, control of which suggests itself as the most generalised 
motivational origin of human conduct. (1984: 54) 
The control of anxiety through the creation of a system of basic trust is the 
foundation of an agent's sense of 'ontological security', the maintenance of which, for 
Giddens, leads directly to the routinization of everyday life, and is thus implicated in 
the reproduction of structure. 
Ordinary day to day social life... involves an ontological security 
founded on an autonomy of bodily control within predicable routines 
and encounters. The routinized character of the paths along which 
individuals move in the reversible time of daily life does not just 
'happen'. It is 'made to happen' by the modes of reflexive monitoring of 
action which individuals sustain in circumstances of so-presence. The 
'swamping' of habitual modes of activity by anxiety that cannot be 
adequately contained by the basic security system is specifically a 
feature of critical situations. In ordinary social life individuals have a 
motivated interest in sustaining the forms of tact and 'repair' ... Tact is a 
mechanism whereby agents are able to reproduce the conditions of 
'/rUst' or ontological security within which more primal tensions can be 
canalized and managed... [TJhere is a generalized motivational 
commitment to the integration of habitual practices across time and 
space. (1984: 64 emphasis added)' 
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Security and trust are a central part of structuration theory. Risk and danger 
are the new themes that appear in The Consequences as symptomatic of the 'darker 
side of modernity' (1991: 7). They are not only here opposed to security and trust, but, 
as in Beck's book are made to perfonn as concepts through which the ecological crisis 
can be included in a substantive analysis of modem society. 
Giddens takes off from familiar ground. Modernity's peculiarly 'dynamic' nature 
results first from the separation of time and space, and their recombination in precise 
time-space 'zones' (1981, 1984). Among other effects, this separation is the prime 
condition of a second cause of discontinuity: disembedding. Disembedding refers to the 
way in which social relations are lifted out of specific time-space locales under 
condition of modernity. Institutional reflexivity is a third causal factor. These three 
institutional features of modernity explain its similarity to a 'careering juggernaut' 
rather than a well-controlled car (1991: 53). Risk emerges as an unintended 
consequence of institutional reflexivity and is approached by Giddens in The 
Consequences via its relationship with trust in a de-traditionalising world. 
In The Consequences, Giddens connects trust with expert systems and 
symbolic tokens (two major 'disembedding' mechanisms). The character of trust here 
appears to have changed in an important way, since it is not vested in another person 
or persons, but in the system's 'abstract capacities', most often on the basis of flimsy or 
inadequate knowledge (1991: 26-8). In spite of appearances, however, Giddens is keen 
to maintain his earlier understanding of the nature of trust. Following Luhmann, he 
argues that trust is to be understood in relation to risk, but where for Luhmann the 
term 'risk' implies an awareness of danger, a conscious weighing of alternatives, and an 
active decision to 'trust', for Giddens 'trust' is a more continuous, ongoing state of 
affairs, upon which a generalised awareness of risk impinges, resulting not in mistrust, 
but in the underlying feeling of angst or existential dread, akin to his earlier conception 
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of the diffuse anxiety which the development of basic trust overcomes (1991a: 30-32~ 
100). Giddens here defines trust in terms of 
... confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given 
set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in 
the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract 
principles (technical knowledge). (1991: 34) 
Here is one source of Craib's anxiety about The Consequences. Giddens has 
clung to the centrality of trust as a condition of ontological security, even extending 
the importance of trust to agents' trust in the abstract systems of modernity. This is to 
misconstrue the nature of trust, Craib suggests, since it is possible for someone to be 
perfectly secure 'ontologically', yet to have a sceptical attitude towards abstract 
systems - or for the reverse to be true (Craib, 1992: 170-171). 
According to Giddens, trust exists under condition of modernity in the context 
of a generalised awareness of the impact of human activity upon the material world 
where the transformative scope of that activity is vastly greater than at any time in the 
past. Because of this generalised awareness, 'risk' now replaces fate, as the calculated 
courting of (socially created) dangers which threaten desired outcomes. 'What is seen 
as "acceptable risk" - the minimising of danger - varies in different contexts, but is 
usually central in sustaining trust' (1991a: 35). Security is a situation where particular 
dangers are successfully counteracted or minimised, and is usually achieved 
(individually and collectively) through a balance of trust and acceptable risk. 
In Modernity, where social relations have become disembedded from local 
contexts of time and place, relations of trust are a vital part of processes of the re-
embedding of action in specific time-space locales. Giddens suggests that the re-
embedding of disembedded social relations occurs at 'access points' in abstract systems 
where 'faceless commitments' (blind trust) become 'facework commitments' (trust 
based on co-presence) (1991a:87-8). Agents have a generalised motivational 
commitment towards trust in others, resulting from the development of basic trust in 
infancy, though the influence of the hidden curriculum in socialisation is also 
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important, since children are imbued with a sense of respect for scientific or technical 
knowledge of all kinds, which in adulthood co-exists with a pragmatic scepticism in an 
attitude of both trust and ambivalence (1991a: 88-90). This means that access points, 
where scepticism or ambivalence co-exist in tension with attitudes of trust, not only 
become 'acknowledged sources of wlnerability for abstract systems' but also for 
agents, who are unable to opt out of the institutions of modernity entirely (1991a:91-
2). 
The force of Craib's criticism becomes apparent, as Giddens develops his 
arguments concerning the relation between trust in both people and things and 
ontological security. 
Trust, ontological security, and a feeling of the continuity of things and 
persons remain closely bound up with one another in the adult 
personality. Trust in the reliability of non-human objects, it follows 
from this analysis, is based upon a more primitive faith in the reliability 
and nurturance of human individuals. Trust in others is a psychological 
need ofa persistent and recurrent kind.{l99 1 a: 97) 
The agent who persistently worries about the threat of nuclear war becomes, according 
to this interpretation, abnormal, or ill. This is not the case because the threat is an 
imaginary one, but because it is not "normal" for an agent to be unable to block out 
such anxieties. The necessary basic dose of trust in infancy acts as an inoculation 
against the 'ontological anxieties to which all human beings are potentially subject' (93-
4). 
Trust, then, becomes a necessary prerequisite for the maintenance of both the 
agent and the social system. But if 'security' is obtained somewhere in the balance 
between trust and acceptable risk, this balance begins to break down in modernity, due 
to its 'dynamic' nature. Humanly created high consequence global risks have a vastly 
increased scope and intensity, which is different in kind from all pre-modem risks. The 
fact that many people are not only aware of the existence of this type of risk, but also 
aware of the limitations of 'expert systems' in terms of risk, has profound consequences 
for ontological security (1991 a: 131). 
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It is impossible to allow these risks to impinge too thoroughly upon our day to 
day lives, Giddens suggests. Indeed, the agent who does so is likely to be thought, and 
indeed is, according to Giddens's own account of what it means to be ontologically 
secure, 'disturbed' (1991a: 133). This is a dangerous position, since the implication that 
a failure to block out the anxiety caused by the threat of nuclear war (which Giddens 
himself acknowledges is real) amounts to mental illness could be taken as a licence for 
the treatment of opposition as deviance.8 Yet as Craib points out, 'Ontological security 
is not the same as feeling safe' (1992: 176), and a failure to 'block out' the anxiety 
brought on by the threat of nuclear war or a nuclear accident may be a perfectly 
justifiable and 'normal' human response. 
Anxiety is not the only result of high consequence risks, however. Agents are 
forced to acknowledged their lack of control, and a belief in 'fate' - the notion that que 
sera sera, reappears 
at the core of a world which is supposedly taking rational control of its 
own affairs. Moreover, this surely exacts a price on the level of the 
unconscious, since it essentially presumes the repression of anxiety. The 
sense of dread which is the antithesis of basic trust is likely to infuse 
unconscious sentiments about the uncertainties faced by humanity as a 
whole.(1991: 133) 
Here is a second source of Craib's dissatisfaction with The Consequences. The 
re-appearance of 'fate', or the experience of modernity as a ~uggemaut' which we 
cannot control, appears to be at odds with his previous insistence on the 
knowledgeability of agents (Craib, 1992: 106). Craib's criticism has some force, which 
is easily seen if we juxtapose Giddens's insistence on structuration as the outcome of 
the transformative activities of knowledgeable agents with the image of agents who 
feel powerless, and are made anxious in the face of structural forces over which they 
have no control. 
8 The Criminal Justice Act, in fact, does treat certain forms of protest as deviance. 
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Risk and Structuration Theory 
Giddens's incorporation of environmental issues as 'risk', then, remains firmly 
embedded within structuration theory, while at the same time introducing issues -
society is like a juggernaut out of control - which appear to confound his previous 
assertions about the knowledgeability of agents and the 'virtual' nature of structures, 
which are perpetually open to the constitutive or transformatory activities of agents. 
By contrast, The Consequences argues that the existence of high consequence global 
risks causes a high level of anxiety, which, in order for the agent to be able to continue 
to act, must be repressed. Yet Giddens describes four adaptive reactions typically 
made by agents as a result of living with high intensity, life threatening, ineradicable 
risks: pragmatic acceptance, sustained optimism, cynical pessimism, radical 
engagement, or a mixture of these. In relation to these reactions Giddens discusses 
briefly a range of 'dialectically related frameworks of experience' (1991a: 139-149) 
which allow him to draw the optimistic conclusion that 'modernity's inherent reflexivity 
and ... many opportunities for collective organisation within the polyarchic systems of 
modem nation-states' will lead to active engagement with, rather than a retreat from, 
risk (1991a: 149). The forms of such engagement, at the level of the agent are later 
developed in Modernity and Self Identity. The long-awaited third volume of Giddens's 
contemporary critique of historical materialism, Beyolld Left and Right (1994) is an 
attempt to develop a radical politics appropriate to this 'risk' society. 
In these two later volumes, contrary to Craib's (1992: 180) assessment, in 
which he suggests that he has had to recognise the powerlessness of the agent, 
Giddens begins to reassert the importance of the transformative capacities of 
knowledgeable agents, who, provided with appropriate social and political conditions, 
will begin to respond in appropriate ways to the issue of the ecological crisis. His 
sociology can be seen, therefore, like Hobhouse's, as providing a foundation for a 
'New' political theory. His status as environmental sociologist, in the final analysis, 
rests on the adequacy of his political solutions. 
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Political Solutions to Environmental Problems 
In Modernity And Self Identity Giddens writes that to be 'ontologically secure is to 
possess, on the level of the unconscious and practical consciousness, answers to 
fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses' (1991b: 
47). These questions - to do with human mortality, relations between humanity and 
nature, and intersubjectivity, have been 'sequestered' or repressed by abstract systems. 
Yet in circumstances where the self has to be reflexively made, the fragility of an 
ontological security system constructed on the flimsy basis of an internally referential 
social system becomes transparent to the agent - creating a problem in respect of the 
'authenticity' of self identity. Giddens insists upon the ways in which agents are 
enabled, in 'Late Modernity', to re-connect with basic moral or existential questions at 
'fateful moments', as well as through sexuality, the reconstruction of tradition, the 
resurgence of spirituality (re-enchantment?), and New Social Movements. The only 
institutional or structural evidence offered at this point for 'the return of the repressed' 
is the shift towards 'decarceration' of both prisoners and the mentally ill (1991 b: 202-
208). 9 Giddens acknowledges the extent to which this can be seen as stemming from 
purely economic motives, but insists that it may also be seen as 'a means of 
encouraging "normal" individuals to face the potentially perturbing questions raised by 
those who fail to adhere to central norms governing social life', leading to the 
revelation of the contingent, fragile and possibly arbitrary nature of conventional ways 
of being (1991b: 204-5). 
Widespread acknowledgement of the contingent status of social "normality" is 
a prerequisite for the emergence of life politics, defined as a politics of choice or 'life 
decisions' (1991b: 215). Life politics has implications at both an individual, and a 
9 As I write this, the British government has just purchased a 'prison ship' from the United 
States, in an attempt to deal with the problem of a rapidly expanding prison population. 
(Guardian, 12.03.97, p.1) In view of this, the suggestion that there is a trend towards 
decarceration (in Britain at any rate) looks a little dubious. 
246. 
global level, in the inter-connection between 'personal lives' and 'planetary needs' 
(I991b: 217-223). 
A clear part of increased ecological concern is the recognition that 
reversing the degradation of the environment depends upon adopting 
new lifestyle patterns. By far the greatest amount of ecological damage 
derives from the modes of life followed in the modernised sectors of 
world society. . . . Widespread changes in lifestyle, coupled with a de-
emphasis on continual economic accumulation, will almost certainly be 
necessary if the ecological risks we now face are to be minimised. 
(1991b: 222) 
Giddens, then, is suggesting that, if they are to be found at all, solutions to 
environmental problems will be found in the emergence of ' life politics'. 
Life Politics 
In Beyond Left and Right, Giddens's first priority is the extension of democracy 
(Giddens 1994: 124-133~ see also Beck, 1992: 231-5, and 1995, in particular 180-4). 
Democratisation on its own, however, is insufficient, in view of the 'intrusive influence 
of inequality' (1994: 132). The redistribution of wealth and income, however, is not on 
Giddens's political agenda (ibid: 166). Democratisation requires a programme of 
emancipatory politics, in combination with the implementation of 'generative politics' 
as an aid to the expansion of 'life politics', thus creating the conditions under which 
agents are able to make (appropriate) life decisions and life style changes (1994: IS). 
Giddens offers several examples of how generative politics might work in 
conjunction with life politics. The latter emphasises the importance of lifestyle change 
as a means of combating 'risk'. In the case of various cancers, this means choosing not 
to smoke, choosing to keep out of the sun, to eat particular foods, and to avoid toxic 
substances at work and at home (1994: 154). These examples are illustrative of 
Giddens's liberal perspective - they require very little in the way of policy at the level of 
the state, and much from the autonomous knowledgeable agent, who must exercise the 
capacity for rational choice. There is no suggestion that cigarette manufacture should 
be forcibly stopped, though Giddens does advocate a ban on advertising as a cheap and 
simple anti-smoking measure operating at the level of the state policy (ibid. ISS). 
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Neither does he acknowledge the difficulties inherent in the unequal distribution of 
wealth with respect to the 'choice' ofa good diet. Yet where the cheapest loafofwhite 
sliced bread costs less than thirty pence in comparison to a pound or more for an 
organically produced wholemeal loaf, this issue has surely to be addressed. 
Structuration theory acknowledges the power differentials inherent in the unequal 
distribution of both authoritative and allocative resources, but Giddens's conception of 
life politics appears to leave open the question of how agents are supposed to choose 
to avoid toxic substances at home, when, first of all, they may have no way of knowing 
what toxic substances are contained in household products or food (or which toxins 
might be produced by combining different substances). Secondly, an agent might feel 
that any job - even if it involves working with toxins - is better than none at all, if the 
alternative is to deprive the family of other 'choices'. 
At the level of policy Giddens suggests primary prevention - similar methods to 
those which have been useful in persuading people not to take up smoking could be 
used to change attitudes and social norms with respect to violent crimes or domestic 
violence; and secondary prevention would involve therapeutic help for victims of 
violence as well as for those prone to be violent. Finally, measures must be taken to 
respond to pathological behaviours, whether smoking or violence, once they have 
already occurred - as well as treating the effects of the behaviour, this means 'making 
sure that individuals subsequently alter their lifestyle habits' (ibid. 156). Giddens's 
examples are selective. Readers could be forgiven for wondering why he chooses to 
focus so heavily on smoking as risk, instead of, perhaps, on the lifestyle changes 
required for the avoidance of toxins at work. Could it be that this particular example, 
rather than any of the others, functions more efficiently to focus attention on the thing 
that Giddens want to focus on above all - the issue of autonomous choice? He stops 
short of recommending that car use should be legally banned from city centres, or that 
employers be required to stop using toxic substances in the workplace, or that food 
labelling should tell the consumer about potentially harmful ingredients, just as he stops 
short of the suggestion that cigarette manufacture might be prevented. Life style 
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change as a remedy for environmental degradation is to be largely the responsibility of 
the ordinary citizen. 
Much of Giddens's discussion of environmental problems at a global level 
reinforces this point. The Brandt Report was wrong to suggest the transfer of funds 
from rich to poor countries, he says. An 'alternative' set of reforms is necessary, 
beginning from the developing rather than the developed world. Giddens betrays his 
ethnocentric bias here (see above, p.228). He postulates the need for a programme of 
alternative development which aims to prevent poor countries from modernising. Key 
words here are self help, self reliance, integrity, and responsibility (1994: 159-162). 
This is a programme which appears to re-introduce the Classical Liberal idea of 
philanthropy as a duty, since it requires 'intervention from "big battalions" - states, 
businesses and international organisations' (1994: 162). Alternative development for 
rich countries involves the attempt to bring rich and poor closer together without re-
distributing wealth or income (ibid. 166) 
It is perhaps surprising that Giddens's solutions say very little about capitalism 
or the activities of national or transnational corporations, or the relations between 
capitalist organisations and States, since the enemy, as he describes it, is 'productivism'. 
This is the 'ethos of industry' (ibid. 140) or 'continuous economic growth' (ibid. 163). 
Although he insists on the need for efficient use of energy and resources in production 
(ibid: 178), the primary focus is again on the agent, whose lifestyle must alter in order 
to appreciate the fact that money does not necessarily bring happiness. Closing the gap 
involves an 'effort bargain', rather than the redistribution of wealth, as the basis of a 
pact between rich and poor: 
A generative model of equality, or equalization, could provide the basis 
of a new pact between the atlluent and the poor. Such a pact would be 
an 'effort bargain' founded on lifestyle change. Its motivating forces 
would be the acceptance of mutual responsibility for tackling the 'bads' 
which development has brought in its train~ the desirability of lifestyle 
change on the part of both the privileged and the less privileged~ and a 
wide notion of welfare, taking the concept away from economic 
provision for the deprived towards the fostering of the autotelic self. 
(1994:194) 
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Put in this way, it sounds as though the solutions to environmental problems lie 
wholly at the feet of individuals. The poor, at home and in developing countries, must 
choose to stay poor, while the rest of us must choose to take our bottles to the bottle 
bank, recycle our tins and plastic bags, and make a New Year's resolution to use the 
car less often! 
Democracy and Corporate Power 
Giddens is quite correct, of course, to insist on the necessity for lifestyle change, but 
his discussion of generative politics, life politics and notions of positive welfare as 
solutions to environmental problems is lacking in some basic respects. First, democracy 
(as he acknowledges) is hardly likely to be served by a continuation of inequality. Yet 
in refusing to address the issue of the radical redistribution of wealth - on both a 
national and a global level, Giddens ignores the possibility that environmental problems 
might not only be mitigated at the expense of social justice, but that they might fail to 
be mitigated at all. As Andrew Rowell (1996), and Stauber and Rampton (1995) have 
shown, transnational corporations can and do invest considerable time, money and 
personnel in the effort to discredit environmental activists and win the public over to 
their side. 
Stauber and Rampton cite William Greider, whose (1992) book Who Will Tell 
the American People? The Betrayal of American Democracy describes how one public 
relations firm manufactures anti-environmentalist support, by telephoning ordinary 
citizens allover America and offering to write letters on their behalf in support of oil, 
chemical tobacco and pharmaceutical companies. The sophisticated level of the cynical 
manipulation of knowledgeable and reflexive agents by capitalist organisations, 
involved in such activities is strikingly revealed by the words of one public relations 
worker cited by Stauber and Rampton. In an address to a conference entitled 'Shaping 
Public Opinion: If You Don't Do It Somebody Else Will', John Davis of Davis 
Communications explained how his company manufactured an anti-environmentalist 
campaign: 
"We want to assist them with letter-writing. We get them on the 
phone, and while we're on the phone we say, 'Will you write a letter?' 
'Sure.' 'Do you have time to write it?' 'Not really.' 'Could we write the 
letter for you?' . . . Just hold, we have a writer standing by". 
The call is then passed on to .. [an] employee who creates what 
appears to be a personal letter to be sent to the appropriate public 
official: 
"If they're close by, we hand deliver it. We hand-write it out on 'little 
kitty cat stationery' if it's a little old lady. If it's a business we take it 
over to be photocopied on someone else's letterhead. [We] use different 
stamps, different envelopes . . . Getting a pile of personalised letters 
that have a different look to them is what you want to strive for". (John 
Davis, cited in Stauber and Rampton (1995), 175) 
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This example illustrates the lengths to which multi-national corporations are 
prepared to go, covertly, to manufacture anti-environmental sentiment. Examples 
could be multiplied of the more overt use of unequal power and resources on the part 
of both multi-national corporations and States to repress environmental protest - even 
to the extent of using physical force. Most notably, Rowell (1996) points to the 
execution of Ken Saro Wiwa, the sinking of the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior, 
and the violent repression of road protests. 
Structuration theory acknowledges the importance of knowledge, and 
technologies of surveillance, as resources which, when unequally distributed, 
exacerbate inequalities of power, and allows some agents to exploit others. There is 
substantial and increasing evidence that such exploitation does occur. Yet Giddens 
chooses to ignore both this and Beck's anxiety that environmental issues as risk might 
simply be defined away by industry 'experts'. 
Purdue (1995) in his account of the first UK National Consensus Conference 
on Plant Biotechnology in 1994, has shown how the conference format and discussions 
were defined and manipulated by 'experts', to the advantage of the biotechnology 
industry, who were revealed, in the conference's opening speeches, to have funded it 
for the purposes of correcting public misunderstandings about biotechnology, to 
educate the public to accept the ideas of experts and to facilitate the industry's 
momentum (purdue, 1995: 172). 
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Giddens's insistence on voluntary life style change on the part of knowledgeable 
agents, then, blinds him to the importance of the superior capacities of corporations in 
terms of both allocative and authoritative resources, even though the principles of 
strucuration theory, in which his radical politics continues to be based, highlight the 
possibilities for domination and exploitation inherent in unequal possession of 
resources. 
Individual Power and Consumer Choice 
There is one other centrally important point connected with the question of unequal 
distribution. It is an issue touched on briefly by Beck in Risk Society (1992: 131-3),10 
one that is picked up by Goldblatt in his outline of his own theoretical position (1996: 
188), and one that is discussed by Giddens in both Modemity and Self Idcntity and 
Beyond Left and Right. This is the issue of consumption. 
Beck points to the ways in which individuals become increasingly subject to 
new forms of social control in conditions of reflexive modernisation. The process has 
been not only one of individualisation - but also of standardisation, so that individuals 
have less 'individual autonomous private existence' than before (1992: 131). Beck's 
discussion is brief but informative: market dependency, mass consumption, television, 
even education are examples of institutional opportunities for new types of influence 
and control (ibid: 132-3) 
As a consequence the floodgates are opened wide for the 
subjectivization and individualisation of risks and contradictions 
produced by institutions and society. The institutional conditions that 
determine individuals are no longer just events and conditions that 
happen to them but, but also consequenccs of the decisions they 
themselves have made, which they must view and treat as such. 
(1992:136) 
The result is that failure comes to be viewed as personal failure, even if is has 
institutional causes. Thus Beck acknowledges the ways in which 'choice', while not by 
10 Curiously, Beck does not discuss consumption in either of his subsequent publicatioos: 
Ecological Politics In An Age Of Risk ([1988] 1995), Ecological Enlightenment 
([1991]1995). 
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any means illusory, can be institutionalised and constrained, while simultaneously 
highlighting the ways in which the 'freedom to choose' functions to mask institutional 
or structural causes of individual problems. 
Goldblatt points out the paradox inherent in the fact that material prosperity, 
which generates environmental politics in the first place, is simultaneously its greatest 
opponent. 
The kinds of changes in consumption and definition of well being 
required to bring western societies within the orbit of sustainability are 
both extensive in their coverage and intensive in their consequence. 
Everyone will be affected in such a transition. Negotiated social change 
of this form is an enormous political task. At the same time, the political 
and legal systems of capitalist societies are not neutral but structurally 
biased in their allocation of power to environmentally problematic 
interests. (1996: 188-9) 
Radical changes in patterns of consumption are thus centrally important for the 
resolution of environmental problems, but the unequal distribution of power is inimical 
to such radical change in consumption patterns on the part of the wealthy. 
In Modernity and Self Identity, Giddens acknowledges that capitalism is 
dependent on the consumption of commodities, but does not see commodification as 
too much ofa problem. Capitalism commodifies (and is thus a form of sequestration or 
mediation of experience), but agents re-appropriate. 'Even the most oppressed of 
individuals' he suggests 'react creatively and interpretatively to processes of 
commodification which impinge on their lives' (1991b: 199). This is, of course, true, 
but while the capacity to create an individual style of dress from mass produced and 
marketed garments (ibid: 200) may illustrate the extent to which agents are 
knowledgeable and reflexive within the bounds of what is acceptable and available 
within a social system in terms of rules and resources, it does not suggest a radical 
change in patterns of consumption. 
The entire thesis of Beyond Left and Right, on the other hand, is bound up with 
the notion of a change in patterns of consumption. Giddens's notion of a post-scarcity 
society, on the 'other side' of capitalism, owes much to the anthropologist Marshall 
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SaWins who suggested that the so-called primitive societies were defined not so much 
by a paucity of goods as by a paucity of needs (Sahlins, 1972). Yet he stops short of 
any attempt to theorise need beyond the most fleeting of references to Maslow's 
(1962) hierarchy of needs (1994: 165-6), which leads him into a discussion of the 
importance of the need for self actualisation, above all. The road to self actualisation, 
according to this argument, lies in the psychological capacity of agents to overcome 
compulsions or addictions as the key to human happiness. It surely does not need to be 
stated, however, that when it falls below a certain level, consumption can and does 
impinge upon agents' capacity for self-actualisation. How much is enough? And how 
would a notion of sufficiency be sustained when those who are to be content with a 
sufficiency are daily confronted with the life styles of those who have more? 
Are agents who have been persuaded into the culture of consumption by the 
'magic system' of capitalist marketing (Williams, 1980); who have been manipulated 
until they can no longer tell the difference between 'true' and 'false' needs (Galbraith, 
1958); who are caught in the confusion of a proliferation of messages about the real 
properties of the 'goods' they buy (Leiss, 1978) - really as knowledgeable as Giddens 
suggests? Perhaps they are knowledgeable, and reflexive, but not quile so 
knowledgeable nor so refleXive as the owners of capitalist corporations whose 'goods' 
they have little choice but to buy - not just for survival, but 'whatever the custom of the 
country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be 
without' (Adam Smith, 1776, cited in Schudson, 1984: 132). 
Giddens does indeed acknowledge the problem of relative poverty - and its 
effects on the capacity to be a 'creditable' agent (1994: 98) - but his refusal to consider 
alternatives to capitalism, or to begin to work out a theory of 'need' (or of necessary 
consumption), severely limits his analysis in respect of social justice. Doyal and Gough 
(1991), whose vision of the good society as one that liberates through 'the optimisation 
of significant choice within and between cultural forms of life' appears to be very 
similar to Giddens's, argue that 
'a belief in the existence of human needs in conjunction with a 
consistent belief in a moral vision of the good lends strong support for a 
moral code that the needs of all people should be satisfied to the 
optimum extent' (1991: III). 
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Paradoxically, in view of the fact that their ultimate vision is similar, as are 
some of their premises (drawing on aspects of both liberal and socialist theory) and 
some of their conclusions about the nature of need, particularly their insistence on the 
centrality of autonomy as a basic human need, Doyal and Gough propose very different 
means for the promotion of optimal need satisfaction. Radical redistribution is both 
desirable and necessary for global need satisfaction. The theoretical and practical 
difficulties with this position are abundant, as they acknowledge when they point out 
that historical variations in social arrangements make it unlikely that optimal need 
satisfaction will be straightforward in practice. There is likely to be disagreement about 
the effectiveness of particular technologies, and appropriate social policies. Other 
problems arise from the recognition of resource constraints. Who is to get what when 
there is simply not enough to go around? This problem is presented as a fundamental 
conflict of interest between different groups, which is likely to be exacerbated by 
existent inequalities in access to, or ownership of, resources . 
. . . [O]ne open question is the extent to which people who are already 
privileged will be willing democratically to put the satisfaction of needs 
before preferences, and the extent to which it will be morally acceptable 
to reduce their autonomy through forcing them to do so in the name of 
the rights of the poor.(1991: 118) 
Surely it is preferable to pose this as a problem for the optimum satisfaction of 
need, than to simply assume, as Giddens appears to do, that all self-actualised agents 
will develop this conviction of their own accord through the discovery of a set of 
universal values via 'life political' activities? Doyal and Gough acknowledge the 
importance of the extension of democracy for solutions to the problem of such basic 
conflicts of interests, which involves both a decentralisation of politics (akin to Beck's 
(1992: 231-235) 'differential politics'), and a strong central democratic state (Doyal 
and Gough, 1991: 119). 
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Both Giddens and Doyal and Gough discuss Rawls and Habermas ell route 
(Giddens, 1991b: 213-4; Doyal and Gough, 1991: 120-141), yet where the former 
arrives at his theory of the emergence and centrality of ' life politics' in conjunction with 
the extension of democracy, the latter are led to propose that the refusal to 
redistribute is morally indefellsible. They argue for the creation of an international 
need tax, within the developed nations, and suggest that 'the ideal agency for world 
redistribution would be a democratic world government'. On its own, however, even 
this would be inadequate if it neglected to safeguard the environment, both in respect 
of current generations and of future generations. This leads them to suggest an 
international political authority for the legal regulation of environmental pollution. 
Of course, such an authority would stand no chance of success unless 
its regulatory activity were combined with an international reallocation 
of goods and services which would make it economically feasible for 
underdeveloped countries to act accordingly. (Doyal and Gough, 1991: 
143) 
Having expanded Rawls's 'veil of ignorance' to include ignorance about what 
gender actors in the original position might be, or what country they might be born in, 
Doyal and Gough then expand it further to include ignorance about whether they 
would be born into the present or some (undefined) future, thus constructing an 
argument in favour of long-term environmental conservation policies (ibid: 144-146). 
They go on to discuss a range of social and other indicators which may be used for the 
practical measurement of specific need-satisfaction in different social and cultural 
contexts. 
Doyal and Gough's approach to the fulfilment of need, then, of necessity 
involves the global redistribution of goods and services as a conditioll of the extensioll 
of democracy. Giddens evades any serious discussion of this problem by stating simply 
that his new politics would not neglect the material resources which might allow 
individuals to negotiate changes in their life circumstances (1994: 187), before referring 
the reader back to the 'goods relevant to the pursuit of happiness: security, self-
respect, self actualisation' (ibid: 191). 
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This really will not do. Giddens's 'utopian realism' results in the over-simplified 
portrayal of a fantastical social order in which the unemployed are not down-hearted or 
demoralised by wishing for a job, but acknowledge that 'unemployment' is a subjective 
condition one can think oneself out of (ibid: 186)~ a social order where old people are 
fit and healthy due to their exemplary life style practices, so are not dumped on the 
scrap heap of industry at an arbitrary sixty five, but instead enabled to work - not out 
of dull economic necessity, but for the intrinsic satisfaction work brings (ibid: 170-1)~ a 
social order in which crime and domestic violence has been eradicated by strategic 
prevention campaigns and therapeutic programmes (ibid: 155-6)~ and in which a 
politics of individual lifestyle choice will lead us to a set of universal values consonant 
with environmental damage limitation via the return of repressed existential questions. 
Life politics is not a politics of the environment, since it is devoid of any 
realistic suggestions for the radical social and institutional changes necessary for any 
serious consideration of either local or global environmental issues. Nor does it have 
any valid conception of how a socially just society might be created. The two problems 
are linked, for as Goldblatt points out, the question of how to persuade 'the 
intransigent, the selfish, the powerful and the uninterested' that such change is both 
necessary and desirable, remains to be answered in Giddens's social theory (1996: 202-
3). 
Assessment of Giddens's Contribution 
As a result of both his international fame and his centrality within British sociology, 
Giddens's adoption of environmental issues means that they will reach a much wider 
audience than would have otherwise been the case. Among his readers will be 
sociologists, politicians and ordinary citizens who remain unconvinced about the 
salience, and urgency of environmental issues, as well as those who, like Goldblatt, are 
already converted. It becomes all the more important, therefore, to assess the adequacy 
of his interpretation. 
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How is this to be connected to environmental sociology? It seems to have little 
to do with a New Ecological Paradigm in which humans are seen to be just one species 
among many others. This new paradigm suggests that our 'natural' environment has 
some intrinsic value independent of its use for or threats to humanity's well-being. 
While Giddens recognises the impact of the unintended consequences of human 
activity to the extent that they create high consequence risks for humanity as a whole, 
he has nothing to say about the value of natural environments either in relation to their 
intrinsic value, for their aesthetic qualities for humans, or their value for non-human 
animals and plants. In other words, his treatment of the problems of environmental 
degradation is limited to its status as a Durkheimian moral or 'social fact', rather than in 
relation to concrete physical and practical problems of the constraints on human action 
imposed by the finite nature of natural resources and our ultimate dependence on air, 
water, sunlight, plants and animals, not for personal autonomy, or self-development, 
but for survival itself.ll Giddens considers the impact of human activity on physical or 
organic nature only to the extent that its 'transformation' has led to its 'socialisation'. 
This means, he says, - though it is impossible to be sure exactly what he means by this-
that it is no longer possible to defend it in the 'natural way' (1994: 205). 
Likewise, he has little to say about (ecological) 'constraint', seeming always 
more interested in the way in which it is always tied to enablement (as the source of 
moral meaning). Yet, in spite of our technological prowess, such 'constraints' do exist 
in the natural environment. Even if only 'in the last resort', human life itself is 
dependent on the capacity of the earth to provide the means of its production, 
reproduction and maintenance. Giddens, then, cannot be justifiably said to have 
adopted the New Ecological Paradigm, since he has incorporated environmental issues 
within the bounds of what is implied by structuration theory - a theory that, in 
significant respects, remains tied to the early British sociological tradition established 
at LSE in the work ofL.T. Hobhouse. 
11 Mol and Spaargaren (1993) would no doubt label this statement 'eco-alarmism'. 
Nevertheless, it is true. 
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Conclusion. 
Sociology and the Issue of the Environment 
Inevitably, it is possible to read this account in a variety of ways. One might, for 
example, take the account of the early years of British Sociology, in Chapter Three, 
merely as an attempt to apply the approach to the history of sociology developed in 
Chapter One, discarding the project's overall emphasis on environment. Alternatively, 
taking Chapters Two, Three and part of Four together - the interpretation of Geddes' 
work and the account of his exclusion from academic sociology - it could be read as a 
plea for his re-instatement and recognition as both a founder of British sociology and 
as an environmental sociologist. Or, taking the second half of Chapter Four in 
conjunction with Chapter Five, it might be read as an attempt to establish Giddens's 
position within a distinctive tradition of sociological (or social) thought and as an 
'environmental' critique of that tradition. All of these ways of reading this account 
would be valid, to the extent that they bear some resemblance to 'authorial' intent. 
Taken as a whole, however, the project began as an attempt to investigate the 
question of why environmental issues were not central in sociology. What sort of 
answer, bearing in mind the necessary limitations in the scope of the research (as 
outlined in the introduction), does it provide? 
Using the early history of American sociology and Durkheim's sociological 
theory as examples, Chapter One argued that the neglect of the natural environment in 
sociology is the result neither of the 'exuberance' of early sociologists, nor of a failure 
on the part of the interpreters of the sociological classics to emphasise the 
'environmental' aspects of their work. Although each of these answers has some 
relevance, neither is altogether adequate. Instead, drawing primarily on Gouldner 
(1971), Shils (1971), Becker (1967), and Levine (1995), I argued that sociology's 
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history needs to be considered reflexively, in tenns of both the social, political, 
economic and emironmental background of the societies in which it has been 
embedded, and of the personal and professional lives of its practitioners. Moreover, 
drawing on Jlannigan's (1995) account of the exclusion of environment from sociology 
during its early history, the chapter suggested that contemporary sociologists with an 
interest in the neglect of 'environment' in the history of sociology need to look beyond 
the theories which ha\'e become 'institutionalised' as part of sociology's history as a 
result of their inclusion in textbooks and histories of sociology. For the 
environmentalist, Patrick Geddes, for example, sociology was inherently 
'environmental' in both a narrow and a broader sense. Yet neither Geddes nor his work 
appeared in Sorokin's (1928) COlltemporary Soci%gica/Theories. Consequently, he 
appeared in neither Timashetrs (1967 [1955)), nor Bierstedt's (1981), nor Hannigan's 
(1995), accounts of historical sociological theories. In this way, ideas that fail to 
become institutionalised through incorporation as part of the academic discipline called 
sociology may be lost. \\ith the result that its intellectual heritage is severely 
attenuated. 
Based on this strategy for the explanation of the neglect of environment in the 
history of sociology. Chapter Two briefly outlined the historical context in which 
British sociology developed. This context was one in which political stability was 
under threat (from both Right and Left) as a result of a number of factors, including 
the existence of an 'environmental' crisis, itself the result of haphazard and unregulated 
industrial de\'elopment. which was in tum partly responsible for the poor physical 
health and living conditions of the urban masses. These were the conditions in which, 
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Patrick Geddes developed his 
sociological ideas. Geddes defined 'environment' very broadly, to include the natural, 
as well as the built and the 'cultural' or social environment. He theorised that the 
natural en\ironment. in the first instance, largely 'determined' what sorts of economic 
activity and culture could develop in a given region. In turn, in the process of getting 
the material goods necessary for survival, people actively altered their environments, 
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and consequently themselves, their ideas and their social life. Social amelioration, 
therefore - which was to be the purpose of sociology - had to be grounded in a detailed 
concrete knowledge of the geology, resources, geography, history and culture of any 
given region. Geddes' work carried a normative orientation that was overtly 
environmentalist, which lay in his insistence that real wealth consisted of the total 
environmental conditions of social life, including clean air, water and food. These ideas 
inspired his friends, Victor Branford and James Martin White to begin the process of 
gaining recognition for sociology as an academic subject in its own right. A sociology 
in which the natural environment was central, therefore, had been in existence in 
Britain at around the turn of the century. The reason or reasons for its disappearance 
constitute one answer to the question of why environment is not central in 
contemporruy sociology. 
The environmental sociology of Patrick Geddes did not become established as 
part of the intellectual apparatus of academic sociology for a variety of reasons, not all 
of which were clearly understood at the time by the people involved in the 
establishment of sociology as an academic discipline. One of these reasons was the rise 
of Darwinian science. Others were the popular appeal of eugenics, a degree of political 
instability, Britain's declining industrial lead, environmental 'crisis', the poverty and ill-
health of the people, and the rise of a jealous nationalism. In combination, these factors 
had the potential to explode into an illiberal ideology based in 'scientific' theories of the 
genetic inheritance of superior or inferior 'national' characteristics. One implication of 
such theories was that the 'internal' environment of the 'germ plasm', rather than the 
'external' environment of the earth was the all-important factor in social evolution, 
development or amelioration. According to such theories, the improvement of the 
environment, social or natural, would be ineffectual as a means to social amelioration. 
Another implication (of Darwinian theory in particular), however, was that 'evolution' 
was a process which humanity could not control. This led some social theorists to 
counter this by over-emphasising human autonomy in respect of natural forces. Yet 
beyond these external reasons for the exclusion of environment, and inter-mingled with 
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them, there were others: the clash of two difficult personalities, academic jealousy, 
competition for the Martin White Chair, and social class differences. 
Tum of the century sociologists may not have been clear about exactly how 
they were to define their science, but they had clearly decided that sociology would be 
a science. Moreover, what a science needed, above all, was 'one great thinker' as the 
eugenist Pearson had put it, to unify under a single theoretical umbrella all the 
disparate areas of research that comprised the new subject. While aiming to ensure that 
their subject remained distinct from biology, sociology's practitioners would seek to 
emulate both Darwin's detailed research methods, and his theoretical achievement. 
This, as Branford pointed out, was what Durkheim appeared to be doing in France. 
Yet Durkheim, as a Frenchman, could not be the leader ofa British sociology. Nor, in 
the end, could Galton, in spite of the popularity of eugenics among certain sections of 
the population. In the first place, he was too old. Secondly, he was a man of private 
means, and well before the establishment of a Chair in sociology at LSE, he had 
endowed a Eugenics Records Office at the University of London. This left two 
candidates for the position of sociology's 'great man of science': Patrick Geddes and 
Leonard Hobhouse. Both believed that the route to social amelioration was through 
improvement of the environment. Each, though, defined environment to mean 
something different. For Hobhouse, environment was primarily 'social', while for 
Geddes it was nature and buildings, history and education, and even the 'internal' 
genetic environment of indi,iduals. This difference was not enough, on its own, to 
account for the ferocious nature of the dispute, and the finality of its conclusion. The 
theoretical perspectives of Hobhouse and Geddes were in many respects similar. Both 
believed that human beings were intrinsically social, and in the value of co-operation, 
other-directed behaviour and community, over atomistic self-interested competition. 
Yet, in the end, it came dO\\n to the question of determinism versus free-will. 
Hobhouse wanted to believe in human rationality and perfectibility, in humankind's 
ability to control the conditions of its own development. He could not concede a 
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position which, like Geddes', insisted that humanity was, at least in part, determined by 
something other than itself. 
In the atmosphere of the times, sociology could have either Hobhouse or 
Geddes for its 'great man of science'. It could not have both. This was not only the 
result of prevailing external conditions however, since, had they chosen to collaborate, 
they could undoubtedly have done so (although only one of them could be the leader 
of the British sociological community). In the final analysis, neither man could tolerate 
the other. 
Hobhouse began from a position of social and educational advantage. He spoke 
with the 'right' accent, adhered to (almost) the 'right' politics, mixed in the 'right' social 
circles, and had been educated at the 'right' place. Moreover, whether by accident or 
design, he had managed, by 1907, to manoeuvre himself into a central position with 
respect to the new subject of sociology. Geddes, by contrast, was a self-educated Scot 
with an acid tongue, who spumed the formal machinery of contemporary politics and 
had no good word for a system of education in which knowledge was over-specialised 
and compartmentalised. He began with all these disadvantages. He and Hobhouse may 
have fallen out over the issue of the Martin White Chair, but there is evidence to 
suggest both that the dispute began earlier than this, with Geddes' refusal to jettison 
Darwinian theory entirely, and that Hobhouse later made a deliberate attempt to 
exclude both Geddes and a Geddesian perspective from sociology. Both men were, in 
different ways, difficult personalities, and neither ever forgave the other. As a result, 
the two branches of sociology became irretrievably cut off from one another, and 
where one became institutionalised through its formal incorporation in the university 
system, the other perished in obscurity. 
Thus, the story of the establishment of academic sociology in Britain is 
simultaneously the story of Geddes' exclusion, and of the exclusion of all but the social 
or cultural 'environment' from a sociological perspective. 
Moreover, this exclusion had far-reaching consequences. A Hobhousian 
orientation - aided by economic depression, Ginsberg's personal allegiance to 
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Hobhouse, the LSE's exclusion of the eccentric Hogben, and Farquharson's disloyal 
behaviour, as well as by the Le Play Society's failure to fully comprehend the 
Geddesian system. - continued to dominate the subject until the 19505. The result was 
that sociology's personnel, during the expansion of the 1960s, were ill-equipped by 
their theoretical training to practice a discipline in which 'natural' as well as 'cultural' 
environments were central. Britain's central contemporary sociological theorist, 
Anthony Giddens, himself a student during the 19505, appears to have inherited a 
Hobhousian perspective. His theory, like Hobhouse's, awards causal primacy to the 
purposive, reflexive human agent. Thus, in spite of his readiness to take on board the 
issue of the contemporary environmental 'crisis', this can only be conceptualised as 
high-consequence manufactured 'risk', to which there are no structural solutions, but 
which must be dealt with through the development of appropriate life-values at the 
level of the individual (although such values may be encouraged formally by 
appropriate political or structural means). This position, which appears to make the 
solution to the contemporary environmental crisis a matter for informed individual 
choice, side-steps the linked issues of the finitude of natural resources and the problem 
of their pollution and over-consumption by both collectivities and individuals who 
already have access to greater authoritative and allocative resources. It is concerned 
largely with the impact of , manufactured' risks on individual and collective psychology, 
rather than with either the impact of agents on nature itself or with the unequal 
distribution of either finite natural resources or 'authoritative' resources as 
transformative capacity. The latter, though it is a question which is more 'traditionally' 
the province of sociology, remains as important a part of an environmental sociology 
as the former, since environmental sociology cannot confine itself to issues of 'natural' 
amelioration, while eschewing issues to do with social amelioration, without ceasing to 
be recognisable as sociology. 
Giddens's theory constitutes an inadequate response to the issue of the 
contemporary environmental crisis, and the reasons for this are connected with his 
embeddedness within a tradition of sociological theory established during the first 
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quarter of the twentieth century - a tradition in which the development of 'mind' was 
the central causal factor in social development. In view of his centrality, however, both 
academically and politically, this approach to environmental issues is likely to reach a 
wide public. It is an approach that is likely to appeal to many, particularly those who 
have greater access to allocative and authoritative resources, if only because it neither 
challenges their right to this access, nor threatens to take it away from them except 
through their own choice. It is an approach that does not challenge either our 
(dominant) political ideology, in which the concept of individual autonomy is 
dominant, or the more generalised (dominant) Western world view (in which humanity 
is autonomous with respect to an external nature) that the New Ecological Paradigm 
initially set itself against (see above, Chapter 1). Thus Giddens's position at the top ofa 
'hierarchy of credibility' is linked to the nature of his theoretical work. Given the self-
reinforcing nature of a dominant ideology or world view, which by virtue of its 
position at the apex of a hierarchy of credibility has not only more 'right to be heard', 
but, in consequence, more chance of remaining dominant, the prospects for the 
institutionalisation of a more radical and (possibly) more adequate environmental 
sociology - one which is concerned with the impact of human societies on 'nature' 
(whether this is seen to be 'socialised' or not) - currently seem rather slim. 
So far it is all negative. To conclude that environment has been excluded, 
historically. from British sociology, for reasons that have no necessary or intrinsic 
connection to the discipline itself; that Giddens's inadequate response to the issue of 
the contemporary environmental crisis is the result of his embeddedness within a 
tradition established by Hobhouse; - and that as a result of the existence of a self-
perpetuating hierarchy of credibility in (and outside) sociology, this situation is unlikely 
to change - is hardly uplifting. A project that began from the researcher's profound 
disillusionment with the discipline of sociology - and which has insisted on the 
connection between everyday life and professional practice of sociologists - needs 
something more positive, if is not to end with that researcher walking away into an 
Autumn sunset vowing to abandon sociology forever. 
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Gouldner's (1971) suggestion that sociologists need to become more 'reflexive' 
- so long as reflexivity is understood to mean more than simply institutional reflexivity 
and goes beyond the 'internally referential' - remains valuable. Reflexivity, both as self-
awareness and as awareness of sociology's historical embeddedness, are useful 
sociological tools. The recognition that sociology's institutional forms are no more 
value-free than its practitioners, if it leads to the rediscovery of 'neglected' examples of 
early environmental sociology (i.e., Mukerjee, Geddes), is not only enlightening on a 
personal level, but may yet help to bring about the re-definition of sociology that the 
New Ecological Paradigm has so far failed to achieve. Such a re-definition need not be 
total, nor based on environmentalist convictions. An en masse conversion to the 
environmentalist cause, is not only unlikely, but would be unhealthy for a discipline 
which thrives on debate and opposition. Perhaps all that is necessary is that 
contemporary sociologists should recognise that far from the natural external 
'environment' having been, historically and 'traditionally', outside the purview of a 
discipline that purports to examine the 'social', its absence has been due rather to non-
disciplinary factors than to anything inherent in the nature of the discipline itself Thus, 
the study of the relations between human societies and the external 'natural' 
environments, on which they necessarily depend for survival itself, may come to be 
understood as an inherent and fundamental part of what its means to 'do' sociology. It 
is even possible, in spite of the obvious and substantial differences of both a 
quantitative and qualitative nature between earlier environmental 'crises' and the 
contemporary one, that early examples of environmental sociology have something to 
add to contemporary debates. 
Is this the case with the environmental sociology of Patrick Geddes? The 
answer is yes - but it is a qualified yes. Geddes has much to offer in respect of a 
contemporary environmental sociology, but in the last analysis - and somewhat 
ironically in the context of this project - his theory of society-nature relations remains 
as inadequate as, and in a similar way to, that of Giddens. 
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Geddes began from the assumption that human societies were an intrinsic part 
of their external environments. Simply in order to survive, social beings must 
necessarily take up matter and energy from their surrounding environment. What sorts 
of matter and energy were available in any given territory would have some significant 
bearing on what sorts of cultural life could develop. This, then, was an environmentally 
determinist theory. But it was not wholly so. Geddes, who like Hobhouse was 
committed to the notion of social evolution, believed that human beings were not 
merely determined by the surroundings, but interacted with them creatively. Human 
societies actively produced their own environments, and in doing so altered the 
consciousness (beliefs, ideas and values) of their individual members. This, we should 
note, has much in common with Giddens's insistence on the altered consciousness (as 
risk-anxiety) produced in individual agents by 'environments' of high-consequence 
manufactured risk. For Giddens, risk anxiety leads agents to re-connect with a number 
of basic moral or existential questions, leading to 'appropriate' life-political choices. A 
major difficulty with this position is that it does not adequately address the issue of the 
unequal distribution of allocative and authoritative resources as power. Yet In 
contemporary capitalist societies there are wide disparities in the degree of 
transformative capacity (as the power to make a difference), between individuals and 
collective agents, and both within nations and between them. Put bluntly, the capacity 
to make a difference to environments of all sorts is much greater for some than for 
others. 
Geddes fares no better in this respect. For although his theory insists that 'good' 
environments can be actively created, and is superior to the extent that he attempted to 
outline (and through his practice to bring into being) the sorts of total environmental 
conditions of living that would create 'real wealth', personal fulfilment and community 
life, without also producing foul air, poisoned food and dirty water, he produced no 
realistic political theory for their widespread achievement. tn spite of his regionalism, 
through which he insisted that different regions required different solutions, and his 
insistence on the importance of the conservation of resources Geddes' vision remained , 
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a Utopian dream. Through his avoidance of formal institutional political means to the 
achievement of social amelioration, as well as through his personal practice, Geddes' 
message seemed to be 'do it yourself. And while this message was not then, and is not 
now, without value, it succeeds no more successfully than Giddens's theory at 
addressing structural issues to do with inequality of access to resources, or the unequal 
capacity to pollute and consume them. 
In spite of this and other failings, however, and in spite of the voluminous 
thickets of mangled prose he created in attempting to transmit his vision of the good 
society, Geddes' work contains much that is useful. His emphasis on the value of 
emotion in everyday life, and his simple psychology, in which different environments 
created different thought-worlds based on our senses, experiences, and feelings, may 
have none of the sophistication of Giddens's much more complex contemporary 
constructions. Yet they serve to remind us, as sociologists, of some things that require 
no theory of the unconscious or unacknowledged conditions of action in order to be 
explicable. These are things we acknowledge, explicitly, each time we are moved by a 
dramatic or beautiful view; when we say that our job (or the weather) is getting us 
down, or that we are pleased to be home. These things are the power of place, natural 
or built; the importance of useful and satisfying employment; and our emotional 
attachment to people. Giddens would not, I am certain, disagree. Geddes' attempt, as 
early as 1881, to draw up a programme (see again, figure 1), for the achievement and 
distribution of 'real wealth', was admittedly over-ambitious. He had no theoretical 
answer to the issue of unequal power. Yet the refusal to separate humanity from 
nature; the insistence on the conservation of resources; on the power of people to 
creatively alter environments, and of environments to alter our consciousness; as well 
as the idea that real wealth consists in the totality of natural, architectural and cultural 
conditions, rather than in ever increasing consumption of transient ultimate products, 
make Geddesian sociological ideas - at the very least - well worth further investigation. 
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Figure 3: Patrick Geddes Diagram of 'The Theory of Civics' or 'The Mapping of Life': 
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Geddes' 36 square diagram went through several permutations over tim~. This version, though slightly simplifed, gives some idea of the difficulties 
he created for the understanding of his work by insisting on using this method of presentation. Geddes' references to the nine Greek muses to 
represent the political sphere (nine squares at top right) have been omitted. I have also altered what was perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of 
the table - an attempt to represent the (idealised) movement of historical time, and the (ideal) influence of place-work-folk on politics - which 
appeared in some versions as a swastika. I have made it instead a circular line, with arrows to indicate directionality. 
The nine squares at top left of the diagram, when isolated from the others, show Geddes' most famous thinking machine. 
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)IEPL\TE l'AUTITlUX TO CLASS II. 
I 
rJ,TDUTE P.\I:TITIOX TO CLASS IT. 
, --, 
-
r~E IlY CLASS II. 
J:]):;rLT-CL.\SS II. 
I 
Figure 1: reproduced from Geddes (1881) 'The Classification of Statistics 
:Iud its Results' 
TETIlUTORY OF SOCIETY.-lII. DECREASE. 
BY SOCIAL AGE:;CY. BY GEOLOGIC AGEl\CY. 
LAS\). 
\V.\TEl:. 
rroductio:l. III. LOSS. PIt!1l1nture Di3.C;il'ation of Energy :tntl Disintegration of M:tttcl'. 
AgPIIl'Y. In Haw Inl El}lloit.'\- In III In In \11til\l~te III RCllletli.lt lIatcl'ials. t:on. )Inn"l'actl1rt.'. 1.·rall"I'~1 t. E\I·ha11ge. Plollnctl. Enolt. 






















OIW.\XI:'mi-i COJll'OSIXG SOCIETY.-IIL DECHEASE. 
ElIIC,H.\:'\TS. DE.J.THS. 
OCCl'l'.\ TroXS Ill. 
t:" ~"'ll l'l.un:u. lJIq,.\BU·O. Ih.o,THll Tin:. HI )1 HH.U. ()t' 
\'()I1th, lIb:\.l \ l'utnre. net'u ... al. )i"!l:ihC. J>t:fel'l. . \~l' War. ('rilllt'. Di ... bll·r. Di .. al)lcll,clIt . De .. trnl'tiOl'. 
I 
)IEDlATE 1'.\RTlTIOX TO CLASS 1Il. 
ULTDIATE P.\HTITlOX To CL.\SS ITI. 
eSE IlY CLASS III. 
. 
HESULT-CL.\SS III . 
